ACTA UNIVERSITATIS UPSALIENSIS

Studia Sociologica Upsaliensia

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PER SÄFHOLM

THE RIVER-LAKE NILOTES

Politics of an African tribal group

1974

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1.1 Introduction

The purpose of this work is to give a comparative analysis of the traditional political systems of the River-lake Nilotes in Africa up to the end of the colonial era. (1) At the same time we aim at reinterpreting earlier writings on the Nilotes in the light of new theoretical approach. The work is based on literary sources which contain references to the political systems. It must be stressed that what are considered here are the traditional systems of these societies, so far as they can be reconstructed. The present situation in all of them is of course something entirely different. (2)

The development of a science of comparative politics depends initially upon the accurate description and classification of political processes in different societies. Much of the significant work in the last decades has contributed to the development of the concepts and techniques to make sucha description possible. There are several models at our disposal, but we have no general theory, no broad-gauge model in terms of which different studies can be systematically compared and contrasted. Thus, we must make a choice between the more or less imperfect means which are available, but because of their shortcomings it would be absurd to confine ourselves to one of them. A certain degree of eclecticism is even to be desired. Yet, it is appropriate to warn against the risk connected with all such courses of action, namely that conceptions which are wrenched off from their original theoretical contexts can be exposed to a fatal change of meaning which can result in a seeming clarity. Our model aims at organizing the maximum quantity of political data; and to reflect and clarify important relationships existing within political behaviour as a whole, where it occurs in the context of a political system.

For a long time the study of comparative politics seemed unable to cater for systems and structures which developed outside constitutional arrangements. (3) Nevertheless, in 1940 a collection of studies was published by two anthropologists, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, called "African Political Systems". (4) They tried to set about the problem from a more "primitive" point of departure. Their results, of course, depended on what a political system was taken to be. Following the classical liberal political theory the authors said that the political system of any society was concerned with the maintenance of basic order in a society and the defence of the nation. They clearly worked with too narrow a definition. It was increasingly obvious that the study of politics must be a broader analysis of all the structures and processes involved in politics and policy making.

Considerable progress has been made since the 1950's, however, essentially as a result of the works of Easton and Almond. (5) In an article in 1957 Easton suggested that a solution to the problem of comparing governments could be found by examining political life in terms of a system receiving certain inputs from the society and converting them into outputs affecting that

society. (6) It could be noted that all governments processed inputs and transformed them into outputs: general comparisons could therefore be made. They would amount to a detailed examination of the content of both sides of the operation. But Easton's original presentation was broad and could not be directly applied. Indeed, even in his more recent works Easton remains on a general plane and a concrete implementation of his model cannot be envisaged. (7) But a new direction had been given to comparative analyses: political scientists were encouraged to examine the content and characteristics of the demands and supports which constituted the inputs and to look at the outputs in terms of the process of decision-making which can be found in all political systems.

Greater precision was to be brought to the model by Almond. (8) Taking Easton's systems analysis as a starting point, his approach was in addition based on the theoretical sociological analyses of Parsons and on decision-making analyses due to Lasswell. (9) Almond looked for the functions which could be included among the inputs and the outputs of all political systems. Having looked at the conversion process which takes place within the political system, he showed that six such functions could be isolated. Almond also showed that, apart from converting inputs into outputs, the system had also to be defined in terms of its ability to maintain and adapt itself (through a process of political socialization) and in terms of the character of its achievements (capability).

Though this is not the place to review their theories at great length, a brief review is not out of place, since their attempts are of immediate relevance to our study. But first we move to some concepts which constitute the chief conceptual foci of systemic approach.

1.2 System concepts

Since function and system are concepts not essentially particular to political science, some characteristics of the model can be sketched in very general terms; thereafter these general concepts may be applied to politics. (10)

A system is at the centre of flows. Inputs flow into it and outputs flow out of it; functions convert inputs into outputs. Fundamental to the idea of system is the idea of interdependence. (11) This simply means that the components of the system are highly related, in the sense that when the properties of one component (or function) change all the other components, and the system as a whole, are affected.

Systems must logically operate at three conceptually distinct levels. On the first level, a system must maintain its fabric in existence. This is the level of system-maintenance. Secondly, a system responds to the inputs coming into it: these are converted into outputs. Operations of this sort are termed the conversion functions of the system. And, on the third level, sometimes called the system's capabilities, are its relations with the external environment.

In this way we can sketch the broad characteristics of system and function as general concepts. They could be applied in a variety of situations. Our next task, then, is to apply these concepts to the socio-political situation.

The term role refers to situations in which interactions between individuals repeat themselves in a regular way over a period of time. Accordingly, we refer, e.g., to the role of a chief. Notice particularly that the concept of a person and the concept of role are very different things, even though both are conceptualizations based on a common body of behavioural data. Actually,

the two concepts cut across one another. A person occupies many different roles; and a role cannot refer to the complete person, but only to selected aspects of his behaviour - in our case the political aspects. The two concepts, in short, are different ways of organizing our thinking about human behaviour. (12)

Continuing the progression from behavioural data to role interaction, we move to the concept of social structure, which can be defined as identifiable patterns of roles that are organized primarily around the fulfilment of some social function or activity. An even more abstract concept is social system, which refers to a set of patterned relations among structural elements so that changes in one element set up pressures for adjustment or other types of change in remaining units. The structure is, therefore, primarily something momentary contrary to the system as such, which can persist in spite of - or at times just because of - structural changes.

A society can be more or less structurally differentiated, i.e. characterized by more or less comprehensive systems of roles. A structure may be formalized, implying that there are explicite rules for the roles being integral parts of the behavioural pattern. The analysis of these structures is, i.a., aimed at discovering which forms of activity they carry on, i.e., of which analytical structures they act as component parts. The functions of a structure in a particular political system are of crucial importance for the characterization of it.

1.3 The political system

As said above, we shall here attempt to delineate a model of the political system based on ideas developed by Easton and Almond. If one decides to develop a systems model of an aspect of social life one's first step must clearly be to draw a boundary round the type of events to which one wishes to apply the model. Our first need, then, is to define what the political system is about, and what it is that distinguishes it from other systems.

The definition used by Almond centres on the notion of legitimate force. (13) In other words, the processes of politics, the decisions made, unmade, or not made, are in some way concerned with the threat of the actual use of force; and this situation is acceptable to the bulk of the population affected. Easton, on the other hand, avoids direct reference to the use of force when he writes of political relations as being concerned with "the authoritative allocation of values for a society". (14) "Authoritative" in this context means that people concerned with, or affected by, decisions or "allocations" which are authoritative regard themselves to be bound thereby. (15) In other words, such allocations are legitimate, rather in the Almond sense, though without such a strong element of force being indicated in the definition. With respect to our purpose Easton's approach is more appropriate, and therefore we follow him. (16) In situations where the coercion in such processes is not regarded as legitimate, then we are confronted not with one political system, but with a political system which has broken up or is breaking up.

1.4 System maintenance and adaptation functions

Functionalism analyses what people do and what determines the nature of their doings. These conditioning elements include what other people do and a general conception of what they expect one another to do. Expectations are a major determinant of social action, and expectations include all sorts of

norms about proper conduct. In other words, the political system exists in a political culture, and the political culture includes all sorts of common habits, norms, and beliefs. (17) Culture, in this sense, is manifested in all political behaviour but it is not the behaviour itself, nor is it the observable result of such behaviour. Political culture is a set of more or less common orientations towards political activity.

Political socialization or politicization is the process by which political culture is maintained and changed. (18) Through the performance of this function the individuals are inducted into the political culture; their attitudes to political objects are formed. Political socialization may take the form of either manifest or latent transmission. It is manifest when it involves explicit communication of information, values or feelings toward political objects. Latent political socialization is the transmission of non-political attitudes which affect attitudes toward analogous roles and objects in the political system. Among the many important latent influences, perhaps the most distinctive is the shaping of attitudes toward authority.

We use the term political recruitment to refer to the function, by means of which the roles of political systems are filled. (19) Recruitment into political roles may be based on achievement criteria on the one hand, or ascription criteria on the other. The societies vary considerably with regard to the degree to which the roles are a consequence of the position ascribed at birth. The basis of this ascriptive role distribution can be kinship, age, sex, race, ethnic group or geographical abode. To the extent that these criteria make up the basis of admission to the roles, the society emphasizes ascription. To the extent that the admission is independent of these ascriptive roles and instead depends upon a certain behaviour on the part of the individual, the society emphasizes achievement. The ascription-achievement dimension is one of the most important determinants of the form of social mobility in a society. If the ascriptive roles are firmly institutionalized, the mobility has the tendency to be collective. If the aspect of achievement is firmly institutionalized, the mobility has the tendency to be individual.

Even though it is, as a rule, a fact that traditional political systems tend to recruit to political roles on the basis of ascriptive criteria, it is probably never the case that a political system recruits solely on the basis of such criteria. In most political systems ability and efficiency are always taken into consideration in recruiting to positions.

1.5 Inputs and outputs

The structures and culture of a political system are affected by pressures from the environment or by pressures from within the system. Above we have drawn a boundary round the concept of political system. What lies outside the boundary of the system is its environment, and this environment can be further distinguished as partly intra-societal and partly extra-societal. The environments must not be conceived of as an undifferentiated mass. The political system is an aspect of the society with a distinctive structure. It is the same thing with the other societal aspects which correspond to systems which have their characteristical structures. Making no claim to give an exhaustive list, Easton enumerates the cultural, social structural, economic. and demographic systems, which all are social systems like the political system. (20) To these are added the collateral ecological and biological systems and the personality systems which the society contains and in correspondence to which it develops. The ecological system

encompasses the physical environment and the nonhuman organic conditions of human existence. The biological system is the hereditary human properties. Even other societies together with their political systems belong to the environment as well as the international political system or systems including the individual societies and their political systems.

These factors constitute inputs into the political system. Depending on the content of the decisions of the system, there might be changes in the environment, which again will affect the political system. This is the feedback effect. This is, in short, the core of the input-output theory, as presented by Easton in conjuction with his general systems theory.

Our next step is to delineate the nature of inputs from the environment. In the model it is clear that our attention must be directed at demand inputs, for these are the basic raw materials which the system processes. A politically relevant demand may be defined as an "expression of opinion that an authoritative allocation with regard to a particular subject matter should or should not be made by those responsible for doing so". (21) Demands are therefore intended for those occupying authoritative roles: if it is felt that the authorities will be entirely unresponsive, particular demands may be subsumed under a general demand for the replacement of the authorities. Demands are political: they require authoritative satisfaction. Easton distinguishes between on one hand demands and on the other a series of phenomena which, indeed, are connected - but not identical - with demands: expectations, public opinion, motivations, ideology, interests, and preferences. (22) These phenomena are grouped together by Easton as "wants".

At least four sorts of demand inputs are distinguishable. First, there may be demands for goods and services. Second, there may be demands for regulation of behaviour. Third, there may be demands for participation in the political system. Fourth, there may be demands for symbols.

Demands may also be distinguished with respect to various criteria. They may be expressed, e.g. clearly enunciated orally or in writing, or implied in actions. They may be specific and concrete or vague and abstract. And, finally, they may be justified by self-interest or by an idea of public weal. Demands are not necessarily selfish, in the sense of being aimed at bringing material satisfaction to those expressing them. Demands for war, welfare services, and so on, may impose burdens, of one kind or another, on those making them.

Demands perform two very broad functions. First, as said before, they are the stimulus which produces authoritative decisions. Second, demands form a bridge between the political system and its environment, both intra-societal and extra-societal. So demands have what has been called a "boundary exchange function". They channel, or begin to channel, influences from the environment. And they are the vehicle of feedback responses to the outputs of the system as a whole.

Demands are, however, not enough to keep the system operating. They are only the raw material out of which the finished products are made. Therefore, the system needs energy which can be used in the process of converting inputs into outputs; it needs support. (23)

Support, which may be relatively active or relatively passive, takes a number of forms: payment of tribute, participation in the processes of system such as voting, obedience to the allocations or decisions made by the authorities, and deference to the people who make these decisions. Support may exhibit different degrees of intensity. Without sharp limits, its minimum

degrees turn into depreciation, which may be graded, principally, in the same way, with an expressed hostility as the final outcome. Thus, the concept is used as a collective designation of a form of interaction between a system and its environment, parallel with the concept demand.

One may also speak about overt support in the form of actions and covert support in the form of sentiments or attitudes. The first one is externally observable, while the other is a form of internal behaviour. There is necessarily no consistency between them. Overt support may be a result of force or of fear of force. Covert support, on the other hand, may not immediately be attained by force. The overt support is momentarily important, while the covert support has a potential character. Support may be direct or indirect. In the former case it is a question of a relation between the system and individual members, in the latter case of mediation, e.g. within a feudal system or through an interest group. Finally, Easton also distinguishes between specific and diffuse support. Specific support is a result of the fact that the demands made have been fulfilled, while the diffuse support, at short sight, is independent of gratifying the demands.

Further Easton distinguishes three objects of supporting attitudes and actions. (24) The first of these objects is the political community. This is support for a conception of political togetherness, a conception of everyone being involved in political action. This object does not necessarily imply anything about specific governmental and constitutional arrangements.

The second of the Easton objects of support is the regime. The regime comprises a set of values which determine the generally accepted bounds of the policy objectives pursued in the system. It comprises as well a set of norms, habits of behaviour, which set the style of day-to-day procedure. And thirdly, it comprises a constitutional arrangement of authoritative roles, among which power is distributed. Some organization of authoritative roles, some degree of constitutional order is necessary in every regime. There has to be some fairly regular way of dealing with demands. There has also to be some way of indicating that a decision has been taken, that the authorities are committed to it. And there has to be some way of arranging for the execution of decisions. The regime is made up of more or less formal arrangements whereby political decisions are made. It includes, usually, an executive, a bureaucracy, a legislature, and so on: such formal structures constitute the regime. It is possible for support for a particular political community to be heigthened while support for the particular regime falls.

The third object is the authorities: these are the actual role-players in authoritative positions whose rules and decisions are obeyed so long as they do not attempt to overstep the general conception of the limits of their roles. Therefore, a member can be opponent to the authorities without a desire to modify the regime.

The model, which is our frame of reference, does not necessarily imply the existence of institutions with the power of command: it merely implies the production, by one means or another, of authoritative allocations. There is no assumption that these allocations are produced by institutions in the traditional sense. For instance, there is no reason why one should not regard the complex of relations between groups in "acephalous" segmentary systems as a conceptual political system. The acephalous political system certainly produces authoritative allocations, sometimes made authoritative by the use of force or by the threat of the use of force. Often decisions are made simply because the interests of the groups concerned happen to coincide on a parti-

cular question: decisions of this sort are the outcome of the coincidence of interests and not the outcome of some commanding institution. A model such as the present one can encompass both situations: whether authoritative allocations are obeyed because they are produced by legitimate institutions, or whether they are obeyed from expediency, fear, habit, defeat, or the lack of alternative, is essentially immaterial to the broad concept of political system.

Having made this general point it is now appropriate to contemplate the particular question of l e g i t i m a c y and legitimate institutions from a functional standpoint. Why do the members of a society largely observe the decisions of these occupying authoritative roles? It is clearly the case that no authoritative institutions could easily exist for long without at least the tacit consent of those affected. Given that consent is necessary to the lengthy maintenance of authoritative institutions - why is it given, and why is it, at times, withdrawn?

The first task is to locate something equivalent to legitimacy in the model. Support input is clearly the most appropriate concept to examine. Let us assume that in any system political cleavage exists, and that such cleavage is a threat to the existence of the system, and that consequently the system must have mechanisms to reduce the effects of cleavage. Three such mechanisms can be distinguished: first, the mechanism of direct action on social structure (for example, the cultivation of a sense of cooperation); second, the mechanism of building up specific support for the regime and the community through the outputs of the system (the assumption being that the satisfaction of demands stimulates support for the structures satisfying those demands); third, the mechanism whereby diffuse support is built up against times of stress - the mechanism whereby the system accumulates "a reservoir of support upon which a system may draw credit in times when things are going badly from the point of view of providing satisfaction for the members of the system". (25) The legitimacy of institutions clearly varies: it is therefore not inappropriate to add that legitimacy must be partly related to rewards. It is enough to touch upon the correlation between the legitimacy of the political system and its actual capacity or "efficiency". It is clear, that the conception of the members of the legitimacy of a political regime cannot remain impassive to what degree it can successfully manage important social functions. To a degree, at least, people must be inclined to consent to a system according to what they get, or fail to get, out of it. So legitimacy and the cultivation of legitimacy must be related primarily, though not exclusively, to the concept of diffuse support. Where there is a high level of diffuse support, attention to specific support, through the satisfaction of demands, may be neglected for fairly lengthy periods without catastrophic consequence for the system as a whole.

The sources of legitimacy are threefold: here we mention Easton's classification, which clearly owes much to Weber. (26) First, it may emerge from a general addiction to an ideology. Second, it may develop from an attachment to the structure and customs of the regime. And attachment of this kind entails diffuse support for a regime and for those fulfilling, but not overstepping, the roles of the regime. Third, it may take the form of a devotion to personal authorities (to an aristocracy or to an outstanding personality) and some of this devotion will run over to the roles filled by these authorities.

In response to stress, diffuse support may be stimulated by changes of ideology; by adaptation of the personal activities of the authorities; and by changes in the structure of the regime. In these categories legitimacy in the

shape of diffuse support may be acted on. Similarly, high legitimacy attaching to authorities may compensate for low legitimacy attaching to a regime, and vice versa.

As a rule a regime can acquire legitimacy itself only over a period of time. It can be reasonably held that the regime may be legitimate in the early years because it is associated with an ideology, and because it is associated with a number of very outstanding personalities. In the early years it is able to operate because of these two factors, and because certain norms, or habits of appropriate behaviour, are already largely accepted. In due course of time it develops a strong legitimacy of its own and is able to survive severe stresses and the not infrequent role-occupancy of distinguished personalities.

But diffuse support also attaches to the political community. Where support for a community collapses it is difficult to restore by deliberate means, so as to preserve the system in being as a whole. Where, e.g., a group decides that they constitute an entirely distinct political community, they could either be directly suppressed, or they could be granted full independence. In the latter case the political community would not have been preserved; and in the former case it would have been preserved in an entirely different form. However, this is an extreme case: incipient alienation may be acted upon structurally, through changes in the regime, and through changes in the authorities.

Finally, we turn to the output side of the political system. Outputs are the collective designation of the products of the political system, the outgoing transactions with its environment. The outputs of a political system vary, but often they tend to correspond to the type of supports mobilized. To what extent tney correspond to demands, and how they do it, however, depends upon the character of the political system. (27) Four kinds of outputs can be quickly indicated: extractive, regulative, allocative, and symbolic output. The system must also have a capacity, which may be great or small, to gather and absorb information (or feedback) about the response to the outputs. (See further below ch. 1.7)

1.6 Functions of political systems

We have established that the political system converts inputs into outputs. An essential part of the new theory is functionalism, as elaborated most explicitly by Almond. According to the functional approach, political systems are analysed and compared with regard to their performance of certain functions postulated as common - logically if not empirically - to all viable political systems. (28) The number and nomenclature of these functions varies according to the particular analyst. This variability is - as Hydén rightly points out - "both to be expected and desired in view of the fact that conceptual schemes are neither right or wrong, only more or less useful for describing and analysing a particular phenomenon". (29)

Almond distinguishes six conversion functions. (30) Demands entering the system are formulated (interest articulation). Second, formulated demands are coordinated into policy proposals of greater or lesser breadth (interest aggregation). Third, policy proposals are selectively converted into authoritative rules (rule-making or decision making). Fourth, these rules are applied in a variety of concrete situations (rule application or implementation of decisions). Fifth, adjudications on points at question are made in individual cases on the basis of these rules (rule adjudication or judicial interpre-

tation of decisions). And, sixth, information about all these activities must be transmitted between the parts of the system and between the system and its environment, so that a certain measure of coherence may be maintained (communication).

As is becoming increasingly clear, there is not a simple identity of political structure and political function in any political system; the political functions are not each linked inextricably with particular structures. Almond maintains that when one takes a functional viewpoint one becomes concerned with analytic concepts which need not correspond to specific structures involved in political actuality. One thinks of functions in relation to systems. (31) Any particular structure may perform more than one function. Political structures, in short, tend to be multifunctional, although the degrees of multifunctionality depends on many factors. Different political systems can, again, execute these functions by means of different structures, but in each system the functions are performed in some way.

In examining the performance of any political function by a political structure, Almond maintains that there are at least two important respects in which the structures of political systems may differ. (32) First the degree to which there is differentiation or specialization of political roles, structures, and subsystems; and, second the autonomy or subordination of these roles, structures, or subsystems to each other.

In the model the first conversion function is distinguished as the articulation of demands, the second as the aggregation of demands. Demands are regulated by the system. Typically demands are processed in three stages: first, there is the conversion from wants into demands; second, there is the reduction and combination of demands into comprehensible form; and, third, there is the conversion of demands into distinct and coherent issues from which a selection is made to produce authoritative outputs. Individuals and structures stand at each of these three processing points. These points Easton calls gateways and the individuals and structures controlling them he calls gatekeepers. (33) Again it must be stressed that these are analytic concepts which do not refer to specific structures. Where the system is not a structurally well differentiated one, where there are few distinctly political roles, conversion takes place through individuals and through the full range of social structures - tribes, clans, villages, and so on. In this undifferentiated situation gatekeepers tend to take the shape of values, or taboos, rather than structures. Structural and individual gatekeepers, whatever the broad nature of the political system, operate in a cultural context, and this influences their activities, the demands they convert and the demands they do not convert. Such cultural restrictions play a major part in the regulation of demand inputs - stifling some, allowing others full expression, restricting other to non-political areas of social life. Most systems exercise cultural limits on what is properly political.

To combine interests in a society which are to be converted into outputs is a function which each political system contains, but, again, fulfils in different ways and through different structures. The concept aggregation may not be interpreted in such a way that all or even some political systems aggregate the interests of all its members and aggregate them equivalently. Whose interests are aggregated and what weight the interests of different members have at this aggregation, are dependent upon the structure of the political system, and its structure is connected with the environment of the political system, i.a. with the structures of the social and economic systems.

The outputs of the system may be said to be composed of three parts or functions: rule-making, rule application, and rule adjudication. Articulated demands are addressed to that part of the system which produces authoritative outputs, viz. the political decision makers. There are, thus, in each system channels of communication through which the demands flow; these channels may be many or few, specialized or unspecialized. The performance of authority to allocate values is the output of the political system in relation to the environment, i.e. in relation to other intra-societal and extra-societal systems. As we mentioned above, Easton characterizes the role of the political system in a society as performance of authority (arriving at binding decisions) to allocate that to which men attach value ("authoritative allocations of values"). "Allocation" does not only mean direct distribution of, e.g., economic utilities. All political systems do not allocate values in this direct sense. Even other things than economic utilities belong to the category of values. A more universal category is meant when the authorities in a political system sanction, e.g., rules of inheritance. Another important group of values is power and influence. When an appointment to an administrative position is made, there is again the question of a performance of authority to allocate values.

If human beings are to live in close proximity to one another, certain rules imposing obligations and limiting conflict are inevitably needed. In traditional societies such rules are given by custom or adaptation. Basic for the existence of each society is what may be called a "constitution", if it has meaning in a system: a set of primary rules for the societal structures and for the distribution of the work among the authorities. Thus, certain roles have the responsibility for maintaining the tribal traditions and seeing that they are passed from generation to generation. Or, the existence of a set of rules designating certain structures as having authority to initiate, to discover, to apply, or to judge the violation of the norms of the society characterizes all political systems. And although the authority to initiate rules on a regular basis may be late in developing, it is typical of human societies that institutionalized ways of resolving disputes, such as the feud and the duel, appear very early in history. They are recurring social processes with well-understood rules and modes of enforcement. As such, they constitute the most primitive political structures, undifferentiated, diffuse, and intermittent, but yet invoking the ultimate sanctions of the society. The constitution of a society also states the foundation of the legitimacy upon which its activity depends.

In many political systems the r u l e - m a k i n g function is a diffuse process, difficult to untangle and specify. If we look at traditional political systems, we can distinguish rule-enforcement and rule-adjudication processes from other social interactions, even in the very simplest ones. It is more difficult to explicate the processes which formulate the general political rules themselves. Over time a series of adjudications of rules and practice would result in substitution of the practice for the original rule. Rule-making and rule adjudication coalesce to such a degree that the rules are mainly modified by interpretation from case to case and only as an exception by formal rule-making. As Almond maintains, it is the nature of traditionalism to resist the very idea of rule-making, since this grants legitimacy to the "changing of the rules". (34) As a consequence, one of the most important mechanisms of change in political structure and in public policy in traditional systems is the charismatic mechanism. Thus charismatic process, a pro-

phetic representation of the will of the deity, or of a magical communication with supernatural powers, or a slow, incremental process of the accumulation of tradition, which is in part derivative of the day-to-day rule enforcements and rule adjudications of the systems. It is possible for us to distinguish the rule-making function in such political systems and to describe the kinds of structures which engage in it. The problem of identifying the rule-making structures in political systems is one of specifying the whole set of agencies and institutions involved in the process, determining the kind of things they do, the way they do them, and how they interact to produce general rules.

The political administration is the only structure which has a near monopoly of a crucial political function, that of rule-application or enforcement. It guards the "output gate" of the political system. Political administrators dominate the output end of the political conversion process; they are indispensable in the rule-making and adjudication processes as well as in the political processes of interest articulation, aggregation, and communication. Thus, political authorities may be viewed as initiators of policy which may only be enforced by administrators or structures charged with rule application beneath the decision makers, serving their information and resource needs as well as implementing their decisions on a regularized day-to-day basis. The simpler types of political systems are characterized by an almost total lack of officialdom. But there may be part-time roles operating within face-to-face groups. We can, of course, view the varieties of self-help such as seizing stolen property, dueling, and feuding as examples of part-time, occasional, or intermittent administrative roles.

The customary rules or legal norms of the political system impose authoritative restraints or obligations on individuals. At some point it must be decided whether or not a rule has actually been violated and to what degree, with appropriate sanctions provided by the rules. The performance of the rule-adjudication functions involves this process of making the authoritative decision as to whether or not a rule has been transgressed in a given case. As such, it almost invariably involves the resolution of conflict. As Easton points out, the adjudication process accepts a certain set of settled or presumed rules and applies these to conflict situations in the society. (35) Resort to these processes implies a willingness to abide by the decision.

1.7 The capabilities of political systems

Effective or adequate performance of the foregoing functions is assumed to be an essential characteristic of all stable, established political systems, or at least the minimal requisite for their continued existence as systems. In addition to these analytical categories centred upon the concept "function", there is another set of categories particularly useful for the analysis of the process of formation of political systems which are based upon the concept capability. Capability as used in this work should be viewed as a quality of the system as a unit in its relation to the society and the international environment. (36) We have to look at political systems, then, not only in terms of their domestic performance, but also in terms of their international capabilities. We can use the same categories of capability to analyse the international behaviour of political systems.

It is assumed not only that all established political systems have developed the structures and are supported by a political culture to ensure adequate functional performance, but also, and consequentially, that they have acqui-

red a capability to solve certain needs or problems generic to all political systems, namely: the problems of identity, legitimacy, penetration, distribution, and participation. Every well-established political system has in the course of its own development generated capabilities - and the structural means for maintaining these capabilities - to cope with these systemic problems. In the subsequent analysis, the concepts set fourth in the following will be employed: assimilative, regulative, extractive, distributive, and responsive capability. These concepts are drawn from Almond, but with some adaptations as suggested by Hydén and more useful for the purpose of our study. (37)

One of the most crucial tasks for a society is to create - and maintain - a societal identity. The assimilative capability refers to the capacity of a society to create a political community, or a group of persons who have agreed to a division of labour for the settlement of their political problems. A sense of political community, of loyalty or commitment, means that the members are of the opinion that they want to constitute a political system, irrespective of its character. (38) It also refers to the process whereby people transfer their commitment and loyalty from smaller tribes, villages, or petty principalities to the larger central political system. A political community can continue to exist for a long time without any sense of identity. It is most likely that historically an actual community precedes an emotionally coloured one.

The assimilative capability, then, emphasizes the cultural aspects of political development in order to create a single, homogeneous society. Assimilation is established through the process of socialization. This brings about an adaptation to the societal norms and also contributes to a political adaptation ("politicization"), often supported by symbols and possibly personified through the leading personage. The assimilative capability may, in that respect, be reinforced by the symbolic capability intended to create loyalty among its members and identity with the larger political system.

When discussing problems of assimilation the exclusive concern is with the political community or the problems connected with the horizontal dimensions of politics; how individual members of the system see themselves in relation to the political community as a whole and its sub-communities, i.e., their feeling towards the nation, the tribe, or the clan. The regulative capability, on the other hand, refers primarily to the other two major components of the political system in Easton's definition, the regime and the authorities, or the vertical dimension of politics; the problem of legitimacy or how the members evaluate the values, norms and structures guiding the system, and how they look upon the authorities who perform the regulative function in society. (39)

The regulative capability is concerned with overcoming the lack of agreement which exists in many societies about the proper distribution of authority among various political structures capable of wielding power. But it also, more widely, refers to the political system's exercise of control over behaviour of individuals and groups. By common definition, this is the distinguishing capability of political systems, the employment of legitimate allocation of values to control behaviour.

In characterizing regulative performance one must consider what individuals and groups are being subjected to regulation, what areas of individual and collective life are affected, and what frequency or intensity of intervention is exercised. In primitive societies the style of regulation is customary

or arbitrary rather than legal. Although many areas of life are in some measure regulated by the political system, the initial presumption is still not subject to authoritative control.

The regulative capability is increased when the political authorities develop instrumentalities or structures designed to "penetrate" the society in order to regulate behaviour in it. It is also commonly associated with the development of attitude of obedience and compliance in the population which are associated with the emergence of such an administration. Thus, we might view the problem of integration and control and its successful confrontation by a political system as essentially a structural problem. That is to say, what is involved is primarily a matter of the differentiation of new roles, structures, and subsystems which penetrate the society.

Similarly, we may speak of the international regulative capability of a political system, meaning the extent to which a political system penetrates another one and controls its politics and public policy.

Regulation, like extraction, obviously underlies much of the performance of the other capabilities. These two capabilities are in themselves interdependent. A system needs resources in order to regulate, but it is through the use of control, and of coercion or its threat, that resources are obtained. Moreover, assimilative and regulative capabilities are basic to the development of any political system. If they are poorly maintained, there is always the danger that distribution and participation can lead to the fragmentation of the system. If the sense of identity and legitimacy, on the other hand, is high, a reserve of support for the system, which can be used while performing other activities, is made available.

The extractive capability is related to the problem of penetration; the question how a political system can extend its capability to extract energies from the system itself, as well as from its domestic and international environment. (40) The extractive capability refers to the range of system performance in drawing material and human resources in the form of food, tribute, fees, services, and labour levies, etc. Even the mobilization of symbolic support to the system can be regarded as an aspect of extractive capability. The capability to obtain such resources underlies other capabilities, and affects the possibilities of attaining various goals for the system and the society.

In characterizing the extractive capability we can first consider the amount of resources which flows into the system at various levels (central and local) and of what kind they are. The support aspect of extraction can also be ascertained - e.g. the willingness of a population to provide resources under different sets of circumstances. In addition, it is important to know who "pays" for the resources extracted. Is the burden equally distributed or are particular groups more burdened than others? We should also want to know what means are used to obtain the extractions. Are there threats of force and coercion or is it necessary to mount symbolic appeals eventually accompanied by material reward? Finally, the structures and procedures of extraction are also of interest in analysing the extractive capability. Does the system rely on an efficient administration, capable of continuous activities over long periods, or on intermittent structures?

A society, the economy of which is primarily dependent on a single main resource, e.g. agricultural production, has a restricted extractive capability, partly because disturbances in the production may seriously undermine the extractive capability, partly because it is difficult to accumulate produce

has to be distributed and consumed quickly. Weak extractive structures and weak support from the domestic society intensify the problem.

The distributive capability refers to the capacity of the political system to control or affect the distribution of resources and values such as land, goods, services, honours, statuses (titles, offices), and opportunities of various kinds from the political system to individuals and groups in the society. (41) Regulation, too, may be viewed in their distributive aspect. What constrains one individual or group may benefit another. A system must have adequate capabilities of extraction and regulation before it can begin to distribute resources.

The most relevant measurement of distributive capability must involve the quantity and importance, the areas of human life they touch, and the particular sections of the population receiving various benefits.

There is also a non-material distribution relating to the rate of effective symbol flow from the political system into the society and the international environment. Symbolic outputs include statements of ideology and policy, rites and ceremonies, visits by royalty, etc., all designed to develop and maintain a feeling of awe among the people, and to consolidate the authority and the legitimacy of the political system. A high symbolic capability reinforces this support level. It is important to point out that symbolic output is not the same thing as symbolic capability. Symbolic messages may be transmitted but not received. Symbolic outputs, then, may be seen as a kind of distribution, but they take on a special character since they have little immediate costs for the authorities being independent of extractive capability. Yet, the authorities are highly dependent on tapping popular beliefs and attitudes in order to enhance the effectiveness of the political system. Thereby reserves of support may be created or mobilized.

While the above-mentioned capability factors are ways of describing the pattern of outputs of the political system into the internal and external environment, the responsive capability relates to the reaction of the political system to various kinds of inputs. (42) The responsive capability of a system can be dependent on two factors: a) demands for a share in the decision making processes in the political system by various groups in the domestic society, and b) the extent to which the system is equipped to cope with these demands for participation. Arguing about political policies, making demands, agreeing to support a candidate, criticizing public officials, all are forms of political participation. Authoritative responses to inputs or demands may take the form of repression, indifference, substitution, or accommodation.

The political system must be responsible to some set of internal or external pressures. The more salient questions are: What groups are engaged in making demands on the political system and what sort of response do the authorities usually make to them? To whom is the system responsive? In what policy areas is it responsive? How does it manage to sustain a pattern of responsive behaviour? Thus, the demands may be confined to particular social strata or to the political elite itself, or there may be a broad range of demands from most groups in the society but particular regional, ethnic, or religious groups may be excluded from the political input process.

Closely related to these questions is the whole problem of mechanisms and channels of demand processing. The structures and cultural attitudes underlying the performance of the internal conversion processes of the political system have great influence on the responsive capability. Thus, in many of the traditional political systems, in which "parochial" attitudes persisted,

expectations and needs - if they existed - were never, or at least hardly ever, politicized.

1.8 Plan of the work

The various terms and concepts which we have introduced above are dealt with in detail in the chapters which follow. In chapter 2 we provide an overview of some environmental aspects which are of great importance to the activity of the Nilotic political systems, namely the demographic, the ecological, and the economic systems. Chapter 3 deals in some detail with the social structures, namely the lineage system, the local community system, and the age-set system. In the last-mentioned section the political socialization process is discussed. In chapter 4 we discuss separately the political systems of the different Nilotic peoples according to our three-level scheme of functional analysis which we referred to above in this chapter. Finally, in chapter 5 we use this theoretical framework in presenting concluding remarks on the Nilotic political systems.

2.1 Tribal groupings

The term "River-lake Nilotes" refers to certain groups of people in the Sudan and Uganda with offshoots in Ethiopia, Zaire, Kenya, and Tanzania, who have closely related cultural characteristics as well as traditions and myths suggesting common origin. (1)

The following Nilotic peoples will be dealt with in the present work. The figures which are put in brackets are estimations of the number of the populations. (2)

The Alur (200,000) live in the extreme north-east of Zaire into north-western Uganda.

The Acholi (180,000-340,000) live for the main part in northern Uganda and on the borders of the southern Sudan.

The Lango (350,000) live in northern Uganda. Their country is bounded in the west by the Victoria Nile and in the south by Lake Kioga. (3)

The Luo (1,500,000) live in western Kenya north and south of the Kavirondo gulf and in northern Tanzania. (4)

The Shilluk (100,000) live for the main part along the west bank of the White Nile from near Lake No in the south to approximately 11° N. Lat. in the Upper Nile Province in the Sudan.

The Joluo (16,000-25,000) live in the Bahr el Ghazal Province in the south-western Sudan. (5)

The Dinka (1,000,000) extend over a vast area from 12° - 16° N. Lat. in the Upper Nile Province. In addition, they live farther to the west in the Bahr el Ghazal Province and in the southern part of the Kordofan Province. Four fifths of the population live in the Bahr el Ghazal Province.

The Nuer (260,000-350,000) live on both sides of the Nile south of its junction with the Sobat and the Bahr el Ghazal rivers and on both banks of the two tributaries.

The Anuak (30,000-45,000) live along the banks of the rivers in the south-eastern Sudan and in Ethiopia. At least two thirds live in Ethiopia.

On the average c. 5 persons live per sq. km. in the Sudan. A local density of the population higher than 20 persons per sq. km. is exceptional. (6) In Uganda the density of the population is higher, more than 10 persons per sq. km. on the average. (7)

2.2 Climatic conditions

In all studies of peoples who live entirely by direct and simple use of the natural resources around them the conditions of the physical environment are of the utmost importance. The ecological relationship - that intimate connection between a society and the country it inhabits and exploits - is a primary relationship upon which the social system is built. Natural features have their effects on the size of communities, on communications and therefore social contacts, and, as a result, on political and social structure, producing local variations. Clearly natural environment influences the development of all peoples. But it is never the only factor involved, nor is it usually the most

important one. Of equal or greater importance are the state of people's technical equipment, the forms of cooperation existing between them and the extent of their empirical knowledge.

The relationship between the Nilotic societies and their environment is considered here, and it is also proposed to give a brief outline of the type of countryside and the chief products by which the Nilotic peoples live.

The determining factor for the African climate is not the temperature but the rainfall, its quantity and distribution during the year. In the tropical savanna climate both the temperature and the rainfall change from the more central wet savannas (1,000-1,600 mm p.a.) to the more peripheral and dry ones (400-1,000 mm p.a.) with a hot, arid and a cooler, wet season. The former corresponds here to Uganda and south-western Sudan, and the latter to the remaining areas of the Sudan. In the former areas no season is altogether dry (the areas nearest to the Equator have rains all the year long) but there are two wetter periods (Mars-May, Sept.-Nov.) and two drier ones (Dec.-Feb., June-July); in the latter areas the wet season lasts from May to October and the dry season from Jan. to April. The rains fall in form of a heavy downpour or during a thunderstorm and they vary so much from year to year that a severe drought is not unusual. (8) During the dry season the temperature can rise to 32°C and during the wet season to 15-20°C.

On the whole the natural vegetation is that of savanna with alternate grass and forest savannas. Along the rivers and lakes in Uganda a tropical rain forest usually extends with a heavy rainfall (1,300-2,300 mm p.a.). (9)

The southern part of the Sudan is a huge shallow basin situated essentially on the great clay plains, through which meanders sluggishly the Upper White Nile (Bahl el Jebel) after it leaves the Uganda border. It is joined by the Bahr el Ghazal and the numerous tributaries which flow down from the watershed which lies between the Congo basin and the Nile basin. In the heart of the basin is a marshy area known as El Sudd. In addition to permanent swamps there are much larger areas which are inundated every rainy season but dry out between December and May. The Nilotes living there (the Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, and Western Anuak) seek areas above the flood waters between June and October. There they have their permanent settlements surrounded by the land that is required for cultivation during the rains and for wet-season grazing. As the floods recede they seek moist pastures near the rivers, called toiches. The settlements close to the drying water courses are called cattle camps, where the people from a number of villages assemble. The distance between a village and a camp varies according to the topographical conditions. The normal seasonal movements or transhumances are c. 100 km or longer in the centre of the region and much less among the Shilluk and Northern Dinka along the White Nile, where a great part of the population can live throughout the year in their permanent villages and have contact with those who migrate. (10) Transhumance enhance the importance of units larger than the villages which, for economic reasons, can not easily maintain a self-sufficient isolation. Thus, there is a very intimate connection between the hydrological conditions and the conditions of life of the population.

The other Nilotic peoples did not make such seasonal movements. The ecological conditions made it possible for them to live throughout the year on the same place and thereby each village remained an autonomous economic unit. (11)

The irregularity of the rainfall combined with the shallowness of the soil are responsible for an important feature of Nilotic agriculture. In order that

any crop should develop well it must be sown at a time when the soil conditions and the rainfall are suitable. These factors necessitate a good organization and experience.

Their economic isolation was to a large extent the result of the difficulties of communication. Each community was nearly self-sufficient meeting its own needs without outside assistance. In consequence, there was little local demand for an improved system of communication. In addition, ecological factors seem to have played their part in accentuating political fragmentation.

2.3 Main features of economy

The influence of environment on traditional Nilotic economy, then, was profound. Economic life centred on herding. Farming, which varied in importance depending on the nature of the land, took second place in esteem if not in fact; farming was a necessary part of their economy owing to the prevalence of cattle diseases and the difficulties of obtaining adequate pastures in the dry season. On the other hand, the climatic conditions did not allow them wholly to depend on cultivations. Farming and cattle herding were, therefore, the two main economic activities, and together they determined the ecological cycle, as well as the distribution of population, village sites, and also the relationships between the various communities.

The permanent farming on the clay plains was seasonal according to the wet and dry seasons. Millet was the staple crop of the area. (12) Farming was much less important in the clay plains than animal husbandry. The natural conditions are ill-suited to crop production, with diseases, droughts and floods all taking their toll of growing crops in the field. Moreover, the high humidities prevailing throughout the year prevented the storage of grain surpluses for more than one season. Yet, the greater part of their diet came from farming. (13) In the south-western Sudan and Uganda a system of shifting cultivation was adopted, where regular cultivation demanded extensive periods of fallowing. (14) In areas outside the Sudan the stress was put on farming. This was, above all, the case in the "fly belts", where tsetse flies live on the margins of bush and forest near rivers and lakes. (15)

They possessed the "cattle complex", which has been defined as an intense devotion to cattle and a permeation of this value into all other aspects of culture. (16) The Dinka and Nuer were predominantly pastoralists. Although they cultivated the ground in order to produce an adequate food supply, this was done from necessity in most cases and not out of devotion. Among the rest of the Nilotes cattle were of less economic importance than among the Dinka and Nuer. Horticultural products were basic to the subsistence economy and were recognized as the staff of life, while cattle functioned mainly in the prestige economy or as a supplement to horticulture.

Livestock provided milk, meat, and blood, while the dead animals were a source of hides, horns, and other byproducts used for clothing and accessoires. Although they were particularly fond of meat, they did not as a rule raise cattle for slaughter. (17)

The economic uses of cattle for all Nilotes were highly important, but the cattle were more than mere economic goods. They were subject to focal interest in the lives of the people, as was indicated by the aspects of beauty attributed to them and the identification with and affection for them that was felt. It was also apparent from their social importance. The number of cattle was a measure of wealth, social position, and influence of the owner. (18)

The relation to neighbouring peoples was partly dependent on their valuation of cattle. So, e.g., the Nuer despised those who had no cattle, and plundered those who had. (19) Quarrels often had to do with cattle and ownership to pastures and water-places. Cattle were paid as fee or compensation for severe offences. The bridewealth partly consisted of cattle. (20) Last but not least, cattle were the main topic of conversation and, indeed, many linguistic references to cattle were used to express thoughts and to communicate information and, moreover, social relations were often expressed in terms of cattle. (21)

Fish made a substantial additional contribution to other articles of food. Conditions throughout the region are very favourable to fishing all the year round. (22)

They were linked together by two levels of economic dependency. On the lower level there were the homesteads which produced enough to satisfy most of their needs. Beyond this, at the second level, to achieve maximum production, members of each neighbourhood banded together in cooperative labour and lending of goods, this cooperative tendency being ceremonially reinforced by periodic communal feasts.

Another type of exchange which was important in cementing social relations was the custom of deposing cattle with neighbours and friends. (23) By distributing cattle far and wide - according to the idea of "spreading the risk" -, they insured that only part of their herds would be lost in the event of cattle raids or disease in the home area and so guarantee that they would not be left destitute. It also prevented inbreeding to some extent. (24)

As to the division of labour there were institutionalized role differences between the sexes and the ages, and at least some of these were related to physical differences between them. Thus, the women did the housekeeping and the lighter tasks in farming, while the men did the heavier tasks in it, and the cattle herding was their special sphere of interest. (25) Concerning the milking, there was a regional difference. Among the Nuer and some of the Dinka milking was mainly performed by women, while among the other Nilotic peoples men and children milked. (26)

Each family was on the whole regarded as self-sufficient in reference to handicraft. Yet, there were those who were particularly handy at making canoes, musical instruments, etc., but this activity was only performed in "leisure time". Only the smith held an exclusive position; he had his main subsistence from smithing. This handicraft was always under the charge of certain families. (27)

Trade relations between the tribes were only weakly developed, as natural resources were fairly evenly distributed over the whole area and technical skill and knowledge were of such similarity in all the tribes that there was no incentive for regular and organized exchange of goods. The occasional bartering of crops for livestock and of the products of certain crafts (pottery, ironwork, and ornaments) was too erratic to lead to the establishment of permanent political relations between the tribes on economic grounds.

Summing up, Nilotic production was typically located to kinship units. Subsistence economy predominated. Domestic craft was supplementary to farming and cattle herding but still attached to kin and village. In some cases, occupational position was determined by an extended group. Exchange relations were also determined by traditional kinship and community obligations. In short, economic activities were undifferentiated from traditional family-community setting.

3.1 The lineage system

In this section we will give a summary sketch of the working of the lineage system. In most small-scale personal ("face-to-face") societies kinship by descent and ties by marriage influence behaviour in a great number of situations. They determine where and with whom a person lives, his range of friends and enemies, whom he may marry or not marry, the positions to which he is entitled, etc. Thus, we may say that the rules of kinship accomplish two major tasks: first, to create groups: special groupings of kin: families, lineages, clans. etc.; the second major function of kinship rules is to govern role relationships between kin. Some kinship rules specify the rights and duties of membership in particular kin groups. Other rules pertain to relationships between kin.

For the purpose of this work we shall regard the lineage as a group of kin descended from a common ancestor through men only (patrilineal or agnatic) or women only (matrilineal). It differs from a clan in that the members can trace their exact genealogical relationship, whereas those of a clan cannot do so but merely recognize their common ancestry. From another point of view lineages are smaller, more localized, and more function-laden unilineal groups. The term clan describes larger, more geographically dispersed, near-functionless categories of people. A segmentary lineage system means that the society is organized into small groups - genealogical structures - that are regarded as being segments of larger groups. As segments they are distinct and their members think of themselves as forming separate groups in certain situations: but in other situations they join together to form larger units. The total system is regarded as constant but the component groups are always changing. (1)

It is stated by all our authorities that the Nilotic clan had a lineage structure. (2) The core of very clan was a lineage. The lineage, everywhere, was a clearly defined structural unit. The lineages were the basic units of Nilotic social organization that emerged in corporate activities. They were defined primarily by the canon of agnatic descent.

The clan was not an abstraction but there was no word in their language that can be translated "clan" in ours. Sometimes the old Acholi word kaka was used by the Alur, sometimes the Moru-Madi word suru, which they used also with the general meaning of "species" or "category" (e.g. birds, trees). The term was entirely relative, and could apply to any order of tribal, clan or lineage grouping, as well as in other contexts. (3) Otherwise they used lineage terms, which often had an original sense of residence and not an exclusive descent connotation. (4)

In spite of the fact that the clans were regarded as permanent and invariable basic structures, the origin of clans and lineages was in no way a completed development but a dynamic process which was perpetually going on. It cannot, therefore, always be definitely stated whether a given group constituted a lineage or an independent clan. Proliferation of clans and lineages took place in two ways: a) by the expansion and segmentation of a lineage, and b) by dispersal of individuals who left their parental homes and settled else-

where founding lineages of their own. Proliferation was usually caused by an increase in numbers and was associated with a migratory drift across the countryside in search of more land. Just as, given a certain kind of economy and ecological background, there was a minimum possible size for an effective cooperating group, so also there was an optimum maximum size for it. The tendency of the various lineages to establish their independence after having reached a certain numerical strength also sprang from a pride in their own strength and power and the resulting desire for a political status of their own. Moreover, as the number of clansmen increased, the cohesion of the clan community was naturally weakened. The feeling of solidarity and the maintenance of the various rights and duties no longer embraced the entire clan community but tended to be limited to the members of the different lineages which thereby automatically developed into clan groups. In the clan traditions this fissive process was usually illustrated by a quarrel between two brothers of the leading family of the clan, or even a serious clash between two ordinary clansmen leading to the formation of two factions within the clan community and, finally, to an open breach between them. (5) From now on they formed two separate clans which no longer called themselves after their former joint clan ancestor but usually after the man under whose leadership they migrated to their new abode. Otherwise groups as well as individuals might move and become attached as accessory groups because of famine, warfare, pestilence, etc.

We have discussed the general process of clan segmentation as though clans and lineages invariably increased. But there were many groups that had decreased in numbers. These remnant clans consisted of members who might be scattered over what was once their own territory but had become so reduced in numbers that the territory had been occupied by encroaching groups from other areas. They still had their own heads, but could never act as independent political units.

The following is a survey of some common criteria of clanship.

a) Common descent. This is not really an independent criterion, for it lacks definition unless it is expressed in the observance of exogamy and other criteria. Otherwise, it was indistinguishable from the general sense of common origin in a homogeneous tribe, which was frequently expressed in the unilineal terminology of the kinship system.

At the clan level common descent was usually fictional and not based on strict genealogy. They did, however, commonly embody claims to remote common ancestors of the clan-hero type. (6) The members of a lineage were all the agnatic descendants of its founding ancestor, both male and female, living and dead. Dead females, though technically lineage members by descent from the founder in the male line, were of no importance since no segments in their own lineage of origin could ever spring from them. On the other hand, a lineage was often named after a woman, its ancestress, because lineages were generally thought of as dividing out from within a polygynous family. The standard pattern was that the segments of a lineage traced their descent from the sons by different wives of their common founding ancestor. (7)

Membership of a clan was normally determined by birth. But in some tribes there was a custom of adoption. Adoption into the clan, in the proper sense of the word, seems to have been of very rare occurrence only, having been limited exclusively to stray orphans and young war-captives from other tribes who had lost all contact with their own clan. Usually they seem to have

enjoyed the same social and legal status as the real clan members. That was not the case with the Nuer, where a Dinka adopted into a family had a lower status than other Nuer individuals. (8)

b) Together with their common genealogy the name of the clan, implying and symbolizing common agnatic descent, was their primary means of identification. As we mentioned above, they had little need of a generic term for clan or lineage, as descriptive references through the proper names of lineages sufficed. The preposition pa(r), fa ("home"), ma or piny ("land") prefixed to a lineage eponym constituted the name of the lineage, often with the addition of - or exclusively preceded by - the pronominal prefix (jo, ja, ju, ji ("people"), kwar, wat, gaat ("children", "descendants"), signifying the members of it. (9) Clan names varied greatly in type. Some resembled lineage names. Some suggested territorial origin. Others were given mythical or ritual interpretations. (10)

When offshoots of a clan split away, the seceding section changed its form in regard to its name, its ritual observances, and the exogamy rule. These changes are striking proofs of the suggestion that all these elements were symbols of clan unity, and that they tended to maintain the integrity of the group. Every clan had a cry conventionally referred to in anthropological literature as the "praise name", one or more words, mostly containing the name of the clan or of some supposed ancestor, that were uttered or cried as a symbol of identity in situations when distinguishing clanship was important (e.g. at a fight, hunt, or dance). (11) Often the clan salutation might assist in the recollection of clanship ties when dispersed sections of the same clan had come to be known by different names.

c) The system of inheritance and of succession to property and authority was embodied in the lineage groups. Certain rights were vested in lineage, the principal ones being those in the resources of land and livestock. (12) Possessory rights were enjoyed by their living members. The transfer of property from father to son implied that other sons had to find land in other places. There were two immediate consequences of this system. First, clan members were scattered all over the country, a factor that tended to increase the degree of social mobility in the area. Secondly, considerable uniformity of custom and behaviour was achieved throughout the country.

In this connection we must also deal with the notion that some of the clans possessed certain qualities of character as well as skills or functions affecting the whole society. On the technical side the lineages of smiths must be mentioned. As regards the magico-religious sphere, a number of clans were reputed to own particular gifts, e.g. as rainmakers, diviners, etc. We may also add the royal and aristocratic clans with their monopoly of political power. (13) Perfection in these offices or arts could not be acquired by instruction alone, but required the presence of an inherited "disposition".

d) As a property-holding unit, a lineage group often might be a unit for corporate enterprise. Many of the living members of a clan were likely to be living in different sections, but they were still thought of as composing a corporate group in which certain rights and obligations were vested. Yet, it was mostly the lineage that was considered as the practical unit whereby clan interests were maintained. Some communal work had to be performed for the benefit of the kin group. A man had a special right for help from clansmen at harvest time, during planting, when building a house, and for other sorts of aid. Customary rules also rendered the lineage members liable to contribute compensation or fines for certain offences committed by individual

members, to assist at the funeral of a member, etc. Moreover, all sorts of game and spoil were shared among the members according to fixed rules. (14)

e) When a lineage group was a property-holding group, and a mutual-aid group, it usually had some machinery for group decision-making and group discipline. Within every clan there were a number of positions of ritual and political authority. At the head of every localized lineage level there was an individual who exercised limited coercive power over the actions of his lineage mates. Maintenance of clan integrity was the concern of senior lineage elders at a lineage council or moot. A moot was a temporary, or ad hoc, gathering of elders with legal authority to sit in judgement and impose punitive sanctions against a person. Legal decisions were arrived at through debate, the presentation of testimony, and final consensus on the part of senior elders who formed a kind of jury that rendered a verdict. The existence of a moot system effectively reduced the incidence of self-help as a means of counteraction and redress of grievance. Given the kind of ecological adjustment to physical environment, and given the social condition of clan dispersion, the institution of a lineage moot appears to have been an effective form of social control, limited, however, to the regulation of behaviour between clansmen. (15)

f) Often the lineage group was a military unit as well. It fought some other lineage groups within the same society. These fights seldom developed into large-scale pitched battles or campaigns. They were usually feuds, that is, longstanding states of enmity between certain lineage groups, fed by traditions of past wrongs and obligations of blood vengeance, that broke out in occasional small-scale violence, skirmishes or ambushes. (16)

g) The clans frequently had its own religion. "Ancestor worship" was ordinarily a unilineal kin group affair. The clansmen were further tied to each other by their mutual obligations to common ancestral spirits (jok). (17) (Ancestor worship might be viewed as an extension of the lineage group - with its rules of patterned rights and obligations - to include non-living members.)

A further - though very much less significant - manifestation of clan solidarity was the observance of taboos (kwer) - sometimes with a totemic affiliation (at least among the Acholi, Anuak, Joluo, Shilluk, Dinka, and Nuer) - on a clan or lineage basis. (18) They recognized one or several primal, non-human ancestors. These ancestors were usually animals, birds, or reptiles, but they might be plants or inorganic natural phenomena. The individual maintained a quasi-kinship tie with the species to which his totem ancestor belonged. The totem relations were sometimes explained in myths of twin births - the ancestor of the clan being born with the totem species - or by other miraculous occurrences in the past. Some Shilluk clans derived themselves from an animal, which Nyikango, their culture hero, turned into people in order to populate the country. (19)

h) Apart from smaller clans (often synonymous with commoner clans) the clans seem,to a large extent,to have been non-exogamous (that is not to say endogamous) or agamous (according to Murdock's terminology) groups. (20) Intermarriage was allowed between lineages of the same clan which were sufficiently distant from each other in the clan structure. That was true of the aristocratic lineages which were larger and grew more rapidly. Restrictions imposed upon them by continued observance of exogamy throughout the clan therefore caused a tension that could only be dissolved by separation and independence. But for them, too, it was legitimate to treat exogamy as a cri-

terion of clanship, for they clearly regarded it as a theoretical obligation which had been,to some extent,abrogated for common sense reasons during the historical process. Moreover, there was no intermarriage between the host's line and that of its own clients during the first generations. (21) It is consistent with the "sentiment" of kinship which existed between host and client.

As a result of exogamy, lineage groups tended to crosscut communities and to tie communities to each other with bonds of kinship. Since lineages must necessarily exchange women they were, in effect, exchanging hostages. (22) The balancing allegiances might conflict, at times, producing various stresses and strains, but the crosscutting system did tend to integrate a fairly large group of people and to resist centrifugal pressures.

Summing up, the lineage system tended to integrate the society, to knit together a scattered population and prevent fissionings into smaller subgroups. The segments of commoner clans which retained their sense of clanship although settled in widely different parts of the country thereby contributedto the self-awareness of the society as a meaningful unit. Their relations to the segments of chiefly clans, if any, similarly contributed to their self-awareness as a people, but their significance was also much greater, for through the recognition of more political action all clan segments were tied to a chief. That shows that even where other organizing principles were operative unilineal descent and the associations based on it might still have crucial social importance.

3.2 The local community system

Lineage groups differ from political groups in that the relationship of their members to one another is based on descent and not on residence, for lineages or clans are dispersed and do not compose exclusive local communities, and also, in that lineage values often operate in a different range of situations from political values. Nevertheless, persons are bound not only by kinship ties but also by ties arising through occupation of the same territory. Though in any settled area a good many people do have relationships either of kinship or through marriage with a good many other people, a man always has many neighbours who are neither kin nor related to him by marriage. Thus the Nilotic peoples think of relationships of kinship and affinity, and relationships of neighbourhood, as different, though of course they knew quite well that they might and often did coincide. Kinship reinforces local ties but the two are not identical. In that connection the localized lineage is an effective political and social unit.

For the purpose of this work we shall regard the "local community" as the localized population which is interdependent on a daily basis, and which carries on a highly generalized series of activities in and through a set of institutions which provides on a day-to-day basis the full range of goods and services necessary for its continuity as a social and economic entity. (1)

The majority of the Nilotic peoples did not live in compact villages but in straggling settlements which were loosely scattered over the landscape on ridges close to permanent waterways. (2) The settlements represented localities marked off primarily by external topographical features. No two settlements were identical in topography, shape, size, or social composition; but all had the same social form, based on the same principles. They were never territorially static. There were no strict territorial boundaries between adjacent settlements. The homesteads of a settlement merged with those of the

adjacent settlements, and the boundaries between them were mostly definable in social terms, as a function of their ecological and politico-ritual relations at a given time. Only the villages of the Shilluk and Alur chiefs seem to have been permanently fortified and compact villages. (3) Previously the Acholi, Lango, and Luo villages were compact groups, too, so that they could be better defended, but during recent years villages tended to break up and straggle owing to the cessation of inter-village raiding. (4)

The Dinka and Nuer differed from the other Nilotic peoples owing to the fact that they, in response to ecological demands, were compelled seasonally to migrate as a consequence of the flood and draining of the water courses. In the wet season they lived in permanent villages on the hilltops of the same type as the other Nilotic ones, while they, in the dry season, lived in cattle camps close to the drying waters. Such concentrations comprised larger or smaller tribal sections and each group had its own separate section of the camping ground. (5)

The settlements ranged from single families to larger and more complex groups. The structure of any village depended on its size. The small villages were usually a socially homogeneous unit being an extended family group or a small lineage. The larger villages with a population belonging to different lineage groups were, in reality, a number of small villages and hamlets stretched out in a continuous line.

The point of departure for the social structure of a village we find in the composition of a smaller village. Although the local organization was based upon agnatic lineages, the homogeneity of these groups was often modified. The members of a village might consist of five categories of people: a) members of the lineage which provided both its name and its leader, b) wives of lineage members, c) men of different lineages or clans: sons or husbands of women, who did not live among their won kin, d) clients: unrelated men who attached themselves to rich men as followers, and e) slaves: war-captives compulsory attached to a lineage. This led in time to the formation of what we call "accessory" groups attached to "host" groups. We perfer the term "host" to terms such as "dominant" or "aristocratic". (6) The host groups were not necessarily dominant either politically or ritually, but where they really were so, we use the term. This type of attachment must be separated from that of heterogeneous groups, where alien groups were absorbed partly by means of the institution of chiefship, which supplied a symbol of unity to groups of diverse origin. It is easy analytically to distinguish between different categories of "dependents" such as "clients", "slaves", and "subjects", but it is not easy in practice, partly since the Nilotes did not appear to have made such a distinction from a terminological point of view and partly because in course of time one category might turn into another. (7)

Clientship was a form of servile institution which linked men in a voluntary relationship of mutual dependence. (8) In essence, the clientage relationship was an individual, asymmetrical relationship between a client and a host or patron, involving the exchange of certain commodities and services. The client was a man who, because of misfortune or misdeed, had lost his kin group or had been expelled from it. But clientship involved more than just an economic transaction between an inferior and a superior. It also involved a close personal relationship. The reciprocal bonds of loyalty meant that one became the other's "man", which amounts to a merging of the individual into the kin group of the host. In return for this act of homage the host owed protection to his client. He was addressed and referred to in a kinship idiom

("child", "brother"), as only by linguistic identification he could be incorporated in the community where he had no ties of cognition or affinity. (9) Clients might also be called "guests" (welo). (10) Clientship was essentially a free association at the outset, and the relationship could be terminated at any time by either party. But as the client became more completely absorbed into the host's group, it became increasingly difficult for him and his descendants to leave it alive. The obligation to remain with their host was in a sense a moral obligation, as the original host gave legal and political protection and bridewealth for the marriage of the ancestor client. The relationship between host line and client line grew into one of mutual interdependence, and continued ability to draw on protection carried with it the obligation to serve the host's people. Nevertheless, members of a client lineage had a less intense association with the host to whom they were attached than had the individual client in relation to the host, and the difference in status between client and host became less marked. Emphasis was on the privileged position of the hosts, rather than on the under-privileged position of the clients.

Like clientage slavery was always linked with certain customary enforced limitations on freedom. The slave was more completely dependent upon his master than a client on his lord, who was not regarded as having earned unlimited rights to his services as was the case with the slave. Moreover, the ties between master and slave were not complicated by the requirements of kinship norms. We should always have to remember that these personal relationships depended on personalities, and that different lords must have treated their dependents very differently. The causes of slavery were: they had become slaves through conquest, made prisoners of war or should suffer penalty for offence. (11)

Closely related to the development of clientage was the development of the rights of chiefs to enact tribute from conquered peoples. Out of the relationship of clientage grew the specific political relationship of ruler to subject, and this was extended to cover persons who had not entered into individual relations of clientship. While such people, unlike clients, may have been technically entirely free, the fact that others had an enforceable claim on a share of what they produced indicates that functionally their status was not so very different. (12) Among the Luo, e.g., the accessory groups were called jodak or jomwa, the strangers ("the separated people"); though if they had lived among them a long time they spoke of them as jobedo, for the other terms were harsh words. (13) In most cases this meant the domination of the Luo, since they were the prime holders of power and influence. Since economic and political power tended to gravitate into the same hands, these kinds of relationship also tended to set the pattern of political relations. This network of interlocking roles gave the society a measure of cohesion and stability as well as an effective solution to the problem of the transmission of power and privilege from one generation to the other.

The host groups were closely associated with the land they occupied and considered the landowners. (14) The bonds between a community and a locality, or between a lineage and land, were summed up in the idea of "ownership". This concept, which occurred in various contexts, had certain general implications. (15) Where it was a matter of property such as land, or where localities associated with social groups were concerned, to "own" meant to have responsibilities towards and for them, rights over and behalf of them, privileges and duties in relation to other corporate groups in virtue of being the "master" of the land or locality in question. The host group formed the

core of the community and political activities revolved round them. The members of the accessory groups were not necessarily socially inferior, but the host lineage was accorded considerable prestige and authority in virtue of their position and was expected to be the leaders in important matters in the community. For that reason the host group was the "dominant" lineage.

In practice, it occasionally happened that the dominant position of the host lineage was taken over by a stronger, wealthier, and more numerous lineage. But, even if dispossessed of political power and the leadership, the original host group retained its ritual connection with the soil and also much of its local prestige. This ritual relationship remained so long as any living representatives of the original host group remained.

Accessory groups were usually the descendants of a man who attached himself to a member of the host group, as a uterine or affinal kinsman or as a client. The original host-client relationship was between individuals and was inherited by their descendants. Their distinct identity and alien origin would possibly be concealed in some fictitious agnatic tie. The Anuak, Shilluk and Nuer, at least, regarded those lineages which were tied to the host group by means of marriage as "sister's sons". (16) A common Nuer distinction was between "the sons of bulls" (g a a t t u t n i), the descendants of the male line dominant in the area, and "the sons of daughters" (g a a t n y i e t), i.e. descendants through the female line and by this means attached to the host lineage. (17) Otherwise, the Luo referred to the affiliated stranger lineages as lineages of in-laws (k a o r c e), or lineages of maternal uncles (k a n e r), since it was from them that they took their wives and the mothers of their children. (18) A common feature in many lineage systems was also that the descendants of a man who settled with his wife's people traced their descent through the female link to the lineage in whose home they lived.

The accessory lineages identified themselves politically with the landowners but they formed a separate social community with its own corporate life. In small villages - either independent or forming parts of a larger community - the people nearly always belonged to a single lineage, since the lineages tended to settle in distinct territorial sections, and thereby preserve their homogeneity and solidarity. That was the case, too, with villages of the more compact type. Accordingly, each Acholi village was divided into smaller sections, consisting of a number of homesteads centering round an o (w a n g - o or k o n g - o). (19) From the account given by Grove it might be inferred that these "clubs" (as he calls them) consisted of distinct agnatic lineages belonging to different clans, each living in its own section of the village with its own social life.

The communities were open to certain structural weaknesses which followed from their internal organization. There were lineage loyalties and lines of structural cleavage within the community. Thus, each accessory group had a dual loyalty - to its own lineage and to the community as represented by the host lineage and its leader. Weak leadership and dissatisfaction with their representation by the leader to external parties, might, in certain circumstances, cause the community unit to be rent by internal feuds and fissions. Only if the community leader and his lineage were strong, the loyalties of the accessory lineages submerged in the larger unit. On the other hand, there were factors that counterbalanced tendencies to separation. The community was an integrated unit bound together by territorial unity, common economic and legal interests, allegiance to a host lineage to which all were connected in some way, and finally, bound by the necessity of mutual

cooperation in times of danger from outside sources. Among the Dinka and Nuer and to a lesser extent even among the Shilluk the cohesion of the community was favoured in the wet season owing to the fact that travelling was difficult and the community tended to be isolated. (20) Among the other peoples seasonal differences were not considerable enough to lead to transhumance or to have any marked effect on social life. But first and foremost the structural differentiation within a community was moderated by the all-pervading connection to the host lineage through various kinship ties.

It was only in connection with certain legal and ritual matters and in reference to rules of exogamy, that lineages were completely autonomous groups and became clearly differentiated from each other. For everyday purposes the position of the host lineage does not appear to have been very different from that of the other lineages in the community, and they cooperated in all that they had common interests. Public affairs in the community, linked with conditions of drought, famine, disease, witchcraft, death, or non-cooperated behaviour of a fellow neighbour were generally managed by concerted action of the male elders under the leadership of the head of the host lineage. A community council might be convened by any local elder. Such councils were empowered to deliberate and judge only those matters which were of public concern for the community at large and to arrive at some consensus about appropriate action.

Above all they had intimate economic relations and a common economic interest which made the village a cooperative unit. The villages were independent autonomous units, the members of which cooperated to produce food from the earth and to herd cattle. (21) Outside small kinship groups and village and camp communities, there were no cooperative economic combinations. Although there had always been a certain amount of travelling, everyday traditional requirements could be satisfied within a small neighbourhood. It was thus possible for a small territorial group to exist economically with only very slight recourse to external trading. There was also little specialization. There was a good deal of mutual assistance between families of the same village in spite of the high degree of self-sufficiency of every family. In most cases it was spontaneous, unorganized assistance based on kinship ties. The nature of the social, economic, and emotional dependence of the individual on his kinsmen, his affinal relations, and his neighbours was such that his social well-being and economic success might properly be regarded as depending as much on his skill in manipulating this complex web of relationships as on his specifically economic endeavours. Regarding the Acholi society, Girling emphasizes that under the traditional economic order, the distribution of the available resources of labour and wealth was never completely equitable. A household-head with several wives benefited from the labour of less fortunate members of the village. The main unit of consumption was not the village, but the domestic family of each wife. On the other hand, a work party, the unit of production, was made up of members of the village who worked on the fields of each woman in turn. They were, he says, rewarded with food and beer, but the products of the fields were mainly consumed by the wife's own domestic family, and not by the whole group in which she lived. A man with five wives had, therefore, five times as much labour at his disposal as a man with one wife. He was thus able to maintain more children and to have more descendants. These larger polygynous gouseholds were often those of "eldest sons". (22) The processes of unequal development, of which this is an example, may be at the basis of traditional Nilotic polity.

This depended for its existence on an economic order in which labour only was an important differentiating factor.

Thus, while in a narrow sense the economic unit was the household, the larger local communities were, directly or indirectly, cooperative groups. As an example we may take the Lango, who had groups organized for horticultural production (wang tic) and for cooperation in herding cattle (jo awi yang). (23) The members of the wang tic group were permanent and numbered from twenty to forty men, often embracing a whole village. Digging and weeding were the chief occasions, but the wang tic might have been called to plaster a house, too. They appointed their strongest member to be their leader (won wang tic). The jo awi yang were the people who kept their cattle in one kraal. All had to help to build a new one when this became necessary. The person who first made the kraal (won awi yang), or his heir, was an important person and disputes concerned with cattle were often brought to him.

As said before, the Nilotic local communities were in a constant state of instability, which was manifested in conflicts of interests between groups and persons. Disputes were about the distribution and enjoyment of rights over the resources of land, livestock, and women, and about the maintenance, abuse, or usurpation of status and authority. Such demands led to the building up of tensions. How these were expressed and which set of demands was given precedence depended on factors such as the richness or poverty of soil or grazing, the abundance or scarcity of water, and so on, and also on personality. The differentiation between host groups and accessory groups became plainer under the colonial era. Land became scarce through increase in population and cattle and decrease in soil fertility. The size of a village was determined by ecological and social factors. When it rose above an optimum figure fragmentation took place; when it fell below a minimum necessary for independent existence, its members left to join their kin in other groups. These processes might continue for a very long period. In the past lineages would fight against one another for land, beginning with skirmishing between individuals as a consequence of trespass. But it became increasingly difficult for groups to move into their neighbours' land, since the colonial government tried to prohibit movement of this sort, which led to disputes and fighting within the communities. Evans-Pritchard reports that among the Luo it was the general rule that a lineage had the right to cultivate land where its forebears had lived for several generations. "Formerly there was enough land for everyone and more could be obtained by war and migration. Now, there is considerable inter-lineage enmity about land. The jopiny claim the land in virtue of their ownership of the tribal territory and as proof of this they point to the ancestral graves. Stranger lineages which are numerous and powerful may also claim to be jopiny in the same area and, having dwelt there for some generations, can also point to their ancestral graves." (24)

Nilotic culture provided various means of expressing the antagonisms. Sometimes individuals resorted to violence, but this was on the whole unusual within the community. Hostility was more likely to be expressed in mutual recrimination and personal abuse, in which threats of sorcery might play a part. More seriously, it might express itself in the imputation and perhaps the actual practice of sorcery. Antagonism between rival sections within a community was the basis of a whole series of corporate group activities ranging from friendly games, mock duels and club-fighting to ritual war-fare and open conflicts of the larger lineages which resulted in a possible migration of

the defeated party bringing about a further dispersion of the clans. (25)

There were different ways in which these conflicts could be controlled. Disputes and offences involving neighbours within a community might, if they were not very serious, be dealt with by an informal local "tribunal" or "moot". There were no administrative or judicial body apart from such an informal gathering of village elders, who had the task of settling any disputes, in occurring cases under the leadership of the village head. The meetings of the elders were courts of arbitration rather than of judicial decision. They consisted of a group of older men experienced in arbitration and known for their wisdom and knowledge of judicial procedure and legal precedents. The initial action was taken by the complainant, not by the court. There was no formal machinery for the legal enforcement of their pronouncements. They merely brought the dispute into the open and used their powers of persuasion to resolve it and restore peace and friendship. It is plain that the primary aim of these community courts was the restoration of good relations, not the punishment of an offender. Yet, the court usually had the power to invoke negative sanctions. If compensation was withheld the injured party would intervene. The approval of at least a fair proportion of community members was needed before any form of intervention could be made effective and force a settlement if necessary to prevent the community being disrupted by internal feuds.

Of course, community courts did not always succeed in achieving complete or indeed any agreement between the parties; it would be astonishing if they did. Sometimes no solution was reached, and sometimes one party was dissatisfied and refused to accept the court's decision, preferring to have recourse to more powerful sanctions. The size of the support group behind a party determined whether or not they would attempt to claim rights usurped by individuals of other clans. Following ordinary anthropological usage, we may refer to fighting within the tribe, chiefdom, etc., as feud, and to that between them as warfare. The essential difference is that there was the obligation to settle feuds by peaceful means, whereas there was no such obligation in the case of warfare. Yet clearly uncontrolled self-help would lead to anarchy. Therefore, in cases of serious conflict the local community system was in need of formal institutions that prevented or at least mitigated open hostility. This was the weak point of the local community system. The solution of the problem was to enter into a system of higher order, since it is noticeable that the chiefs' courts dealt with those disputes that would in the community system have been settled by fighting. In short, chiefship took over the role played by feud and warfare.

The common responsibilities made the lineages both corporate and political units. The community occupied a critical position in two sets of relations. In relation to other communities the community was a political unit, and membership of the village community was a political affiliation. But in addition the village was a kinship group whose members were interlinked by ties of blood and marriage. Thus, the village was the group in which political and kinship ties were intertwined: it knitted together the political and kinship systems. In this process the host lineages had a central position, for at one end they were structural groups with political functions, while at the other end they spread out into relationships of a kinship kind through which the attachments were made which enabled them, while remaining distinct descent groups in certain situations, to become in other situations identified with the community and so to function politically.

What did the relationships of communities to each other in the larger framework of political structure look like? People of one village might have a strong sense of solidarity vis à vis people of other villages, since most lineages had kin in other villages, and everywhere there was the same culture and social organization, but nevertheless the village community was a corporate group witha sense of solidarity governed by "parochial" attitudes. Though its members had contact with persons in other villages, and even in other sections of their tribe and in adjacent tribes, the greater part of their activities were carried out within their own village community and their strongest ties were generally with other members of it. (26) Adjacent communities might combine to defend themselves against attack but these combinations were only temporary expedients provided no permanent authority was recognized by the communities which combined in this manner. (27)

Before concluding the discussion of the local community system, there is one important elucidation which should be added. These local communities tended to be omnifunctional social systems. There were no clear boundaries between the economic, the political, and the religious systems of action. To be sure religious, political, and economic action differed in substance and in structure; but changes in the division of labour and in orientation appropriate for these different forms of social action were intermittent. The boundaries between them were not drawn with any clarity, nor was there any clear awareness among the members of these communities of the shift from one form of action to the other.

3.3 The age-set system

In the present chapter age-sets are dealt with and their ritual of initiation, their structure and machinery, their ideology, and their social function. (1)

In every society age is a social, not an absolute concept, measured by artificial standards correlated more or less directly with the major physiological changes of infancy, adolescence, and maturity. Generally speaking, in tribal societies increasing age carried increasing responsibilities, and elders exercised considerable influence and commanded corresponding respect. The authority of age characterized all Nilotic behaviour, and age was one of the main factors in group association.

We regard the *age-set* as a recognized and sometimes organized group consisting of persons who are of the same age. Once a person enters a given age-set, he remains a member for the remainder of his life. An age-set may consist of one or more sub-sets. An *age grade* is a term which should be kept for recognized divisions of the life of an individual as he passes from infancy to old age. Thus, each person passes successively into one grade after another.

Despite differences, all age-set systems had in common the fact that they were entered by initiation usually during adolescence, and that the boys or young men who were initiated together formed an age-set. (2) We don't know to what extent members of "client" or "slave" groups were admitted into the "brotherhood" of the age-set organization.

The basic rule was that all men born within a certain number of consecutive years were admitted into one set: *ric* (Shilluk, Nuer), *rak* (Dinka). (3) A set usually lasted for up to ten years before being cut. Between the sets there was an interval of some years. Each age-set had two or more sub-sets each with a separate name. (4) The Shilluk called them "head", "neck", and "middle". The sets were named, and a man together with a large group of his

fellows of about the same age as himself remained in the same set all his life. The names were not uniform for the whole country, and they were not repeated. Among the Nuer the age-set nomenclature was common to whole tribes, but did not extend beyond tribal boundaries. Among the Shilluk and Dinka it was limited to smaller segments of society. The names of the age-sets appear to have commemorated incidents occurring at the time of formation.

Admission to a set usually involved some initiation ritual often including some form of bodily mutilation. (5) A chief effect of this ritual was to mark the individual's emergence from childhood, and his assumption of full tribal membership. The complete procedure during the initiation ritual comprised of three major phases, which did not occur among all the peoples.

The first phase consisted of preparatory observances by the candidates and led up to the actual operation of cicatrization (Joluo, Shilluk, Dinka, and Nuer). This ceremony was called ngol by the Shilluk (6), gar by the Nuer (7), and gornum by the Dinka (8).

The second phase comprised the life of the cicatrized boys in seclusion where they stayed while their wounds were healing up and for a further period of time during which they were instructed both in practical and theoretical knowledge. The Northern Dinka initiates were taught morals only. They learnt about their religion not until they became men of thirty five. (9) Among the Joluo the boys were trained in fencing with their sticks, on account of which the group was called "the fencing lads" (aparak or agoyo). (10) Evans-Pritchard maintains that in his time neither in connection with the cutting nor during any subsequent stage did the Nuer initiation of the boys include educational or moral training neither of technique nor of traditions. (11) He rejects Stigand's information of their military training (12), owing to the age-sets - in his opinion - being only incidentally a military system at all. Against this opinion we will maintain that the ritual was part of the socialization process, a symbolic affirmation of certain social values, and in traditional Nilotic society where specialized formal educational institutions were non-existent, the age-sets served as the main channels for inculcating the values of loyalty and group morality. The emphasis was on traditional values. The consequence of this was, i.a., the defence of the social and political systems.

The third phase, finally, began with purification rites of coming out of the seclusion, was then followed by a series of further ceremonies and festive occasions, and terminated with a round of visits by the initiate to all his relatives. (13) By taking part in dances (Shilluk: cong bul) a youth formally entered public life and could take part in a man's obligations and privileges. He received gifts of weapons and tools and possibly an ox and as a token of his new status he acquired a new name, an "ox name" (nyin tuot) (Joluo, Shilluk, and Nuer).

The Anuak and the Lango peoples diverged each in their own way from the above pattern.

The Anuak did not have highly formalized age-sets, and there was no initiation ritual, but when a group of youths of about the same age and in the same village was recognized to have grown to manhood, they collected together and formed a group (luak) in an enclosure near the homestead of the village headman and spent all day there for a period of several weeks. (14) At the end of this time a feast was provided by the headman, who also named the group. Youths appear to have been organized in this way every 7 or 8

years. Apart from hoeing the cultivations of the head, the luak seems to have had no special functions. Lienhardt states that the boys themselves selected from the older and richer men of the village one whom they wished to make their leader or sponsor (kwai luak), (15)

In the villages where a nobleman was the leader, on the other hand, each installed nobleman had a band of youths which served as a bodyguard and was in charge of a kwai luak. The luak was an essential part of a nobleman's power, particularly after the introduction of rifles when it became an effective private army. The nobleman, too, named his youths after they had left his court and served him and were due to be replaced by another younger set. (16)

In three of the four parts of the Lango country a festival (ewor or aworon) was held every fifth year for the purpose of honouring the aged and instructing the young men who had grown to manhood (awobi) in the tribal traditions. They were also taught their social duties, cultural heritage, arts of hunting and fighting, ritual and mysteries of rain-making together with rain-dances and songs appertaining to the group. (17) During this period of time there was a suspension of all hostilities within Langoland. At the end of every 16 years there was a gap of 9 years, instead of the usual 4, after which the cycle began again. The initiates were divided into one of four groups: "buffaloes" (jobi), "leopards" (kwaic), "elephants" (lyec), and "rhinos" (amorung). Each ewor was named after one of these animal groups and the rain rites for the following four years were said to belong to that group. The jobi and lyec had certain features in common as had the amorung and kwaic. The jobi called the lyec their fathers and the kwaic called the amorung theirs. A boy initiated at the lyec year remained a lyec all his life, and similarly with the other sets.

From this we conclude that the Lango age-set system was a cyclical system, unlike that of the other Nilotic groups which consisted of a straight progression of non-recurring sets. It was very similar to that of the Kipsigi, Teso, Kumam, and other Highland and Plains Nilotes, and it is generally recognized as deriving from there, since the Lango people consisted of big groups of Plains Nilotic origin. (18) But none of the Nilotic peoples followed either system exclusively. Bernardi is, therefore, of the opinion that "the difference between the two systems is one of stress. Where the lineal system is followed the stress is on the changing character of the age-system; where the cyclical system is observed, the consideration of the system's permanent form prevails". (19)

The Shilluk war leader (bany) was responsible for the initiation and the organization of the age-sets. (20) He was elected among the settlement chiefs at the ngol ceremony. As such he had no other administrative or political functions than organizing the mobilization of the warriors and presiding at communal feasts at which people assembled in age-sets. According to Nalder the Acholi war leader commanded all age-sets, too. (21) The Dinka chief was responsible for the initiation of all the boys of the tribe. (22) The Lango rain-maker played the leading part in the ewor ceremony. (23) Among the Nuer the officer in charge of initiation into age-sets was the cattle expert (wut ghok). (24) His authority was recognized in matters concerning the age-set system. A certain wut ghok was, in each tribe, responsible for opening and closing the initiation periods and thereby dividing the sets. He performed the appropriate rites in his district, and where the news went round other districts began or ceased initiation. It often happened that, when a new

set had been started in one tribe, an adjacent tribe would follow suit.

It is only natural that in a society in which seniority was socially significant, people with equal age status should tend to engage in common activities and practise mutual hospitality. (25) Between members of the same age-set there was a loyalty and camaraderie. They treated each other as equals. They were bound together by a network of reciprocal rights and obligations. They helped each other with regard to food, and they hunted, danced and ceremonially ate together. Such groupings, however, were not formally organized and had no leadership. Certain ritual observances were also practised between members of the same age-set, and between members of different sets, principally in consequence of the relations being defined in ordinary kinship terms. E.g., a Nuer man might not marry or have sexual relations with the daughter of an age mate, for he was a classificatory father to her. (26) The network of mutual obligations which they acknowledged might have been an important determinant of interpersonal behaviour, and so an effective agent of cohesion.

Every man was not only a member of a particular set, but also at any given time he occupied, with his age mates, a particular grade. It is difficult to find proper terms for the various grades or stages of structural progression, but at times it is certainly correct to refer to them in terms of such general categories as youths, adults, elders, etc. as the Lango did. (27) On the other hand, the age grades among the Acholi were entirely based on a military frame of reference: boys (uninitiated), juniors, warriors, seniors, reservists, and old men (non-combatant). (28) Specific rules were associated with each grade. Thus, warriors fought and defended the community from attack, elders settled disputes, made important decisions, and interceded with the ancestral spirits.

The essential thing about this kind of system was that the sets moved through the various grades as complete units. This means that a whole group of people - all the members of a particular set - changed their grade, and so their social status, all at once. As succeeding generations were initiated, each age-set moved up in rank, till it finally became the oldest age-set alive and withdrew from the organization. This status followed the upward movement of the sets and thus was periodically changed by structural progression. Changes of status entailed changes of prestige and influence, and hence of authority. Because the rhythms of structural progression were caused by the performance of the institutive ceremonies, everybody knew the structural status of any set, for those ceremonies were a matter of interest for the whole community.

The question of the social importance of the age-set systems is a matter of controversy. Evans-Pritchard maintains, as far as the Nuer are concerned, that its importance was only of a social nature in that a person's position in the age -set structure determined his social behaviour, and he sums up that the system "segments the male population of a tribe into stratified groups which stand in a definite relationship to one another and it cuts across territorial divisions, giving identity of status where there is political disparity and differentiating status where there is political identity". (29) We can agree with the view that primarily, the age-set organization was not so much in itself a system of political or social organization in which each age-set formed a unit with definite functions. This is also evident from the fact that the leaders held political authority quite apart from the age organization. But it was one of the institutions relating to political authority and leadership. It

was combined with the allocation of authority on the basis of seniority. Members of the senior grades constituted more or less formal councils of elders, whose importance as decision-makers might be backed by weighty sanctions. The organization chiefly served as a means of reckoning age. Seniority counted as a grading principle in economic, political, and magico-religious activities. The notion - to a certain extent universal - that advance in age means a rise in status was strengthened by the characteristics of clanship and its corollary - the ancestor cult. Therefore it is obvious - as Wagner emphasizes - that "in the absence of a calendar some system of time-reckoning is imperative to provide an objective criterion for determining seniority". (30) The formal transition of individuals from one clearly-marked social status to another provided for such a criterion.

To a limited extent they provided a means of establishing corporate groups whose members,while they were in the warrior grades,might form a standing army. Howell suggests that formerly the Shilluk age-set system had special military functions: "Although now fast disappearing and no longer of great significance owing to the repressive policy of the Government, the primary function of the age-grade organization seems to have been military". (31) Everywhere the right to raise armies and make war was taken away from the indigenous authorities, who thenceforward had to depend upon the colonial Government for protection against internal and external enemies. It is certainly wrong to regard this as the primary function of the age-set system. But as a corollary of the principle of seniority and the mechanisms for system maintenance connected to it the initiation and the membership of an age-set had great importance for the military and political systems. These conditions were strengthened by the fact that individuals of the same age - apart from any formal organization - always have a tendency to unite in consequence of similar physical capacity and common experiental background.

The age-sets emphasized the solidarity of the community by organizing the generations within it. The age systems also provided a means of establishing social contact, even some sense of tribal unity and cohesion, over a wider range than would otherwise be possible. Often the age-sets were organized on the basis of whole communities. Sometimes they were even syncronized with the age-sets of neighbouring communities and tribes with similar systems. Crosscutting kinship and community groups, the age-sets constituted convenient units to which men could rally for defence, raiding, or ceremonies.

Last - but not least - in transmitting culture between generations and socializing individuals into the cultural heritage the educative process as performed by the initiation contributed to social integration.

The partly wrong picture of the Nilotic age-set systems given by recent authorities depends to a large extent on the fact that the age-set systems represented a passing social order. They grew with territorial expansion and the need to maintain political independence and internal security. Its weapons proved ineffectual against conquest symbolized by the colonial system. Moreover, owing to the political and economic changes the age-set systems were gradually becoming less important as a factor of social integration and the status system based on social age had fewer functions to fulfil with each passing generation.

4.1 Historical background

4.1.1 Traditional history

The history of the River-lake Nilotes is largely that of the origins and migrational movements of the ancestors of the local communities, and their development as cultural and political units. (1) The original group of River-lake Nilotes lived along the Nile in the southern Sudan. This place of origin has often been referred to as the "cradle-land of the Nilotes". Up to the 15th century, they all lived just south of the point where the Bahr el Ghazal river meets the Nile. Their descendants moved and settled all through the southern Sudan, along the Sudan border in Ethiopia, into Zaire, across Uganda, and as far as the coasts of Lake Nyanza in Kenya and Tanzania. In the Sudan, the groups of Nilotes found today are the Dinka, the Nuer, and those peoples who are collectively called the Lwo, viz. the Shilluk, the Anuak, and a few others. The Anuak are also in Etiopia. In Zaire near Lake Albert live the Alur. In the northern part of Uganda are found the Acholi and the Lango. In eastern Uganda along the eastern side of Lake Nyanza are the Luo of Nyanza. All through the Bantu-speaking world to the north and west of Lake Nyanza are found Nilotic groups, now speaking Bantu languages. In some cases, they are the ruling families of their predominantly Bantu areas.

The coming of the Lwo had a tremendous impact on the history of this region. Through central Uganda there has been much friction and intermingling in the last five centuries since the Lwo peoples began pressing against the northern borders of the Bantu. Contrary to the eastern and northern parts of Uganda, at the time of the Lwo invasion southern Uganda was densely populated. Here Lwo were the heirs, not the initiators of the political system. It was the Lwo who assumed kinship over the remnants of the Bachwezi empire, called Bunyoro-Kitara. Some stories tell us that the Lwo were invited to take over as rulers by the Bachwezi before they ran away. They began a dynasty of kings called the Bito dynasty, because the founders were of the JoBito clan of the Lwo. The Nyoro area became the dynamic centre of Lwo penetration of Uganda.

Thus, the early Lwo expansion was not enacted in a complete vacuum. Nevertheless, the same applies to the early Dinka-Nuer movements, which took place during roughly the same period. There were populations of hunter-gatherers, who would have entered into relationships with the newcomers and exchanged products. Many were absorbed into the Nilotic tribes; others maintained their independence by retreating into the forest and other types of country less favourable for crops and herds. There are to this day a number of groups or bands that live by hunting and gathering, and exchange with their agricultural and pastoral neighbours. Not all these hunter-gatherers and forest-dwellers are in fact true descendants of the pre-food-producing inhabitants of the area. Some have reverted to this mode of life, for in hard times many people will take refuge in the forest, or revert to a life dependent on nature. In some regions, stories are told of dwarfs that once lived or hid in the thick forests or sudds. (2) The reliability of these stories is difficult to

assess, but they may refer to the former presence of pygmies.

The information that has been given evinces that the principal motivation of the migration of the Nilotes must have been the desire for a better country. The migration from the southern Sudan seems to have been caused by dynastic and domestic disputes, overcrowding, famine, tsetse flies, and sleeping sickness. The early Nilotes were forced to penetrate adjacent areas, and since they were successful colonizers, their numbers continued to increase rapidly in all the widely separated places where they settled. Some of the more pastoral Nilotic migrants are supposed to have spread across the plains and grasslands as conquering waves or as desperate splinter-groups in search of land or refuge; more often migration was generally a very short-distance affair. The expansion in Nilotic history is best understood as the accumulation of many small movements of people over a period of generations. As populations increased and more land was required, so expansion and migration proceeded, and new territory was cleared from the wild, for homesteads, pastures and fields.

Some authorities are of the opinion that they settled without much resistance as, apart from minor skirmishes, no major military encounter is reported; extermination or expulsion of the previous population by the immigrant invaders was the rare exception, and interaction and assimilation of peoples the rule. Crazzolara, who is an extreme representative of this view, considers it to be a historical fact that wherever the Lwo arrived they met awe-struck populations which were more than ready to accede to the view that the Lwo possessed god-given powers and gifts for leadership. "People longed for it, they did not submit to it." (3) We generally assume that the truth about past events is at least in some degree ascertainable - it usually is a matter of degree - but we know, too, history is influenced by those who transmit it. Since Crazzolara admits that the historical traditions recorded by himself to a large extent derive their origin from the dominant Lwo groups, it is evident that they mirror their own ideology. It would appear that the small but well-disciplined Lwo minority succeeded in establishing their control over the former inhabitants so that today the only existing historical traditions are those of the Lwo.

Traditional evidence suggests that the Lwo were accepted as rulers because of their mental and physical qualities. They are said to have been welcome as "protectors" and "guardians" of the small scattered aboriginal communities. Furthermore, being superior to the much less sophisticated culture of the aboriginals, they could provide a more differentiated economy, and they were rich in the all-important commodity of cattle with which they could reward and assist their subjects. And the fact that people believed in their divine origin was of no less significance. The fact is that the Nilotes were the creative and dominant force in the amalgam. Nevertheless, one ought to make a distinction between the conditions in which the Lwo regimes were established and the legitimacy associated with an ideology as well as with a number of outstanding personalities that they could have acquired over a period of time. The traditions explicitly prove that the Lwo confrontation with foreign groups did not follow a stereotyped pattern but present a complete spectrum of different sorts of action from voluntary subjection to extermination and expulsion, which speaks in favour of the authenticity of the traditions. We can quote a Shilluk tradition which states that Nyikang, the founder of the kingdom, used to send his messengers to tell the people of every village to subdue to his forces peacefully, otherwise they would have no other alterna-

tive but to fight. It is also said that he used his supernatural powers by sending fear and cowardice into the hearts of the people so that they surrendered without a fight. Many surrendered, many fled, and some afforded weak resistance. (4) Nevertheless, certain general factors can be discovered. Above all, this is the case when both parties competed against each other for the same ecological environment. The population density in the land into which the Nilotes penetrated is also intimately bound up therewith. The greater the density, the more difficult it was to penetrate the territory in question.

4.1.2 The colonial period

There had been Egyptian influence in the Sudan after the Turkish conquest of Nubia in the 16th century. (5) By the beginning of the 19th century the Sudan was divided into numerous small chieftainships which had come into being after the disintegration of the Funj Empire. Mohammed Ali of Egypt began the conquest of the Sudan in 1820; Kordofan was annexed in 1822 and the new capital, Khartoum, was established in 1823. By 1830 that town had become the centre of a great slave and ivory trade; by 1859 armed bands, composed chiefly of Dongolani, had pushed beyond the boundaries of Egyptian-occupied territories in all directions, and had established trading posts as far south as on the northern edge of Uganda. The trade was self-financing, the result of one season's activities enabled the borrowed capital to be repaid. Thenceforward all was profit. The main expenses were the large bribes necessary to sweeten the Egyptian officials so that they would allow the slaves to proceed downstream. The large profits derived from the trade at this time attracted adventurers of many different nationalities, including Copts, Syrians, Turks, Maltese, and others. In 1860 there were eight European companies operating under licence from the military Governor of the Sudan. The purpose of the Egyptian Government in seeking control of the Sudan was mainly to obtain slave-recruits for its armies. The merchants were able to supply that need and also to enrich themselves with the ivory trade as a profitable sideline.

The slave and ivory traders did not only approach from the North into Nilotic areas. For some years before 1860 Islamic influence had reached Uganda from two directions. The Arab state of Zanzibar, established by Said bin Sultan in 1806, had by 1856 become the most important port on the East African coast. Its slave, ivory, spices and gum markets were the most important in the East. The prosperity of Zanzibar was founded on the caravans of Arab merchants, who, as the supply of ivory and slaves was exhausted in the coastal tracts, penetrated further and further inland in search of virgin territory to exploit.

Thus when accurate historical records are first available, Uganda was already placed astride the watershed of the two large trading systems. Part of the ivory and slaves collected among them flowed to the North, and found its way to the markets of Khartoum, and from there either to ports on the Red Sea such as Suakin and Masawa, or to Cairo, for distribution throughout the countries of the Middle East. Another part flowed South and emerged at Zanzibar, where the ivory was sold and the slaves either bought for domestic use at Zanzibar and the other coastal towns, or shipped to Arab and Asiatic markets.

The slavery in the Sudan and Uganda was an old one. It is important to realize that in the early phase the slave trade was almost entirely confined within the traditional pattern of tribal life. It started as domestic slavery

and turned into gang slavery to international demand. It was part of the structure of the societies of the North and the South. Its origin and development lay in tribal warfare. When weaker tribes were conquered or raided by the stronger tribes, slaves were taken. Originally the trade was in ivory and the traders established curious predatory alliances with the local chiefs and tribes, and inter-tribal warfare passed into a means of extending the power of the slave traders over vast regions. The situation and the process of slave trade, according to Sanderson (6), was "more complex than that implied in the traditional stereotype of 'Arab' exploiters and negroid victims". Some groups were indeed enslaved almost to the point of tribal disintegration, but even among these, some fortunate individuals found in enslavement not a life of misery but an attractive career. In the states of Buganda, Karagwe, and Bunyoro primary production of slaves was a state monopoly operated by the rulers, who dealt with Arab traders as middlemen in a chain of distribution. The Arabs had to pay heavily for their privilege. (7)

In the middle of the 19th century slavery was an essential part of the economy of the Sudan, Egypt and other Islamic countries. The Khedive Ismail of Egypt, however, under pressure from the Anti-Slavery Society in England, decided to take action to bring to an end the actual collection of slaves on the Upper Nile, although while the market existed it was evident that the supply was sure to continue. 1869-1879 were years of struggle between the Egyptian Government and slave traders, the former striving to establish its authority and the latter to continue their work. In 1881 discontent with Egyptian rule culminated in a revolt instigated by Muhammad Ahmad, a native of Dongola, who declared himself the Mahdi or Messiah. It is noticeable that the largest number of outsiders in the Southern Sudan were Dongolese. These people who had no official status, but lived off the land, had become thoroughly acclimatized to the South, and traded and behaved as they pleased. (8) The Mahdi's followers, the Ansar, grew rapidly in number, support being found especially among the merchants and slave traders whose business had suffered through taxes and Government intervention. They covered their political and economic interests with a veil of religion, since the institution of slavery was not as such repugnant to Islam. (9)

Beshir emphasizes that it is far from true that the Mahdi's revolt represented a revolt of the Muslim North alone against the foreign administration and refers to Sanderson who writes that by 1880 the whole South was united against Egyptian rule. (10) This is an absurd point of view. The overthrow of the Egyptian regime did not give the tribes of the region the freedom they desired. The people of the South appear to have remained either indifferent or actually hostile to Mahdism, for the coming of the Ansar was the signal for the slave traders to resume operations. This fact, and their general inability to establish any permanent co-existence or modus vivendi with the tribes, accounts for the extremely disruptive influence of the Mahdist State on the peoples of the South. (11) On the other hand, the local rulers who participated in the slave trade certainly stood up for the revolt against an oppressive and unpopular government. For example, in 1898 messengers were sent to Khartoum to call the followers of the Mahdi to assist the Nyoro king against the troublesome English. (12)

Once again Beshir embraces the Arab cause in maintaining that the disruption of the tribal organization of the Southern tribes was the result of the punitive expeditions and repressive measures made against the tribes which refused to accept the new administration rather than of a large-scale slave

trade. (13) The fact remains that first under the Egyptian regime and then under the Mahdiya, the Southern Sudanese were plundered and oppressed, and their principal despoilers and oppressors were Arab and European traders, who systematically exploited the Southern territories. It resulted in the complete depopulation of large areas of the Southern Sudan and the disintegration of the social and political systems of many peoples. By 1870, the slave trade was estimated to be 12,000 to 15,000 persons per annum. The slavers and ivory traders very little inconvenienced the Nuer. It was only the Zeraf River tribes that appear to have suffered to any extent from their depredations. Among the Nilotic peoples above all the Dinka and the Joluo sustained severe depletions causing prejudicial implications for the continued existence of their societies. As early as 1827 a slave-raid was made into the Northern Dinka country, but it yielded only (!) 500 captives, while the Dinka put up a very stiff resistance. (14)

It is difficult to estimate what the effect must have been on the social and political systems of the loss of their cattle. But the destruction of the once-large herds of cattle by the Sudanese slave and ivory raiders in the 19th century must have affected the livelihood of the people considerably. According to Baker's calculation, a station sending 1,000 loads of ivory to Khartoum in a year, consumed upwards of 5,000 head of cattle in the same period. (15) Rinderpest epidemics and finally sleeping sickness parasites helped to complete what the raiders had begun. Grunnet states concerning the Dinka that the slave hunt was responsible for the expansion of the tsetse fly. Bush and flies invaded and the cattle could not exist where it formerly played a big part. (16) There are now only small numbers of cattle among the Acholi and Lango. At one time they may have had a mixed economy with cattle herding and agriculture playing equal part. Agriculture is now dominant, eked out by hunting and food gathering.

After the decisive defeat of the Khalifa's forces in 1898, the task was the imposition of the Pax Britannica upon the Nilotic territories. Pacification was not an easy task. Some of the tribes looked upon the new administration in the same light as they looked upon the Egyptian or the Mahdist administration. Expeditions and patrols were sent from time to time to quell a revolt of a tribe refusing to submit or suffering from inter-tribal feuds and fights. The Nuer were the most difficult of the tribes to pacify. Beshir enumerates 10 expeditions against this tribe between 1902 and 1928. It was not until the early 1930's that the Nuer finally submitted. Other patrols were sent against the Atwot, Twi and Aliab Dinka and the Anuak. (17)

The situation in the White Nile Province was more serious because of their proximity to Ethiopia, where slavery was a recognized institution. Traffic in slaves continued on the Ethiopian border until 1912 and, in spite of extended efforts, the trade continued to flourish in the late 1920's. Probably the Anuak rulers had a finger in the pie also.

The chaos that the slave trade was unable to cause, the British pacification carried to its conclusion. Their line of conduct may, to a certain extent, be explained by the fact that originally their policy was based on two coherent misconceptions which were present during a long period of British rule in the Sudan and Uganda and which were non the less potent forces for being unconscious. The first of these was the idea that in the past most indigenous societies lacked any real organization or continuity. The second was that the British administrators conceived the ideal form of all government as that represented by a constitutional monarchy. Thereby their first-hand classifi-

cation directed the development. Girling states that he was asked by Acholi men whose traditional ruler had been removed and a stranger appointed as Chief in his stead: "Why have you Europeans spoiled our Government, while you have left intact that of the Banyoro and the Baganda?" (18) The same may be said about the Shilluk. The European foreigners may in some degree be excused, since the traditional leaders were in several places in the habit of keeping well in the background and continued to operate incognito, being referred to by different names for so many years that the British administration believed them to be without chief or any form of traditional leadership. Or else they put forward a mere figurehead. (19) Thus the colonial power created in several places the conditions that they believed to be the original ones. The European administration worked toward the disintegration of societies whose traditions, norms and religion were unknown, misunderstood or ignored. They undeniably encouraged the fragmentation of the realm into a mosaic of independent communities. These facts will influence our mode of approach. The possible contention of our authorities that there were no real chiefs need not be accepted without qualification.

With these summary statements of the Nilotic history as a background, we will now proceed to the analysis of the political systems of the individual Nilotic peoples.

4.2 The Alur

4.2.1 Introduction

At the time of the Lwo invasion, western and northern Uganda was sparsely populated. Here Lwo were the initiators, not the heirs of, the political system. The best example of their expansive power can be observed in the Alur country, where it worked in two ways. (1) The Lwo mixed with the Madi, Lendu, Okebo, and Bendi, with groups of Nyoro speakers and small aboriginal Bantu groups of the Nile valley and Lake Albert, and with the western Bantu Nyali and Bira. In the highlands (Alur mamalo) Atyak and Ucibo clans, who arrived at this region c. 14 generations ago, subdued a great number of different ethnic groups and captured a vast territory by planting out princes as sub-chiefs from already existing Lwo chiefdoms in order to rule over non-Lwo groups (the chiefdoms of Ukuru, War, Mambisa, etc.). This was the most distinctive feature of Alur chiefship in contrast with other neighbouring areas of Lwo political power, such as the Acholi. But it had counterparts elsewhere in the great Lakes Region, especially in the proliferation of chiefship from Bunyoro into Busoga, Toro, Koki, and Kiziba. (2)

At the same time Lwo extended their dominion in another way in the lowlands (Alur mapiny) (e.g., the chiefdom of Ragem). Here most of the Lwo chiefs came from the great Bito state Bunyoro, though they could make no claim to kinship with the Bito dynasty. The political right they demanded was based on regalia and other outward signs of chieftainship. Once the Bito rulers had accepted their position, the Lwo chiefs did not extend their territorial power by placing their sons like the highland chiefs. Instead they delegated political authority to certain favoured or key clan heads, who then ruled over both Lwo and other ethnic groups. (3) Many of the Alur chiefs (at least those in the Angal and Magongo areas) continued, until recent times, to recognize the paramountcy of the Nyoro king, or rather what Southall calls "their ritual subordination" to the Nyoro king (*mukama* in Runyoro, *ruot madit* in Lwo), by going to Bunyoro "for confirmation of their title after accession to

kingship". (4) Evidently the Alur fell within the sphere of Nyoro political influence, and if the term "empire" is not too narrowly defined they may be said to have formed a part of the Kitara empire.

4.2.2 Social structure

The Lwo element represented in the first place the royal or ruling lineage (jo pa ruot), and then the noble or aristocratic clans (joker, sing. nyaker). All the rest represented the subjects of the former or common people (luak, properly speaking "the herd", sing. jaluak, or jomiru), the aboriginal population of the country (wegi ngom, wegi lobo), who had to do the ordinary work for their masters as well as their own. (5) The Abira and the Lendu were supposed formerly to have been hunting and collecting peoples, while the Okebo were the major iron-workers of the area. Luak (or bong joker) also included people who attached themselves as clients to members of the royal lineage and followed them as their suite. (6) Nevertheless, a good number of the Lwo had become luak, i.e., they might intermarry with the Lwo proper. It was the clans which could claim ancient Lwo, though commoner descent, which had the greatest general prestige, while their political importance depended largely on their size and cohesion. In relation to their numbers, the commoner clans developed less than the royal clans, above all as a result of the state of inferiority, in which they kept their subjects, as well as the tribute which the royal clan imposed on them. (7) Moreover, the Lendu - unlike the Okebo - were penalized by specific regulations against marrying Alur girls; but Alur always married the daughters of the subject groups for they ruled over them. (8)

A form of domestic "serfdom" was much more important among the Alur-dominated Lendu than among the other dominated tribes. Alur used various terms to indicate serf status: jomiru, bong, angeca. These terms were partly regional variations of the same concept. According to Southall, they were not slaves, and had the same political rights of person as ordinary subject clans, but males were given wives by their masters, who consequently had the right of disposing of any resultant daughters in marriage. Such a status might result from orphanhood or destitution, giving in exchange for food in famine or in settlement of a blood feud or as a fine to a chief, but rarely if ever the result of purposive capture in war. (9)

4.2.3 Political structure

The Alur country as a whole never had any political unity. Yet there is no evidence of serious fighting between different Lwo groups. Their situation in the midst of alien populations, whom they wished to dominate, may have concentrated the political energies of each group on maintaining and developing its effectiveness in a situation of constant hazard. The exercise of power was directed towards alien groups rather than towards one another, so that relations between the different Lwo groups remained good, and while they were probably prepared to co-operate with the chief among them whose groups was particularly powerful for the moment, no centralized political structures developed. (10)

Among the Alur a degree of political specialization was present in the form of chiefs (ruoth, sing.) and sub-chiefs (nyathi ruoth, properly speaking "princes") with monopolized politico-religious powers (ker) and an embryonic administrative staff. (11) The greater chiefs, like the chief of

Ukuru, had a large body of retainers living in and around their homesteads. These varied greatly in status. The first one was the deputy or representative of the chief (jadipo or jawange (or lawang) ruot). (12) One of the chief's half brothers could be selected to this position. He was the jago of the court and of the royal clan. Though a chief was expected to stay in his homestead and always to be available to his subjects, rather than to move about his chiefdom, the chief was not generally accessible to everybody. Cases of members of the royal clan, or of other clans that had joined the royal clan directly, were brought before the jadipo and were discussed and tried by him; only special cases would be submitted to the chief by the jadipo himself. Moreover, there were the chief's great councillors (jokal), usually belonging to some commoner clans, and the destitute who had sought asylum with him as clients (andwaci). (13) There was no critical distinction between jokal and andwaci, for though the latter were in essence of inferior status they often in time individually acquired the status and duties of the former. A big chief had particular courtiers as envoys semiformally accredited to different quarters of his chiefdom. They went with the customary gifts to confirm the accession of sub-chiefs; or with the chief's spear to warn fighting parties to desist on pain of the chief's active intervention. (14) The chief's slaves (jomiru kal or jomiru pa ruot) were war-prisoners who were divided into groups or "clans", each group having its particular compulsory job. Another class of slaves were the nyiwot kal, boys and girls whom the subjects had to pay as compensation for homicide (members of the royal clan had to pay a bull only) or else the chief burned their homesteads. (15) Finally, Madi warriors served the chiefs of Ukuru as a bodyguard, and Lendu hordes fought for the chiefs of Panduru. (16) This embryonic administrative staff possessed by chiefs in their envoys and courtiers never acquired any formally defined administrative powers, and remained intermittent agents, advisers and confidents of their chief.

Change in the chiefly position usually occurred at the death of the chief, but they had even recourse to the deposition of the chief, if he had lost the support from the subjects, because he ruled with severity. (17) The chief could even - more or less voluntarily - prefer to retire from the position owing to the fact that one of the princes had seduced one of the chiefly wives. (18) It might be suggested that this was interpreted as an indication of sexual impotency on the part of the chief which made him unfit for discharging his position.

In all chiefdoms the death of a chief was signal occasion for the mobilization of the chiefdom as a whole; for the expression of its political structure; the affirmation of ties of ritual and tradition with other chiefs of common descent; and for the exchange of courtesis with other neighbouring chiefdoms of common culture and political value. A chief's death was also an occasion of generally recognized amnesty. The news of a great chief's death ("the milk is spilt") was taken by envoys to the clan heads of the chiefdom, to its sub-chiefs and to neighbouring chiefs. (19) The death of a chief was a ritual and political secret. As in the case of other sacral chiefships and kingships, there could be no formal recognition of a chief's death except in the form of a recognition and proclamation of the reigning successor. This was delayed for some months after the actual death. The treatment of the whole matter as a state secret, even if the secrecy was feigned, may well have done something to reduce chaos, and to tide over the period necessary for the new chief to secure his position and for the new reign to be accepted as a fait

accompli by the people.

The selection of a successor to the chiefship was the product of factors not rigidly defined. In ritual terms it was simply stated that the chief's successor was the son who put a bead into the mouth of the dead chief. (20) In practice, succession to chiefship was decided by the balance between the dying chief's choice from among his sons, and that of his assembled elders. The eldest son was not necessarily elected but he was supposed to be the most fitted. Illness and sometimes twinship seem to have disqualified any prince as pretender to the chiefship. (21) The decision was given supernatural ratification by the giving of porridge with a bead hidden in it to all the sons. (22) In Ukuru the heads of commoner and chiefly clan sections, all the elders of the chief's minimal lineage, and the old and respected widows of the chief, congregated, each group in a separate hut, to reach a final decision as to the succession. (23) If a chief's son did not acquire political power during the lifetime of his father the chief, or during that of his full or half brother who succeeded, he did not acquire it at all. (24) It was not the practice of the royal lineage to eliminate or suppress defeated rivals to the throne as it was in some other places, but such rivals had to withdraw to a safe distance from the victorious one. (25) Usually the maternal uncle's village was thought to be the natural place of refuge. (26) During interregnum even a female relative could act as regent guarding the royal stool (okoro kom). (27)

Once the successor was selected, whether through peaceful deliberations, or only after the vanquishing of rivals, there followed the rituals in public and private for endowing him with the powers and attributes of chiefship. He was secluded for some days in a special hut (kovogo), and during this time was instructed by old clan heads in some of the secrets of office and the ritual injunctions which regulated the life of a chief. Tradition stressed the importance of the initiation of the new chief into the mysteries of chiefship, culminating in those of rain-making. (28) After the period of seclusion the new chief was invested with the robes and regalia of chiefship (jämi ker or masana mi ker: the royal spear, drum, stool, metal shoes, etc.). He was then introduced with sacrifices to the chiefly ancestor shrines, and finally presented to the multitude in the council place (dipo), and there enstooled. He was given instructions by the elders (jodongo) on the duties of a chief. (29) He also received the homage of all holders of political office in the chiefdom, and of many other men and women.

At their succession the chiefs would as a rule select their deputy. In a few instances, they set up new jegos for the different districts and replaced one clan head by another, or directed a particular clan to reside in a particular locality for a definite purpose. (30) But for the most part they not only accepted the subordinate authorities they found, but permitted them to be replaced at death through the traditional mechanisms internal to the sub-chief areas or clan sections concerned, having themselves only a vague and negative control by way of agreeing or refusing to confirm the successors chosen.

The chief's domestic life differed from that of commoners as regards the special etiquette observed towards him and the special food taboos and other rituals observed by him. (31)

The chiefs followed the same rules of exogamy as commoners. (32) The chief was marrying girls he fancied from all the subject clans, so giving them a renewed interest and stake in the chiefship through their bonds of consanguinity with it, and from this heterogeneous stock he himself begot an ever growing population observing common values. (33) By their marriage,

chiefs also increased the distribution of cattle among their subjects, which became hostage of good behaviour which could be confiscated for political offences. A chief was expected to pass bridewealth for his wives in the same way as ordinary husbands. But chiefs were traditionally accustomed to the acquisition of wives by other means than normal contract. They always had some women falling into their hands as a result of war or of payment of fines. The greatest distinction between the wives of chiefs and those of commoners was that the former could not themselves terminate the union under any circumstances.

The chief always controlled the production and consumption cycles. (34) The chiefship, as so often in African societies, was economically based very largely on a reciprocity of goods and services in which the chief was the main centre of exchange of products from different ecological regions. Different groups delivered different products according to economic resources in the area. The chief also added a certain entrepreneur function of his own which kept the process in motion. (35) Moreover, he had the task of organizing hunts and of firing the bush. A family had rights in as much land as it could cultivate. When land was abandoned it reverted to the chief who held all land on behalf of his people. Any stranger wishing to settle on the land of a chief had to ask his permission first.

The extractive capability of the Alur chiefdoms took the form of fines, services and tribute. Fines and tribute (tyer) were an important but rather irregular source of wealth. Probably the chief received a certain amount in this way after every harvest, in the form of grain and animals. Craftsmen and people from parts of the country which had local specialities brought contributions of these: salt from an area with salt deposits, dried fish from the lowland near the Nile and sesame from the higher ground, ironwork from the Okebo, woven baskets from other groups, etc. Moreover, the chiefs claimed the right hind leg of every large game animal that was caught, and the ivory and the skins of lion and leopards. (36) In theory all found wanderers were a prerogative of the chief in the same way as ivory and portions of game. (37) They expected the heads of the clans subject to them to bring to the court what was due to it. Sub-chiefs who acknowledged the overlordship of their fathers received the tribute from their subjects and sent some of it on; to cease to do this was to assert autonomy. All this was done on such a small scale that there was no need for special officials to organize it. Such regular tribute was stated as an ideal by both chiefs and commoners, especially as a "thanksgiving" to the chief for the prosperity which his ritual activities had brought to his people. In practice tribute depended on the loyalty of the clans and sub-chiefs and on the size of the crops. (38) Tribute service was probably much more regular than tribute in kind. Chiefs had their fields dug for them every season, and their huts and granaries built whenever they needed it. Naturally it was the Lendu clans living nearest to the chief who were mainly called to do the work.

The distributive capability was in part tied up with the extractive capability and in part with the symbolic capability. Thus, from the supplies of grain and livestock he received he helped the needy and rewarded the loyal subjects. The large herds the chief possessed, by which his prestige was i. a. measured, were mainly kept nearby, though some were also sent further afield. These herds were given out to members of nearby clans, to cognatic relatives, to clients, and so on. (39) Moreover, he organized feasts which evoked sentiments of loyalty and intensified social relationships leading to a

sense of unity. (40)

The symbolic capability of chiefship was intended to knit the chiefdom together, or at least to secure for it a loyal core of supporters. This was effected through the traditional distribution of rituals among a number of different clans. (41) The ritual gave a special place to the clans whose ancestors were believed to have been associated with the chiefs before they emigrated to their present country. E.g. while the succession was being discussed the likely candidates went into hiding, and the successful one had to be found and captured with a show of force. This was the duty of the elders of two of the senior clans. Other clans were responsible for tending the great shrines and the royal graves (jatyer). Moreover, it was particularly important to tie the aboriginal groups into the system. They had valuable local ritual knowledge which it was expedient to incorporate. So were the Bira the ultimate standby of the chiefs in rain-making, and when the chief of Ukuru moved his village it was they who cut the space for it. (42)

As mediators between the natural and supernatural realms the chiefs were not, in this sphere, used for individual consultation on personal problems, but the lives of chiefs and the rituals performed by them were held by themselves and by their subjects to provide the indispensable general foundation for public well-being. (43) More particularly, this aspect of chiefship was formally expressed in the chief's personal ancestor worship, in his service of the various ancient shrines of his chiefdom, and in his rain-making activities. The chiefs paid the same attention to their ancestor shrines as commoners did to theirs, offering first fruits at harvest time, and making sacrifices whenever divination revealed that misfortune was due to a dissatisfied ancestor. In addition, a chiefly ancestor shrine inevitably had a political focus. We have already referred to the new chief's presentation to it. It was also one of the essential means of making or averting rain. It was the place at which, and the means by which, the loyalty of the heads of clan sections to their chief was enjoined and expressed. Heads were chosen by their clan sections at the death of their predecessors, and installed in their villages. But in some chiefdoms they could not take their share of the sacrificial feasts at the chief's ancestor shrine until they had been ceremonially invested before it.

The efficacy of rain-making was inherent in the chiefship, which inhered in the chiefly lineage, but rain power was divisible. (44) Its ultimate source remained theoretically in the lineage of the holders of the original chiefship of each chiefly lineage, but such holders could bestow subsidiary rain powers on any other members of their own lineage who acquired the political power which necessitated rain-making, though each bestowed his won ultimate power on his own chosen heir. It can be seen from this that rain power was very largely an aspect of political power. In fact, we see that autonomous political authority never existed among the Alur without the validation of rain-making, and this must - according to Southall (45) - be attributed "on the one side to the fact that authority would not be accepted as legitimate on other terms, and on the other to the fact that all holders of such authority belong to lineages in which chiefly rain power has inhered since time immemorial. All therefore possessed potential rain powers which were realized by their achievement of political authority".

Finally, a chief's power depended ultimately on the number and size of his subject groups, and he was considered personally responsible for both factors by virtue of his popularity in the one case and his sacral power in the other.

(46) There is no mention in the tradition of any group of chiefs or sub-chiefs ever having tried to prevent the transference of allegiance by force, just as there is also no mention of any chief ever having tried by physical means to enforce recognition of his suzerainty on derivative sub-chiefs or on any other chiefs.

The process of Lwo domination consisted in the spread of the Lwo concepts of chiefship (k e r), by means of the natural increase and spatial dispersion of the persons through whom it could be expressed. Southall points out that three aspects are to be noted. (47) First, the constant rise of new sub-chiefs and the immense increase of the lineages of chiefs and sub-chiefs. Such lineages were attached by the strongest ties to the ideas of chiefship, and they always enjoyed the privileges of it themselves, though to a diminishing extent. Second, the Lwo commoner clans, which were the earliest subjects of Lwo chiefs, demonstrated the practice of chiefship by their exaction of rights and submission to obligations under it. Third, the sections of non-Lwo tribes on the advancing peripheries of Lwo chiefdoms, which found it worthwhile to become attached as junior members of the cadre of subject clans, gradually acquired equal status and full membership of Alur society.

The system of sub-chiefs was far more highly developed in and from Ukuru than anywhere else, and chiefs and sub-chiefs derived from the original Atyak chiefship of Ukuru controlled more than half the population of Alurland. (48)

In both a geographical and an ideological sense, the sub-chiefs radiated from the major chiefs. (49) Capacity for chiefship depended not only on chiefly descent but on continuity in the exercise of chiefship. Irrespective of those who acquired their political power in Bunyoro, Alur tradition provides no instance of elevation to rule for any whose fathers were not ruling chiefs, nor the re-assertion of chiefship once it had lapsed, let alone of the successful assertion of chiefship by any of non-chiefly descent. From another aspect chiefship was a matter of personality and sacral power, thought to be inherent in the chiefly lineage, as a result of the dogma of descent in the latter case and in the former of traditionally sanctioned patterns of upbringing and maturation, adequate to qualify a son of a ruling chief as a potential chief of any people.

Most clans in the highlands considered to want a prince to "guard" them (k o r o or g w o k o) so that other chiefs might respect them. (50) Such a petition was sometimes a welcome opportunity for a chief to deal with unruly sons by planting them out at a distance, in places outside the domain which he actually claimed to rule. Such a prince was not necessarily exclusively attached to a single localized clan section, but might serve a cluster of several of them, though usually a particular one had been primarily instrumental in his establishment and therefore might have stronger sentiments of attachment to him than any of the others. Some were those who became established as a result of direct entreaty to the chief by some commoner group for a son of his to settle with them. Other princes, who failed to succeed to their father's chiefship, might wander about, settle amongst some commoner group, and be accorded the honours of a prince by them. Those who drew this distinction regarded the first type of sub-chiefs as those who established firm lines of rulers who might develop into important chiefs. The second type was regarded as more ephemeral and as liable to lapse towards commoner status after the first generation. Recollected instances do not bear this distinction out, for sub-chiefs established in the second way had sometimes

founded important lines, while those established in the first way had often lapsed. It is, Southall says, "a distinction in terms of ritual ortodoxy rather than of actual power, and is not recognized at all by the Alur as a whole". (51)

There are elements which recur time and again in the accounts of the establishment of new sub-chiefs. (52) There is the actual securing of the prince by one particular group, or claimed as their honour by several groups in rivalry, represented as a kidnapping; there is the motive of the kidnappers, usually oppression which they had suffered and from which the new chief was to protect them; then the motive of the kidnapped prince himself, often escape from the consequences of some highhanded action which had got him into difficulties at home, and which made his departure a convenience to the major chief. There is also the deference paid to the new sub-chief by all the former authorities of the area on his arrival, either by full acceptance of his sovereignty or by migration far beyond his influence. Finally, there is confirmation of the power of the sub-chief in his new jurisdiction by the holder of the major chiefship from which he had sprung.

As long as any sub-chief recognized the superiority of another, it was open to his subjects, if they were dissatisfied with him, either simply to abandon him in favour of another sub-chief, or to supersede him by again going to the major chief and getting another prince as sub-chief. (53) On the other hand, sub-chiefs whose lines prospered, in terms of the increase of their own lineage and of their subject clan sections, became less and less distinguishable in status from the parent chiefs from whom they had originally sprung, and in course of time attained complete political autonomy. The size of a sub-chief's own lineage was an important factor in the stability of his position, for kinship made it the most effective support to the authority of its chiefly head, as well as giving it some immunity from abuse by him. The causal linkage of chiefship, cattle ownership, marriage, and procreation, made the empirical coincidence of successful chiefs and large chiefly lineages self-explanatory. The critical distinction between a sub-chief who remained to some extent the satellite of a major chief, and a sub-chief who had become himself an autonomous chief, depended in its political aspect on whether or not he continued to send tribute, especially in game from the hunt, to a major chief as his due, and to ask for rain. These criteria did not all necessarily coincide, and consequently it is not strictly logical to draw a hard and fast line between original major chiefships, lines of sub-chiefs which remained satellites of major chiefs, and lines of sub-chiefs which had become effectively autonomous. But though there are borderline cases the broad distinction is clear.

Generally sub-chiefs had no important insignia of chiefship. "Their insignia were their cattle." (54)

A sub-chief received dues and services similar to chiefs but on a smaller scale. (55) He had his fields cultivated, his granaries constructed and his huts built by his subjects. On the one hand, he claimed this of right, and the subjects presumably rendered it willingly since, after all, they had themselves usually been responsible for bringing the sub-chief among them. On the other hand, they expected their services to be recognized by a generous provision of food and drink, and persistent failure to do so would be one of the natural factors leading to supersession by a new line of sub-chiefs. This balance ran through the whole relationship.

It was the personal prestige of a prince that was stressed. His protection was visualized as personal authority rather than as ability to defend his subjects in war. While this ideology seems characteristic of the formal authority

pattern, and may have cut less ice in practice, real importance clearly did attach to the personal character of chiefs, which was highly relevant to their manipulation of the standardized techniques of chiefship, which included rain-making, hospitality, sacrifice, and judgement, which subtly depended upon the dignity and sheer self-confidence which was attributed to and always expected of chiefs.

General leadership in the domestic affairs of the smaller lineages was vaguely defined and very largely a joint effort of all lineage members who had reached the status of elders. Leadership became more definite at the point where it became more specifically political, and this was at the level of the larger corporate lineages and clan sections which were recognized by chiefs as forming the component local communities of their chiefdoms. (56) The graded definition of leadership was reflected in terminology. The word j a - d i t meant literally "elder", but could refer to physical age as well as to seniority by descent, and was used by a younger to an older child as well as in general reference to the elders. The leading elders of small lineages were usually simply jadit, just as all elders were, and as a family head was to his family. But the special term j a g o (or j e g o) was used for the heads of the corporate lineages or clan sections recognized by the chief, and if any segments of these had also acquired a clearly defined leadership, their heads were also called jago. These latter did not acquire new ritual duties, though the greater definition of their office meant a corresponding formalization of ritual function.

The headship of these lineages and clan sections followed strictly from father to son though not invariably to the eldest son. The succession was arranged by the elders of the whole group, though influenced by the choice made from among his sons by the previous head at his death and the successor was formally recognized, confirmed, and installed by the chief or sub-chief. The chief would refuse to recognize one who claimed the headship in defiance of the recognized rules of succession. If the head had legitimate male issue there was no question of any of his brothers succeeding him except as a usurper, and this would not usually have been permitted by the chief. The more permanent and stable the smaller corporate lineages became, as both agnatic and territorial segments of these component units of a chiefdom, the more the leadership in them approximated to the same clarity of definition. In this case, even if the leading elder of the lineage died leaving an heir too young to be considered as an elder, he succeeded to titular headship of the lineage, though the elders still jointly assumed considerable responsibility and could themselves officiate ritually on his behalf where necessary. In fact, even in the case of a chief's lineage, despite the unique position of the chief himself, the elders of his lineage still took a marked responsibility in the management of some of its internal affairs. (57)

The distinction between a chief or sub-chief and a clan section head is theoretically fundamental, although there were a few instances in which it appeared little more than ritual and nominal in practice. Southall maintains that "Chiefship and kinship are the joint principles of Alur political organization. Ideologically, the two principles are quite distinct, and at some points conflicting. But there are many links between them. Chiefship has spread and radiated to a considerable extent on kinship principles. Alur chiefs with their subjects, and Alur homestead heads with their domestic servants, were, respectively, more or less inclusive versions of a similar type of structure." (58) The head of a great clan exercised authority over a group several times

larger than the domains of the smallest sub-chiefs, and his authority was in some way more binding than theirs, but it remained a kinship and not a specifically political authority, and to this extent was more limited, lacking the sanctions of force which sub-chiefs could legitimately invoke, though not necessarily with success. Therefore the successful growth of an agnatic group was never enough in itself to confer the title of chiefship. (59) Thus, in principle, the headship of clan sections was totally distinct from chiefship, the latter depending on the recognition of specifically political allegiance, whereas the former was always based on the extended application of kinship principles. Heads of clan sections, which were recognized by chiefs as having administrative responsibility for other groups adjacent to them, had powers comparable in their territorial range to those of sub-chiefs, but the conceptual scope of their powers remained more limited. They acted on behalf of the chief and with his backing, whereas sub-chiefs were for most practical purposes independent, and became so more completely the more their realms increased - a development which was unheard of in the case of even the most important heads of clan sections.

While in a formal sense the regulative capability was in the hands of the chief, in actual fact it was substantially decentralized. Thus, the chief characteristic of Alur legal processes was that both the authority of the chiefs and sub-chiefs and the right of vengeance were recognized. (60) The subject peoples recognized the right of retaliation for wrongs and did not have any formal means of bringing hostilities to an end. Self-help was a latent possibility in the reaction to nearly all offences. For men tended to rely first on themselves; secondly on the agnatic kinsmen with whom they were settled; and only when these resources were inadequate, on the over-riding powers of chiefs or sub-chiefs. It was to their own interest to be spared from mixing up a chief, since his intervention could be an expensive matter. So the Nyali and Bendi, who like the Lendu had no chiefs of their own, came to the Mambisa chief for settlement of disputes. They had to pay a girl as a fee for the hearing of big cases. (61)

The Lwo chiefs did not bring with them a complete apparatus for the enforcement of law and order. The type of order enforced in Alur society was of a flexible kind, in which considerable political responsibility for their members was left to the heads of local groups, the chief and sub-chiefs acting directly in punishment of the gravest public delicts, but otherwise only when forced by challenge to their authority, since the ubiquitous tendency to self-help might aggravate any offence into an intolerable breach of public order, perhaps involving a chief in direct action with neighbouring political authorities. The general distinction between chiefs and sub-chiefs on these occasions was the contrast in the range of efficacy of their political powers and the greater likelihood of sub-chiefs becoming embroiled with one another. (62)

A chief had both moral and material means of enforcing the settlement of disputes. (63) Bloodshed was regarded as an offence against the respect due to them. Where his authority was effective, he would send messengers to collect the fine due to him and order the enemies to make peace. If the order was not obeyed the chief himself would appear on the scene with all his retainers, a band of followers who were neutral in the dispute at issue, and powerful enough to give decisive support to the side adjugated by the chief to be in the right. This was the procedure among the Lwo themselves. On the borders of Lwo authority, among subject peoples, the way of dealing with

sections who flouted the chief by refusing his orders to settle a dispute was to authorize more loyal subjects to plunder their possessions.

Concerning the assimilative capability, those particular factors which favoured the Lwo as a dominant group were that they possessed more highly specialized political institutions than the peoples they dominated, and they believed in their destiny to rule other peoples and in the superiority of their own way of life. (64) The administrative system of the Lwo and of the neighbouring peoples whom they partly incorporated ranged morphologically from the decentralized chiefless systems of the latter, based on structural relationships and values which were a direct extension of the kinship system, to the embryonic political specialization of the Lwo. In the decentralized chiefless societies citizenship and nationality were comprised within the bonds of kinship. Incorporation into such societies was only possible by way of incorporation into the kinship system and into a localized kin group. This might be through the forging of affinal ties, which later became agnatic ties. Into this situation the Lwo introduced a new principle in the regulated allegiance of one man to another without any kinship bond existing between them. This appeared in the political relation of all subjects to chiefs and sub-chiefs. The high veneration in which the Lwo held their won chiefs was an attitude which proved to be communicable to the surrounding populations, and they were successful in converting them increasingly to their own political values. The segmentary tendencies of chiefly lineages also led to their wider dispersal as political authorities. (65)

The growth of the regulative capability of the Lwo system has already been implied in what has been said above. Southall emphasizes that a great deal of Lwo expansion and domination over other peoples "appears to have taken place almost without the use of force, and it is the voluntary element in the submission of subject groups which remains an interesting problem". (66) And elsewhere he says that "Alur political structure did not favour the use of force in purposeful political expansion, yet it evidently provided a more widely based and satisfactory security than the surrounding tribes were able to achieve within their own systems. This permitted the peaceful assimilation of groups, resulting in a heterogeneous and stratified social system which favoured the development of more specialized political institutions." (67) Another factor which - according to Southall (68) - assisted the Lwo in maintaining and extending their system was the extent to which they and their subject peoples shared a basically similar metaphysical outlook: "They both inhabited the same universe in this respect, and the Alur were therefore fully able to utilize for political ends the non-material aspects of sacral chiefship and rain-making". This summary picture which Southall gives of the relationship between the Lwo and the dominated peoples is clearly biased by the Lwo ideas of these relations. It is an interpretation of the consequences of their assimilative and regulative capabilities, rather than an appreciation of their initial motives. (69) The Lwo expansion and domination obviously occurred with a permanent threat of force, even if, to a certain extent, the subject peoples could benefit by their "protection". Elsewhere Southall terms the Mambisa system "a mild form of organized and sovereign banditry", and, further, he says that "plundering and terrorism seem to have been an integral part of their behaviour towards the chiefless peoples around them". (70) We have seen that in the case of the Lwo authority system also a certain amount of unrestrained violence was tolerated in practice. The willingness or resignation, then, with which some non-Lwo groups allowed them-

selves to be incorporated into the Lwo society suggests that they wanted to escape oppression by themselves becoming inferior agents of it. We may say that the Lwo regime developed a "proselyting" culture, to which they gradually recruited the various subject groups by whom they were surrounded. At the same time, the Lwo began to treat the inhabitants straight away as if they were subjects, since their "innate" superiority entitled them to demand certain services of others, or even to exact benefits arbitrarily if they were not voluntarily supplied.

The factors in the relationship of dominant and subject groups in Alurland may prove to be comparable with those at work in the large continuous area, which has been referred to as the Great Lakes Region. This region can be considered from the political point of view as a single region, characterized throughout by the domination of chiefless societies by immigrant aristocracies. (71) These latter did not belong to a single ethnic group, and were not aware of themselves as in any sense unified, but a combination of several ethnic components in varying proportions was common to nearly all of them and, despite the contrasts in language and other cultural features, they are essentially comparable in the principles and development of their interrelationship with the subject populations. This large area presents a great variety of actual political situations, but they can be significantly analysed as local variations representing different stages of a largely common process.

4.3 The Acholi

4.3.1 Introduction

It is evident that the Acholi society - like that of the Alur - was formed by different peoples, who occupied a defined territory under the Lwo leadership basing their economy on cattle herding and agriculture. Thus, even in Acholiland Lwo immigrants were responsible for the creation of new societies out of heterogeneous ethnic groups.

We have shown how the Lwo expansion of chiefship among the Alur coincided with their own penetration of alien ethnic groups and was invariably held by the Lwo themselves. The Lwo in Acholiland showed a similar pattern. As among the Alur there were, apparently, two distinct types of political structure. The spread of chiefship of a Lwo type and of Lwo speech, which occurred through the constant migration of chiefly groups from Palwo in Bunyoro, apparently took place widely in Acholiland. (1) On the other hand, the Ragem system of a chief delegating political authority to key commoner clan heads over several adjacent kinship groups, instead of planting chiefly authority among them in the persons of members of the chiefly clan, was an adequate basis for the absorption of alien individuals and groups who wished or were willing to come in and add their allegiance, but provided no mechanism for the spread of political authority outwards among alien groups. This form of political structure was that which prevailed within most Acholi chiefdoms. (2) In this form there appears to have been no intermediate functionary between the chief and the local communities. The head of the dominant lineage in each village was bound directly to the chief either by patrilineal relationship or by affinity, by personal service or ritual. It is a form of political structure in which very little differentiation of political function has taken place.

Lwo structural and cultural elements were also adopted by Madi, Lango, and other groups even where there were no Lwo actually among them. Thus,

in the Acholi area there were chiefships held by lineages of non-Lwo descent. Yet, these chiefships were of the Lwo type, and only occurred in areas of Lwo influence and not otherwise among the Madi and Plains Nilotic neighbours of the Acholi. (3)

From another point of view the Lwo people admittedly behaved otherwise in Acholiland than they did in Alurland. The Lwo of Alurland remained, on the whole, more united and isolated from the rest of the population. On the other hand, among the Acholi quite small Lwo groups intruded and mixed in the various political units they found, managing to obtain, as a rule, the position of power as the chiefly clan. They were thus dispersed and lacked the advantage of a closely united group: they had to adapt themselves to their environment.

The question of the way of Lwo expansion and domination over other peoples has the same immediate importance concerning the Acholi society as among the Alur. Crazzolara insists upon the voluntary element in the submission of subject groups. The standard pattern should have been that peoples of non-Lwo origin joined freely, without fighting, a Lwo minority, as petitioners and were by degrees peacefully assimilated, dropping their language and most of their own tribal customs. (4) We are of the opinion that even here the traditions mirror the Lwo attitude of superiority. (5) It should not be allowed to imply organized movements of large bodies with a complex structure. This is the picture presented by Crazzolara. But, initially, the Lwo immigrants seem to have used tactics of force in order to establish their supremacy in conflict with their expanding western neighbours, the Madi. On account of the fact that Lwo political structure did not favour the use of force in purposeful political expansion, they failied in checking the Madi penetration. Therefore, the Lwo were forced to change their tactics - which gives a proof of the flexible strategic repertory of the Lwo political system. So at some stage they went over to more supple methods in order to attain the same goals which appear to have been more successful. (6)

In some way Acholiland formed only a small segment of a much larger circle at the centre of which was the king of Bunyoro. The main unifying force was the strength and influence of these rulers and the respect with which they were regarded by the surrounding peoples. Crazzolara is emphatic in his contention that each Acholi chief was completely independent both of other Acholi and also of foreign control. "The Acooli tribe", he writes, "consisted and to some extent still consists of small kingdoms or chieftainships, i.e. groups ruled by a rwot (king) and dependent on nobody else. This absolute independence from each other and from outside influence (e.g. Bunioro) must be stressed in the face of some sporadic assertions from interested parties who wish to glorify themselves at the cost of the Acooli." (7) It is difficult to understand why he should be so vehement in his denials of what in fact appears to be the truth of the matter: that the rulers of Bunyoro and Payera had a special status with regard to other rulers of Acholiland. The evidence to support this view is derived principally from scattered references in the writings of Speke, Grant, Baker, Emin Pasha, Gessi, and other European travellers. (8)

The rulers of Bunyoro, the Bantu-speaking kingdom to the South, maintained that Acholiland was one of their "counties". (9) In the widest sense, the separate chiefs of Acholi regarded themselves as forming branches of the agnatic lineage of the mukama of Bunyoro. The term bito, which was used generally of the sons of an aristocratic lineage in Acholi, is an indication of

the close connection between Acholi chieftainship and the Babito dynasty. (10) The kings of Bunyoro acted as the ultimate arbiters of the Acholi political system. Disputes about succession to chieftainship were taken to them to settle. Many of the drums and spears which formed part of the regalia of Acholi chiefs were said to have been presented to an ancestor by a past mukama. (11)

Speke, one of the first Europeans to reach Bunyoro, describes how,in 1862, a deputation from surrounding countries (including Acholi) visited the king's court with gifts. (12) More than thirty years later the Italian Romolo Gessi Pasha wrote about Wadelai whose area was on the Nile some miles north of Bunyoro in what is now Acholi-Madi country, that he "though a powerful chief, was the vassal of Kaba Rega, the king of Unyoro. Wadelai gave to Kaba Rega all the ivory he collected; five or six times in the year it was sent, and each time two or three hundred bearers were necessary". (13) Whatever may have been the situation later it is clear that there were close and intimate contacts between Acholiland and Bunyoro at this time. It is likely that these gifts were forms of the tribute. It is possible also that in return for their tribute the people received gifts of cattle and expected protection from attack. The Acholi gave their assistance to Bunyoro in times of war, and some of them formed part of the bodyguard of their king. (14) Bunyoro was a source also of iron hoes and salt for some of the surrounding peoples. (15) The exact form, however, of the relationship which existed between Bunyoro and Acholi is not easy to establish.

Girling believes that there are good grounds for stating that each Acholi chief enjoyed a degree of relative independence. And although there was never any close or formal political control exercised by the Banyoro over the Acholi "nevertheless many of them regarded the Bakama as their suzerains in some sense". (16) According to Beattie, the Acholi chiefs "acknowledged the Nyoro king's supremacy while at the same time preserving effective independence, and in return for these expressions of respect these lesser rulers were granted the Mukama's formal acknowledgement of their local authority". (17) In spite of this, the Acholi never formed an integral part of Bunyoro society. The authority exercised by the Bakama was not sufficiently close or sustained to affect greatly the politico-territorial organization of the Acholi. The relations of intermittent friendship between Acholi chiefdoms, and of irregular hostility between them and other societies surrounding them (the Lango, Madi, Karamojong, Jie, Didinga, etc.) defined the nature of the relations within this formation.

Although recognizing an affinity with each other, which took concrete military form under the pressure from surrounding peoples, the Acholi was not constituted as a unified state. On the contrary, the Acholi country was a multi-chiefdom society; they consisted of a number of tribal groups, some of them very small, each comprising several kingdoms or chiefdoms. Certain authorities want to ascribe the former Payera chiefs "the position of paramount chief to the Acholi country" (18), or at least of a symbolic leadership ("eine Art Ehren-Oberhaupt") (19), while others have contested these points. (20) The chief of Payera was regarded by both Baker and Emin as the de facto ruler of all the Acholi. (21) The traditions of the Acholi themselves are contradictory, too. The Payera claim that they were the acknowledged chiefs of Acholiland before the arrival of the British. The inhabitants of other chiefdoms affirmed their independence of the Payera and of each other. One of Crazzolara's informants candidly admitted that in spite of his paramountcy

the chief of Payera, out of generosity (!), would always allow the other chiefs to collect and enjoy the tribute offered to them, according to custom, by their respective subjects. Crazzolara asked the other parties about these matters: "Irritated by such pretentions they simply retorted: 'Ask people of Payiira to tell you whether people of other realms, say Patiko, Pa-Icoo, ever brought their tyeer to the rwoot of Payiira'. Of course, even my informant of Payiira admitted that this was not the case. This all important fact of the symbolic offering by which a subject recognizes his rwoot, is decisive and excludes the superiority of Payiira over other realms". (22) These traditions express, perhaps, the aspirations of the people rather than the facts of the political system. Yet, some ten chiefdoms were represented at and/or brought gifts to the installation of chief Awic of Payera, in 1888. (23)

The Payera occupied the central, most fertile and least accessible part of the area, and were able to offer refuge to groups pursued by their enemies or diminished through famine. (24) They enjoyed the recognition of the Bakama of Bunyoro as governors of the province of Acholiland. (25) The Payera attempted to maintain their authority over a number of nominally independent political groups in a variety of ways. But their control over other Acholi territorial groups was never secure, and never received formal organizational recognition in the political structure. It seems clear, however, that this authority was mainly political, and had no ritual or religious sanction. According to Girling, it seems that the Payera enjoyed the respect of most other Acholi groups. These were, he says, "allegiances owed by the weaker to the stronger, and based on esteem rather than conquest; they were relationships established more by default than by any positive act of statesmanship...". (26) The chief of Payera could be more accurately described as the leading Acholi chief, than the chief of all the Acholi. Whatever the truth of the matter may have been, there is little doubt that the political structure of Payera was more highly developed than that of other Acholi chiefdoms.

4.3.2 Social structure

Every Acholi political unit or chiefdom varied greatly in size and consisted usually of a cluster of villages including the surrounding territory used for agriculture and for hunting, over which a chief (r w o t, pl. r w o d i) exercised his authority. (27) Territorially it was made up of two types of villages, those of the "aristocrats" who were the agnatic kinsmen of the chief, and those of "commoners" who were unrelated to the chief in that way. There was also the household of the chief (k a l k e k e n y) which constituted a separate village. This was known as the chief's or the royal village (g a n g k a l). The villages of the chiefdom formed what Girling terms a "protective screen" round the chiefly village in the centre of the area. (28) Given that the total number of villages was about 1,000, there were about 40 chiefly villages, 220 aristocratic villages and 700 commoners' villages. (29)

Socially the chiefdom was made up of a variety of larger or smaller, from the beginning unrelated clans or lineages. (30) Each chiefdom was associated with a dominant or aristocratic lineage from which was chosen the ruling chief. The members of the royal lineage (k a k a p a r u o t) was called the "people of the court" (j o k a l, l o k a l or j o b i t o, l o b i t o) or the "people in power" (j o k e r, l o k e r). (31) To this nucleus up to 20 or more commoner or subject lineages from the aboriginal peoples were attached. The commoner lineages were called (l o) b o n g ((m e) k a l) or simply l u a k, meaning the "mass" or "bulk", i.e. the non-aristocratic lineages of the unit. An-

other name for them was "ordinary people" (dano ata), i.e. people without political power (ker). (32) The genealogies of the aristocratic lineages were, as might be expected, much longer than those of commoners. (33)

All of these villages, which were in origin foreigners, were living in close proxi mity to Acholi groups. In varying degrees they had adopted Acholi customs and speech. The old people of certain Madi groups still spoke that language, although their descendants knew only Acholi. (34) The structure of the former Madi groups did not differ fundamentally from that of the typical Acholi. This is either because they had been in contact with the Acholi for a long period or because their original social system was not greatly dissimilar. The structure of the Lango and Jie groups was, however, based on radically different principles.

In all cases the village was made up of a core of agnates, and the number of non-agnates attached to it differed in accordance with social status. Aristocratic lineages differed from those of commoners in a number of ways. Above all, the former included more non-agnates, who were related to the dominant lineage in a number of ways. (35) There were a number of household heads who were related to the others through affinal, sororal or maternal ties; he might also be the blood brother (larem) or friend of one of the others, or he might be a former captive who had married and settled down in the hamlet of his captor. (36) Thus strangers by blood were not excluded, nor was membership difficult and dependent upon stringent formalities. Any man "seeking a lord" might take up residence in a chiefdom and by acknowledging the chief's authority and rendering him the customary tribute could become a member of it. They sought the patronage and protection of a chief for a variety of reasons and contracted affinal ties either with him directly, or with one of the branches of his agnatic lineage. It was the outcome of protection, not tenure. Landownership was not a significant factor, and the protection that was sought was for cattle, wives and such-like forms of wealth. Through the enjoyment of the chief's favour some of the household heads became the founders of separate commoner lineages. They thus owed a two-fold allegiance: the first to the head of the aristocratic lineage with which they had established connection, and the second to the chief, as the politico-ritual head of the chiefdom.

Moreover, there was a body of slaves attached to the chiefly lineage. They were collectively called opi (m.), angeca (f.) or göci. (37) In Atyak chiefdom war prisoners were given to the chief who gave livestock in return for the tribute. (38) If the captor had taken two prisoners, he was allowed to keep one for himself. The chief allotted these slaves to poor people who could not marry or to invalid persons who could not work. The social status of the war captives was lower than that of other Acholi. On the other hand, there are traditional accounts of former slaves having succeeded to the rule of the chiefdom. They owed service to the chief, or to their owner, but in return cattle were sometimes provided for their marriage. No legal sanction apart from force existed to prevent them from running away. The Acholi terms for 'slave' were used more as forms of abuse than as indications of former servile status. No man would admit that he or his ancestors had been slaves, but the extremely shallow genealogies of some of the lineages may have indicated that the ancestor had been brought into the chiefdom as a child and did not know the names of his ancestors. Only when a quarrel took place and insults were exchanged, would he be reproached with the fact, however. Several proverbs which were in common use indicate that there were, of course, certain

real disadvantage in being a slave. Since the slave had no kin to whom he or she could appeal, there was no check on the arbitrary powers of the master.

Immigrants from other areas were also accepted into Acholi society. (39) On Eastern borders of Acholiland, for example, Karamojong men might occasionally be seen working in the fields side by side with Acholi. Some of these were poor men who had no cattle and who were working in return for food only. Often they returned home but if they found someone to act as their patron they might remain. Eventually they might build their huts in their patron's hamlet and with his help might marry an Acholi girl. Their sons would have no agnatic kinsmen in Acholi society and they would grow up among their mother's people.

Men whose own agnatic lineages were poor and weak, and particularly those whose prospects were limited, the younger sons of small households, orphans and others, tended to ignore ties of agnatic kinship and to evoke more distant links with the aristocratic lineage. (40) The aristocratic lineages were best able both to pay compensation for the sons of other lineages whom they wished to retain, and also to resist claims of this kind when they did not wish to pay. Consequently the size of the aristocratic villages tended to increase, and that of commoner villages to grow less. Aristocratic villages were thus more heterogeneous in their kinship structure than those of commoners.

Crazzolara maintains that whereas in Alurland the distinction between Lwo and non-Lwo was of plain evidence and publicly acknowledged, it was difficult to differentiate among the Acholi, "on account of a kind of guileless blending" that had taken place there. (41) Within each chiefdom, the distinction was, nevertheless, clearly established between the aristocratic lineages who claimed agnatic kinship with the chief, and the lineages who were related affinally or not at all. The general kind of social distinction is to be noticed in the phrase commonly used of a man of aristocratic descent: "he is a Lwo (en lwo). (42) For example, the compensation awarded for the killing of a member of an aristocratic lineage was higher than for the life of a commoner. (43) The bride-wealth demanded for the daughter of a chief, or an aristocrat, had always been higher than that for a commoner's daughter. (44) In this as in other spheres of Acholi life, the unequal distribution of wealth was an important feature of the social and political order. The social distinctions so recognized conferred no extra privileges; they served, however, to place at the disposal of aristocratic lineages and villages more of the scarce means of survival. Cattle and women were two of the principal forms of wealth (lim). (45)

Thus the unequal distribution of wealth had an important bearing on the structure of the Acholi society. The most wealthy villages were necessarily those with the largest numbers of wives and therefore of children. In each chiefdom, the chief's household was equivalent in size to an aristocratic or a commoner village. Both Baker and Kitching write of Acholi chiefs' households which contained more than a hundred persons. (46) A member of an aristocratic village was able to help his kinsmen in two ways. In the first place the wealth of his village made it possible for him to offer help to indigent kinsmen, in the second, their advantage in numbers and political influence enabled them to offer more effective protection to fugitives and assistance to those who thought themselves wronged. Moreover, the aristocratic lineages were able through their numerous affinal kinship ties to exert influence on the policy of the chiefdom. The largest of all the Acholi chiefdoms,

the Payera, had in it women of many of the other politico-territorial groups. (47) Female agnates of the Payera lineages were also found in many of the scattered chiefdoms throughout the region. The wealth of the Payera circulated in a kind of eddy which tended to draw in that of all the remainder of the territory.

There were external factors, too, which contributed to this state of affairs. The majority of the wives, and of the wealth which was their equivalent, were acquired through previous internal transactions; but there were also a number of ways in which wives and wealth generally were introduced into the Acholi society from outside. (48)

This may show the manner in which the political status of the aristocrats in the society, by enabling them to obtain control of wealth, tended in the course of time to alter the ethnic composition of the whole society.

4.3.3 Political structure

Whenever a chief died there appears to have been a period of uncertainty before the political balance in the chiefdom was restored by the new chief's installation. During this time the claims of the various sons of the late chief to succeed were decided either by fighting or by an appeal to arbitration by the king of Bunyoro. The rightful successor to a dead chief was his youngest son by the chief wife (dakh ker), who had been installed with him. This rule was not, however, observed invariably and disputes about the succession were not infrequent. If the chief wife was childless one of his other sons were chosen by the heads of the commoner lineages. Generally, before his death, the chief had told the elders whom he wished to succeed him. All the sons of the chief by his numerous wives had a claim, however, and if there was a dispute each was entitled to claim support for his own candidature. (49) During the period of the minority of a chief when his elder brother acted for him there was frequently internal dissension. The regent enjoyed his position of authority and was unwilling to relinquish it. (50)

Thus, if the youngest son of the chief wife was still a child, one of his elder brothers acted as regent or "guardian of the throne" (laguok ker) until he was old enough to be installed. (51) Even the chief wife could exercise authority during the infancy of her son the heir. Meanwhile she received all the gifts due to the chief. Matters of administration were, however, settled by the chief's counsellors.

The chief wife (dakh ker, the "wife of the chieftainship") was usually a girl from another chiefdom. She was not necessarily of aristocratic origin, and was in fact rarely so. (52) Girling says that he could find no evidence for Seligman's categoric statement of "the importance the Acholi attached to both the rain maker's (: rwot's) parents having 'rain', and the bride called dak ker (woman of power or authority) (being) the daughter of rain-making parents". (53) In many cases, however, a chief contracted alliances with the chiefs of surrounding chiefdoms by marrying one of their daughters as an additional wife. (54) While the chief would himself provide the bridewealth for his ordinary wives, that of the chief wife would be provided by the commoner villages, which shows that the position of the chief wife was a public affair. (55) And it would also seem to accord closely with the whole symbolism of the installation ceremony and its integrating force in the chiefdom, which depended on the fictional affinity established between the commoner lineages and the chief through the chief wife.

The chief wife, who was also known as the "ruler over the women" (rwot

mon), supervised the activities of her junior co-wives. She allotted the women for different duties and she was responsible for the adjustment of minor quarrels between them. (56)

It was a constant principle of chieftainship that a new chief should show formal unwillingness to undertake the responsibilities of the office, and also that he should be chosen and installed by the heads of the commoner lineages. In the installation ceremony there was, as it were, a symbolic representation of the principles on which the whole society was established. For example, relations between the main part of the chiefdom, the aristocratic lineages and the small groups of non-agnates, the commoner lineages, were asserted. Thus, the ceremony took place in two separate parts. In one the earth custodian officiated, as the leader of the heads of the commoner lineages who had presented the girl to him. Through his wife he was bound by ties of fictional affinity to all the commoner lineages. They regarded her, in a sense, as the daughter of them all. In the second stage, the chief was installed by the heads of the aristocratic lineages who formed branches of the main aristocratic lineage. (57) Details of ceremonies and rites for the installation of a new chief were more or less the same as among the Alur and Shilluk. (58) By custom the new chief protested and struggled and showed unwillingness to undergo the ceremony of installation. The chief was installed on the throne (kom ker) together with his chief wife. A particular group among the members of the commoner lineages was selected for the office of loket ruot, and it fell to them to perform the installation ceremony and to anoint the chief and his wife with oil. Then there followed a feast for many days with the display of generous gifts of food, meat and beer for all the people. On three days the chief sat before his hut and he was formally exhorted by the old people of the chiefdom. They addressed him in words such as these: "Care well for your father's people", "Be generous and feed your father's people". (59)

The regalia of chiefly power (jämi ker) consisted of sacred drums (bul ker), i.e. the chief had the symbol of the traditional right to the chiefship. He also had a skin garment (la ker) and sacred spears (tong ker) on which oaths might be taken. (60) Some of the drums and parts of the regalia were said to have been brought from Bunyoro by ancestors of the rulers and were jealously preserved by their lineal descendants. (61)

The interrelation among the Acholi chiefdoms is shown up by the fact that aristocratic lineages in one chiefdom in some cases participated in the installation of a chief in another group. For example, the heads of the aristocratic lineages in Patiko, Paibona, and Paico took part in the installation of the chief of Payera. These were said to be agnatic branches of the Payera lineage and to have diverged from that line at some remote time in the past. Similarly the chief of Koro took part in the installation of the chief of Koic. (62) On the occasion of installation of a new chief in Puranga and Pajule the chief of the other country always functioned as the leading official. (63) Moreover, it appears that representatives from the bakama of Bunyoro attended the installation and other ceremonies of the chiefs of Payera. (64)

Like the Alur chiefs, the chief of the Acholi chiefdoms had a body of retainers living in and around his homestead. The Acholi chief did not maintain a large retinue of subordinate officials and court functionaries as was the case among the Shilluk and the Anuak. The formost in rank was the (la-) wang ruot (jago (me) kal, jago ma loyo kal, or lakor gang pa ruot). He was a kind of prime minister, the deputy or repre-

sentative of the chief, and the chief of the court. (65) He was the chief's confidant, with whom he consulted and who was empowered to act for him in his absence. He was frequently a man of a commoner lineage and may have been selected for his personal qualities. In some cases he became the interpreter of the chief. It seems undecided whether this was an independent function or whether it was one of the lawang's regular functions. According to Crazzolara it was the custom of the chief to appear only exceptionally in person before petitioners, be they his subjects or delegates from other tribes or countries. (66) Therefore, the chief had an interpreter (ladom, pl. lodom), who was a kind of secretary or mediator, who represented the chief, dealing affairs in his name. Foreigners could easily be led to think that this ladom was an actually important person but he had no power of his own.

The messenger or official delegate of the chief (oo or la'or) belonged, it was said, to one of the commoner lineages also. (67) He was also called won lapii, because he was sent with a fire-stick (lapii) as the symbol of authority. Such a messenger could also be sent by the subjects in order to obtain assistance. (68) It was customary to send the fire-stick, together with a girl, also known by the same term, when requesting help in fighting. The chiefly messenger lived in the chiefly household and was sent by the chief to carry his decisions throughout the area. Also, when the chief travelled abroad he was preceded in the path by the messenger.

Jodongo (pa ruot) were the counsellors of the chief and they acted as his council and heard disputes, referring their decisions to him for confirmation. It was they who decided who the dakh ker was to be and their presence was necessary at rain-making and hunting ceremonies. (69) They also played an important role at the chief's installation. (70)

Finally, in each chiefdom there was said to have been one important medicine man (ajwaka), whom the chief consulted about planting crops, hunting, sickness and other matters. (71)

As to the extractive capability of the Acholi chiefship, all the male adult inhabitants of a chiefdom, whether they belonged to an aristocratic or to a commoner village were required to render tribute (tyer, "offering") to the chief which consisted of certain animals' skins, meat, fish, and ivory. There were, apparently, different forms of tribute in different chiefdoms. (72) It was regarded both as the formal acknowledgement of submission to the authority of a chief and as a critical test of whether or not a particular village formed part of a certain chiefdom.

In some chiefdoms, it was said that the skins of all leopards and lions killed were given to the chief. In others it appears that only the first leopard and lion a man killed were given to the chief. His right on them was based, perhaps, on the association between these animals and the chieftainship which was common in many African societies. The chief alone had the right to wear leopard and lion skins; at the installation ceremony his stool and that of his wife were placed on leopard skins. (73)

One leg from all large animals killed in hunting: buffalo, buck, etc., was the property of the chief. These were dried and used in the entertainment of his people, which was an essential part of the chief's duty. (74) The failure to render tribute of meat was a frequent occasion for internal dissension in a chiefdom.

In addition, the chief had a large share of the war-booty. (75)

In most of the chiefdoms there were one or more lineages whose members practised smithing, and where the craft descended from father to son in cer-

tain lines. (76) The making of spear-heads, arrows, hoes and iron bracelets, was said to be their tribute to the chief.

There were other forms of tribute which were rendered to the chief by commoner lineages only. These were hereditary forms of personal service to the chief. A number of the lineage heads participated in the installation ceremony in various capacities. Under the direction of the earth custodian in chiefdoms where he existed, they were responsible for anointing the chief and his wife with oil, and beating the drum of the chiefship. Not all the commoner lineages of a chiefdom performed these duties, however, only those, it seems, which had formed part of the group longest. (77)

Other forms of personal service were also rendered to the chief by commoner lineages in the chiefdom. Some were responsible for maintaining the ancestor shrine of the chief (lager abila), and others provided beer for the sacrifices. In this way these lineages heads were incorporated into the ancestor ceremonies of the chief, at which, not being agnates, they would otherwise be ineligible to attend. (78) Thus, the rituals of chiefship assisted in knitting the chiefdom together or at least in securing for it a loyal core of supporters. This was also effected through the traditional distribution of rituals among a number of different commoner lineages. Hence the submitting aboriginals remained as priests (loted) in charge of the sacrificial rites to the aboriginal guardian spirits of the chiefdom. (79)

A chief established his reputation and maintained his following by the hospitality he was able to provide. (80) He was expected to provide hospitality in return for the tribute he exacted from his people as a whole and to provide for the marriage of his indigent subjects (lacan) by giving them either a girl or cattle for bridewealth. This form of distribution was considered as both a duty and a privilege. Also by his hospitality he won support from his own people and from men of other groups who would join him in expectation of receiving cattle or wives.

The right of the chief to the meat of animals killed by inhabitants of his chiefdom appears to have been based on the ownership rights which he claimed in the land. He was known as the owner of the land in its territorial aspect (won lobo), in contradistinction to the earth custodian (won ngom or won piny, properly speaking "the father of the soil") who controlled its ritual aspect as a source of food from agriculture and hunting. (81) The land was owned only by aristocratic lineages. The commoner or subordinate groups occupied such land as they were allowed to by courtesy of the chief but without any real claim of right. The groups were permitted to cultivate the land in a chiefdom by virtue of its recognition of the authority of its chief. The chief, as the ultimate landowner, was the supreme authority; he functioned as such through one or more earth custodians (wegi ngom). The earth custodian was normally either the head of an aristocratic family or the head of a well-established commoner group (won kaka), found by the ancestor of the chief, when they moved into the area. This is evident from Grove's information that "in all villages is as well as the chief the won ngom or owner of the land, who has no authority but who has to be consulted in all questions of moving villages, sites of crops, boundaries of hunts, and who is responsible for propitiating the various spirits of the country". (82) Nalder states that as landowner the chief might exercise that function, too, but "where, as sometimes happens from sleeping sickness or other reasons, a community are not living on their own ancestral ground, their own won ngom cannot function and they must have recourse to the real 'landowner'." (83)

Bere emphasizes that there was a definite distinction between the won ngom and the won piny. The won piny, he says, was lord of all the individual landholders (wegi ngom), owners of the earth they cultivated. (84) In fact, the land holder appears to have been the head of the family and not the individual cultivator. Because of the plentiful supply of land, however, individual members in effect owned and controlled the land they cultivated, although shifting cultivation sometimes caused disputes which were submitted to the chief for settlement. Cultivation rights were maintained in the land as long as there was memory of former cultivation by a man or his forebears. (85)

The chiefdom had a certain economic unity, provided by the chiefs who were largely responsible for organizing agricultural work and by common service of its members to the chief in agriculture and in other ways. (86) All the adult inhabitants of the chiefdom were obliged to work twice a year on the fields of the chief as a further part of their tribute. The chief in many cases controlled the "rain", he gave the order for rain-making ceremonies to be performed, in which he and the earth custodian took part. After rain had fallen the signal for cultivation to begin was given by the chief. He summoned the people to work on his wives' fields and when this was done, entertained them to feasts and dancing. They then returned to their own villages and began to cultivate in their collective work parties (awak). (87) Later in the year, when the time came to gather in the millet harvest, the people again worked on the chiefly fields. A first fruit ceremony also took place under the joint authority of the chief and the earth custodian and was attended by all the people. These occasions were periodic affirmations of the chief's authority in political matters, and were not really equivalent to a rent for the use of the land.

The village-lineage was the group in which property rights in land were transmitted. Each village in the chiefdom had a hunting tract, which was owned by a "father of the hunt" (won dwar), or an "owner of the bush" (won tim), an office which was hereditary and independent of both the chief and the local leader, although not infrequently these people also owned their own hunts. (88) Even when the local chief decided that a hunt should be held the consent of the owner was equally essential. (89) Each animal killed was shared by those whose spears had pierced it, and one hind leg was claimed by the owner of the hunt, on behalf of the members of his own village. (90) Since hunting was the main source of protein food, these areas were no doubt an essential part of the domestic economy of the Acholi. (91)

The chief was the ritual head of the political unit. As said above, the chief and the earth custodian together were usually responsible for rain-making, both for their own people and also for those of another chiefdom whose chief "had no rain". Seligman maintains that rain-making was the most essential function of certain chiefs (wegi kot, sing. won kot). (92) Little is known about the methods by which the chief was believed to produce rain, but the ritual seems to have centred round the rain-stones which were owned by each rain-maker. The chief wife would have to perform the ceremonies, if her husband were ill, and perhaps also after his death. Moreover, the chief and the earth custodian officiated in sowing and first fruit ceremonies. (93)

The earth custodian was often the ministrant in the spirit cult of the chiefdom, and all the members of the group respected the guardian spirit (jok) of the earth custodian. (94) As seen above, many Acholi villages, which may have possessed their own spirit-shrine in the past, were devotees of the

spirit-shrine of an aristocratic lineage. But there were also a few which had maintained their own rites. All the villages of the earth custodians had done so, and they continued to function side by side with the spirit of an aristocratic lineage, where one existed. (95) In some cases, however, the chiefly lineage had no separate spirit-shrine of its own, and it also took part in the ceremonies performed by the earth custodian. Girling is probably right in his supposition that the possession of a spirit-shrine was a function of political independence. (96) Some of the lineages which had most recently been subordinated to the political authority of a chief, after having been rulers in their own right, had maintained their own spirit-shrines. Others which had been dependent longer either did not possess a spirit-shrine of their own, or had given it up.

As to the respective roles of the chief and the earth custodian in the chiefdom, Girling avers that it is possible to infer from them the dual nature of power and authority in the chiefdom: "The two spheres of sacred and secular authority are apparently conceived separately, but occasionally meet for some purpose in one person". (97) In reference to the whole chiefdom, the territorial nature of which implied political authority, the chief "is regarded as the active and developing force... Ritual authority over the fertility of the women and of the land was in the keeping of the 'father of the soil', the descendant of the original inhabitants of the area, who is also the guardian of the spirit shrine. Characteristically the ritual authority of the 'father of the soil' continues to be respected long after the decay of the political authority of the Rwot". (98) It will perhaps be objected that together they formed the knot through which the separate principles of structure in the chiefdom were bound together; on the one hand the homogeneous lineage of the chief, on the other heterogeneous lineages of the commoners, were brought together by the principle of assimilation. Aboriginal sacrificial rites were integrated into the Lwo political system and then, so to speak, redistributed, or delegated, to the aboriginal ritual authorities, who held the office by virtue of the structural relationship to the aristocratic lineage.

Force and the threat of force provided the means by which the independent existence of the separate chiefdoms was guaranted. The Acholi political system was a polycephalous one, and Girling describes the relations between different territorial units as the "attempts by the larger heads to eat up the smaller ones, and of the latter to avoid being eaten". (99) Thus, the form of the political unit was derived in large part from the necessity of collaboration for defence and aggression, and the need to do so gave the unit its internal cohesion.

Very many reasons were given in the traditions for the fighting which took place between different chiefdoms. In general, however, the causes were limited to competition for hunting rights in land, or for the acquisition of cattle and women, but even to guarantee the accession to chieftainship of a favourite candidate. (100)

The unequal distribution of wealth was an important feature of the social and political order. Within the lineage the "eldest son" inherited his father's livestock, and was thus able to marry more wives and to produce more sons and daughters than the other household heads. (101) The chief was in the same position with regard to other members of the chiefdom. To poor men the raids for cattle and women would have provided an opportunity for them to distinguish themselves and perhaps to obtain a wife. Moreover, audacity and physical strength were highly regarded in the traditional social and political

order. Raids conducted between different groups of Acholi society and outside it, effected a temporary redistribution of wealth within the victorious villages. But it is likely that they did little more than replace losses which occurred in the same way. This did not, however, materially alter the operation of the processes of unequal development which ran through the whole society.

Wars were often preceded by a formal declaration of hostilities and the issue of threats, which often produced the desired effects without any actual fighting taking place. The response to the call of alarm was demanded of all male members of the chiefdom under the penalty of confiscation of cattle. When war was waged, however, the prior consent of the inhabitants of the chiefdom had to be obtained, and there was no legal obligation on any man to take part. If his close kin, either within Acholi society, or outside it, were involved, he did not do so. (102)

The position of the war-leader (otega or oteka lawii mony or ladit me tong, "the chief of the spear") was clearly distinct from that of the chief. The former was appointed by or with the approval of all the warriors of the chiefdom. He had no authority of his own to engage in war without the permission of the chief and his counsellors. (103) Frequently he was a man from one of the aristocratic lineages, who was celebrated for his courage and strength, the "bull" (twon) of the chiefdom. The chief was rarely the leader in fighting. Girling gives an apposite explanation of this fact. He says that the prosperity of the chiefdom and the personal safety of the ruler were too closely associated for him to risk injury in fighting. (104) The chief gave his consent, often, it appears, unwillingly, to the organizing of a raid or attack; his influence was a restraint on the war-like ambitions of the young men.

Since the chief was chosen from the dominant aristocratic lineage, he must have been the symbol of the cohesion of the unit, the organizing and leading authority within the territory occupied. Crazzolara emphasizes that the Acholi chiefs virtually were kings, "the highest instance over life and death". (105) This statement involves a strong exaggeration probably coloured by the Lwo chiefly ideology (106); the ruler did not wield autocratic authority, but it might be expected that the chief would have had certain conversion functions, together with the jadongo, who were his hereditary counsellors. (107) Although the chief was the political head of the chiefdom, he had no permanent coercive machinery for enforcing his decisions. Girling maintains that the efforts of the chief were directed not to enforcing law, but to maintain peace within the chiefdom by acting as intermediary between disputing members of different lineages. (108) He intervened personally in disputes or sent his representative or his chief wife to do so. Occasionally also the earth custodian came between disputants carrying a branch of olwedo or opobo, the shrubs used in ritual occasions. At other times the sacred spear was thrown down between fighting groups. The chief of Payera also sent a sacred spear or a fire-stick as the symbol of authority. (109) Nevertheless, in certain situations the chief was provided with a strong executive authority. (110) By distraining forcibly on the possessions of his people a chief punished affronts to his dignity. Those who failed to answer the alarm call, those who refused to accept his ruling over internal disputes, were mulced of their cattle.

The success of the chief's attempt at mediation depended on the willingness of the parties to a dispute to accept his decision. This in turn was partly influenced by the degree of independence they felt they had achieved, or by their possession of powerful kin in another chiefdom to whom they could appeal for support. More important is that the ultimate sanction of his autho-

rity was the force of superior numbers whose support he commanded; he was able to impose his authority by virtue of his leadership of the largest and most homogeneous grouping within the unit: the aristocratic lineage. Dissident members of the commoner lineages and villages had to obey or to leave the chiefdom. They knew that they were too few to risk a trial of strength. The state of intermittent friendship which existed between different Acholi chiefdoms, and of occasional hostility between the Acholi and surrounding peoples, made the maintenance of the cohesion of the chiefdom essential.

It would be misleading to regard the chief as forming the apex of a single structure, that of the territorial unit, in which there was a descending hierarchy of political office. His was rather the hand which held together in temporary association a number of structures, which tended to diverge when it was removed. The head of each village-lineage was an intermediary between the chief and the people. In some cases the chief had representatives among the local subject groups, which points to a penetration of the Acholi chiefship in the Ukuru manner. The aristocratic lineage of Payera had members in various parts of the chiefdom, where they were, mostly, the elders of a given group. Chief Awic realized the difficulties of controlling a chiefdom the size of that inhabited by the Payera, and established a system of small chieftainships. These minor chiefs would bring matters of importance to the chief to a decision; they were war-leaders, and could gather men quickly around him if he wanted them for battle or any other purpose. (111) According to Baker who visited chief Kaciba of Obbo in the Sudan, he kept a certain number of wives in each of his villages. He had 116 children living, and every one of his villages was governed by one of his sons, who "believed in their father's power of sorcery, and their influence as headmen of their villages increased the prestige of the parent". (112) In Palabek there was an elder, whom the chief set at the head of the aboriginal group. (113) Finally, the headman of Gaya, a people of Lango origin, was the representative of the chief (ladit pa ruot). (114)

Each of the commoner lineages had its own headman, called the ladit (pl. lodito) for the smaller groups and jago (pl. jagi) for the larger ones. (115) The jago, a sub-chief, came next to the chief in authority. Some groups had the right of the first jago, the second jago, etc., according to their numerical strength or, more commonly, as the outcome of historical development. Smaller groups had only a ladit kaka, an elder, as their immediate head and made part of some major jago-group or the aristocratic lineage itself. According to Butt who refers to Girling the larger village units in a chiefdom were represented by the jago, while the ladit was an "important" man and was head of a small kinship group. The jago was the head of the dominant host group as well as the representative of the village community as a whole. The dominant lineage to which he belonged was not necessarily of the same lineage as that of the chief whom he acknowledged. (116)

As leader of the village community the jago was also called the "owner" or "father of the village" (won (or wan) gang or ladit paco). (117) He was assisted by his counsellors (jadongo, sing. jaduong) whom he consulted in all matters of importance and by whom all internal affairs were dealt with without reference to the chief. These counsellors were probably headmen of lineages in the village.

The imprescriptible authority of the founding ancestor of the lineage or community, in ritual and secular matters, was acknowledged by all its members although not always obeyed. By virtue of his genealogical position in the

group the lineage elder was the living representative of their common progenitor from whom he was supposedly descended through a succession of "youngest sons". The principles of ultimo- and primo-geniture determined the inheritance of politico-ritual authority and of material wealth respectively. (118) He represented, not only the unity and exclusiveness of the unit, but also their unbroken connection with the past. The head of the lineage was the principal authority on the citing of old precedents (o n g o n) which regulated the relations of its members with one another and their relations with other villages. It was binding on the members by reason of their supposed genealogical relationship. Should any man refuse to accept the decisions of the elders he might move to another village where he had kinsmen. (119) The lineage elder officiated in the observance of the ancestor cult, and also, in some cases, in those of the guardian spirit cult, the jok of the village. (120)

As to the responsive capability of the Acholi chief, according to Bere it is "quite evident that the rwot was never in a position of execute authority comparable to that in which his descendants are placed to-day. The appointment was basically democratic, for the rwot was truly the representative of his people; far more so, in fact, than their ruler". (121) The impression of a weak authority possessed by an Acholi ruler derives from traditions such as those borne out by Emin's account of a visit to chief Ocamo (Rwotcamo) of Payera in 1880: "... he has, however, absolutely no authority over his people; they laugh at the long boring speeches he makes about everything...". (122) Later Postlethwaithe makes a similar observation: "... I became discouraged by the absence of any real chiefs with definite, permanent, tribal authority... The absence of real chiefs in the recognized Government sense of the word, was in fact a blessing in disguise, as no hereditary chieftainships has to be recognized and a well-chosen outstanding Acholi was usually accepted by the tribe on the D. C.'s instigation". (123) But when every reservation has been made about the extent of the authority of the Acholi chief during the colonial period it is still clear that there w e r e chiefs with definite and permanent authority, who attempted to assert the power devolving on them as heads of a territorial political grouping. That they sometimes failed to do so is an indication of the contradictory nature of the forces at work in the Acholi society.

The unity of the chiefdom was always threatened by internal conflict and external kinship connections. The position of the chief was partly dependent on the superior numerical strength of his supporters and on his ability to command the respect and allegiance of all the members, either as the head of their agnatic lineage, as their cognatic kinsman, or through ties of affinity, or finally, by virtue of their personal service to him. The political structure of the group was the result of the combination of all these forms of relationship. Where the chief was unable to command support the succession passed to another lineage. The welfare and prosperity of the chief's lineage was regarded by his people as being necessary for the survival of them all. Girling refers to an Acholi saying that the chief dwells in the middle of his people, like a queen ant in a nest. (124) They regarded the queen ant as the principal organizer of the work of all the others in the nest, for if it is removed the whole organization is known to break down and the nest to disperse. It was natural, therefore, and inevitable, that chieftainship passed to the most powerful lineage in the chiefdom. Only very occasionally were chiefs deposed, but a series of disasters could lead the people of the chiefdom to seek a chief from another line. As among the Alur they could "capture" a son of the chief

in a neighbouring and more fortunate group, and instal him as their chief. (125)

The chief's pivotal position in the structure of the chiefdom may be surmised from the period of disintegration and disruption which followed the death of a chief. On his death the opportunity occurred for a new alignment to be made. The not infreqnent changes in the line of succession, in the smaller chiefdoms, seem to have occurred when a commoner lineage became more powerful than the aristocratic one. (126) While the aristocratic lineage recognized the authority of the chief as their lineage head, the commoners accepted his ruling only when it was in their interest to do so. Given the numerical weakness and comparative heterogeneity of the commoner lineages, it was always likely that they might choose to transfer their allegiance to another chief, rather than accept a decision which went against them.

Another threat to the unity of the chiefdom was involved in the process of independent development. (127) Given the nature of Acholi political system, and the low level of agricultural production, it was impossible for the total population of a chiefdom to exceed a certain strength. When this number was reached the processes of fission and migration which appear to be inherent in the system showed themselves. The secession took place when one or more of the aristocratic lineages attracted to it sufficient commoner groups to be able to break away and establish itself as an independent unit.

These threats to the corporate existence of the political unit were endemic and a part of the whole political system of Acholi life. These aspects of the political system placed limitations on the chief's coercive powers, and tended to inhibit the development of the political structure.

We may conclude that Acholi polity was composed of definite political units of different sizes in which there was a rudimentary form of centralized authority. All of them enjoyed a high degree of individual autonomy. The largest of their number, the Payera, had acquired an retained an ascendancy over most of the Western Acholi chiefdoms. Both the Payera and the others were united in acknowledging the suzerainty of the kings of Bunyoro over the whole area. There are indications, too, of the development of the distinctions which characterize stratified societies. To what extent these developments were due to internal factors of differentiation in the society, and to what extent they may be ascribed to the influence of the institutions of the Bunyoro or other states, it is impossible to say. No doubt both were involved.

4.4 The Lango

4.4.1 Introduction

The Lwo groups were linked together by common traditions of origin and migration, and by distinctive features of social structure. In these respects the Lango stand apart from the rest; they are peculiar in not accepting the name Lwo. (1)

Westermann, Seligman, and Driberg have, in their writings, classified the Lango with the Nilotes. (2) According to Westermann, for example, the Alur, Palwo, Lango and Luo were off-shoots of the Acholi. (3) After considering several points, Driberg concludes that the Lango were not part of the Karamojong stock. (4) But the theory that the Lango are a Nilotic tribe has been challenged most strongly by Tarantino in three short articles. (5) According to him and many other writers, the Lango are a "Nilo-Hamitic" people, part of the Karamojong stock, who by the middle of the 19th century had ac-

quired a Lwo tongue. He challenges the theory on several grounds: (a) The Lango themselves say they are not of Lwo origin, and there is therefore no reason why we should disbelieve them. (b) The Lwo group also agrees that they are not related to the Lango. (c) The Lango arrived in their present area from the East (unlike the Lwo who arrived from the North), and "found that the Acholi, Alur, and Jo-Pawir had already separated and had for some time past occupied their present positions". (6) And they arrived about 200 years ago. (d) Although the Lango speak a Nilotic tongue today, their original language, according to Tarantino, was that of the Karamojong-Teso group, and they only adopted the Acholi language "for reasons of convenience where they came into contact with the Acholi". (7) Moreover, the present Lango vocabulary contains many nouns of Karamojong derivation, particularly the names for animals, plants, diseases, parts of the body, and household objects. (e) Finally, Tarantino challenges the theory on cultural grounds. He points out, for example, that when Lango clans split, they retain the same name for the different sections of the original clan. But they cease to be exogamous, where as Lwo clans are always exogamous, no matter how large the divisions may be. And in any case the Lango name for clan is a t e k e r e , a name which only obtains among the Karamojong-Teso peoples.

These then are the five points adduced by Tarantino for rejecting Driberg's etc. theory about the origin of the Lango. They sound so plausible that the majority of the students of Nilotic history and culture have accepted them almost wholesale. (8) Recently, however, Crazzolara, in a very controversial paper, rejects Tarantino's hypothesis and asserts that "Lango-Omiru are not Lango at all, not any more than the Acholi are, but both are Lwoo peoples, and to about the same degrees". (9) He underlines an obvious but very important point which many traditional historians have overlooked, viz. they look for a common origin of all the Lango clans. The origin of the Lango, and hence their early history, can only be determined by studying the early history of each of the clans constituting the Lango today. Crazzolara makes it clear that "the Lango-Omiru are not a homogeneous people with a single past history, but a composite, a mixture of elements". (10) He suggests an original Madi hegemony in the present Lango area. According to tradition, it was Madi migrants who either exterminated or assimilated the early "Lango" peoples who had preceded them in modern Lango district to which they had given their name. Between 1550 and 1650, the region was gradually occupied by migrating bands of the Lwo that came from different directions at different times. They assimilated most of the populations that they found in the area. It was these Lwo-speakers who introduced the Lwo tongue into Lango area. Then between 1750 and 1800, the area experienced the first major wave of Teso invasion. In the words of Crazzolara, they "were apparently in search of places in which to resettle possibly during a time of famine at home. The clan groups of Okarawok, Atek and Arap /: Arak/ are named as having thus come from (Lango-dyang or) Teso, where these names are still found. They entered the country in relatively large numbers. There does not appear to have been much fighting; they came to the understanding with the original Lwoo population. They dispersed over the greater part of the country and settled down peacefully among the former inhabitants, they did not occupy any part of the country as their exclusive area...". (11) One tradition belonging to the JoOyima clan substantiates this opinion. On the occasion of a great famine a woman had come along from the east. She met a man of the clan with whom she stayed and bore him four illegitimate daughters (l u k).

(12) Probably this tradition mirrors the fact that the new arrivals were adopted as clients.

Lwo, or other ethnic groups which had become Lwoized, doubtless set up a sort of overall Lwo administration. Nowhere in the country did the new Teso arrivals become the rulers; such an idea was foreign to the hereditary ideas which they had brought with them from home. Since the political terminology was entirely derived from the Lwo language, this serves to prove the statement that Lwo groups once had the political power in the Lango country, while the Karamojong-Teso vocabulary seems to have belonged to the household sphere, which may indicate to marriages with Karamojong-Teso women. It is therefore certainly strange to find that the Lwo of these "Lwo" areas are hardly ever mentioned or represented, except for a few individual clans. The number of Madi names found in the same area, is, on the other hand, extraordinarily large. The Lwo had been accepted rulers and their language had been adopted, but they had apparently adapted themselves to the established conditions and evolved within the existing political units. Yet, Crazzolara presents a theory that for the past 150 years or more the Lwo rule has ceased to exist; because, he writes (quite contrary to his opinion quoted above), the new Teso invaders were fairly numerous and turbulent, and refused to submit to any authority, either from within their own groups or from without. Those who represented authority, the Lwo groups, moved away in order to avoid fighting. In this way a real political authority, a centre of unity and order, ceased to exist. The only voluntarily recognized authority that remained was invested in those who were generally accepted as the headmen of the individual clans. In the end, a quasi-anarchy reigned in the country as a whole. The country became an area of never-ending unrest and disturbances. (13)

Even some other European scholars have tended to regard these traditions as actual history. Before British administration the Lango lived, Driberg says, together in "a loose, almost anarchic state" with no central authority. Nevertheless, one of his informants, a man of Ayer, stated that long ago the Lango used to be under one king, to whom all the other leaders were subservient. Another man claimed that his grandfather was considered the ruler of all the Lango. On the other hand, a man of Aber, stated that in the past there were only village headmen, no big ruler. In spite of that, Driberg concludes that "there does not seem to be much conception of a centralized government over the united tribe at any time, and it seems likely that the reputed kings ... were nothing more than local war-leaders on a large scale". (14) Tarantino lends support to this view. He writes that the Lango never had a paramount chief who ruled over the whole tribe. The chieftains whom they referred to as leaders of the tribe were military leaders only. They said than when they came from Karamoja they had a great chief, Ongora Okubal, who brought them to their new land. But it is significant that no tribal chief was chosen to succeed one of his successors, Agoro Abwango, when he was killed in battle in Bunyoro. The reason for this was that the big wars were then over, and the people no longer wanted a war-leader. (15) But their picture of the state of things which preceded European rule is necessarily incorrect since it is based on interpretation of these conflicting statements of an earlier form of government, which do not throw much light upon the subject. Even a modern historian as Ingham, writing about the Lango, refers to a state of "anarchy, and "lawlessness" which prevailed before European rule was introduced. See, for example, Ingham's statement: "... the Lango themselves admitted no wi-

der loyalty than that which they owed to their village communities and recognized no greater authority than the war leaders who came to the forefront of affairs only during the annual cattle raid on neighbouring villages". (16) This is almost certainly incorrect. A study of the available sources reveals that this is far from being the case as far as the Lango and neighbouring peoples are concerned. It is clear that when Speke and Grant were in the area, in 1862, the Lango recognized the authority of the king of Bunyoro and in fact many of them served in his armies. The king's chief minister proposed an expedition through Lango country to the East in order to buy ivory. It would be preceded by a magic horn which would guarantee immunity from attack and would carry iron hoes to pay the officials through whose territory they passed. (17) More important is the tradition of chief Olet Apar related by Wright. (18) Olet controlled Lira but he was not a great chief - his authority did not extend for more than fifteen miles from Ngeta Rock; but his power was based on more than success in war, though this was an element. He was a leader of the Oki clan; but he ruled other people than the Oki, and the vanguard of the clan in its migration from the north-east had reached many miles beyond his influence. With the help of the elders he settled matters between his people, including the making of blood payments. He was also a great rain-maker - Driberg describes him as "the last rain-maker of any general power" - and he presided over ceremonies on top of Ngeta Rock. (19) Of the chiefs Olet had been at least first among equals; according to his descendant Isaya, his influence had extended "over a wider area than any other headman among the Lango when they were in the unadministered state", and he had been succeeded by a capable son who was at least fourth in a line of chiefs who had ruled Lira, father to son.

It is evident that before the British came there was no constituted authority for the Lango as a whole; there were only small chiefs like Olet. The Lango chieftainship arguably included a military function, but authority extended to judicial and ritual matters, and it was an authority that was hereditary. It is therefore a misapprehension to say that the Lango before European rule recognized "no greater authority than the war leaders". Nor is it accurate to say that, under the British, "chiefs were to be created where hitherto they had been unknown". (20)

Other statements give an important elucidation of these conditions. According to Driberg, who is supported to some extent by Hayley, the Lango were almost continually at war among themselves during the period before the British administration. Driberg describes the organization as "essentially military". (21) In wars against other tribes, clubs, spears, and shields were used in fighting. In feuds between Lango villages a different method was traditionally practised. If feeling between them over some dispute was such that there was no basis for mediation by the elders, a whipping duel was held. (22) Driberg now maintains that it was largely as a result of participation in the wars of the Bunyoro with the Ganda people that the Lango began to fight among themselves in a more violent manner than the traditional whipping duel. By the way, their skill in war made them welcome allies to rival claimants for the throne of Bunyoro, too. (23) It is evident that this was no sufficient reason to escalate the conflicts among themselves. The reason why they abandoned their traditional methods must have been the fact that the internal conflicts had been aggravated. But why had the inter-village relations become particularly hostile about that time?

One solution to the problem of the increasing inter-village hostilities

seems to be the fact that the concentration of distinct lineages or clans within a local community required mechanisms for the reduction of in-group aggression among its members. One technique or solution that channeled aggression outward away from the local community was the institution of rivalry between communities, with raids and warfare conducted against neighbouring tribes. Defence against invaders also provided a means of promoting unity and social prominence through war honours. Raiding and warfare were outlets for any tensions generated through suppression of in-group hostility. With the overwhelming power of the invading foreigners, indigenous social control achieved by the traditional political system no longer performed its cohesive function. In-group aggression (that is, physical violence) increased when out-group aggression was prevented by the new political circumstances or, later, was forbidden by the colonial government.

Another possible cause of the internal strife among the Lango groups was perhaps an increasing shortage of land. The Lango are now primarily a nation of cultivators. The Karamojong-Teso groups entered the country as pure pastoralists but gradually changed their mode of life in the new environment. (24) With the influx of the new groups, the availability of agricultural areas might have been substantially reduced, which caused disputes about the remaining areas, since the necessary and logical corollary of land shortage, viz. territorial expansion, had been made impossible.

Whether psychological, economic, or political factors were responsible for providing the initial impetus for an "essentially military" organization cannot be readily ascertained from the oral history of the Lango. No doubt all were involved.

We may conclude that in 1860 and for some years afterwards there was a traditionally ordered system of indigenous administration. This gradually broke down under the impact of foreign invasions from the North and the South. Finally, there was a period of interregnum after the power of the native rulers had been broken and before British control had been established. It is to this period of interregnum, which in some cases may have lasted as long as twenty years that the statements about anarchy really apply.

4.4.2 Political structure

It is thus evident that before the colonial period, many chiefs ruled over various independent groups of the Lango country and there was much fighting between the people of the different chiefs. All the people, however, called themselves the Lango, although the people who lived in different areas were distinguished by classifying names. Other unifying elements which induced in the individual that system of sentiments and loyalties which kept these groups in being and maintained their union one with the other were a common language, endogamy, common traditions, the linking up of the clans by the age-sets and common customs and beliefs, ceremonies and institutions, in other words a common pattern of culture. The whole tribe had to co-operate with a common will to obviate the two external threats to tribal integrity - enemy invaders and drought. The tribe-wide organization of the age-sets was entrusted with these two tasks. The chiefs were rivals and were the cause of the intermittent civil strife in Lango. But their rivalries were expressly suppressed and internal peace was maintained at the tribal ceremonies.

Some concepts demand an elucidation. The name of a clan designates a particular agnatic group of people, usually with a limited geographic extension or dispersion, but occasionally reaching out over large areas or even

countries. The name of a tribe, on the other hand, is a collective name which comprises a number of individual, unrelated clans. It is applied to a district or area in which a particular clan of that name may not be extant. As a rule, a tribe originated as a clan; in one way or another, due to its number or qualities, the clan became important so that various, unrelated groups voluntarily or under compulsion joined it forming a political unit evidently for the sake of security. In time an entire district was called after such a principal clan. Generally each group had its headman. The headman of the most important one, the aristocratic clan, was head or chief of the whole tribe. Such a common authority most probably existed also in Lango in earlier times. Hayley's informants maintained that the chief of the strongest clan of a locality became ruot (chief) and appointed jagi under him the heads of the stronger clans within his sphere of influence, the lesser clan heads being appointed as village leaders. Hayley thinks that this was an inaccuracy due to confusion with the modern system. (25)

Because of the fact that the theory outlined above of the traditional political system of the Lango people is contrary to the descriptions given by Driberg and Hayley, we will, as a comparison, reproduce their analyses of the political structure in the 1920's and 1930's respectively. (26)

Driberg's approach is that the basic structural unit of the political system was the clan which - like a segmentary system - intermittently extended with similar basic units up to the level that, for the occasion, was required to solve a societal problem. A permanent political superstructure on the tribal level was lacking. Thus, the Lango had other institutions for creating and maintaining a "corporate counsciousness" than a "central and controlling authority".

According to Driberg the government of the Lango was vested traditionally in the clan chief, who had authority over the people of his clan. Each corporate clan or lineage had a leader (adit (me atekere), cf. jadit of the Alur), who settled disputes between clansmen and led his people in war. (27) As said before atekere was the generic Lango name for clan. His most popular and able son inherited his position; otherwise the headship might pass to the deceased's brother's son. The seniority of the successor was not important. The heir had to be a man with a sense of responsibility and adept at using his spear and shield in the fight. He was elected by the clan members (jo me atekere). He was installed in his position by the ceremony of cibo adit me atekere, when he together with his most popular and best known wife was anointed with oil before his clansmen and instructed by old men in the art of ruling his people well. (28) Driberg points out that the adit was governed by the clan spirit, which was crystallized in the founder of the clan and handed down to his successors in office. (29) So the supernatural bond between clansmen was symbolized in the person of the head.

Besides exercising judicial functions, the clan controlled the disposal of property, including wives. When a man died, a council of the clan would choose the man who should inherit his wives. The clan also had control over cattle, although ownership by individuals was acknowledged. (30)

The Lango clans were dispersed in small groups all over the country, and each of these localized clan groups had its own chief. But Tarantino states that each clan had one big clan chief (ruot aduong me atekere), who exercised jurisdiction according to custom over all the various groups. (31)

Although the clan chief was the final authority in matters affecting the clan, the majority of village affairs were dealt with by the village elders.

the more difficult or important cases being taken by them for settlement by the chief. Every village community had a chief or headman (jago, pl. jagi or jegdi), who was also head of the clan most powerfully represented in the village. (32) The office of jago was not necessarily hereditary, though the election often alighted on the deceased's son. Should this son, however, have been evidently an impossible person, either on account of his mental or physical capacities, the most suitable member of the family was elected. His past generosity and hospitality, especially in the matter of beer, played no insignificant part in securing the successor's appointment. He held his office for life, and his son would be the heir presumptive: the title would not revert to a lineage descendant of the old chief.

On the installation of the successor of a clan head who had been a jago, the ceremony was celebrated with especial elaboration, and the clans within the dead jago's sphere of influence would attend. It was the knowledge of the jago's prowess and success in battle that united his people under him for self-protection and for raiding purposes, since the duties of the jago in his village included the organizing and leading the fighting men of the community, regardless of which lineage they belonged to, and so protecting the village from the attacks of other village communities. (33)

Concerning the relationship to the ownership of the land, Driberg points out that "indications are not entirely wanting to show that in the remote past land was held communally by the clan within the sphere of tribal occupancy, and that such clan-land was at the disposal of the individual members of the clan for their use so long as they required it. This clan-tenure, however, is by now almost non-existent". (34) The question of ownership of the land seems to have assumed another emphasis, since the jago sometimes was also "the guardian of the hunting area" (won arum). The country was divided into hunting areas. The Lango said that this division was made when they first entered the territory. The leaders, who first occupied a locality claimed it as their arum. Each claimant was called the won arum. The office was hereditary and the arum remained the property of the clan. It is not evident from the sources whether the jago or another clan member usually held the office. The functions of the office were ritual as well as administrative. But his ritual qualifications were said to be more important than his administrative duties, since he alone had ritual control over the hunting area. (35)

By virtue of his position as chief of the village, the jago would settle inter-clan quarrels within his sphere of influence with the assistance of the elders (aduong). (36) Driberg emphasizes that since the village organization was based on egalitarian principles, the jago had only such power as was freely accorded him by the majority of the villagers. (37) The council of elders was, he says, in reality a court of arbitration rather than of judicial decision, and there was no machinery existing for the legal enforcement of their awards. Nevertheless, even though they had no means of carrying out their decisions, the moral sanction of the people, on which their code depended, sufficed to support them as far as decisions in cases wholly within the village went. If necessary the jago backed one side against the other and threw his influence and the support of his dominant lineage into the scales to settle the matter by superior force. This is consonant with Hayley's information that his verdicts were backed ultimately by the sanction of force, for he could call out the man-power of the associated clans against a recalcitrant clan within his sphere. (38) Even if custom had evolved an elastic scale of fines and compensation for various offences, recourse had often to be made to violence to obtain

satisfaction, and in cases of murder or even adultery it was easier to make war on the village rather then to await the result of a lawsuit which would probably be unfavourable or inoperative. (39)

The village community which was an economic, ritual, military, and legal unit had, thus, a structure based on the position of a powerful lineage. The entire village owed allegiance to a common leader who was the symbol of its solidarity and its independence. This kind of political machinery maintained balance between group interests, thus preserving it from disintegration from within.

In spite of the autonomy and independence of each self-contained village unit and its hostility towards others, there were - besides the assimilative devices, which induced in the individual a common pattern of culture - certain factors which made for cooperation among groups of village communities. First, lineages of the same clan were spread over a number of villages and this must have mitigated feuds to a certain extent. Second, cooperation for hunting occurred, several villages taking part in a hunt in a large arum. (40) Third, there was the practice of placing cattle in the corrals of other villages to avoid a whole herd being destroyed by rinderpest and perhaps to express kinship or friendship. (41) Therefore it is evident that the villages, though structurally differentiated and opposed to each other to a certain extent, were loosely organized into associations for politico-economic purposes. These associations were, no doubt, of the vaguest type, and perhaps only intermittent and they appear to have entailed few legal or political consequences. The cooperation was most clearly expressed in the allegiance which might be freely accorded to a ruot (pl. ruodi). (42)

Among the Lango the position of the ruot - as described by Driberg, etc. - appears to have been more precarious than the position of the chief among the other Nilotic peoples, and lacked the qualities characteristic of the latter. (43) Even if they were elected to their position on the grounds of heredity or convenience, no formal installation to the office seems to have occurred. Chief Adoko informs us that in his father's day a chief had a way of influencing the selection of his successor. He saw to it that the son whom he had chosen as his heir was shown at the right times to his people. When fighting broke out nearby, he would send this son with a spear to warn the people to be on their guard, and when important guests came to his compound he would charge this son with the arrangements for their well-being. In this way the people would know who it was that should succeed the chief. (44)

According to Driberg a jago might obtain a following in neighbouring villages, if his lineage was particularly powerful and his ability in war especially remarkable. A jago who had thus extended his sphere of influence and was the war-leader of a district became a ruot. Driberg says of him that "the rwot was the nearest approach to a chief which the Lango knew, his sphere comprising a varying number of jegdi - possibly only three, but in exceptional cases as many as nine or ten. His functions were almost entirely military, and, although often elected clan headman, he owed his position largely to military success, combining with other rwodi for larger operations under a twon lwak or warleader...". (45) Hayley likewise maintains that a jago with outstanding military successes would exert influence over a wider sphere than one village, and the neighbouring jagi would acknowledge their subservience to him and style him their ruot. (46)

The fact that the role of the chief was almost entirely tied to the military system as "leader of a column" (while the jago was the "leader of a company")

indicates a societal need of defence, while the "civil" political functions had dwindled down into a minimum. Nevertheless, by virtue of his position, the ruot also settled inter-clan quarrels within his sphere of influence in the same way as a jago and with the same possibilities of sanction. Adoko mentions that in compounds like that of his father there were special huts for the "askaris" who guarded the home. (47) Probably they made up a standing force to enforce the chief's decisions, too. Moreover, as Tarantino states that a Lango chief usually had as many as thirty wives (48), he must have been able through his numerous affinal kinship ties to exert influence on the policy of the political community. Usually, he seems to have depended largely upon the allegiance of his followers in other villages and this allegiance was only accorded him if he was both able and fortunate in war as well as the representative of a powerful clan or lineage in the district. Therefore, the territorial group in question was constantly changing its boundaries and was based on the personality of the leader, while, on the other hand, the village communities were the more stable territorial groups.

A temporary commander-in-chief of several ruodi was called tuon luak ("the bull of the crowd") or oteka lawi mony, and hefunctioned when the Lango for a short period of time achieved a sufficient tribal unity to organize a raid upon a neighbouring tribe. During battle the various ruodi and jagi were under the orders of the war-leader they had accepted. But while the ruodi and jagi had a certain amount of civil authority, being elected to their chieftainships on the grounds of heredity or convenience, the tuon luak had none beyond his own most immediate following, but was a military leader pure and simple. He gained his position as the war-leader over a group of ruodi by his personal influence due to prowess in battle, and the question of the power of his lineage did not arise. (49) By its nature, the office of tuon luak was a precarious one. The ruodi supported him in hope of success and booty, and in time of failure they deserted him for more successful war-leaders. "Thus we find" - according to Driberg -"many cases of men winning a wide reputation and much renown, in fact becoming paramount chief of a large area, suddenly losing their position and following almost entirely." (50) Occasionally a tuon luak kept his position until he died in battle and was then succeeded by a son or brother with the requisite ability. But such a succession was accidental: the son succeeded not by virtue of his sonship, but by reason of his own prowess.

In time of peace he had no recognition or privileges. When the war was over their authority lapsed, and they returned to their clans and resumed their ordinary occupations of cultivation and house-building, in which they were not entitled to assistance by other people. Even a clan chief had to make payment of beer when he wanted people to work for him. (51)

The result of this system of war-leaders was that each tuon luak endeavoured to obtain the allegiance of the neighbouring tuon luak's villages. (52)

Finally, the practice of rain-making and the observances connected with it give us an interesting clue to the cultural and structural processes of change in the Lango society. In Driberg's day the rain ritual (lamo kot) or rain dance (myel kot) was performed annually and it was a "democratic" ritual based on the age-sets. Although theoretically the last age-set to be initiated was responsible for the rain until the new set was formed, actually all the sets took part in the rain-making rites. (53) Control of the rituals was reserved for the age-set in office and certain other privileged persons. The festival took place at three different localities according to the divisions of the country. The practice of the Jo Aber, on the other hand, was much less complex; there

was less unity observable also, and often the rites were conducted clan by clan. Enough has been said to show that the rituals were unique among the River-lake Nilotic tribes, and in consideration of the fact that they were both widespread and more elaborated among the Plains Nilotes, it is reasonable to suppose that they had a common Plains Nilotic origin. (54)

Running parallelly with and in some measure integrated with this system, the control and organization of the proceedings of the rain rituals were concentrated in the hands of powerful, hereditary rain-makers (won kot). They were the owners of old sacred spears (agat) and of rain stones (kide kot). (55) Above we referred to Olet, the chief of Lira, whom Driberg describes as "the last rain-maker of any general power". Even rain-makers from the Madi population seem to have been very powerful individuals. To them deputations came from all over the Lango country with requests for rain, and they used to give the order for the rain rituals to be held locally in different places of the country. The petitioners used to come with goats, grain and beer to beg for rain. The rain-maker combined Madi principles with Lango practice by appointing certain old men to be his agents for rain. These men belonged to a certain age-set, which was said to "ripen the grain". Certain people were too old for the rain ritual, and the rain-maker turned them into "leopards" (kwaic) and they could no longer take part in the rain rites. (56) Driberg maintains that "it is probable that originally the won-kot was a person of great power, as among the Bari and eastern Madi, but gradually lost his rights and privileges by a process of democratization". (57) Irrespective of the degree of prestige that the Madi rain-maker enjoyed, he remained an expert and he never attained the position as chief possessed of special political authority. He had nothing to do with the maintenance of law and order. They consulted him only in time of need of rain.

In conclusion, we may say that, in dealing with the Lango problem, considerable difficulties are encountered due to a complete lack of reliable data on the one hand and, on the other hand, due to the fact that in the second half of the last century and at the beginning of this century the Lango country witnessed a number of large conflicts and changes. The original socio-political system of the Lango thus underwent considerable artificial changes (introduced from outside or developed under external influences) which gave rise to substantial alterations in the original social relations. All these factors had the result that today it is possible only with considerable difficulty to determine the original political system of the Lango and even then only in its roughest outlines.

The events which led to the political change among the Lango came from the international environment. Change resulted from the existing structure of the political system being unable to cope with the problem which confronted in. This gives an explanation to the weak support to the traditional political authorities. Available sources do not afford information regarding the extent of the extractive and distributive capabilities of the political system, but it seems to have been negligible. Since the system needed to be able to draw on popular support if it was to sustain them at given levels of effectiveness and efficiency, decline in support for certain activities reflected in tribute evasion or civil disobedience affected the performance of the political system. Instead, support was given to military leaders. In confronting this challenge it found that it needed more resources and more effective ways of deploying its resources. It might have to adapt itself structurally, that is, develop new roles, if it was to survive. Specifically, we attribute the temporary development of intertrib-

al war leadership to the struggle with the foreign intruders. Moreover, the military function of the political authorities strengthens this assumption. This is quite exceptional among the Nilotes, since the political authorities did not usually participate in the battle and, moreover, they were above the prescribed age. Otherwise, military prowess in the early years was an important qualification for a political office. Everything gives evidence of a society being under stress.

But even the military system broke down under the superior force of the intruders. The change resulted in "development" in a negative or regressive sense. The capabilities of the Lango political system declined; the higher roles and more complex structures atrophied. Instead, we see clan heads who were installed as if they were kings with leopard skins, stools, "best known wife", etc. (58)

Driberg's statement of "a process of democratization" is relevant to the matter. The diminishing economic resources of the Lango society in consequence of cattle raids and cattle-plague, etc. - it is said that there was much more meat for the Lango to eat formerly than there is now - probably reduced the difference between the rich and the poor, i.e. a reduced distance between the political elite and the commoners, which in turn weakened the power of the political authorities, since the basic factor for the origin and existence of social stratification is the production of a certain quantity of surplus within the social system.

4.5 The Luo

4.5.1 Introduction

The Luo people who form the subject of this section of the work inhabit the Central and South Nyanza districts of the Nyanza Province of Kenya extending into Tanzania. They constitute the largest group of the Nilotes. Though they are the only Nilotic people in Kenya and Tanzania, their migrations and settlement had a crucial importance to the inhabitants in the Lake district.

The clans that now make up the Luo came from various places, by numerous routes, and at different times. Simply speaking, there are - according to Ogot's historical reconstruction - four major migrational divisions among the Luo: (a) the group that claims to have come from Acholiland (the Joka-Jok) - this is the oldest and the biggest group, (b) another group that broke off from the Alur (the Jok'Owiny), (c) a third group that hived off from the Padhola (the Jok'Omolo), and finally, (d) a heterogeneous group of mostly non-Lwo people known as the Abasuba in South Nyanza, which consists of refugees from Buganda, Busoga, the islands of the lake, and from Tanzania, as well as from other places. (1) On the basis of genealogical evidence, Ogot maintains that the first Luo settlers arrived in Nyanza about fifteen to sixteen generations ago, that is, between 1490 and 1600.

There is traditional evidence to show that parts of modern Luo homes were formerly occupied by some Bantu and Plains and Highland Nilotic groups. (2) The story of the Luo settlement in the lake region has often been presented as an invasion of the area by the Luo groups who, arriving as a unit, conquered the former inhabitants in a series of battles, occupying one territory after another in their own way and proceeding with their daring methods until "Pax Britannica" stopped them. Evans-Pritchard writes that "Luo expansion at the expense of the Bantu was like a line of shunting trucks, each tribe driving out the one in front of it to seek compensation from one yet further in front, gene-

rally a Bantu tribe". (3) Likewise, Crazzolara says that by continuous forays and wars against their alien neighbouring peoples, by plunder and kidnapping, the Luo increased quickly, incorporating little by little several smaller groups either by force or enticement or by a wise blend of both. (4) Nevertheless, it would be incorrect, Ogot avers, to describe the early intrusion of the Luo in Nyanza basin as a "conquest". (5) Unlike the narratives dealing with the second and third waves of migrations which are replete with allusions to battles fought and populations subjugated or assimilated, the traditions describing the first wave are characterized by the lack of any reference to wars or encounters. What appears to have happened was that a small band of nomads settled on the periphery of agricultural populations; and so long as they were safe and there was adequate pasture for their cattle, they preferred to maintain a state of co-existence. It therefore seems reasonable to infer that this was a slow and peaceful penetration of the region. For a short while they lived peacefully with the original inhabitants. But when their number increased, friction developed between the newcomers and the aboriginals. The previous populations in Nyanza were rarely exterminated: they were either driven out or subjugated and absorbed. Hence the population of the Luo expanded rapidly, which in turn led to further migration, encounters and assimilation.

The real conquest of the lakeshore region of Central Nyanza by the Luo may be said to have taken place between seven and twelve generations ago, and therefore between 1590 and 1790. It was during this period that two other major divisions of the Luo arrived. (6) The cause of this sudden expansion is unknown. But the main cause appears to have been that the land was no longer adequate to sustain both the animal and human populations, which must have increased considerably during the peaceful generations. Between six and seven generations ago, South Nyanza was invaded. (7) They continued to expand and conquer along their borderlands up to 1900. It is evident that it is about this period that Evans-Pritchard's and Crazzolara's descriptions of Luo expansion would refer. Thus the picture we get is that the Luo frontiersmen were rapidly extending their domain southwards at the expense of the former population. It would be misleading, however, Ogot says, to convey the impression that this was a planned and organized invasion of Bantu areas by Luo marauders. It was a confused and haphazard movement, with each sub-tribe acting independently (see further below!). (8)

The Luo imposed on the previous populations their language and culture, and most of them were finally assimilated. Circumcision and clitoridectomy (where it applied) were gradually abandoned, and almost simultaneously, the Luo custom of removing the six lower incisors was adopted. (9) Any persons or group of people who refused to "naturalize" themselves were evicted and expelled if they were already in the country, or were refused entry if they were outsiders. (10) The influence of language was probably vital, for Luo speech has had a great tendency to dominate other languages, to judge even from its adoption by the Bantu. But, at the same time, the Luo were greatly influenced by Bantu culture during the process of expansion and assimilation. (11) The Nilotic influence was most pronounced in the southern and south-western parts of the district, where intermarriage between Luo and Bantu occurred more frequently. (12) This cultural influence extended even to such an area as the Buluyia, which strictly speaking were outside the area of direct Luo influence. Another important consequence of the Luo invasion was that it compelled the divided and mutually combating Luyia clans to unite, and thereby it promoted the development of larger and more complex societies.

The same happened to the Gusii but not on such a large scale. (13)

With the arrival of the Luo folk in the area, they began the change from a primarily pastoral life of cattle-keeping to mixed farming with increasing emphasis on agriculture. (14) We can only speculate on the possible reasons for this change. The mixing of peoples in Nyanza may have dampened the traditional Nilotic attachment to cattle-keeping, particularly in their conquest of earlier Nyanza peoples who perhaps cultivated and placed great value on land. Whatever the reasons, agriculture, and thus rights to land, became very important to the Luo.

4.5.2 Social structure

The Luo were divided in pre-European days into from thirty to thirty-five tribes (ogendini, sing. oganda) varying in size from about 10,000 to 70,000 persons, living in their own territories (pinje, sing. piny). (15) Some terminology differed among the Luo in South Nyanza (the "outside people" (jooko) unlike the "inside people" (joiye) of Central Nyanza). The South Nyanza Luo did not use the term oganda to mean tribe but used only the term piny. Oganda was reserved for a group of people which assembled around a particular issue or which met to oppose the interest of a similar group. It was sometimes used to mean clan (dhoot), too. (16) These independent tribal units were generally composed of groupings of patrilineal clans or large lineages. Thus there was a close association of territorial grouping with lineage grouping. (17)

No political superstructure, such as a federation or a confederation, existed. It was not until the last decade of the 19th century, Ogot writes, that the Luo were beginning to be conscious of their distinct identity. Before this period they were widely dispersed lacking in any social or political cohesion. (18) Nevertheless, Ocholla stresses, while the structures of community councils and chiefship was for the society a great integrating tribal force, other factors acted for national solidarity. These were included in ideology, identity, and kinship relationship unity through ties of affinity. Moreover, the ideas of the Luo past events were contained in the political system and so they formed a part of their social attitudes and relationships with the non-Luo. All this is reflected in the concept of "Oganda Luo", "the Luo people", as a group with identical culture and language as opposed to non-Luo peoples. (19)

Even though it sometimes happened that a weak tribe would form an allegiance with another tribe to fight a common enemy, each tribe was a self-contained economic, landholding, political and ritual unity. (20) Ritually, the tribe sacrificed on certain occasions as a group. The boundaries of each tribal group were clearly defined and there appears to have been continual sporadic fighting between the Luo tribes to maintain them. (21) The stripes of land left between tribes (thim), usually forest land or swamps, served as a buffer between one tribe and the next. Moreover, the tribal groups were distinguished from each other by the fact that blood compensation could only be paid between members of the same tribe. Tribal groups married exogamously. (22)

The first major division of the tribe was the clan (dhoot, pl. dhoudi). These clans were of the nature of maximal lineages in that they represented the largest lineage division of the clan and were exogamous units. The nuclear lineage group (libamba, pl. libembini) functioned as a corporate group more frequently than the clan. This was because it was the libamba group which most frequently met as a corporate unit to discuss the welfare of its

members. It was the group which most often took action on issues which affected the group or a member of the group, and it meant a patrilineal lineage of between four and seven generations in depth, the members of which shared an agricultural area and within which the members shared sacrifice frequently. The libamba segment was further subdivided into segments called keyo, or in some tribes hosi. Among the South Nyanza tribes the term (jo-)gweng was used as a synonym of keyo. Keyo meant, etymologically, a straight strip of land shared by the descendants of a common ancestor who lived from three to five generations back. It was made up of extended polygamous families which traced descent from a common great grandfather (jokakwaro). These groups were often co-terminous with the village (dala). (23)

The relationship between kinship and territorial units seem to follow closely the pattern found in other Nilotic tribal groups. Each tribe had a dominant clan or lineage. There were a number of other clans and large lineages living in the tribal area as well as small stranger groups and individuals. The dominant clan was usually identified linguistically with the tribe. Members of the dominant clan alone were the landowners (jopiny). The rest were jodak or jomwa, the strangers ("the separated people"); though if they had lived among them a long time they spoke of them as jobedo, for the other terms were harsh words. The presence of these clans and lineages, and their relations with the dominant clan, were accounted for by traditions in which stranger lineages and the lineages in possession intermarried, and the stranger lineages assumed the position of in-laws. Evans-Pritchard emphasizes that the lineages of the clan which owned the tribal area and those affiliated to it seem to have been on a general social equality. They were differentiated only in matters of ritual, marriage regulations, and in settlement of homicide. (24) As we shall see on the following pages, his opinion is at variance with the real facts.

Land in all of the Luo tribes was being settled on a lineage basis, and the right of occupancy depended on the rights of conquest. (25) The land, therefore, in the final analysis, belonged to the dominant clan and all of its members, past, present, and future, and therefore although a man might use his land as he pleased, he could not transfer the rights of his lineage to it, or the rights of his descendants to it, by sale or outright gift to strangers. If those who left returned, or if their children returned, the customary share of the ancestral land was given back to them regardless of the length of time that individual or his descendants had been away from the land in question.

The basic connotation of the term gweng (pl. gwenge) was "land" or "country", but the social group occupying the land was always implicit in the term. Settlement is thus a reasonable translation of gweng. (26) Just as the piny had rights to an area over or against all other tribes so had each segment of the tribe over or against equal and opposite segments. Between the segments, unoccupied or deserted land was left in the same way as between tribes to prevent internecine fighting and was the communal grazing area for the clans. These buffer areas were called lek. (27)

As said above, within each tribe there were clans who had descended from persons other than the founding ancestor of the dominant clan: the slaves he brought with him; the jodak who entered the area many years ago; strangers who were adopted into the clans and later established independent groups; members of other tribes who were given protection and so on. (28) The Luo found it difficult to refuse land to a stranger who asked for it and therefore many such people were living among the various tribes of the Luo. A person

who came to the area of a lineage and begged for land was called a jadak (pl. jodak) or client. If he was given land it was given on usufructuary principle only. He therefore had no rights of inheritance and his children might only renew the usufructuary right to the land and might not inherit the land as a right owner.

How did there come to be land clients in Luo? Wilson states that it was a custom which dated back to the times when a man counted his security on the number of sons, friends, servants, and squatters he could attract to his holding. (29) The larger the number, the more secure he was to his title and the more status he received in the community. It is fair to say that the Luo encouraged clients to settle and until recently a client was not normally turned out of the land loaned to him except under the most serious circumstances (see further below!). Moreover, Luo married the daughters of clients, and vice versa, so we find that most clients were also affinal kinsmen (orche, sing. or).

A client had certain obligations which he was expected to fulfil. He must fight for his patron and support him in all matters regardless of his own opinion; he must follow the instructions of the cultivation leader (jagolpur) of the lineage to which the patron (wuon lowo) belonged and he must show respect to the patron and he must give him a high status position at all beer drinks and festivities and he must be content with a low status position when invited to social or ritual gatherings at the homestead of his patron. Finally, and most important, he must remain in continual occupation of the land which was allocated to him or he lost his usufructuary rights to it. (30)

Every client knew when he begged for land that his position was a precarious one. He had no right to allocate land to friends or to his kinsmen without the prior approval of the patron. He had no way therefore of building a group of supporters in the community. Moreover, he had not the customary right of regarding land as his by right of expansion. (31) Land given in usufruct was usually land well within the boundaries of the gardens cultivated by the owner of the land. It was therefore a relatively simple matter to terminate the usufruct by denying access or right of way to the garden through the gardens of the owners. (32)

The refugees from other tribes (jomotur, sing. ngat motur) moved from their land complete with cattle and other property and if the warriors of their tribe were defeated in battle, they were allocated land with affines or friends, and could remain as long as they continued to fulfil the traditional obligations. The tribe which accepted such refugees benefited because it was then in a better position to fight its own enemies. The refugees were not regarded as clients because someday they would fight as a unit for the host tribe; unlike the ordinary client, they came with an organization. (33)

When the victorious tribe took up the new land, those of the defeated tribe who took shelter among them were given land there but were no longer considered to be the landowners. The conquered peoples, under these conditions, were not regarded as true clients. They maintained the right to sacrifice on behalf of the land; because they were its former owners, they retained this powerful ritual and ceremonial position. They were allocated land as if they were a clan of the victorious tribe and their elders were called to the tribal councils. But they were never fully regarded as members of the tribe because the real clans of the tribe could intermarry with them, as if they were an enemy people, but in time they began to be regarded "as if" they were full members of the tribe. (34)

If the victorious tribe later attacked another people and the clients assisted in the fighting, they were given land and their status changed from clients to allies (joyuote, sing. jayuote). Under these conditions they began to be regarded as landowners. We find,therefore,among the Luo persons in this category who, although they were not of the tribe which was the owner of the gweng, were considered to be the landowners (wuon piny). In some cases persons in this category, especially if they were related affinally to the tribe, became absorbed by the victorious peoples. Absorption would take at least three generations. (35)

Other categories of peoples, such as friends of other tribes, affinal or maternal kin might also receive land on usufructuary principle only and once such land was left, it reverted to the landowner and the right to use it was lost by the usufructee as for clients. (36) Affinal and maternal kin might use the land but might never claim full rights to it because they were "strangers" (orche, sing. or), i.e. persons who might be married by the group which had loaned the land. These categories could neither be absorbed nor called clients. After several generations they might become landowners formerly held as usufructuary gardens. They were in fact jobedo, a term used to describe one who held usufruct animals and must fulfil obligations similar to those of clients. (37)

Finally, misumba was the term used to describe a slave or servant, a foundling brought up as a foster child. Whether misumba came as a child or as a full-grown man, he was assigned to the hut of a barren woman as if he was her son. In arguments, however, the social stigma of misumba remained with him throughout his life. He had no rights beyond a portion of his foster mother's gardens, livestock, etc., unless the foster father, i.e. the head of the homestead (wuon dala), gave him cattle to marry with. In this way the misumba was adopted into the lineage of the master. But the children were regarded as the legal descendants of their social father, i.e. the man who gave the cattle for their mother's bridewealth. (38)

Ideally the exogamous principle should extend to the whole of the tribe and this in fact happened in some of the South Nyanza tribes. (39) In all other Luo tribes the principle of exogamy extended without exception to that group called dhoot and among the group to the dhoudi, who called themselves jolowo, i. e. those clans which traced patrilineal descent from the founder of the clan or a group of clans. As we have seen, within each tribe, however, there were groups who had descended from persons other than the founding ancestor of the tribe. In some tribes the exogamous principle extended even to those groups but in most, the Luo married within these groups as well as within tribes.

Before we conclude this section concerning the social status groups, we will briefly touch upon the equality before the law of these groups, and the distribution of wealth. (40)

In homicide cases compensation was dependent on the status of the deceased. If it happened within a group where marriage could not be considered, compensation for a man might be 50 or more cattle, for a woman about 20 or less. For a misumba two cattle might be paid to his people, and for a jadak, 10 or 15 depending on his social relationship with the landowners, that is if some marriages had taken place between them.

As to the distribution of wealth, the Luo had a set of categories stratified according to wealth. We find a group characterized as ruoth, considered the richest in the country; okebe, those who were next to ruoth in wealth; jo-

karuoth, the royal clan; ogaye, those who combined wealth with a military title; jomoko, those whose wealth was expressed in terms of grain, a few cattle, one or two wives, and a few children; and joeso, the well-to-do people, those considered to be little above the general level. These categories were men who by virtue of their possessions influenced the policy. The wealthy received constant estime, they were given special position in public gatherings etc. They had a number of privileges not shared by the masses, which were stratified as follows: jochan who possessed two or three cows, but were considered to be lazy at the agricultural activities and therefore lacked grain; jokayongo, who might have been well-to-do but because they killed their animals for food or mainly were considered to like to go to witch-doctors, into whom they put a lot of wealth; jomfwadhi, those who lived from hand to mouth; and jochan kururu or jodhier, the beggars.

4.5.3 Political structure

Evans-Pritchard who produced a paper after only a six-weeks' stay in Luoland in 1936, emphasizes that the Luo tribal structure appeared to be, in all essentials, similar to that of the Nuer - as he interprets the Nuer political system; the typical segmentary lineage structure, associated with territorial units, was not organized round a symbolic office such as the Shilluk kingship, the Anuak nobility, or the Acholi chiefship. (41) The interaction of the segmentary system was, he says, the basis of the organization and cooperation. Political authority remained inarticulate. It was not linked up with clearly defined rights and privileges, such were usually associated with institutionalized chieftainship. The leading elders of a clan or lineage were merely those persons whose opinion carried most weight when public matters were discussed. There was no generally accepted term for a clan or tribal head, but they were referred to by a term which could also be used with regard to any respected and honoured person. They had no rights that were inherent in their office, such as to collect tribute, or to enact laws. And there was no formal appointment and installation of the head of a clan. Further there was no real political office in the autonomous tribes, but, instead, there were, he continues, a number of people who were of notable status. The ruoth was an influential person, but no more. He was richer than his fellows in wives and cattle and people came often to his home to eat there and to discuss affairs of the day. Finally, he says he was told that a poor man might ask the ruoth for the gift of a cow to help him marry and that it was considered an honour to marry into his family. Any man gaining an enhanced social position of the kind was called ruoth, though he was in most instances a member of the dominant clan of the tribe.

Even Southall maintains that the Luo entirely lacked any specialized political institutions and that the successful growth of a patrilineal group was enough of itself to confer the title of chiefship of the great lineages. (42)

Nevertheless, recent research has shown that the indigenous political structure of the Luo varied from tribe to tribe at the time of European ascendancy. Some of the tribes appear to have developed an incipient form of centralized chieftainship, while others were examples of decentralized, loosely organized, political units. The tribes had a long lineage segmentation system that even in a more centralized chiefdom where there was admixture of lineages, clans, and conquered and assimilated groups, the lineage element was noticeable. Nevertheless, the Luo political system cannot be considered wholly on a lineage system basis. Ogot who has recently studied the problem

among the Luo avers that it is difficult to accept Evans-Pritchard's and Southall's interpretations. Both, he writes, have either belittled or paid scant attention to the chiefship principle. (43) Southall's paper on the Luo lineage formation seems to have been based entirely on the Karachuonyo tribe, in which the majority of the people were members of the dominant clan. The few stranger lineages had intermarried so much with the dominant clan that the clan had become.by the 19th century.the effective political unit. In other words, descent groups tended to be identical with political communities, and both leadership and politics were conceived largely in kinship terms. But this was not typical according to Ogot. For in other Luo areas the basis of political unity was the occupation of particular settled territories. Within these territories there were usually several clans, some of them unrelated, occupying their own settlement and it was the settlements where, on the whole, the lineages coincided with the territorial boundaries.

Ogot's view of the development of Luo political structure is as follows. (44) He writes that originally the Luo seem to have lived under a form of patriarchal system. But migrations, warfare, conquests and the subsequent process of cultural assimilation of non-Luo elements produced a different political structure in many territories. The existence of a "plural" society thus made it imperative for the Luo settlers to evolve territorial social and political organizations which were not based entirely on kinship groupings as had been the case hitherto. One may regard this development as the beginning of chiefship. As Ogot has argued elsewhere, there is a possible correlation between the existence of plural and sedentary societies and the emergence of a central chiefship. (45) Ogot also relies upon Whisson who has come to a similar conclusion. (46) The latter writes: "Leadership within the sub-tribes varied considerably. In some sub-tribes there is a tradition of chiefship which goes back for ten or more generations each chief being succeeded by his son, or by a very close agnate who was subsequently considered to be his son... Such routinized chiefship appears to have emerged when one clan gained ascendancy over the rest, and did not divide into factions based on subordinate lineages in the clan. - In other sub-tribes there was no such routinized leader, the people maintaining their unity more by virtue of their common enmity against neighbouring sub-tribes, and their affiliation to a single lineage which embraced most of them. The effective leaders of such sub-tribes were the most successful warriors, and the most feared magicians... Some clan histories suggest that chiefship has been in the sub-tribe for only a small number of generations, and in those there is a correlation between the establishment of a form of chiefship and their being forced to take to a more sedentary way of life than was traditional. Uyoma and Asembo, having been driven out of South Nyanza, and confined to a considerable extent to the Uyoma peninsula developed at that time a routinized form of chiefship, supported initially by the mystical experience of the leader, but subsequently by his lineage affiliations".

Concluding his remarks on this subject, Whisson states: "The development of a form of chiefship when the tribe was forced to halt or slow its movement south, and to form a sedentary society with a greater reliance on agriculture is probably the best example of evolution under social and economic pressure. It included wars and population expansion resulting in a shortage of pasture land, an increase in internal tensions, and the emergence of a single figure - the ruoth or jabilo - to settle disputes peacefully and lead his people united into war against their powerful adversaries". (47)

This rather long extract from Whisson's book bears a good evidence of the fact that his analysis shows a greater awareness of the complex nature of the problem than previous writers such as Evans-Pritchard and Southall. Yet Ogot is not satisfied. He says that Whisson fails to appreciate the importance of the existence of a mixed society for the emergence of centralized chiefship, and that he also ignores the possible influence of external factors on the evolution of chiefship. Ogot refers to Lonsdale. According to him there is ample evidence to show that external pressures contributed towards the emergence of a ruoth. (48)

Summing up, Ogot concludes that a form of chiefship had definitely emerged among the Luo of Kenya by 1900; that the emergence of such an institution was partly due to the slow transformation that had been taking place from a semi-nomadic existence to a sedentary way of life; partly due to internal factors such as clan feuds, the dispersal of lineages, expansion of population and the assimilation of non-Luo elements; and partly due to external factors such as wars with the Bantu and "Nilo-Hamites" in the second half of the 19th century. (49)

In spite of the fact that Ogot is a historian, he has here adopted an evolutionary approach. His opinion that Luo settlement was not a united invation, planned and executed consciously and deliberately, cannot be accepted without further notice. (50) Ogot himself says that among the Luo the type of movement practised was what Bohannan has called "expansion", where movement does not break the correspondence between genealogical and spatial relations. (51) This set-up still remained the basis of land-tenure in Luoland. Wilson states that when the Luo moved into a newly acquired land, they did not completely vacate their former land. (52) This was especially true of the chiefly clans because the ruoth did not accompany the people into the new area at once but remained in the old until the new had been fully consolidated. Since we, moreover, thanks to Ogot, know that Owiny's party, the leaders of the second wave of migration into the Nyanza region, were the first to be looked upon as rulers (jokaruoth, "the royal clan") (53), we can imagine that the first wave of migration consisted of the advance parties of young warriors that invaded the area to test its efficacy, while their chiefs waited until the state of things had become stabilized (see further below!). Thus we can imply that the expansion in historical time proceeded in much the same way as recently on a local level. One of Ogot's conditions of the existence of chiefship, viz. that of a "plural" society, is fulfilled, too, since he mentions that the group that migrated into Nyanza was already a "mixed" population. (54) Finally, if one accepts an evolutionary interpretation of the emergence of chiefship, one has great difficulty in explaining the terminological identity between the Luo and the other Lwo peoples (ruoth, jago, etc.). How can a phenomenon that is considered to have developed out of local conditions be given the same designation as among related peoples living at a great distance and with whom they lost contact centuries ago? We know from other spheres that a phenomenon that has no place in a given culture has, of course, no designation, and that, if a phenomenon, for some reason or other, has ceased to exist the designation of this phenomenon also tends to disappear. Therefore we prefer to suggest an unbroken tradition of chiefship among the Luo ever since the time before their migration.

In Central Nyanza each tribe or chiefdom ("ruothdom") was an independent economic, political and ritual unit. Each had its own chief (ruoth (mar piny)). (55) Ker meant chiefship or the symbol of chiefship. (56) The

chief was the jural-political leader who controlled both the internal and external affairs of the entire chiefdom. In some tribes he was also a prophet (jabilo) or rain-maker (won koth). From the chief to his lowest agents ran a chain of authority; information was passed through two channels to office-holders, according to their rank and personal prestige, and importance of their units, and which in turn made up the political "elite" who in advising the chief were responsible for the policy decisions. At every stage the council was divided into two "chambers", that which discussed regional country affairs (chieng -poro-weche-piny) and the court assembly to discuss cases (jalo buche). In every unit with a council, there was an executive body (ogulmama) to carry out orders. (57) The existence of two councils was determined in the highest councils, buch piny, as a political council, and doho, as supreme court, both of which were headed by the chief himself. The fact that the chief had to consult his counsellors before any major decision was made, suggests that power was not concentrated in the hands of one man. Nevertheless, the final decision was his. The tribal council dealt with matters affecting the whole tribe, such as the question of war and peace, inter-territorial relationships, famine and rain rituals, migration, and distribution of conquered land. This council was exclusively a men's council. Besides the chief himself, as the head, it was generally attended by men of outstanding merits (jodong piny), the peace-maker (ogaye), the tribal war-leader or general (osumba mirawayi or langi), the tribal prophet (jabilo), distinguished old ex-war-leaders (jodong gagi or ngaga), and clan elders (jodong dhoot).

The supreme court enforced the laws promulgated by the society. The chief was the supreme judge and the peace-maker was the "chief justice". In the supreme court there were even women counsellors or witnesses. Cases such as divorce, debts, and all kinds of crime were judged. It also acted as the final court of appeal for the whole tribe. The supreme court could only confiscate a person's property and send him into exile if he refused to obey their judgement, whereas death sentences were left to the supreme council to pass.

The personal retainers of the chief (jotiend ruoth) had no official functions but accompanied the chief whatever he did. Within the group were ogulmama who acted here as his body-guard, and who might be sent to enforce his decisions. Ogulmama were not young men; they were selected from the retiring warriors.

The chief in person did not undertake any economic transactions. He neither received in his hands any gift, nor involved in any direct contact with material properties. His right hand (pad ruoth) was very often one of his brothers who handled most of his properties. The household work was done by slaves and by those who had lost their kin.

The subjects, either directly or through their local leaders,gave tribute to the chief and worked for him as they did to their local leaders. They built his houses, cultivated and fished for him, provided a part of the meat from the hunt, and gave a portion of grain harvested. The whole was known as levies (ndongo or biero). The supreme council decided what to be collected from the country, then regional leaders appointed who must pay. Those who refused were dispossessed of their tribute by force by the ogulmama. The tribute collected from the subjects were placed in the hands of the ogaye and his counsellors, who paid the prophet for his services, and the rest they delivered to the chief. The chief in turn redistributed this tribute to the subjects as individuals by coming to the aid to those whose homes were destroyed,

or to an individual who had no cattle to pay for the bridewelath, and as group in feasts and ceremonies.

Though the chiefship was inherited, the country might look for another person to elect as a new chief at the death of the chief. The election system was more traditional in the office of ogaye than that of the chief. Among the Luo in South Nyanza and Tanzania, there were few known struggles for chiefship. Often it was the supreme council that confirmed the chief of the country.

Among the Luo all holders of office were chosen from the middle-aged grade (oteke). Legal advisers being from the last age grade. The holding of office was partly due to merits and partly to heredity but could be recalled by or rejected by the people. Most of the officers were elected or appointed on the basis of merits and past accomplishment, e.g. ogaye, osumba langi, or thuon were offices occupied only when one had higher military performance throughout life. The popular choice did not rest on hereditary right, though the same clan elders might remain in leadership until there was no one in the family to take over. This does not imply that all leaderships were permanently inherited as infered here. Ocholla mentions that if the people desired a son for leadership, it was said "the country has chosen him". Some basic qualifications expected of a leader of any rank are as follows: besides being a Lwo, the leader must not be a client, nor a slave; he should be a member of one of the important clans in the tribe; he must be a former war-leader; he must not have any physical deformities, nor being a twin; he must have the ability to rally support, generosity, and good judgement; and he must be wealthy to keep the prestige of his office. These qualifications for earning a title of office can be seen to be distinct from achievment within the political structure and outside it. For the Luo, political office was in one way reward for outstanding achievement outside the political sphere, i.e. in war, possession of wealth, bravery, frankness, and honesty, etc., and on the other hand, status being allowed according to descent. This implies that no personal favour from the chief was enough to place a person in the office unless he had the required qualifications. Ocholla emphasizes that the Luo considered generosity and hospitality, honour and dignity, as some of the basic characteristics of a man, and therefore wealth was an indication of a man's ability that guaranteed that he would be able to maintain the prestige of the chiefship.

The installation ceremony was conducted by prophets, and former leaders of different kinds. They presented the new chief with the Luo spear, smeared his head with cow's oil, and also presented him with the Luo chair (kom nya luo), etc. Several of the clans possessed sacred spears and other objects believed to have belonged to their founding ancestors. The best known sacred spear (tong mar duong piny or tong (ma) liswa, "spear of sacrifice") was the spear of Alego, the founder of the Alego clan. (58) Where there were important stranger lineages in a tribe they might also have their sacred objects. These objects were symbols of the clan and, by extension, of the tribe in which it was dominant, and they were used ritually in time of war or of common calamity, such as drought and invasion by locusts. As Mboya mentions, there were many forms of conducting oaths (muma), in fact they varied by degree of the crime. (59) The objects of oath also varied. The sacred spear (mbira) was used in very exceptional cases involving clans rather than individuals in some tribes. Such "insignia" as the sacred spears seem to have been proper regalia implying a clearly defined status of leadership.

The Luo tribes were rarely secure in their tribal areas and because of

this insecurity they developed a structure of politico-religious leaders to bring supernatural agencies to bear on the holding of the land. These leaders (jobilo) had a considerable power in the pre-European times and acted as the counsellors to the chief and as prophets or diviners for the tribe. (60) One of these functionaries in a tribe was generally more influential than the others and a tribe requiring the services of an exceptionally famous prophet might ask for him even if he lived in a distant tribe. His functions, which tended to pass from father to son, were said to have been to divine the fortunes of war, to curse the enemy, and to make magic to secure victory and the safety of the warriors. He did not himself accompany a raid. In return for his services he received part of the spoils and according to some informants he was entrusted with its distribution. It was also said that the people had to wait for permission of the prophet to sow and that he had ritual functions in cases of homicide within the tribe and that he was a peace-maker who could intervene in a fight by dragging his leopard skin along the ground between the two sides. (61)

The prophet was also, at least sometimes, the rain-maker (won koth, pl. jokoth), while at other times the rain-maker seems to have been a different person. (62) Rain-makers among the neighbouring Bantu peoples were also appealed to. Roscoe mentions a Soga rain-maker who lived among the Luo for the purpose of assisting them in discharging those ritual obligations which they did not themselves understand how to perform. He was said to be treated with great respect and he had a comfortable existence among them. (63)

The prophet and the rain-maker appear to have wielded political power of a kind, as, through the practising of their arts, they could influence the activities, not only of single individuals, but of larger groups of people. The prophet, as has been stated, was consulted on the probable outcome of war expeditions, and on similar matters of wider concern, while the rain-maker, through his alleged ability of withholding rain and of directing the rainfall, had the power of an executive organ in the administration of justice. These two experts, however, formed categories of their own. Their knowledge was by virtue of inheritance, and they wielded it independently of their clan - and, sometimes, even of their tribal affiliations. But the special knowledge of the rain-maker does not appear to have lent him authority beyond that implied in his specific practices, while, on the other hand, many of the famous prophets who were known and consulted all over Luoland had a clearly political position who acted as counsellors to the chiefs and whose main function was to look after the spiritual well-being of the tribe, and to prescribe moral standards against which the policies of individual chiefs had to be judged. The people revolted against dictatorial and repressive rule which intensified inter-clan feuds. (64) This tended to emphasize the unity of the Luo as a group.

On the other hand, it was partly due to communications which were not developed, news to the centre travelled slowly, and the chiefly levies could not be transported rapidly, that many of the Luo societies were constantly splitting up, with segments setting themselves up as independent political communities. But for the Luo there were further characteristics which contributed to the processes of fission. Ocholla maintains that the Luo love of freedom and independence contained disadvantages for the strong centralized state. Nevertheless, whenever the chiefly clan split, once independent, the initiator of the breach himself tended to become a ritual leader and at time the chief of the newly conquered clans which might retain the chiefly lineage to provide

the hereditary chief. In some cases, however, they attempted to do away with the chiefship system altogether. (65) When the chiefship system implied a sort of despotism, or rigid authority, in some tribes there were splinter groups that formed chiefless political communities where the leadership was collective. Taking this into consideration, the chief had to be responsive in his administration and judgements, and to avoid tyrannous rule (loch gweno). Any unfair judgement might cause unreparable split. As a rule the chiefly control was not a despotic sort of administration. This was noted by Phillips. (66) In Central and South Nyanza where there was stronger tradition of chiefship, he observed that "the ruoth might pass out a judgement contradicting the decision of the lower court (in Central chiefdoms), whereas in South Nyanza the ruoth generally accepted the decisions of the jodongo gweng court".

The heyday of war expeditions and raids was the semi-nomadic period of Luo history, which lasted from about thirteen generations ago to the end of the 19th century, and which was the period of the "saviours" or local heroes who behaved like chiefs. (67) The chief was not the leader of the fighting forces in time of war. In most of South Nyanza Luo tribes ogaye was not only considered the highest man next to the chief in the tribal council, but he was also regarded as the commander in chief of the military forces, and in some tribes he was often the chairman of the council of war. In these tribes a "general" (osumba mirwayi or langi) was responsible for planning the war and for directing the army though he himself did not participate in the fighting. He received his order from the chiefly war council, but he was under the ogaye who might recommend his dismissal. Thuon ("bull", pl. thuondi) was the highest fighting rank. He was the target of the enemy. Once killed, the war was over. After retirement he might become osumba or, in some tribes, ogaye. (68)

Before newly acquired land could be occupied, it was found necessary by the prophets to send young warriors into the area to test its efficacy and to test the right of the tribe to it. These advance parties of warriors built temporary villages (kiru) on sites chosen by the elders of the tribe and remained in the area for as many as three years or until the prophets decided that the land was free of poison of the enemy. (69) The land was occupied ceremoniously on authority of the chief. The time of occupation was arrived at by him in consultation with the prophets and the elders. Ngat mochor was the term used to describe a man, a son or a client, purposely sent to occupy part of the lek or thim, or for that matter unused land which was known to be that of another group than that of the man. (70) Uninhabited land was finally occupied after purification by the prophets and was occupied by the people in the same way as land taken by conquest. (71)

Within the tribe, a hierarchy of offices had developed. Though the tribal chief controlled the tribe through two main structures, buch piny and doho, he usually ruled with the help of hereditary officers who represented him in the various regions of the tribe. This view is supported by the observation of one of the earliest British administrators in the area, Northcote, who wrote about the traditional chiefs thus: "Each chief subdivides his territory, placing each portion under a sub-chief". (72) The degree to which chiefly authority was delegated to other authorities is an index of centralization or penetration and not a sort of despotism. Ocholla stresses that traditional chiefs did not rule arbitrarily; the distribution of power fell in the hands of traditional hereditary leaders, to whom their subjects recognized an allegiance independent

of the allegiance which they granted to the chief himself who confirmed them. (73) In the case where the chiefly clan members (jokaruoth) scattered throughout the country, they took the regional leaderships.

Wagaye or ruoth matin was a sub-chief over a district (dhoot) with a council (buch dhoot or libamba). He was also known as jaduong dhoot. (74) Dhoot was the largest land holding unit within which the jural-political and economic affairs were managed by wagaye with the help of his counsellors (jodong dhoot). The sub-chief and some of his counsellors attended the tribal court. The sub-chief's position was certainly inheritable but its confirmation was done by the tribal council. He must come from the same local group as he was to rule. The installation of the sub-chief was done by the tribal council. He was given as garment of office a leopard dress (law kwach) and the spear of the clan and a special kind of stick (ragwar) which must be placed on the ground when a case was pronounced, as he was the regional judge as well as the political leader.

The political leader of a settlement (gweng) was jago, a term which seems to have disappeared, only still known in a few chiefdoms, e.g. Alego and Ugenya, and a few more. Otherwise the settlement chief was called okebe, ruoth gweng or jaduong gweng. (75) The settlement council was known as buch gweng. According to Mboya the settlement head was appointed by the tribal chief. (76)

Kidhedhe or wuon lowo was the head of a group of hamlets (keyo or hosi) with a land council (buch lowo or dak).

The clans were controlled by a group of elders who represented its constituent lineages (jodong ragwar). (77) They met frequently to discuss clan affairs and to settle inter-clan disputes regarding cattle and land. The clan therefore can be described as a corporate group in terms of its function. The council was controlled by a leader who was a wealthy and successful member of the senior patrilineal lineage, senior by the principle of primogeniture. Nevertheless, succession to authority in the clan as well as in the lineage depended on a combination of three qualifications: primogeniture, personal suitability in character and wealth, and appointment by one's predecessor. (78) Primogeniture was highly regarded and preferred, but was never an absolute rule. Whenever an eldest son was unsuitable, or another patrilineal relative was clearly more suitable, the latter was chosen to succeed. But a successor must be named by his predecessor, and as a result of the strong common sentiments in lineage segment, the predecessor's appointee seems usually to have been the one whom the elders of the group wished to elect.

Social anthropologists have always considered gweng to be the lowest political unit. (79) Ocholla considers this to be less accurate. (80) The hamlet (dala) was the smallest political unit, he says, headed by jaduong dala, hamlet elder, sometimes known as hamlet owner (wuon dala). Each dala was composed of a number of groups, each group rallying round the house of a woman. In political grouping, the house also included relatives (wede), land clients (jodak or jobedo), and assimilated slaves (wasumbni mocham). The house was the focal point for all activities in relation to members of similar groups, the relationship was therefore called "rivalry group" (jokanyieko). While joining in the inter-hamlet exchange, assimilated slaves tended to be neutral in hamlet disputes. The same was the case with clients. The affairs of the hamlet were directed by jaduong dala in accordance with traditional customs. The management of economic affairs, the maintenance of norms, law and peace, that is a peaceful social relation

with the members of the hamlet and neighbouring groups must be maintained through a well-organized system. Therefore jaduong dala was not only the patriarchal and political head of the hamlet, but its chief administrator as well. He acted as the judge, and he settled all major and minor disputes between the members of the hamlet. All such matters were treated as family concern and as such it was the privilege of the hamlet council (buch dala) to deal with the cases within the radius of the hamlet. No case could go before the settlement court, the first public court, before it had been tried by buch dala unless stated by jaduong dala as beyond his jurisdiction. Jaduong dala represented his hamlet in the settlement council.

The structures of doho courts under the chief had the authority which forbade internal fighting, to protect individual and group rights, maintenance of norms, customs and traditions, and to compel submission to their adjudication. (81) The doho body therefore had command and a standing force (ogulmama) to enforce their decisions. All cases, both civil and criminal, were brought before the court. These included such cases as those of robbery, homicide, witchcraft, land, arson, and adultery. Appeals could then be made to the chiefly court. If the members of the lower courts could not reach agreement or if one party to the dispute refused to accept their judgement, then the case was taken to the chief. His decisions were backed by legal sanctions of force. In some of the chiefdoms authority was delegated so that some judgements from the lower bodies were respected by the higher authority, the chief, who, after consulting his counsellors, declared them valid and final. Should someone refuse to obey regional ogulmama, the chief reenforced the order by sending more ogulmama from other regions but only after consultation with his counsellors once again.

As to the regulative functions, acts which traditionally carried the sanction of banishment enforced by the courts were those which were liable to bring disgrace (chira) to the community or those which caused friction between members or segments within the community: incest within the clan; sodomy, bestiality, homosexuality; premediated murder of a tribesman; continual troublemaking within the community; to be caught in the act of witchcraft; etc. (82) For a client it must also be added refusal or neglect of the obligations outlined above and aggressive attitude towards his patron. These actions brought automatic and inevitable expulsion to a client, orche, or misumba without any hope of ever returning. A jaluo banished for the same reason (apart from incest) might return to the area after many years, or after he had been cleansed by the medicine man (ajuoga) and resume his life within the lineage.

While each lineage had its earth custodian (won gweng, "father of the land"), the earth custodian of the senior lineage (dhoot ma duong) of the dominant clan of the tribe had chief prestige among them. He was a man of influence in each district. He settled land disputes, and he sacrificed to the sacred spear of the clan and pointed it towards the enemy before tribal war. (83) According to Ocholla, the earth custodian could also be called jagolpur. (84) Wilson, on the other hand, maintains that this term was used to describe the cultivation leader, the head of a lineage segment who gave the signal to plant and who advised his people where and what to plant. (85)

The products of the uninhabited forestland left between two tribes, such as trees, firewood, or grass, were completely communal property. Animals might be hunted by anyone but certain portions of large game were traditionally given to the guardian of the forest (jaduong dwar). (86) This office

was elected by the people, and he could be dismissed if the hunt had been constantly fruitless. He was normally one of the heads of the conquered aboriginal groups which had decided to stay. In certain cases he might be just one of the wuon lowo elected for the post. (87)

We may say then, in conclusion, that the factors in the relationship of dominant and subject groups among the Luo may prove to be comparable with those at work among the Alur and Acholi, which have been referred to above. Luoland can be considered from the political point of view as a region, characterized by the domination of chiefless societies by immigrant aristocracies, resulting in a stratified society and a mechanism for maintenance. Our data have shown political domination to be a factor of paramount importance; they also reveal the occurrence of clash and conquest - though not on a comprehensible scale; but they do not prove an original group invasion. Nor can our data, in fact, be taken as evidence for an internal diversification and a gradual emergence to political supremacy of one out of a number of ethnic groups. The traditional political system consisted of a number of autonomous political units of similar type with a hierarchical structure. The system which evolved had three levels of authority hierarchically subordinated to the chief. Thus the Luo political structure was more differentiated than the segmentary system that was taken for granted by the earlier authorities.

4.6 The Shilluk

4.6.1 Introduction

Among the other Nilotic peoples we find everywhere political communities under leaders with democratically more or less limited powers, while the king of the Shilluk ruled, fairly independently, over the whole country. The origin, development and continuance of this unity must undoubtedly be ascribed to the peculiar geographical position of the country. (1) They live along the west bank of the Nile to the north and south of Malakal. At this point the ground rises fairly steeply from the river, and houses can be built at a height which is permanently out of the reach of floods. Moreover, the Shilluk had less cattle than their Nuer and Dinka neighbours and being predominantly sedentary relied more upon horticultural products, and so their lives were not centred on the quest for water and grazing. In the rainy season it might be difficult to get about on land, but people could always travel by river, so that no part of the country was ever isolated from the rest. Some writers think this is why the Shilluk were sufficiently united to recognize a single king. (2) Furthermore, the ever threatening presence of their close neighbours (the Nuer, Dinka, and Arabs) forced the various parts of the country to rely on one another's assistance for defence. (3) The situation of the fierce Shilluk warriors on the White Nile, and the hazard of navigating the river itself, had long prevented the penetration of Negro Africa from the North. Until the coming of fire-arms and steamers, they were able to meet their northern neighbours on equal terms. Outward political unity existed from the beginning. Internally, however, the history of the ruling dynasty represented a continuous struggle for the throne.

4.6.2 Social structure

Territorially, the country was divided into two provinces, Gerr in the north and Luak in the south, within which were the northern and southern

districts of Muomo and Tonga. (4) The royal settlement Fashoda occupied the centre. The provinces were divided into eleven districts (luak or lak) founded by order of Nyikang when he parcelled out the country among his followers. These districts,though said to be organized by Nyikang,were not a permanent political factor. Their importance might have been felt during exceptional periods, such as war-fare, or to meet another common danger. (5) Each district was divided into a number of settlements (podh or fodo), of which there were about a hundred in Shillukland. The settlement was the largest political unit which had a permanent and stable function in Shilluk society. The members occupied a common and clearly defined territory, had a common grazing and fishing area held collectively, a common name, and a common system of age-set nomenclature. Finally, within each settlement were a number of villages or hamlets (fane or myer, sing. pac), each of which, with its offshoots, was occupied by a distinct kinship group, the local lineage of one of the main clans.

The lineage structure within a settlement revolved round two recognized types of lineages: the dyil and the wedh. (6) It was said that Nyikang originally granted each settlement to a clan. The surviving descendants of the grantees were considered the landowners (dyil). The wedh lineages consisting of immigrants and strangers, who settled on their land later, identified themselves politically with the landowners, but they formed a separate social community with its own corporate life. They were grafted on to the dyil lineages by means of intermarriage, and relationship was traced through female links, the wedh lineage becoming "sister's sons". The dyil lineage was generally dominant in numbers but if the original landowners were extinct, the wedh lineage next in importance took their place and became dyil. The members of the dyil lineage were closely associated with the land they occupied and were accorded considerable prestige and authority in virtue of their position and this association. The dyil formed the core of the settlement and political activities revolved round them. The wedh lineage members were not socially inferior, but the dyil lineage had greater prestige and were expected to be the leaders in important matters in the settlement. The chief of the settlement (jago) was taken from the dyil lineage. (7) For this reason the dyil was the "dominant lineage". In practice, it occasionally happened that the dominant position of the dyil lineage was taken over by a stronger, wealthier, and more numerous lineage, but even if dispossessed of political power and the chieftainship, the original dyil lineage retained its ritual connection with the soil and also much of its local prestige. This ritual relationship remained so long as any living representative of the original dyil lineage remained. In each settlement there were also usually representative lineages of the royal clan who sometimes, but not always, had assumed a position of dominance within that settlement, usually by force of numbers, and could choose the chief of the entire settlement. (8)

The Shilluk people were divided into five main social status groups. (9) The first, or royal, clan (kwaret) was composed of the king himself, his children, and the surviving offspring of former rulers (nyiret). (10) The royal clan was the largest of all clans and, like the others, was spread through all parts of the country. All members traced their descent, in the male line, from Nyikang. The nobility (kwanyiret) consisted of all other members of the royal clan who were not themselves the children of a king and were thus ineligible to succeed to the throne. They numbered about 7 % of the total population and enjoyed certain privileges and were treated with defer-

ence by the commoners but they lacked any political authority unless they happened to be lineage heads in the communities where they resided. In some regions the members of the royal clan had become more numerous than the commoners and had supplanted them in the chieftainship of the settlement. This had been possible because the members of the royal clan were richer and tended to marry more wives, and also because of the system whereby the offspring of a king were planted out in various settlements away from Fashoda. (11) To thwart untoward ambitions they were all banished from the capital and compelled to live in the settlements of their mothers' lineages. A prince built a separate hamlet (pa nyiret) (unless he was called on to become king), and thus became the founder of a local branch of the royal clan which might eventually grow powerful enough to overthrow the dominant lineage and assume the political aspects of its position in the settlement. Every prince was recognized as a potential king and was treated with the utmost indulgence and respect; the royal daughters also had their privileges and might exercise considerable influence in district affairs, and when elderly might help and advise the local chief. (12) Yet, they were forbidden to marry - so that no king had sisters' sons who could make inconvenient claims on him, thus avoiding possible conflict over succession. They should remain virgins, but in practice they illegally found lovers and when necessary aborted. (13)

The ororo clan was a group of "degraded royalty", comprising the patrilineal descendants of royalty who were in former times, for various reasons, declared ineligible for the kingship. (14) It was said that the king always had the right to disinherit lineages of the royal clan but, apart from one traditional instance, it is not certain whether the right had been exercised. (15) They were few in number and might intermarry within the royal clan. The king always took some of his wives from the ororo. The ororo were indistinguishable from the commoner clans except for the special functions they performed for the king at his investiture and at the time of his death and funeral. They were said to be "at the beck and call of the kings". (16) Traditionally, they always smothered the king when he was ritually killed.

The name collo (sing. ocolo) meant "commoners" and referred collectively to the main body of clans (kwa), of which there were about a hundred. (17) They were patrilineal clans tracing descent from the original followers of Nyikang, and also from those who had since migrated into and settled in the country or were in occupation when the Shilluk immigrants arrived under Nyikang's leadership. Among them the descendants of the original followers of Nyikang had the highest rank and they also possessed some social privileges and state functions.

Next came the group of retainers (bang (a) ret, sing. ba ret), who were organized into a single artificial exogamous clan and were even more numerous than the royal clan. (18) They were composed of war captives kept by the king as personal servants, of convicted murderers and their brothers, of aliens and commoners who had voluntarily, for economic reasons, placed themselves under royal clientage, and of the patrilineal descendants of all such persons. Apart from these, the bang ret also included all those who became possessed by the spirit of Nyikang or of some other king (ngate ret). (19) They were the personal attendants and clients of the king and owed primary allegiance to him. Since they were ineligible to hold land or to intermarry with royalty, they had a status slightly lower than that of commoners. In return for receiving cattle to marry with, they tended animals, engaged in building and cultivation and performed all the duties connected with the upkeep

of the royal household. They lived in a hamlet of their own near the capital in which the king resided. When he died they, together with his elderly widows (also called bang ret), became the guardians of his grave shrine (kengo, pl. kace). When a prince was planted out, his father sent some of his retainers to live with him. These became bang nyiret and their descendants continued to live near those of the prince as a fictitious client lineage.

The lowest category was that of privately owned slaves, comprising war captives, victims purchased from the Arabs, children bought from poor parents during a famine, and the descendants of all such people. (20) It was said that at the time of king Akwot (1825-1835) every Shilluk had a Dinka slave girl and a Dinka cow from the war booty. (21)

4.6.3 Political structure

The Shilluk people recognized one supreme head or king (ret, pl. ror), who represented the country as a whole, regardless of territorial, social or kinship divisions. (22) According to Shilluk tradition the king installed in 1951 was the 32nd of the royal line which began with Nyikang, who led the Shilluk into their territory, conquered it, and established the social order. The spirit of Nyikang was thought to reside in every king and to have passed from one to another down the line of his successors. (23)

The distinct feature of the Shilluk political structure was the existence of an established and theoretically omnipotent monarchy and it is in the political sphere that the most definite contrasts to the other Nilotic peoples may be found. Whether this established and institutionalized monarchy was the result of diffusion from elsewhere or the result of spontaneous development is a controversial subject which we do not propose to discuss here. (24)

The Shilluk king is considered to come under the category of divine kings as described for the first time by Frazer - for quite natural reasons, since he relied on the Shilluk as an important type-case for his theory of the divine kings! (25) This is clear from the mode of his death and succession as well as from the duties he performed during his lifetime. Apart from his political and executive functions, the king, voluntarily through ritual actions and involuntarily through his own life, was generally responsible for fertility in man, cattle, and crops, for success in hunting and fishing. He made sacrifices on important occasions, especially for rain and for military victories, and it was his duty to provide gifts for the royal shrines. (26) He was responsible, however, for these matters as affecting the whole nation. There was also among them a number of ritual specialists responsible for local interests. Moreover, the king was considered the dynamic centre of the universe and he was the source of social order, who might fulfil his function merely by existing. Hence the well-being of the universe depended upon his actions and the course of his life; both must therefore be carefully regulated.

It is noticeable that everywhere there was the closest connection between the political structure and the religious cult. First, the territorial segments and their associations with certain dominant lineages were explained in terms of the myth of Nyikang's division of the country among his followers who became the founding ancestors of many of the Shilluk clans. (27) Second. the lineage heads who were settlement chief had ritual duties to the kingship. They performed ceremonial services at the time of the king's investiture, were responsible for building huts in Fashoda and for the upkeep of Nyikang's shrines and those of past kings. The tombs of the dead kings distributed through the land were indistinguishable from the shrines of Nyikang and had

the same ritual importance in rain-making rites, harvest rituals, and in times of sickness and pestilence, etc. (28) Third, the traditional customs of the people and the organization of society in every way were considered to be the work of Nyikang directly or acting in the line of kings. In the kings Nyikang personified the unchanging polity and moral order which centred in the kingship. The myth justified and hallowed present alignments of property, influence, and power. (29) Finally, the identification of Nyikang with the king was the central point of the Shilluk political, ritual, and moral systems. Nyikang, the culture hero and first king, and the creator of the nation, was immanent in the king and this made him the double pivot of Shilluk society, the political head of the nation and the centre of the national cult. Nyikang was also the medium between the Shilluk and Juok - the Supreme Being. (30)

The king was therefore the central figure of tribal religion as well as the symbol of political unity. He was responsible for the welfare and fortunes of the people both spiritually, as the present manifestation of Nyikang, and temporally, as the leading tribal authority. The aspects of the function of kingship in reality overlapped each other, and were interrelated in one role, functioning as a whole.

As has already been indicated, the king was believed to possess the power of affecting the health and general well-being of his people: the king existed for the well-being of his subjects. He was, accordingly, thought to be a source of potential danger to them, since it follows logically that his failure of physical powers dislocated the rhythm of nature, bringing drought and famine, the abrogation of law and order. In order to prevent such a state of things it was believed that the king ought to be killed. According to the ideology of divine kingship the king must not die a natural death, lest the spirit of Nyikang might be lost to the Shilluk for ever. Therefore he must be ritually put to death. According to tradition the king was killed either by a prince, or an agent of a prince or he might be strangled or suffocated by the ororo, or walled up in a house and left to die, if he showed signs of illness or senility. In the first and second cases the king might die battling his foe in the night or in an open fight. (31)

Doubt has been cast on this tradition, notably by Evans-Pritchard in a study in which he denies the occurrence of the regicide not only among the Shilluk but obviously also in Africa as a whole. (32) He considers that the ritual putting to death of kings was probably a fiction; there is no historical evidence for it and some Shilluk kings seem to have reigned until they were quite old. According to the records many other kings met a violent death; that is, they were assassinated by enemies, not secretly stifled. The other alternative Shilluk tradition was that any prince - on his own initiative - could challenge the king to single combat, and, if he proved himself the stronger by killing the king, could claim the throne. (33) Evans-Pritchard does not believe in the literal truth of the tradition of single combat either. He points out that this picture does not square with the well-authenticated accounts of the choosing of the successor by a number of chiefs representing the major divisions of the country, and thinks it more likely that, if a national disaster afflicted the people, feeling would turn against the king. This occasionally took the form of a plot against his life. Any prince could undertake the killing of the king if he was sure of support from his district chief, or a rebellion might be led by a prince against the king, if the king had lost support by the majority of the population because of his injustice, or prejudice, etc. A rebellion was nevertheless not easy to make, and unless a real cause existed

upon which a good majority would agree, such a rebellion would be doomed to failure. According to Riad, "the Shilluk try as long as possible to keep away from the intricacies of royalty, and thus the case must touch them directly before a real cause will unite them against a king". (34) In this light the simplicity of the statement given by Evans-Pritchard may be misleading, otherwise the history of the Shilluk would be full of rebellions. But, as Riad convincingly proves, there were only two important rebellions in the whole history of the Shilluk. (35) The historical evidence shows that most of the Shilluk kings (21 out of 29) died unnatural deaths at the hands of claimants to the throne or at the hands of the ororo.

The tradition of murder, which necessarily involved direct access to the king's person, is supported by the evidence of extraordinary precautions taken to avert possible attack during his lifetime. As mentioned above the princes were planted out from the time of their birth, and potential rivals were not allowed within the capital at night, when the king was said to wander round looking for intruders. Why did the king take such precautions against ambush, if he did not fear assassination?

It is, however, equally possible that the regicide might sometimes have had a purely practical explanation. The nation wanted to avoid eventual feuds about succession. Such feuds might arrive out of disturbances that could be planned by different factions, if the ruler was weak. The king's "powerless" years might give unruly members of the royal clan opportunities of laying plans for upheavals.

Irrespective of the prelude to the dismissal of the actual king, tradition appears to give positive evidence that the executioner of the royal court entered upon his duty to give the fallen king the "saving mercy" at the will of the latter. This was the ritual moment.

Even if their ideology included the possibility of rebellion against the reigning king in the event of national disaster - plague, a defeat in war, etc., it was not the custom to depose the king. Nor is there any known instance of an attempt to change the existing type of government. A king might be killed, but he was always succeeded by a near relative, never by an outsider, and the kingship itself was always retained. Loyalty to a personal king of Shilluk was factional; solidarity and loyalty on a national scale rallied round the abstract principles of kingship rather than round the actual king. Therefore they killed the king in order to preserve the "office", and consequently the social and natural order. The interpretation that the kings were not killed ritually is not tenable, and may have been influenced by the present subjection of the Shilluk to modern law.

The funeral of the dead king was carried out and was followed, a year later, by mortuary ceremonies and funeral dances (wuowo). These events were chiefly a family or clan, rather than a national, affair and were organized by the ororo and the royal clan. (36)

The death of a king was followed by an anarchic interregnum, while his successor was being selected from among the men of the royal clan. The succession to the throne was hereditary and brothers of the dead king took precedence of sons. (37) Only descendants to Nyikang who were begotten with Shilluk, Dinka, or Anuak wives, and those who, moreover, had a father who had been installed as a king, could be raised to office. Such a person was called "prince" or "royal son" (nyiret). A king must be pious, passionate, frank, and brave enough to lead the nation to victories in war, a real daring and enterprising leader to the extent of sharp despotism in some cases, and in

good health. (38) On the other hand, a left-handed prince could not be elected. (39)

While ritual regicide was not an affair of the nation, the election of a new king concerned the whole of the Shilluk people who were represented by an electorial college, and this does mean that more heed was paid to the views of the nation at large. (40) The king-makers consisted of (a) the leaders of the Northern and Southern provinces, which for ritual purposes were represented in special ritual terms, viz. Gol Dhyang and Gol Nyikang respectively, (b) the great chiefs, descendants of the men who were, traditionally, made chiefs of the first degree by Nyikang when he divided his conquered territory among eleven of his followers, representing the common Shilluk people, and (c) three representatives from the royal clan. The ororo and bang ret had no representatives and took no part in the election although they were important in the ceremonies of installation. (41) The chief of Debalo who was simultaneously the chief of the Southern province, was the one who called the other chiefs for the meeting. (42) As a sub-committee the two leaders of the religious moieties had first to reach agreement upon the successor of the dead king, and their choice was confirmed by a representative of the royal clan, which was not identified with either moiety. The electorial college, representing the various settlements of Shillukland, then formally confirmed the choice. The election of a particular king must have the backing of the whole country, although at first sight it may appear that the choice lay with the chiefs of Gol Dhyang and Gol Nyikang. The election could not take place unless they agreed and this did not involve their own personal opinions solely. Disagreement between them was said to have led to fighting between the moities in the past, and thus to civil war in the country. Sometimes there seems to have been even two kings, residing in different parts of the kingdom. (43)

During the interval between the death of a king and the election of his successor custom required that all potential claimants should stay in their villages, since this was the chance to seize the kingship by force, if a candidate wished to do so and had the necessary backing. Cooperation between the candidate and the settlement chief was essential,for only the latter had the necessary force and only a king's son was eligible for the kingship. Competition between claimants to the succession had sometimes been fierce enough to cause fighting between different factions in the kingdom - another indication of its great importance to all Shilluk.

Detailed description of the installation of a new king has been given by Howell and Thomson who were in Shillukland at the election of king Fafiti Yor in 1943 and of his successor king Anei in 1944. (44) In the events described by them the political, ritual and symbolic nature of the king and the importance of the Nyikang myths may be clearly seen. All these myths looked back to the events which were supposed to have established the Shilluk polity in its traditional form. The ceremonial with which a king was installed on his throne recalled the most important events of this mythical past, and reaffirmed the rightness of the order which, as Shilluk in general saw it, had lasted unchanged from the time when it was first set up. In addition, the relationships between the various social divisions and between the territorial and kinship segments may be perceived in action. Because there could be only one king of all the Shilluk, all had a common interest in the king. This is what made the Shilluk nation one, and so it deserves to be called a political community. It was particularly when a new king had to be chosen that this fact was brought home to them. All the different settlements were represented,

through their heads, in the ritual of accession, each having some special duty which was the prerogative of his clan. During the accession ceremonies one clan provided a girl to be the royal "wife", married with cattle from the sacred herd of Nyikang. (45) Others provided objects that were used at different points of the ritual, and some were responsible for the buildings in which the rites of installation were performed. The claims of the different clans to make their special contributions were held to go back to the origin of the kingdom, when the ancestor of each "first performed" the action, whatever it was, that one of his descendants repeated at the beginning of every new reign. Thus, at the accession rites not only was it recognized that to make a king called for the participation of all the leading descent groups, but they and all the populace were reminded of the original divine ordering of these divisions as the basis of Shilluk society.

The main events were as follows. The principal shrine of Nyikang was at Akurwa, where he was believed to have disappeared in a storm. At this shrine were kept effigies of Nyikang and his son Dak. At the installation of the newly elected king these effigies were brought in procession from Akurwa to Fashoda with their priests to "test" the new king. The conventional opposition between the Northern and Southern provinces now became apparent. The forces of Gol Nyikang flocked to support the king-elect and waited at Debalo settlement, while Nyikang and his supporters assembled at Adodo. The two armies met in mock combat with millet stalks instead of spears on the provincial border and that of the king-elect suffered defeat. Nyikang captured the king-elect and there was a procession to the shrine of Nyikang at Fashoda. Certain ceremonies of a mystic nature followed, which were not participated in by the whole people, as were the procession and battle. The king-elect was treated as a small boy, being made to do the work of a small boy making fires for the cows and clearing their place. (46)

As said above, the Shilluk believed that Nyikang did not die but simply disappeared; thus he needed never be thought of as suffering old age or sickness. Moreover, the continued existence of the Shilluk people was held to be in some way bound up with the continuance of Nyikang as a living being: "If Nyikang should die, the whole Shilluk race would perish", they said. (47) The king was the living representative of Nyikang, and as he took his seat on the throne (k w o m) the spirit of Nyikang was believed to enter into him; when this happened he trembled in the manner that indicated possession by a spirit, and this was the moment at which he became king. Thereafter he participated in some way in the supernatural qualities of Nyikang.

A few days later a second mock fight occurred between the king's supporters and Nyikang. The king was victorious, for Nyikang had taken possession of him and the effigy was now merely the symbol of Nyikang and no longer the repository of his spirit.

The complicated ritual which every king went through on his accession had two essential meanings; it asserted the permanency and rightness of the order which he symbolized, and it gave him the power of a non-material kind that he required in order successfully to play his royal part.

It is worth noting that there was also connection between the rituals of kingship and the qualities of justice and generosity that were ascribed to the ideal ruler. At a final advisory council (l o k o) all the important chiefs and elders from all parts of the country declared their allegiance to the new king, and he was admonished to rule his people justly, but the rites were not directed to ensure this end. They were concerned with making him strong and victorious.

(48)

The king was surrounded by his court: retainers, clients, kin. He had a small governmental machinery or administrative structure beyond the royal court, who had delegative or appointive powers. The number of ministers who stood at the king's side ranged from 2 to 5. (49) This ministerial council whose members were nominated by the king consisted of two or more of the great chiefs, and, moreover, a minister of war. The king had also a "great council", probably consisting of all the great chiefs of the country. This council was summoned by the king in exceptional cases. With him always was his "scribe" or special clerk who acted as the prosecutor in the royal court. He depended upon his personal guard for protection. He had many wives, some of whom he inherited from his predecessor. King Kur wad Fafity was married to 77 wives. An elderly one was the chief of the king's harem. (50)

The king was assisted in the administration of the country by a large body of chiefs (jake or jang, sing. jago), directly responsible to him and acting as his proxy. (51) Eleven of them were the so-called "royal chiefs" (jake ret) or "great chiefs" (jake dong or duong). They were elected by the settlement chiefs of their respective district from among two (or more?) lines of the original settlers and landowners (dyil), descendants of the original followers of Nyikang, whom he made chiefs of the first degree. (52) Their choice had then to be approved by the king who sent the robe of office (lau, lit. skin) for the investiture, on receiving which the candidate was installed by the elders and the people at an impressive public ceremony. On the other hand, Seligman emphasizes that the election of these officers was in the hands of the king, but that the approval of the community was sought. (53) Among their most important duties we can mention: to constitute an intermediate resort in legal affairs and to collect customary gifts of game from their respective districts or to provide such articles by their own exertions. (54) Though tradition counted for much and ancestry as well, these sanctions alone would not support the legitimate claim of a chief to what was regarded by all Shilluk as their office as of right unless he had a strong lineage and an imposing number of warriors prepared to back him. Every great chief had an assistant (tyel kwome) who exercised authority as occasion required. (55)

The two great chiefs living nearest to Fashoda were the greatest in the land in all constitutional and ceremonial matters, and in the prestige deriving from their office. (56) They were the right-hand men of the king. These two were the chief of Kwom, south of Fashoda, who, moreover, was the deputy of the king and regent at his death, and the chief of Golbainy to the north. They were in theoretical charge of the Luak and Gerr Provinces. How far writs of these two "viceroys" ran in executive matters outside their own districts is not clear. Judicially they almost certainly had no say, and in executing commands of the king they may have acted as messengers of the king, but can scarcely have had authority of their own. It was the tradition that the king presented the chief of Golbainy on every installation with a spear, because originally Nyikang invested his forebear with a spear of office. (57)

Two other great chiefs of importance were those of the extremities (jake a wothe tung), the chief of Tonga (jang dwong mi tungo) in the south-western end, and the chief of Muomo (jang dwong mi mwomo) in the north-western end of the country. They were said to be "quite similar to the reth". It was their duty to defend the country against invading enemies, and in this respect we can consider Crazzolara to be right in his opinion that they were doubtless the main pillars which supported the unity of the Shilluk kingdom. (58) Apart

from this, however, these frontier chiefs were also the king's representatives in the two extremes of the country and used both to see cases themselves and send along to Fashoda those cases which they thought the king should see. (59)

All other chiefs were "small chiefs" (jake thono). (60) In each of the Shilluk settlement the lineage which claimed to have first settled there supplied a chief who was acknowledged by the whole settlement and had certain public functions. In the administration of justice the chief was assisted by the local elders (jok dongo), but an appeal to the king was always possible. (61) Moreover, he was said to have been expected to execute orders of the king, though we know little about the kind of orders that the king might have given before he was made the agent of colonial rulers. The settlement chief did not depend upon the district chief. He depended upon the king, taking orders directly from him. (62) Besides maintaining peace and order he managed public affairs and had control over the warriors. The chief represented his people in inter-settlement and inter-clan affairs, and hamlets were gathered into districts for common defence under their chief. He was responsible for looking after any shrine of Nyikang which might be in his settlement. But he was not only the territorial agent of the king. He was above all the man whom the lineage heads of the settlement had chosen with the consent of the great chief, who also sent the lau of investiture. But when the choice was made he could also go to the king to have it ceremonially confirmed by the tying of the skin cloak on his shoulder. The settlement chief was thus personally responsible to the king for keeping order and welfare in his settlement. If the local heads did not come to terms, the great chief would support one of the nominated candidates. According to Crazzolara, in the clan which from time immemorial had provided the chief there were two lineages which would provide the chief in turn. (63) In each settlement there were also usually representative lineages of the royal clan who sometimes, but not always, had assumed a position of dominance within that settlement, usually by force of numbers. In that case its leader was generally recognized as holding authority over the rest of the community. Even royal daughters could take charge of the position of chief. There were also bang ret living in close association with the royal lineage or tending one or more of the numerous royal shrines.

The term ban(y) (bayn or beng) was restricted to the age-set leader, whose duties were primarily military as the leader of the youth of a section, i.e. the warrior class. (64) Within the settlement the war-lord was the leader of organized hostilities in connection with blood-feuds and inter-settlement fighting. Against common enemies different settlements combined under the leadership of the eldest bany. He was chosen among the village heads. Only the settlement chief could call up the necessary force of warriors. The war-lord had only advisory functions and he was powerless in himself and depended on public support. Frequently being an elderly man he took no active part in the fight and when his people went to war he was carried as a "mascot" on a bed. His age-set comrades assisted him in his cultivations.

Within each settlement there were a number of villages or hamlets, each of which, with its off-shoots, was occupied by a distinct kinship group, the local lineage of one of the main clans. (65) The head of the hamlet (jal dwong pac) had a status which varied according to whether he was headman of the principal hamlet of a lineage (pan duong) - in which case he was also the representative of his lineage within the settlement - or, whether he was the headman of a subsidiary hamlet (nyole myer), in which case he was hamlet headman only and merely the senior member of a group of

homesteads. The headman of a principal hamlet often received a lau, sometimes directly from the king, in other cases from the settlement chief. The headman of a principal hamlet represented his lineage in the settlement and, if he was a representative of the dominant lineage, he would have a special status as representing the landowners and the settlement chief would treat him tactfully. The hamlet headman had charge of affairs within his unit and represented his people in external affairs. He was responsible for executing decisions made by the council of the settlement.

Finally, the owner of a homestead (jal gol) was responsible for the unmarried members of his family, but he had no special status. (66)

It is important for the building up of kingship that the society should have some surplus of wealth which can be extracted and concentrated in the hands of the ruler and used for the purpose of state - among which one of the most important is rewarding services. The Shilluk king was able to maintain a permanent following, since customary "gifts" were to be delivered to the king from all parts of the country. (67) It was the hereditary duty of the chiefs to collect such tribute from their respective districts. At the elections in 1943 and 1944, the chief of Tonga said to the king: "Our job is not to keep order, that is your job. Our duty is to supply you with choice morsels of hippo meat". (68) Refusal to pay tribute was expiated by payment of a fine. (69) Earlier the tribute was very heavy and consisted of cattle, grain, canoes, etc. The method of raising tribute to the king shows that certain clans owed special duties to the king; indeed, anyone killing a leopard must send its skin to the royal court, while the gyek antelope was specially hunted to obtain skin for the king. Moreover, there was a royal monopoly on ivory. Even members of the royal clan living in the settlements had the benefit of different advantages in this respect. (70) The inhabitants of the districts also had the duty to join in the building and repairing of royal houses and shrines. The time of this activity was "sacred time" (fing da kwer), during which all disputes were prohibited. (71)

The actual degree of political power possessed by the king has been much disputed by the anthropologists. There are in fact two opposing views. On the one hand, there are those who consider that, traditionally, the king was the head of a highly-organized administration with a hierarchy of appointed chiefs; that he had absolute powers of adjudication and execution; that he exacted tribute from his people; and that he imposed fines upon them for offences against the State. The majority of the early writers who accomplished the basic field research stress his power and authority. According to a record written in 1862 by Brun-Rollet, the king "... übt über die anderen eine unbestrittene Oberherrlichkeit aus, die um so stärker ist, da die Regierung in den Händen eines echten Nachkommen des Niekam sich befindet...". (72) In 1903 Tappi writes that the authority of the king was "absolute". (73) And in 1911 Seligman states that "In the old days his word was law..." and, twenty years later, that "The Shilluk king is absolute Head temporal and spiritual". (74) Westermann and others have said likewise. (75) Finally, Hofmayr says that "Mit dem Regierungsantritt ist der König Herr des Landes, das er nach Belieben vergeben kann, und Herr sogar des Eigentums seiner Untertanen". (76)

On the other hand, there are those recent writers holding the opinion that the king had no administrative authority or judicial power at all, but that his influence rested solely upon his divinity and his ritual functions. The king reigned but did not rule. Evans-Pritchard is a representative of this opinion. (77) Howell and Thomson hold an intermediate position and speak of a "theoretic-

ally omnipotent monarchy". Order was maintained through "self-help" rather than by means of any kind of centralized administration. (78)

Among the recent writers Crazzolara, Pumphrey and Riad diverge from this pattern. According to Crazzolara the king wielded a very real power over the entire country. (79) In unpublished notes from 1936 Pumphrey holds the view that "the power of the Reths before the Turkish interference was undoubtedly great. It was based partly on the semi-divinity with which tribal tradition clothes them and partly upon their great wealth in cattle and slaves". (80)

The extent of the king's authority is naturally of considerable importance to an analysis of Shilluk political system, especially in the past, and an answer must be attempted even though the evidence is scanty and it is too late to obtain more. The first factor of great importance in this discussion is, of course, historical, for the Shilluk have not been entirely free of alien government since 1867 and external influence prior to that date, so that, whatever the political authority of the king might have been previously, since then it has been influenced by external forces. (81) Perhaps more than the other Nilotes, the Shilluk have for long been in intermittently hostile contact with foreign enemies and foreign governments. Schweinfurth, who visited them in 1869, says that at that time little or nothing remained of the original condition of the Shilluk, who of all Nilotic peoples "used to uphold the most perfectly regulated government", which, he says, could only be properly appreciated by reference to the registers of the expedition of Mohammed Ali earlier in the century. (82) More recently, in the 1910's, king Fadyet, a government nominee, expressed the fear of the kingship, since he could no longer act in accordance with his own will. He was no longer the almighty God, whose will was the law of the people. The kingship had according to his opinion "zum Zerrbild aller Macht und Herrlichkeit herabgesunken". (83)

As we mentioned above, without the king the world would not continue to exist and his action was necessary to maintain life. According to kingship ideology, his action, however, should not be manifested in particular interventions; it was conceived rather as an underlying force which sustained the whole universe but did not interfere in the development of current affairs. He did a "non-active" action merely by existing. The preservation of the king's sanctity required that his life be subject to observances which shielded him from the public eye and restrained his movements. (84) Therefore, he lived isolated in Fashoda. He was not allowed to go to battle. He could be approached only with difficulty by ordinary people, and only with elaborate etiquette by the higher class. His appearance among the people, as for a journey, was rare and awe-inspiring, so that people used to go into hiding or keep out of his path.

This attitude may be looked upon as an ideal which was impossible to maintain in the political reality, but it created, however, inherent tensions around the office, since, according to tradition and to what the Shilluk often themselves said, in the past, matters related to the national security, such as the declaration of war, mobilization, the ending of a state of war, peace-making, etc., were all prerogatives of the king alone. Naturally consultations were made with the ministerial council and the important chiefs, but the ultimate authority rested in the hands of the king. Rather the role of the king should not be conceived as isolated to the person of the king but in connection with the whole kingship with its delegated functions. It is quite natural to see that the prevailing conditions of peace all over the Sudan must have added to the shrinkage of these powers, and ultimately to the diminishing of the political

powers of the Shilluk king.

According to the personality of the Shilluk king, and his status as the incarnation of Nyikang, his court was the highest in the whole land, and his judgements were final, and he himself could not retreat from a decision uttered in the court. Moreover, the king had absolute powers to execute those judgements and of intervention to suppress public disturbances. This is, e.g., evident from the fact that at the installation the king publicly promised to be a just ruler, to punish wrong and to protect the weak, and exhorted his people to remain true to Nyikang and to their ancient customs. (85) There was no written law, and the sole authority in legal matters was the tradition of Nyikang and the tradition of the previous kings. Their judgements were considered a standard which should be followed in similar cases. But this was always liable to individual interpretation and custom.

Between the legal and the political systems there was a certain correspondency. The hamlet court comprised the smallest court, and at its head stood the head of the hamlet. This court handled the local disagreements and quarrels but its judgement was not final. The more serious cases were raised to the settlement court. So it appears that the hamlet court dealt only with local quarrels which arose among the members of the hamlet, i.e., the members of one lineage, and as such was weak and not a very influential court. (86) The court of the jago was really the strong judicial authority in the local grouping of the Shilluk. To this court the serious cases were brought and the jago governed it with the help of a council of elders from the settlement. Nor his rulings were final, and anyone who was not satisfied with the judgement could appeal to the court of the king in Fashoda. Hofmayr states that important cases were treated by the king and his judgement was final. (87) It would appear that cases tried at the royal court above all concerned public delicts or crimes coming under the general category of breaking the king's peace, disputing the king's judgement, breaking the king's and Nyikang's laws, refusal to pay the royal tribute, and claims upon land and property, etc. Homicides took probably the first place, since all "blood" (i.e. all subjects) was said to belong to the king. Accordingly, killing of a member of the nation was a crime against the king. The fine for homicide was ten head of cattle. (88) As the fountain of justice the king kept for himself by far the greater part of the fine, but he might give two or three cows to the family of the deceased as compensation. Formerly the offending lineage would have to produce a girl and a boy. (89) The girl would be handed over to the relatives of the dead man and the boy would be slave to the king. According to Westermann, if a man was executed on account of a crime, his whole family and everything he possessed became the property of the king. These slaves of the king were known as "men of crime" (tyen orok) or "slaves" (adero) of the royal household. (90) The great number of bang ret who were partly recruited from such people furnish a powerful proof of the authority of the king.

Among many Nilotic peoples there were different rates of compensation for the taking of human life according to the status of the person killed. It is significant that Hofmayr says that to wound a prince or princess, or a daughter or son of a prince, whether it happened accidentally or intentionally, demanded a higher penalty than for a commoner. (91)

There are also other indications of the role of kingship in the judicial procedure. At the installation the new king could give amnesty (especially for adultery and seduction) and crimes were prescribed after the reigns of two kings. (92) During the interregnum after the death of a king the most important

chiefs decided all comparatively small matters, great affairs standing over until the appointment of a new king. (93) The royal shrines might serve as an asylum. (94) Oaths, of the ordeal type, were sworn on one of the holy spears (alodo) from the shrines of Nyikang or by means of ashes from the dung of a sacred cow. (95) In Panyikang there was a hut (called Duwol or Nyikang) in front of which the king sat and heard cases when he visited the village like Nyikang at his time. (96)

The king possessed, in his large body of retainers, a major instrument of force. The king - in his court - or the jago in his, depended more or less upon their spies who kept them informed about everything everywhere. (97) Hofmayr maintains that the rulings of the king's court were executed by the king's bodyguard or police, which consisted of a number of youths who followed the king everywhere. (98) Moreover, if a case was not settled, or if one village went to fight with another one without sufficient cause, the king would send his "army" (tiek) to plunder the offending village, or, if necessary, burn their villages, or send orders to the chief of the neighbouring settlement to do this. (99) This army could consist of his retainers and the warriors of one or more of the adjacent "neutral" settlements or levied from the injured neighbours, its strength depending on the amount of potential resistance. It seems - according to Pumphrey - that the sections so instructed were glad to go, since the king's army was seldom, if ever, opposed and consequently there was little bloodshed, but a certain amount of booty.

This, however, did not always settle the matter, and a blood feud might start, the outbreak of which the king might be unable to prevent. Blood-revenge was well known among the Shilluk and feuds did exist between persons, families, and villages. (100) In the case of hostilities within a settlement, the sanctions were probably sufficiently forceful to secure amicable composition without either external arbitration or repression. The unity of the settlement was favoured during the wet season on account of the fact that communications were relatively difficult to maintain and the communities tended to be isolated. At such times of the year the authority of the king was diminished and he had to rely upon the loyalty of the local leaders. We must, therefore, consider the accounts of inter-settlement feuds in which the king was more particularly involved in the role of peacemaker. Feuds were still being pursued in this century, and they often lasted a long time. Intervention in a serious feud between two districts is recorded by Titherington (D. C.). (101) The author indicates that the king busied himself with the actual organization of the rites and certainly acted as arbitrator, visiting first one side and then the other. In 1920 Oyler describes a similar peace ceremony. (102) His account gives us a picture of the ritual performed by the king and also of his function in exhorting the people to make peace. There is nowhere any suggestion that he compelled them to do so, he merely "advised" them.

One thing is striking. The procedure described in these accounts bears little resemblance to the above-mentioned punitive expeditions carried out by the king in order to suppress internal hostilities, and this might be expected after thirty years of alien domination. Yet, the punitive methods resemble - according to Howell - "the methods employed by those who were used as agents in Turkish times to maintain some kind of order. They are also reminiscent of Arab procedures, and it must be remembered that the Shilluk were influenced by Arab contacts. They are in keeping also with the methods employed during the Mahdia". (103) He emphasizes that the king's role as arbitrator was far more in accordance with his true functions in Shilluk society.

(104) Yet, from recent references of this nature we are not able to reach reliable conclusions concerning the king's executive authority in the past in connection with homicide and blood-feuds, whether actual or theoretical. In actual powers of government and administration, and in personal prerogative, the kingship was, to a high degree, dependent upon fluctuations in the support of its regime or of its authorities, so that sometimes, under the leadership of the king, public action against warring factions, whose continued enmity was disturbing the peace of Shilluk society as a whole, could be undertaken, and sometimes the king might be little more than a mediator in disputes and perhaps the balancing force which decided a quarrel one way or another. According to our opinion the instances show indication of disintegration and regression to a more primitive pattern. Since the old political system had atrophied through colonial policy, the picture of the royal authority in recent accounts has come to be congruent with the picture of the king as an arbitrator. The foreign policy sought to invalidate the authority of an absolute chief as the king of the Shilluk, by increasing the powers of the local chiefs and giving them more independence from the control of the king, in order to get rid of a potential enemy.

On the whole, the output in the traditional political system in Shilluk country was quantitatively minimal. This must be admitted. People in the local settlement communities lived a rather autonomous life. The king did not interfere in their daily life unless in case of emergency, such as feuds or civil war. Nevertheless we must not overlook the fact that - apart from the district chiefs who served as political representatives of the central authority - the kingship was always locally present through the members of the royal clan and the guardians of the royal shrines who lived in the settlements.

This gives us occasion to touch upon another sphere, where the king had an opportunity to make use of his power, namely the recruitment of different leading posts. (105) Each king in practice at succession found an existing distribution of power, in which territories were already headed by traditional leaders, to whom their subjects recognized an allegiance independent on the allegiance which they granted to the king himself. The only case in which the king nominated chiefs was that of forming his ministerial council: this was a personal act, and the king must choose whom he liked as his special adviser. The chiefs of the districts were traditionally determined. They held in the beginning their office at the grace of Nyikang, who had created "fiefs" - if we can use the feudal analogy - to reward individuals who had given him some special service. These grants were probably aimed at being in force for the recipient's lifetime only, but even in this respect the hereditary tendency became predominant. It is possible to say that the king, as the incarnation of Nyikang, approved the jagos in their positions because they were descendants of the men whom Nyikang installed as chiefs. They were answerable to the king and looking to him for their authority, and an important step towards centralization of social and political control in the system was taken with the establishment of these offices. The chiefs of the settlements were confirmed in their office by the king. In no case, however, did he nominate them, for they were elected by the people of the units they represented in virtue of their positions as heads of lineages dominant in the area. Though the king did not nominate the settlement chiefs, his approval affected the choice and the chief. It was quite impossible for a chief to practice his duties without being confirmed by the king. The king might even reduce the power of these chiefs by placing members of his own family among, or above, them. Yet, this was a

two-edged mode of action, since this gave power against him not only to commoner chiefs but also to princes who had claims to his kingship.

In comparison with modern conceptions of an organized State system, or with such highly developed political institutions as are found in some African kingdoms, such as that of the Baganda, the Shilluk system cannot be said to have reached a high degree of efficiency. The political life had the character of a permanent antagonism within a privileged minority. But the contest was not witnessed with indifference by the people as such, since the competitors for the kingship were supported by different local groups. The permanent antagonism produced by groups ambitious to secure power cannot be taken as a substantiation of an inherent weakness in the kingship. We may call attention to Gluckman's argument that civil wars tend to strengthen rather than break tribal unity: "a periodic war was n e c e s s a r y to preserve that national unity: sections fought for the kingship and not for independence from it". (106) Since there was an open contest for the throne on the death of each king, there might have been few weak rulers as distinguished from those systems where there was a principle of automatic succession when children and other weak individuals could ascend the throne, thus providing other groups with an excellent opportunity to increase their powers.

Of all the Nilotic groups of which there is any considerable information, the Shilluk alone formed a single political community, or nation, with a highly developed identity and consciousness as a people, the political homogeneity of which and natural characteristics of their political structure were manifested by the institution of the king, as opposed to a number of separate tribes or tribal groupings which were culturally similar but not politically unified. At the same time, the principles of their political structure and social organization were similar in many respects to those of the other Nilotic peoples.

4.7 The Joluo

4.7.1 Introduction

A small group of Nilotes live in the Bahr el Ghazal Province. The people call themselves the Joluo - the Luo people. In the literature they are often called "Jur" - a nickname meaning "foreigners" which was originally applied to them by the Dinka, a term which - properly speaking - ought to be avoided. (1) Besides the Jur, the most important groups are the Shilluk-Luo, the Dembo (Bwodho), and the Shatt (Thuri). (2) The last-mentioned tribe has degenerated into mere forest hunters in the western part of the area, the presence of tsetse fly in their country preventing them from having cattle.

The region inhabited by these peoples has been tormented by incursions of Arab slavers during the 19th century. Even the Azande people, to the south, attacked them because of their small numbers and lack of a centralized government, and kidnapped slaves. (3)

The interrelations between the Joluo and the Dinka are extremely important. When the Dinka, moving from the far east (probably from the banks of the Nile), were advancing westwards in search of new homes for their fast increasing numbers, they started pushing back the less numerous Joluo, by degrees, until the Joluo reached the iron-stone belt - infested by the tsetse fly and therefore an unsuitable place for Dinka cattle - where they finally settled up to the present time. The early Dinka inroads probably deprived the Joluo of their already scanty cattle, a fact that played a decisive role in their destiny, turning them into an agricultural people. The very nature of the soil has favou-

red the extraction of iron-ore and the consequent manufacturing of iron implements, for which they have been long since famous all over the country. (4) Santandrea maintains that the Joluo were, on the whole, either reticent or vague concerning their relations with the powerful Dinka. Similarly they were unwilling to admit that they had been robbed by them of their cattle, which were believed occasionally to be seen by night grazing by the river side: "shadowy figures of a nostalgic past gone forever". (5) Nevertheless, they had to perform all the smith's work which was required by the Dinka. Petherick says that "being excellent smiths, they are tolerated, as, ignorant of the working of iron, the Dinkas supply themselves with lances and other iron implements and ornaments from the more industrious Djour in exchange for cattle". (6) The Joluo also supplied the Nuer and Shilluk with iron-work. They carried out trading expeditions and traded their products in exchange of beads, salt, and other commodities. (7)

The Luo traditions give evidence of an undeniable fact: a long period of oppression from, and consequent dependence upon, the superior Dinka people. According to Wallis each section lived under the "protection" of a neighbouring Dinka chief (8), and Schweinfurth characterizes it as a form of "vassalage". (9) Santandrea, on the other hand, is not clear as to the purport of this relationship. On one side, he emphasizes that they gradually made friends with the powerful Dinka who continually advanced like an irrepressible wave, but "it was a friendship that looked more like subjection". (10) On the other hand he says that they yielded to a kind of "mild allegiance" to the nearest paramount Dinka chief. "Their condition was not of a humiliating subordination." (11) He tries to explain this incompatibility by means of seeing the differences in character of these interrelations as successive phases, but even in this case he is inconsistent, since in one passage he says that it is evident that they formerly resented their dependence on the "powerful" Dinka, but with the passing of years their feelings cooled down considerably, so that in the first half of this century always peaceful and often quite friendly intercourse prevailed. (12) In another part of the work he says that "after the final withdrawal of the Mahdists, the Dinka seemed in a mood to impose their sway on their Jur neighbours rather by sheer force than by a kind of friendly mutual agreement, as of old." (13) The most obvious solution to this problem might be that the balance of power between the two peoples at every point of time determined the character of this relation of dependence. Though divided into a number of separate sections, the Joluo managed to maintain their society intact, with an inheritance of culture, customs and activities, which had been only slightly affected by Dinka influence. (14) The opposite happened to those tribal sections, which fell under Dinka sway and to those groups who left their home of their own accord to seek refuge among the Dinka. They gradually lost their identity, language and traditions to merge into the Dinka society. (See below ch. 4.8!) The Shatt were in fact divided into sections which lived at a great distance from each other and often near to other tribes or to the Dinka submitting themselves to foreign chiefs. (15)

4.7.2 Social structure

In spite of the fact that the Joluo are said to have lacked in social organization and it is well known that in the past they used to depend greatly on the Dinka, the tribes were stratified according to the general Nilotic pattern into chiefly clans and commoner clans. The chiefs of the Dembo group all belonged to a particular lineage of a single clan called "the royal clan" (paker), the

first ancestor of which was Maggi. (16) The Shilluk-Luo dynasty, "Wadelmak", and the Jur claimed descent from Dimo. (17) According to tradition, Dimo and Maggi were brothers of Nyikang, the national hero of the Shilluk tradition. Other chiefly clans were Demöi (s. Shilluk-Luo), Amec (w. Jur), and Barjok. (18) The commoner clans probably belonged to the Shatt, which were looked upon as the "owners" of the land, a fact from which we are able to infer that they had been there for a long time. Practically they were either identified with, or considered the same as, the Luel. (19) (See below ch. 4.8!)

4.7.3 Political structure

The tribal chief was called ruoth (pl. ruodhen), while ja (pl. jag) was a sub-chief. (20) Santandrea mentions that the head was earlier called ja, but that - as the population increased - he became a ruoth. The sub-chiefs were living besides the more powerful chiefs and headmen in a half-independent position, often calling to them for support, but doing alone their smaller home business. (21) Generally speaking such headmen's power must have been confined to a small number of clans, which in case of fight, revenge, and similar occurrences were likely to join their forces. The sub-chief was assisted in his various duties by the elders (jodongo), and some "strong and honest" men acted, when needed, as "police" (woden, sing. wodo or woro). (22)

Concerning the death of a chief, the Shilluk-Luo believed that Dimo's spirit had his abode in the chief. (23) He who possessed it was, therefore, not to die a natural death, lest - by passing through weakening diseases and agonies - he lost the power of transmitting Dimo's spirit to his heir. It was said that a violent death was essential to ensure the keeping of Dimo's power in the chiefly lineage, and therefore the natural death of a recent chief, weakening away "as the last of his subjects", was accounted as the main reason for the decline of the chiefly regime. Thus, deviation from customary rules gave rise to diminishing popular support. Traditionally, special rules, to be strictly adhered to, regulated their death. The chief's elderly relatives and counsellors were summoned by himself to his death-bed, and, after a ritual address, invited them to "help his soul to pass away worthy of a Dimo's successor". The task of killing the chief belonged exclusively to the people of a section of the Puwarjak clan. They did it by breaking his limbs and finally suffocating him. The corpse was mummified and carried to the burial ground of his forefathers. The corpse was not interred but placed high on a tamarisk tree far away in a territory north-east of Tonj, "their home", from where they had migrated. (24)

Regular succession from father to son was not strictly observed. (25) Yet, the power, if worthily exercised for long years, easily passed on to the eldest son who had been brought up in a way fit for the office. Thus, except in case of unworthiness, it became a hereditary privilege in the lineage. Moreover, Santandrea maintains, "it was one's cleverness in affairs, shrewdness in handling other people's will together with fairness in settling their disputes and cases - that gained some individuals a considerable ascendancy over their tribesmen; ascendancy, which, if cunningly and in the same time gently made use of, made them acknowledged all round as the lawful headmen". (26) A difference concerning succession is to be noted between the hereditary powers of the tribal chief and priest. The "priestly" functions of the chief were usually performed by another lineage of the same clan than that of the chief. Whereas the chiefly position was not necessarily from father to son, but often to a

brother's son, etc., the priestly office was always, if only possible, from father to son according to the ideal norms. (27) Often a chief appointed his own successor. (28) When near to die, the chief would call a trustworthy elder, not belonging to his clan and tell him the name of the man designated by him to take his position. After the funeral, he who had been appointed to carry out the dead chief's last will noticed who was the successor designated by putting a hippo-skin whip in his hand and making him to sit down on a mat (belo). The same he did with two other men chosen as leaders of the council of the elders. On that occasion the people had the opportunity of objecting to the election. A new chief or headman could also be elected by common consent by the elders. In that case the chief elect was lifted up, as in triumph, head upwards by some strong young men - a procedure which is reminiscent of the installation of a Dinka chief. Afterwards one of the elders hit the ground thrice with a hippo whip to show how the chief was to punish those who disobeyed his orders. Finally, he was given a leopard's skin as a garb of office. At the installation of a Shilluk-Luo chief, the chief of the Dembo used to preside over the ceremony. (29)

Besides the leopard skin cloak the chief had other symbols of office. Frobenius mentions a stool as a royal emblem. (30) The chief of the Wadelmak dynasty had inherited a sacred spear (ubur) from Dimo, and the chief of the Barjok clan also had a "spear of the fathers" (tong weno). (31) Both spears were supposed to have a double power; they were used both as a war "charm" to ensure victory against their enemies and to obtain rain. Among the Dembo, on the other hand, a sort of royal "sceptre" or "staff" (apudö or apuri) was found as an emblem of power, and orders were sent out with it, fights were stopped, and rain was made. (32) Moreover, the Dembo chief had sacred "rain-stones". Smaller chiefs or headmen had a cob's or a dikdik's skin as a token of position.

An interesting detail concerning the political responsiveness refers to the discharging of a leader. A skin of the sort belonging to his degree was placed against the door of his hut by night as a sign of distrust of him. (33)

The Shilluk-Luo chief performed the duty of priest-king, especially where the rain-making ritual was concerned. Ceremonies in which the sacred spear was used were also performed by a lineage of the same clan as that of the chief. (34) The chief of the smaller southern section was assisted by a sister's son - a commoner - who also acted as official repeater (ngade gam). (35) No Barjok clansman was allowed to touch the sacred spear. A foreign servant (formerly a slave) was employed for the job. (36) The paramount rain rites traditionally took place in Deim Genawi, where Dimo's grave was situated. (37) By the way, in the 19th century this village became, for a short time, operating base for the slave-traders. (38) Local rain rites were also performed by the clan heads. (39) The ceremonies were often performed by the side of a river or stream, mention being made of the ancestor spirits (atiben, sing. tibo) whom they meant to pacify and make friends with. Magagnotto emphasizes that ngade aciek officiated in public situations in case of famine, drought, epidemic, war, etc. (40) Santandrea supposes that under Dinka influence medicine-men (ja aciek, sing. ngade aciek) came into fashion after the Dinka diviner (tiet), and it became customary to call them to perform the rain-making rites. (41) It is surprising, however, he writes, to realize that among the Joluo, who live closer to the Dinka, the whole thing was still done by headmen, and not by ja aciek who were usually consulted in case of barrenness and illness, especially for young children. It will be ob-

jected that the Dinka diviner had no rain-making functions. The medicine-man may possibly be taken as a ritual expert with "advisory" functions. In an unaffected system he could not act as representative of a social group possibly apart from his own kin group.

Previously Santandrea avered that the chief and headmen did not collect tribute, and that proceeds from court cases were their sole means of obtaining financial aid, but it seems that it was not a negligible one. (42) Later he has abandoned this attitude. (43) He states that among the Jur there was the custom of offering their chief, as a kind of tribute, a foreleg of all the game killed in hunting. It is also evident from older sources that they received tribute from their subjects. (44)

Moreover, Santandrea says that at least one girl from the tribe was offered free to him by his subjects, possibly on his accession to the throne, in acknowledgement of his authority. A Shatt girl was to be the mother of the heir. The aboriginals sanctioned the conquest of the new-comers by an inter-marriage which, on one side, was a present, but on the other it implied an obligation highly honourable for the donors. The Shatt had not amalgamated with the tribal structure of the Shilluk-Luo, but only accepted some sort of "mild vassalage" in regard to their chief. (45) We have found a similar custom among the Shilluk and Acholi.

Cases of civil disputes and crimes were heard by the chief or sub-chief, or, in their absence, by any of the village elders. (46) The above-mentioned official repeater also acted at the proceedings of the court repeating in a loud voice the words of the chief, the plaintiff, the defendant, etc. One ordeal to prove innocence was to drink water which had been poured on the blade of a sacred spear. (47) Ghawi states that the courts had many ways of executing their judgements. (48) Usually, fines were paid in the form of iron hoes (m a - l o d a) and/or cattle according to the character of the offence. If a debtor, assisted by the members of his lineage, should fail to pay his debt, he was compelled to deliver an unmarried sister or daughter as security. As was the case with other Nilotic peoples, after such crimes as murder and adultery the peace-making processes ended with purification rites. (49)

Powers of leadership, ability in settling disputes fairly and tact in handling people gave the chief his ascendancy, but to a large extent the elders substantially circumscribed his power. Some chiefs seem to have been fairly well known and to have acted as intermediaries between their own tribes and their Dinka lords. Thus, the founder of the Wadelmak dynasty, Yamo Kon, brought all the neighbouring Joluo and Dembo under his sway and the Shatt clans also acknowledged him. (50) His power, however, was backed by the Dinka, with whom he was on friendly terms, and, moreover, he had little to fear from the slave-traders operating in the area before British occupation. Nevertheless, he was put to death for taking part in a rebellion. Even during the colonial administration the chief of the northern Shilluk-Luo - though being deposed - was still looked upon with respect. Reverence and obedience towards him did not diminish; he alone was looked upon as the real chief and he continued to perform his ritual functions. (51)

Were we to generalize about the capacity and adaptiveness of the Joluo political system, we might say that in spite of the fact that it had been penetrated by the neighbouring Dinka people and reduced by them to at least temporary vassalage, it was able to maintain its integrity and cohesion as a political system with palpable Lwo characteristics over a long period of time.

4.8 The Dinka

4.8.1 Introduction

The largest divisions of the Dinka people were some 25 named aggregates of tribes, each with its own well-defined territory. (1) The largest organized political groupings of the Dinka, the tribes, were the largest groups which the Dinka called wut (pl. wot), which in its simplest physical sense meant a cattle-camp. By extension from this, wut denoted the section (the smallest formal political unit of a tribe), the sub-tribe, and the tribe. Thus the Dinka were not a nation, but a people - a cultural and not a political group. In their homes, they had no consciousness of themselves as a nation. Only in the case of the chiefly clans, there was an awareness of common ancestry, which, yet, evoked feelings of sentiment rather than furthering direct political solidarity. Nor in relation to neighbouring peoples did the Dinka see themselves in terms of a political whole.

That their political organization was weak is evident from the fact that in the 19th century, "when the earth was spoilt", when much of Dinkaland was pillaged by slave-traders, adventurers and the Mahdia, there was little wide-scale cooperation against the common enemies. (2) Nor were they able to unite to defend themselves against the depredations of Nuer hordes who found them an easy prey. This series of invasions left the Dinka peoples - above all in the eastern parts - scattered, confused, and probably much reduced in numbers. They said that in the troubles of their past they were reduced to marrying for sheep and goats and even still inferior media of exchange, indicating thereby the depths of poverty and misery to which they thought they at that time sank. (3)

The Dinka were predominantly pastoralists, but also practised horticulture. (4) The care of their herds was the chief occupation. They were pastoralists by tradition and inclination. The necessity for part of the population of each tribe to be almost continually on the move over the country which was uncompromising for herder and beast was an important factor for breaking down the isolation of political groups.

Before the coming of the Dinka, the western, and probably even the central Dinka country, was inhabited by a people called by the immigrants the Luel. (5) (Concerning the aboriginals of the eastern and northern parts of Dinkaland, see below!) According to Santandrea no reasonable doubt can be entertained nowadays about this. Some traditions assert that they were Lwo - or at least spoke the Lwo language - whereas others maintain that they had their own language. The Luel have ceased to exist as a tribe, and the problem of their origin and ethnical identity is not discussed here. The advancing Dinka hordes started fighting them, who, being a people of little organization, were conquered and their cattle confiscated; others were absorbed by the Dinka people. The Dinka married their girls and a good number of them remained among the Dinka as slaves. They were said to be good workers, especially as blacksmiths, and all the artificial mounds (wun thony in Dinka) existing in the country were attributed to them. (6) Other groups of considerable size have also been incorporated into Dinka society, which, however, cannot be confused with, or equalled to, the Luel units scattered in the same area. But whereas the latter have completely lost their original identity, the other have kept their clan organization, together with part of their tribal traditions, though under disguised forms of language and custom. (7) Among these the Mananger lived in the north-eastern part of Rek Dinkaland. Their life was

formerly spent almost altogether "in the water", fishing and hunting hippos, part of which were exchanged for grain and other necessities. The Jur wir ("the foreigners of the river") is a group living north-east of Tonj and commonly believed to be of foreign origin. Their mode of life resembled that of the Mananger. (8) Santandrea maintains that it appears that the Mananger formed one of the original Joluo hordes migrating from the east in early times in search of new homes in the west. (9) On the other hand, it is beyond doubt that a good number of them trace their descent to fairly recent times mostly from the Jur.

4.8.2 Social structure

The social structure was the same throughout the Dinka area. Each tribe was an alliance of lineages who were bound by a strong sentiment of coordination, with the addition of individuals or families who had attached themselves by marriage to one or another of the lineages which were thought originally to have settled together and grown into the tribe. Each tribe as a whole was identified with a particular lineage, almost invariably derived from one of the main chiefly clans, the members of which were called collectively bany (sing. beny), dinyor or wenyor (sing. menyor or ngwat yor), who were dominant and said to "have" the land of the tribe. (10) The people of chiefly extraction represented the largest group who claimed a single ancestor, and clans of this stock were found throughout the country. They based their right to political and religious superiority on an important myth known in some form to all their descent-groups.

The second category of clans, the members of which had no special hereditary religious functions, were called collectively "commoners" (kic). (11) They varied considerably in size and area of distribution. At one time the commoner clans were scarcely to be regarded as clans at all, but as disunited families with no sense of a wider agnatic relationship. In fact, Lienhardt states, the chiefly clans could on the whole produce clearer and longer genealogies than the rest. (12) The commoner clans among the Dinka as a whole were more numerous than the chiefly clans, but the latter formed a large minority. (13) The chief of the Apuk, a large section of the Rek Dinka, acknowledged openly that about half of his subjects (c. 40.000) were originally Jur. (14) The commoner clans were also described as "people of the war spear" (koc tong) in relation to the chiefly clans who were "people of the fishing spear" (koc bith), and were - according to Lienhardt - distinguished from the latter by political function rather than by rank. It would be absurd, however, if these terms should signify that the commoner clans (or "warrior clans" as Lienhardt calls them) alone went to war, while the chiefly clans only provided priests who ensured victory by their prayers. Instead, the distinction is one of culture, not of function. (15)

The pre-eminence of the chiefly clans was established by myths which the Dinka recounted in some detail. They represented the beginning of a systematic correspondence between religious conceptions and traditional political experience. The myths as known in different parts of Dinkaland have fundemental features in common, though also differences between them corresponded to differences in political realities between parts of the country. Most versions are about the Dinka prototypical sacred chief and culture-hero Aiwel and about his origin. The most important items in the Rek Dinka version are as follows. (16) An old widow who had no son went to weep by the bank of the river. The river-spirit, Malek (Malengdit, or Maleng yath), told her to draw

the waves (or the foam) towards her so that they might enter her. He then gave her a spear and a fish. She bore a male child whom she called Aiwel. The child was born with its teeth complete, an augury of supernatural power. The versions told among the Eastern and Northern Dinka are also about the impregnation of a barren woman in the river and the birth and early development of Aiwel much as it appears in the Rek Dinka version. (17) Aspects of the myth are comparable with details of Nuer, Shilluk, and Anuak myths at least. The essential feature for comparison is the riverain origin of the royal clan of the Shilluk, the noble clan of the Anuak, and the dominant clan of the Jikany tribe of the Nuer.

The myths describe Aiwel as "bad" (r a c), also having the meaning of "extreme", suggesting the pre-eminent possession of a quality. (18) He was like a spirit (j o k), and he was like a man. He was capricious and motiveless. He wanted to try everything, to test everything, and he was sometimes represented as a Protean figure who changed his form into that of various beasts.

Concerning Aiwel's end, a Bor Dinka version relates that he disappeared, but nobody knew where he disappeared to, whether up, or down, or back to the river. (19) Another version maintains that he got into conflict with the Sun and the Moon on account of his "extreme" behaviour. The Moon transfixed Aiwel through the whole body so that he was pinned to the ground. A hut was built around him, and he was buried inside it. (20)

On the other hand, some clans among the Rek, Abiem, Padang, and Niel Dinka regarded themselves as ultimately descended from Deng. (21) The myth of the Adero clan of the Niel Dinka runs in this way: The first ancestor of the clan appeared from the sky as a young woman pregnant with her first child. She bore a marvellous babe, whose teeth were adult and whose tears were blood. She said to the people: "This is your bang, look after him well, for I can stay with you no longer". As she spoke the rain came down in torrents, and therefore the boy was called Deng(-dit). He ruled over them for a long time, and when he was old, he disappeared in a great storm of rain. (22)

As the chiefly clans as a whole were known to be superior to the commoner clans in influence and endowment within the whole social system of the Dinka, so their homogeneity and superiority in relation to the commoners were imaged in the supernatural power (r i n g, "flesh" or "blood") they all possessed. (23) The first sacred chief divided the raw flesh that came from his sacrificial cattle among the founders of chiefly clans. Transmitted to them by their ancestors, the supernatural power which was thus incarnate in them, and was intrinsically part of them, was associated with truth-telling, justice, knowledge, and prophetic vision. Their knowledge was figured as an illumination which made the sacred chiefs to be "the lamps of the Dinka". The functions of the sacred chiefs were also summed up in the expression "they were carriers of life" (w e i , also meaning "breath", i.e. life-soul) of the people. (24)

In any tribe, each lineage of the chiefly clan had equal political representation, although some were known to be senior to others. According to this model, then, each sub-tribe should have as its nucleus a descent group of the chiefly clan, and also a descent group of commoners. The tribe as a whole should have a central, pre-eminent lineage of the chiefly clan, and a pre-eminent lineage of commoners. Thus, the lineage of Anau was originally the chiefly lineage in the Abaga sub-tribe and also the "maternal uncle" of the whole tribe (n e r w u t). (25) Pagong was one of a group of related clans thought to be descended from the first sacred chief, Aiwel, and its prestige

was greater than that of other chiefly clans. (26) Pagong, and its ancillary clans composing the wenyor group, unlike other chiefly clans, was represented in many, perhaps all, tribes, and seemed therefore to sense that it had a wider distribution than any other clan. In some tribes it provided the lineage with primacy throughout the whole territory. In all, however, it was accorded a status higher, in an ill-defined way, than the rest, as Aiwel himself was the first among chiefs. The Dinka said that Aiwel remained "like a Governor-General", while the others were "like Provincial Governors" indicating the sense of a wider responsibility and reign outside the particular tribe, of the descendants of Aiwel. Among the Western Dinka, in some versions of the tradition, Aiwel was represented as standing above the sacred chiefs to whom he delegated his power. He distributed sacred fishing-spears among those who responded to his summons and they became the founders of the chiefly clans. Those who did not come at first, when they were called, founded the commoner clans. Finally, he told the loyal chiefs to look after the country, saying that he himself would leave it to them to do so and not intervene. (27) The Pagong clan regarded themselves as being morally and politically at the centre of the community, as the bull (muor) was at the centre of the herd, and it was also said that Pagong was "the maternal uncle of all Dinka". There was a suggestion by some Dinka that in the past, when tribes were autonomous and war on a large scale possible, only the chiefs of Pagong and its related clans, or an outstanding prophet, could make effective peace between different tribes. In some versions of the tradition it is explicitly stated that when problems could not be settled by other chiefs, they were to go to Aiwel. (28) Among the Dinka of the east bank of the Nile, Aiwel's clan was not called Pagong, but its pre-eminence was more strongly marked. (29) It was represented by many lineages all descended from Aiwel, which in numbers and influence far exceeded lineages of other chiefly clans in that region. Among the Northern Dinka the chiefly clans were all descendants of Aiwel. (30)

Hence within a tribe the chiefs with whom the largest sections were politically associated might be members of a single lineage with primacy throughout the whole tribe. The presence of two chiefly lineages of approximately equal reputation was accompanied by rivalries and, according to the Dinka, these might eventually split the tribe into two in a way which could not occur where one chiefly clan had the undisputed primacy. (31) These rivalries, we think, were aggravated by the fact that there appears to have been used two models of power distribution. First of all, Aiwel divided nearly the whole of Dinka territory among his sons (see below!), and a Ngok Dinka tradition states that when Aiwel died, the leaders of the commoners went to fetch one of his sons to be the head of the tribe. (32) Sometimes the new arrivals accepted selected members of the aboriginal groups into their own ranks. This was the practice of the above tradition, when Aiwel delegated his powers among those who responded to his summons, and may have been a response to the special problem created by the rapid expansion of their regime. Since the original population of Aiwel's group was so small, it could not produce nearly enough officials. Hence they accepted into their ranks those who were born into the clan, as well as cooperative leaders from the aboriginal groups. Together, these chiefs by blood and chiefs by privilege formed the dominant status group which ruled the Dinka. Although chiefly clans were on one category in relation to commoner clans, their heterogeneous ancestry evoked feelings of rivalry rather than furthering direct political solidarity, and, moreover, they were identified with and embedded within the communities for which they functioned,

acting as mediators and peace-makers within, and representing their communities in opposition to others of the same order in the total political structure.

This leads us involuntarily to a closer examination of the question of the exclusiveness of Dinka tribes, and still more of sub-tribes and sections, which was represented in terms of different associations and combinations of agnatically unrelated lineages. Lienhardt emphasizes that this structure of associated lineages was consistent with the generally aggregational, rather than congregational, nature of the various political segments. Such a structural principle was, he says, clearly consistent with the fact that leadership, in any Dinka political segment, necessarily involved the presence of members of two different classes or categories of clan, "the warriors and the spearmasters, which are of equal and complementary status". (33) It was found, moreover, that the Dinka saw the historical formation of their political groups, "not as the grafting of strangers on to a single original descent group, but as the division of their land between a number of equivalent original groups which have spread out and displaced each other on the ground". Scrutinizing relevant information we find that Lienhardt's supposition is at variance with actual facts. Historically, the Dinka regarded themselves as being composed of different levels of incomers superimposed on earlier populations. This build-up has been the result of immigration and absorption, which is clearly shown in the traditions Dinka related about the origin of their clans. Yet, Santandrea states that the remnants of the aboriginals were unwilling to manifest their ethnical identity which might lower their prestige before their Dinka lords. (34) According to Riad, it is clear that "a series of migrations brought about a new class of people who, through their cultural superiority (and military ability) were able to subdue a basic Negro population... and owing to its numerical weakness was absorbed by the bulk of the subdued element...". (35)

Among the Northern Dinka the commoner clans claimed to be indigenous. (36) Later, other immigrants, including certain menyor groups, came and settled with them. Aiwel appeared mysteriously and lived in a humble position, until his miraculous gifts proved that he was more than human, and he took over the supremacy of the tribe. The leader of the commoners, Ding (or Apiny Ding), who was believed to be the first ancestor of the Dinka and Nuer and Aiwel's foster-father, surrendered his position to him. The agreement between them resulted in Aiwel being acknowledged as leader and "saviour", and given many wives. His foster-father asked only that he and his descendants should be recognized as landowners. Each of Aiwel's sons together with their people was allocated by Aiwel a different territory over which he was placed as religious and temporal head, he also being given power to intercede for rain and perform rites for the land. On one level this tradition is a justification of political and territorial divisions which existed at the time of investigation; on another it ought to vouch for the religious powers which were hereditary in the hands of the heads of the landowning commoner lines. But menyor descent groups held chiefships in all parts of Dinkaland, and their heads performed rites for the land as well as holding it by political ascendancy. As we have seen, moreover, most tribes were said to "belong", as whole tribes, to a single lineage of the chiefly clans. Among the other Nilotic peoples we have found that where land had been taken over by immigrants from outside, the new owners left the former inhabitants to perform land rites, but among the Dinka the chiefly clans had successfully usurped landowning status when they had political supremacy in a tribe, and in spite of the fact that they lacked an original religious association with the soil they could perform valid land rites.

Even among the Eastern Dinka the chiefly clans were regarded as immigrants. The tradition told by the occupants of the important Deng shrine (luak or luang Deng) in the Gaawar Nuer tribe (see below ch. 4.9.1) is as follows. (37) Deng (Garang) originally came from the north, but travelled far south into Twij Dinka country, accompanied by Aiwel. Luak Deng was originally occupied by the ancestor of the Thoi Dinka, a man of exceptional spiritual powers, who was eventually ousted by Deng. The display of power caused him to recognize Deng as his spiritual superior and to abdicate from his position as paramount spiritual leader of the area.

4.8.3 Political structure

From the nuclear chiefly lineage the sacred chief was provided. Traditionally he held the title of beng (being) (pl. bang or bain) or beny (pl. bany), which has been given various translations, e.g. "chief", "expert", or "master". (38) The title always had an attribute in order to indicate his office: beny de ring or beny rem (or riem) among the Northern Dinka, and beng (a) bith in the remaining parts of the country. (39) Ring (or rem) probably referred to the supernatural power of the chief. Bith, on the other hand, was the term of the sacred fishing-spear as a symbol of office. It was unbarbed or unserrated. There were also leaf-bladed spears (tong) normally used in hunting and war. It is evident from accounts of the Northern Dinka that sacred leaf-bladed spears were more typical of that area than were the sacred fishing-spears. A number of such spears were taken into Government custody in the past on the assumption that they formed a focus for rebellion.

The following description of the position of a Dinka chief in the early 1860's by de Pruyssenaere is a good basis of comprehension of the role of the chief. (40) Since the Dinka were no more than a congeries of independent tribes speaking dialects of a common language, it follows that there was no individual with the temporal and spiritual authority of the Shilluk king. Yet, in practice we find much the same conditions on a smaller scale.

"Jedes Dorf bildet eine Gemeinde, die auf derselben Waldlichtung wohnt und ihr Vieh zusammen weiden lässt, in einer Heerde (Mirza) oder in mehreren, wenn dis Zahl zu beträchtlich ist. Das Dorf erkennt einen Häuptling an, dessen Autorität nur dem Namen nach vorhanden ist. Es ist ein Mann, dem die Zahl seiner Heerden oder sein persönlicher Character einen gewissen Einfluss gegeben haben. Da der Besitz vielen Viehes ihn befähigt, eine grosse Zahl von Frauen zu nehmen, so kann er sich dadurch Verbindungen mit vielen Familien seines eigenen und der Nachbardörfer verschaffen; er hat viele Diener; er kann sich gegen die Anderen freigebig zeigen. So kann er auf gütlichem Wege manches von den Leuten seines Dorfes erlangen, ihre Streitigkeiten beilegen &c. Aber er kann ihnen keine Steuer auferlegen und noch weniger sie zu Dienstleistungen zwingen. Jeder ist frei in Allem, was er thut und treibt, er kann seine Streitigkeiten fort führen, seine Rachepläne zur Ausführung bringen und sich selbst Gerechtigkeit verschaffen. Selten einmal mischt sich das ganze Dorf in eine Angelegenheit, um Gerechtigkeit zu üben und einen Schuldigen zu verjagen oder gar zu tödten... Der Häuptling empfängt einige Zeichen von Ehre und Unterwürfigkeit. Er geht immer voran und setzt sich auf den besten Platz und hat oft als Zeichen von Würde ein Individuum bei sich, das Alles, was er spricht Wort für Wort wiederholt."

Every chief had immanent in him the spirit of a great ancestor who had come to him down the generations, just as Nyikang was the guardian spirit of every Shilluk king, and it was this which gave him his special powers and wis-

dom. It was believed among the Northern Dinka that if the chief was killed, his spirit would look after the tribe and rule it until someone was chosen in his place; then his spirit entered into the new chief. If the chief was left to die a natural death, his spirit would also die. The divine grace and virtue vested in him on behalf of his tribe would be lost and evil would befall the country. (41) The Agar Dinka, on the other hand, believed that if he was killed on the battle-ground the ancestral spirit would pass to a suitable successor and not vanish. (42) Moreover, the Dinka maintained that there was a close connection between the special powers and physical condition of the chief and the condition of the soil (he was also the rainmaker), and the cattle. (43) Thus the chief had to be vigorous in order to ensure the health and prosperity of the people. If he showed evidence of physical decline, the Dinka considered that he had outlived his usefulness, and killed him. (44) On the other hand, there was no question of removing an unsuccessful chief from his office. Instead, it was common knowledge among the Dinka that sacred chiefs were rivals, and their rivalry was usually represented as a rivalry for religious reputation. (45) The rivalries were thought to lead in time to changes in the leadership of political groups, for a conspicuously effective and successful chief would attract followers from a weaker one who might be their traditional leader.

The fundamental principle, clear in all accounts from all over Dinkaland, then, was that certain sacred chiefs must not or should not be seen to enter upon physical death and the debility which precedes it in the same way as ordinary men or domestic animals. Their deaths were to be, or were to appear, deliberate, and they were to be the occasion of a form of public celebration. Their period of existence were longer than that traditionally assigned to the Shilluk king, and no special stress was laid on the maintenance of the high standard of sexual activity which the Shilluk demanded of their king. The ceremonies were officially forbidden by the Government, but it is not improbable that the custom was sometimes carried out in the secret. (46) Not every one who was technically a sacred chief had sufficient standing to be treated in this manner. According to Titherington, the custom was originally confined to the clans of Pagong and Parum of the Dinka of the Bahr el Ghazal Province. (47) Speaking of the Northern Dinka, Bedri states that the practice of killing the chief was not common at the time of Government intervention but if he was a beny nial, then he was more powerful and must be killed. (48) An interesting notice is that in the Majok tribe (and probably elsewhere) a special commoner clan had the duty of burying a sacred chief alive. (49) Their role in the situation of the death of chiefs may be seen to have something in common with the reported role of the ororo, the demoted members of the royal clan of the Shilluk at the death of the Shilluk king. They were also traditional "prayer-repeaters" to the chiefs.

There were several methods by which the chief might be ritually killed, a custom which was spoken of in terms of the chief had "gone to his seat" or "been taken into the earth". (50) As we have shown, they believed that the chief "carried the life" of his people. If he "died" like ordinary men, the "life" of his people which was in his keeping went with him. It may be that the frequent references to strangulation and suffocation which we find in other accounts (e.g. about sacrificing animals) relate also to this belief; for the Dinka "life" was recognized particularly in breath, and these forms of killing involved, above all, the retention within him of the chief's breath. Seligman describes the procedures of burying alive the chiefs of the Bahr el Ghazal Province. (51) A Bor Dinka chief who contracted bronchitis was laid in the

midst of dried and burnt cattle dung, and his people danced around his resting place, raising dust so that he either was asphyxiated or coughed himself to death. The dead chief was then buried in the cattle byre. The Northern Dinka were in closer contact with the Shilluk and might have a development of ceremonial influenced by, but not modelled upon, that of the Shilluk kingship. Bedri states that generally the "famous" chiefs, when they became old or sick, should be killed in some way. (52) The most common way was that the elders suffocated the chief, who was then buried secretly at night, usually in the bed of a water-course. It is also recorded that a chief was shut up in his barn with his first wife and favourite bull, and left to die of starvation. The Northern Dinka took every care to guard the chief from accidental death, but if he died by illness or accident a sheep was suffocated and the usual rites were performed. They believed that it was not always necessary to kill an ordinary chief, and it was generally sufficient if a sheep was killed and buried with him at his death, but this ritual killing was essential in the case of a beny nial and there were always people accompanying him for this purpose.

All authorities agree that the office of sacred chief was hereditary, but that the eldest son did not necessarily succeed his father. (53) A chief must possess certain characteristics and qualifications. It was said that "he should be of very good character, and temperate, and ... against bloodshed and any ferocious deeds, prone to forgiveness rather than punishment". (54) As successor of the prototypical chief, Aiwel, he might, on the other hand, be expert at trickery and cunning, given to strange freaks of behaviour, capricious and unpredictable. (There is plenty of evidence for the attribution of such qualities to "culture heroes" of the trickster type in many parts of the world, of course.) As leader, then, the chief must have cunning, resolution, and ruthlessness, as well as the qualities which seem to us, perhaps, more "priestly", since political and religious leaderships were combined and required in the person who combined them the qualities necessary for both. The chief was, thus, chosen because he conformed to a preferred social type, but if an heir was deficient in these qualities, then the chief nominated his successor from among his near relatives, a brother or cousin or any male member of the lineage, the selection depending on individual ability. A young man would not assume the position until he reached middle age, although he might have been initiated into the duties by his father before his death. (55) If the chief died suddenly without having nominated his successor, an assembly was held to appoint one. The wives of the late chief had a good deal to say in the selection. (56)

The fact that the office of chief was a sacerdotal one was emphasized in the installation ceremonies through which the chief had to pass. Sometimes the installation was held at the final mortuary ceremony one year after the death of the chief. (57) Bedri's report from the Northern Dinka appears to indicate that the formal aspect of priest-chieftainship was more developed there than among the other parts of Dinkaland. (58) A big feast was held followed by a religious ceremony, and the elders of both the chiefly and commoner clans attended. One or two of the menyor elders might be installed with him as his "viziers" or counsellors. A sacred fire was lit and it must not be extinguished until the day of his death, when it was put out together with all the fires of the tribal section. At the actual ceremony of installation the kic elders placed the chief elect on a bed and washed him in water. The kic and menyor elders placed strings of ostrich egg-shells (abeg menyor) round his neck, crowned him with a ring made from a roan antelope, and anointed his body with butter

from a sacred cow. All who had any claim to the office of chief renounced their rights and sweared loyalty to the new chief. Then, the chief was presented with his ancestor's spear (tong yat), and the warriors paraded before him. Bedri states that, if a member of the chiefly clan who was very highly esteemed and of exceptional character became a chief, he was known as "chief of heaven" (beny nial) and was held in greater honour and considered to have more power than the ordinary chief. (59) He was installed as one of them, but in addition he was carried on a bed on the shoulders of the elders. He imitated a dead man and the elders ran with him towards each of the four points of the compass singing. The people then lowered the bed and, before it reached the ground, the chief jumped from it "as if returning to life again".

Various sacred objects were associated with the office of chief. The most important object of all - and the symbol of their monopoly of power - was the above-mentioned sacred spears, which played an important role in the rites. (60) Oaths were taken on them. Some of them were very old and had been inherited from father to son during generations. Thus when Aiwel ordered his seven sons to emigrate he gave each of them a spear. (61) The Cic Dinka believed that at death the spirit of the chief went into his sacred spear until it took up residence in the new holder of the spear. (62) Among the Padang Dinka other sacred objects included a sacred stool (kol yat) and the sacred hide of the bull sacrificed at the installation (bwang yat). The beny nial wore a distinctive dress of leopard skin which had been killed by the warriors. (63)

If we may trust in our authorities, by custom the chiefs collected no revenue from their people. (64) No sources of wealth and labour were available to help the chief to meet his obligations. Nevertheless, in theory certain parts of the sacrificial victims considered as the seats of life (the heart, liver, spleen, kidneys, pizzle, etc.) were the perquisites of the actual chief. (65) Another and much more important source of income was that a chief might take one cow as the fee for stopping a feud. (66) Yet one ought to class among the income even the articles of food and animals which were given to the central shrines at the rain rites and harvest festivals as well as the work that people spent on the building and maintenance of them. Nevertheless, we have every reason for asking the question whether the chiefs did not earlier collect tribute or whether they had ceased to be supplied owing to the historical circumstances which resulted in a loss of retainers simultaneously with a levelling status and wealth. Much tells in favour of the latter alternative, since several authors say that the chiefs were wealthy. It is stated that the Malual Dinka Arianhdit (see below!) was a spiritual despot who ruled over vast territories, the people of which paid tribute to him. His followers were bold enough to burn down huts and granaries of people who refused to pay "homage" (=tribute) demanded of them. (67) Cummins maintains that "nothing confers such prestige and position as the possession of large herds, and the authority of a beng ... who loses his cattle is usually impaired". (68) Lienhardt emphasizes that the chief did represent an inclusiveness in the Dinka political system, in that - in consequence of the chiefly resources - anybody who succeeded in attaching himself to one of them made himself sure of help. (69) Therefore, individual strangers might seek out chiefs if they wanted protection, and "praised their heads" with gifts or songs. It is also understandable that when the mother's kin were a chiefly clan and the father's kin were not, the tendency would be for the child to turn to the mother's brother, who had the greater prestige and power to help. The ultimate cause of the reduction of the material and political resources of the chiefs appears to have been that the

surplus upon which they relied had dwindled down because of war, slave-trade, occupation, and cattle plague.

There are even other facts which support the hypothesis that earlier the Dinka political system had higher extractive and regulative capabilities. As said above, a great number of Joluo were subdued by the Western Dinka. What we are suggesting is that a system with high resource extraction capability from other societies, may also be able to demand much at home. With the emergence of economic surplus, it became both possible and profitable for the Dinka to establish relatively permanent control over other groups. The economic surplus was sufficiently great to sustain the necessary military and political machine and to justify the necessary expenditure of effort. As a consequence of this process, the Joluo were brought within the framework of the Dinka political system. But, we must be very cautious in thinking of the relationship between domestic and international capability. Domestic capability cannot be directly inferred from international capability, nor can the international capability be inferred from the domestic, although there may be important links between the two.

The chiefs had ritual authority and duties in relation to the rain, land and natural phenomena, and their reputation varied with the success which was held to attend these rites. (70) The intimate chiefly connection with the nature and the vegetation is evident from the following. Among the Bor Dinka the chief was said to take the food of the community with him into the grave, so when the next season arrived a hole was dug at the side of the grave so that the food might come out again. They believed that this would ensure good crops, abundance of termites (a delicacy!), and other food. (71) When the Cic Dinka chief was buried, milk was poured into his right hand, millet in his left, and the hands closed over their contents, thus ensuring plenty until the new chief was installed. (72)

The chief performed the annual rain sacrifices, since Deng appeared as clan-divinity (yat) of the menyor clan, and then carried with it the ability successfully to pray for rain. (73) The great central rain rites (as well as those of installation) of each tribe took place at one of the shrines dedicated to Dengdit. (74) Most tribes appear to have had one shrine (luak) in their territory. Howell describes one important shrine (luak Deng - or luak Kwoth, "the cattle-byre of God", as the Nuer called it) which was situated in the Gaawar Nuer area. (75) The whole of this area was once occupied by Dinka tribes but they were driven out, divided, and widely scattered by incoming hordes of Nuer about four, or at most five, generations ago. In the vicinity of the shrine there remained a small Dinka community, who, unlike so many Dinka lineages in that part of Nuerland, had retained their identity and had not been wholly absorbed into the tribal structure of the Nuer. Howell maintains that it is difficult to assess the true significance of the shrine in the past, though there seems little doubt that it was of considerable importance in the tribal structure of the area. Matthews and Struvé who visited the country in 1907 describe the shrine as "the Mecca of the Dinkas and Nuers". Luak Deng was of particular importance to the Rut, Thoi, Nyarraweng, Padang, Dwor, and Ric Dinka, and some lineages of the Twij Dinka, and in certain respects was a symbol of their association. The shrine was maintained by collective effort, each tribe, or more likely particular lineages within each tribe, having specific functions to perform. In most years, at any rate when the rains were late in breaking, collective rain-making ceremonies were performed at the shrine. There is little information on the methods of rain-making, but animals were said to be

sacrificed, and the rain-stone of Deng (pam Deng) was brought out and rubbed with the intestinal fluids, and water was poured upon it. Locally the people asked the chief to seek rain from the particular spirit - locally regarded as being connected with rain. (76) A sacrifice was made, and the spirit was induced to intercede with Dengdit. The chief prayed for rain and went through various rituals in which the sacred spear was used. Among the Agar Dinka - who did not normally build cattle-byres in their homesteads - there were cattle-byre shrines of certain out-standing chiefs which had a tribal importance, and which were maintained and repaired by the members of the whole tribe, who also took beasts for sacrifice and offerings of first-fruits there. (77) References should also be made to the mounds or "pyramids" of Aiwel (pwom Aiwel) and to the great pyramid in Lou Nuer country built in honour of Deng (see below ch. 4.9!). (78) Effective prayer for rain was not limited to chiefs, and anyone who had Deng as his divinity, or had one of a certain numbers of clan-divinities, was thought to be able to bring rain. (79)

The functions of the chief mentioned by all Dinka were their prayer, invocation (lam), and sacrifice for the cure of the sick and the vitality and prosperity of their people and cattle, their driving away of lions and other dangers of the forest and of the river. (80) He also blessed the seed, and cursed (waak) or offered prayers to harm enemies, and he would do this by pointing his spear at the person concerned or at the animal to be sacrificed. (81)

When the chief spoke in official situations (in invocation, etc.) each phrase was repeated by a "repeater" (gam lung or long). (82) The latter was usually a classificatory sister's son. Among the Western Dinka the members of Padiangbar, a large commoner clan found all over the area, regarded themselves as traditional repeaters to chiefs. Among the Bor Dinka and perhaps the Agar, the function of making such speeches was recognized as belonging specially to a particular lineage of each clan.

The tribe was - by definition - the largest unit which had permanent machinery for maintaining law and order. (83) In general it was the convention that fighting between tribal segments should be with the club only. Fighting between tribes, on the other hand, was not governed by any such conventions, nor did the Dinka think that peace between them should be the rule. The tribe was, thus, the political unit for defence, since it was impossible for fighting to persist within one tribe without it leading to the complete disintegration of the group. It was the chiefs who were expected by means of their ritual powers to secure success for the tribal armies in war and raiding. (84) In times of difficulty all the chiefs, led by the most pre-eminent one, should provide "spiritual" guidance for the warriors of the tribe as a whole. With some exceptions the chief was not allowed to join in or witness a fight personally. The sight of blood flowing was said to weaken the power in the body of the chief, so that he tried to avoid seeing the flow of human blood. This was one of the reasons why chiefs were supposed not to take part in actual fighting, but to stay at home and pray for victory. In the battle the warriors were led by a tribal war-leader (keic), who always belonged to a commoner clan. (85) Each sub-tribe had its nuclear lineage of a commoner clan, which provided its war-leaders. In inter-tribal warfare one of the several war-leaders emerged as war-leader of the whole tribe. The sacred chief led the warriors outside the village, blessed them and then retired to his homestead to cause harm to the enemy by his prayers and the use of his power. One may say that he was in constant communication with the supernatural military command.

The age-sets played no part in the fighting organization of the groups concerned if they were within one section, but if two or more sections were involved, the warring parties might be organized into their respective age-sets. (86) It appears that the chief had a clearly defined political office owing to the fact that he opened and closed the age-sets and was responsible for the initiation of the young men of the tribe, when they reached the puberty. Moreover, he instructed them in "morals" and, characteristically enough, nothing about religion. Though the age-sets seem never to have had in themselves specific regimental functions, their pride and reputation were connected with their military prowess. Consequently, a renowned chief was himself at the centre of the military organization of his people, and the inspiration of the most active fighting men.

The tribe was in Dinka theory, the largest group of people among whom it would be possible and desirable to settle cases of homicide by the peaceful process of mediation and by the payment of compensation in cattle, rather than by the selfhelp and feud. (87) The tribe, then, marked the limits of the possible recognition of any convention that disputes should be settled peacefully. The chief, with the backing of his line and the important religious powers vested in his person, was a mechanism for maintaining peaceful relations within the tribe. There was no contradiction between the function of the chief as a guide in war and as a mediator and peace-maker. They were functions of different situations, which had in common the assurance of the welfare of the tribe. There were several grounds of their ability ideally to reconcile conflicting groups and interests. The chiefs were placed above and before others, so they were theoretically above and outside their conflicts, and could mediate between them. Moreover, in the Dinka model of leadership, it was implied that in each case one of the descent groups was peacemaker in relation to the other, and it will be remembered that a nuclear chiefly group of a tribe or sub-tribe might be referred to as "maternal uncle of the camp" (naar wut), since it was the descent-group whose women were most widely distributed through the other descent-groups of the tribe. (88) The maternal uncle - a kinsman with whom there was a special relationship of respect among the Dinka (89) - was the peacemaker between his own children and those of his sisters, and was the pivot of relationships between members of his own and other exclusive agnatic groups living in community. The connection between their peacemaking functions within the group as sacred chiefs and as "maternal uncles" was explicit.

It must be remembered that the chief never initiated litigation, but waited for persons to put their petitions to him for consideration and arbitration, and that the chief crystallized and expressed the views of the elders after general discussion. (90) In traditional Dinka "law" it was said that there were always gatherings (luk) between the "big people" (koc dit) of the settlement. The purpose of the gatherings was the presentation of the whole of the situation to the disputants and to the community in order to arrive at a true assessment of the rights and wrongs of a case. As a last resort, they had recourse to oaths and ordeals. (91) The chief supervised the swearing of oaths on the sacred spear or by Dengdit by the parties to a dispute. As arbitrator in cases of homicide the chief was called bang thiop. (92)

According to Titherington, by ancient custom, each Rek chief was assisted by an informal council, which he consulted in all matters. (93) It was composed of his "sub-chiefs", each of whom was responsible for his own area (94), and whose appointment was largely in the chief's hands, and elders, and any-

one - man or woman - who wished to hear or to speak. Decisions were made after discussion with the council, and the proceedings were - he says - democratic and the chief's position was that of primus inter pares. Moreover, he found traces of a system of rule by a number of independent chiefs among the Rek Dinka with different offices and overlapping or identical territories. Which, if any, of these was supreme apparently depended on personal prestige and success in his sphere, and supremacy was brief and uncertain. (95) These sparse items of information give us another foundation of the statement that the Dinka political system was more structurally differentiated in the past than recent authorities have taken for granted, since many roles and structures had disappeared at the time of their investigations.

Throughout the territory of each tribe were many settlements straggling over a large area and consisting of a number of local groups of the various clans each mainly controlled by its own elders (koc dit), but as regards pasturage the elders only visited camps for short periods and the care of the cattle lay in the hands of the young men under the authority of the "cattle chief" (bain weng, lit. "cow") or "head of the camp" (bang wut), who controlled the local groups and was responsible for good order and the safety of the village cattle. The leader of the camp was also said to be the "executive officer" (?) and war-leader (bang tong or keic). The sacred chief could also function as head of the cattle camp during the dry season. (96)

There were also other officials in the Dinka society. All over Dinkaland at places chosen for major fish battues there were fishing experts (bang de rec or raich, or beny wir, "masters of the river"). (97) They were traditionally controllers of the river, as their title implies, and their task was to allot the water and order the fishing season to start accompanied by drowning a beast and prayers that the fishing might prosper. Other minor experts were known as "masters of the grain" (bang (de) rap). (98) They were called in if insects or birds were ruining the crops. Like the fishing experts, they did not function for defined political groups, but for people in their neighbourhood. They might come from chiefly clans or from commoner clans which in a given locality traditionally performed this function. Bang lei were hunting experts. (99) Finally, there were lesser rainmakers (bang (de) deng) who had certain types of rain magic and collaborated locally with the chief in rainmaking. (100) They also blessed the agricultural implements and the seed before sowing time.

The reaction to loss of political autonomy made possible wider political combinations than were previously possible, and the influence of prophets (ran nhialic, "man of divinity", or aciek, "creator") was undoubtedly made possible by a response on the part of many Dinka, traditionally divided from each other, to a common influence or set of influences. (101) The great prophets, those who were chiefs too, were thought to have a place also in the original system of religious and political institutions before these were modified by external forces. In this they corresponded to the balance of change and permanence in their life which the Dinka encountered in experiences of foreign influence and control. It was said of the great prophets that they united two principles in their bodies. They were overtly inspired by their clan-divinities, and it was said that the really great prophets were always hereditary chiefs, or members of chiefly clans. The special strength of their clan-divinities in them was one of the principles of their effectiveness. The other was that they were in addition vehicles, and representatives on earth, of Divinity. By special inspiration they were able to show powers which were denied to

ordinary chiefs. Their guardian spirit was thought to show itself less in the states of possession which the ordinary diviner (tiet) (102) induced himself than in the direct insight they had into the "truth" of situations, and their ability to help or injure others by a mere word or gesture. The Dinka thought of them as being essentially men of peace, who, nevertheless, might be forced by external circumstances into uniting their numerous followers against a common enemy. Their reputation was great, and their names were known and influence accepted beyond the frontiers of their tribal group. Many gifts of beasts were taken to them in supplication for favours.

Prophets of outstanding reputation were not numerous in Dinkaland. The prophet Arianhdit died in about 1948 after a long period of exile, following a patrol carried out against him by the Government in 1922. (103) He began a revolt of civil disobedience called after him the "Arianhdit's revolt", which had to be subdued by force of arms. Lienhardt describes him as a "charismatic" personality, representing an ideal type of religious leader, who also had a clearly defined political role, a type in which the Dinka included also the prophets of other peoples, in particular the outstanding Nuer prophet Dengkur. It was said that Arianhdit's power was manifest, not in possession as with a minor diviner, but simply in the truth of his words. So great was his reputation for this power that it seems that for a time he was able to exercise some influence in composing political differences far away outside any area over which an ordinary chief could hope to have any influence. He sent emissaries as far east as the Agar, and Dinka and Luo from remoter parts of the country visited him, some settling around his homestead.

Seligman gives an account of a meeting with another prophet of importance, Wal. (104) In 1910 he exercised enormous influence, not limited to his fellow Aliab tribesmen, for Bari and Nuer alike consulted him and paid the strictest attention to his commands. He was certainly opposed to bloodshed, and had lately condemned the participators in an insignificant brawl, in which but little blood flowed, to an elaborate ceremony of atonement.

The Dinka maintained that the prophets wanted only peace, both between tribes and with the Government. Wal was most anxious to make clear his adhesion to the Government, and said that his spirit was "red" (as Europeans are) and came from Khartoum, which all the black tribes regarded as the home of the white man. Arianhdit was said to have been misunderstood because some Dinka carried lies to the Government, while some hot-headed commoner leaders acted contrary to his advice in defying the Government. Whatever may be the true story, Arianhdit and his people did eventually defy the Government, which sent a patrol to deal with the situation. It is conceivable that the prophets, in the beginning, considered the British to be a stabilizing factor which was to the advantage of their position, while representatives of the commoners raised opposition to the new colonizers, which forced the prophets to attach themselves to the latters' line of policy. (105)

Lienhardt emphasizes that the Dinka are an example of a people where certain positions of authority were hereditary, but the authority attached to them was very slight. The chiefs had ritual authority without political power. They were indispensable for certain of the purposes of the political community, but they did not directly command the actions of others. Here we must over again object that even in relation to Dinka society the whole ritual sphere may be logically contrasted with the secular. This does not mean that institutions can be classified as ritual or secular in this way, for they are mixed in this respect. The Durkheimian dichotomy between the sacred and the prophane

spheres is, thus, not applicable in this case as it is in conditions of greater specialization. In this connection it is important to enforce that the British administration introduced a structural differentiation by means of dividing up the traditional chiefly functions into two roles: the civil or governmental chief and the sacred chief respectively. (106) Other authorities maintain that the sacred chief had religious functions which gave him political authority and such political power was naturally accorded to the chief by the force of public opinion. (107) Thus, Seligman says that the chief was "in each tribe the most important man, the undisputed religious head who also wields much civil authority ... consulted and deferred to on every occasion and his words is law" ... "In theory, and no doubt generally in practice, the authority of the rain-maker is absolute." (108) Lienhardt objects to Seligman's point of view that it is a description in ideal terms, but he concedes that some of the chiefs were regarded with great respect, and they were described as if they were rulers who commanded obedience, and he mentions that he heard of a renowned chief of the past that he "led" (kwath, the word for driving cattle) his people, and "brdered" (cieng) the country. (109) The chiefs were not only priests mediating and representing "life" to their people. They were also political leaders, and seen by the Dinka as having been their leaders in the migrations which they supposed themselves to have made in order to reach their present lands. New divisions could not establish their independence unless they had their own chief, and the move to break away was often initiated by such a man. Historical traditions included in the myths show this political leadership. (110) As a proof we may also quote a statement given by Nebel: "Questioni d'ogni genere erano portate davanti al consiglio dei beny, gli anziani, che 'nasceva', diciamo così, spontaneamente in ogni clan. E' naturale che un beny, eminente per ricchezza e saggezza nel giudicare le cause in tribunale, aquitasse una autorità superiore a quella degli altri, e che, in casi speciali (guerre, emigrazioni ...), il suo potere si estendesse a vari clan, a intere sezioni tribali." (111)

There was on the whole a correspondence between religious reputation and political influence, which depended partly on the size of the chiefly clan. Members of chiefly clans particularly maintained that in the past they were more influential politically than they were later, when the commoner clans had multiplied. It is also interesting to see that small numbers seen in relation to their religious reputation at once evoked the notion of something unnatural - witchcraft - viz. a socially unacceptable power. (112)

The crucial point is here the support to the political regime. Support as well as demand can fluctuate, and may descend to critical levels. As we have seen, traditionally, a chief could never be deposed by his own people, his position could, however, be weakened by the non-cooperation of the elders. The chiefly power was a reflection of the effectiveness attributed to their owners. For example, it was said that since Nuer attacks did not abate, one Dinka chief renounced sacred spears and supernatural power for his descendants since "that of his father had not fulfilled its promise". (113) In practice sections of the commoner population might turn to others than the one who should theoretically be theirs. Consequently, in Dinka "political theory", changes in political alignment traditionally occurred in consequence of the raising or falling reputations ofchiefly descent-groups and the leaders they produced. The actual chiefly lineages with which groups were politically identified might thus change over periods of years, but the system itself remained the same. (114)

The events which led to an overall political change came from the international environment. The menyor power may have been undermined by natural calamities such as smallpox and cattle disease. To a pastoral community, like the Dinka, the latter would be particularly fatal. Local revolts and even civil war may further have weakened the menyor regime. Whatever the case, the collapse of the Dinka society must have been accentuated by the contemporary foreign invasion. During the last hundred years the Dinka social system was found in a state of decay: anarchy, chaos and violence had almost abolished order and security. In confronting this challenge it found that it needed more resources and more effective ways of deploying its resources. It might have to adapt itself structurally, that is, develop new roles, if it was to survive. Specifically, we attribute the temporary development of inter-tribal leadership to the struggle with the foreign intruders. Faced with this crisis, the Dinka (as well as the Nuer) responded by delegating a measure of inter-tribal authority to certain leaders or "prophets" which they had not previously done. Change resulted when the existing structure of the political system was unable to cope with the problem which confronted it. This gives an explanation to the weak support to the traditional political authorities. Since the system needed to be able to draw on popular support if it was to sustain them at given levels of effectiveness and efficiency, decline in support levels for certain activities reflected in tribute evasion or civil disobedience affected the performance of the political system. Instead, support was given to new political leaders, but even the latter broke down under the superiority of force of the intruders. The change resulted in "development" in the negative or regressive sense. The capabilities of the Dinka political system declined; roles and structures atrophied.

4.9 The Nuer

4.9.1 Introduction

The Nuer call themselves by a common name which distinguishes them from their neighbours; they have a common language; their culture is the same for all Nuer. (1) But formerly all Nuer never acted in common. They were divided into sections each with its own territory, which acted independently and were often engaged in actual fighting, even if normally there was a regular intercourse between them in the form of visits, marriages, and settlements. The Nuer themselves speak of those tribes which inhabit the country to the west of the Bahr el Jebel as "homeland Nuer" (nath cieng) and of those tribes which inhabit the country to the east of Bahr el Jebel as "bush Nuer" (nath doar), and it is convenient to make this distinction also by speaking of these two divisions as Western Nuer and Eastern Nuer respectively.

The Nuer were clearly of the same stock as the Dinka and the two languages have close affinities, but it has been regarded as a mystery why the Nuer should have emerged as a separate people and with comparative suddenness about the first half of the 19th century driven the Dinka out of so much of their country, seized so many of their women and cattle, and absorbed whole sections of Dinka into their own society.

According to Riad the Nuer are a recent branch of the Dinka. They began to rise as a separate tribe in the Bul area about the beginning of the 18th century, and from there began to expand at the expense of their neighbours. Their migration was directed mainly to the east across the Bahr el Ghazal river. About

1750 they invaded the whole area west of Bahr el Jebel, mainly the northern part, and in 1800 they were found in the area between the Jebel and Zeraf rivers. In 1820 they swept across the plains east of Zeraf river and ultimately, in 1838, reached the Sobat river; then they extended eastwards. In this way the Nuer made a great wedge through the Dinkaland. The Dinka originally occupied a unified area in the Zeraf-Jebel triangle which was broken up by the intrusion of the Nuer. The result was a diffusion or dispersal of the Dinka and a series of Dinka migrations in all directions from this core. (2)

Even Sahlins maintains that the Dinka have been the consistent victim of Nuer predation. "Nuer expansion is perhaps an outstanding instance of the Law of Cultural Dominance... In any event it is clear that the Nuer have been able to expel the Dinka because of the superior military potential of the Nuer segmentary lineage system. While the Nuer and Dinka are alike in culture, there are differences in social organization. On the Dinka side these differences amount to the tragic flaw that has condemned them to a history of withdrawal." (3)

According to him the Nuer and the Dinka expanded in different ways. The Dinka appear to have spread without great opposition. The enormous population of the Dinka - about 900,000 - coupled with the weak, fragmented polity, certainly does suggest that they moved into a large uncontested domain. They were first. The Nuer, by contrast, were invaders. They spread through an already occupied niche, and the very large Nuer population, over 200,000, is testimony of their success. The Nuer had different adaptive problems than the Dinka, precisely because the Dinka were already there. (4)

The determining factor of this problem is the alleged weakness and passivity of the Dinka people: a people fleeing before the enemy. As is apparent from our analysis of the political system of the Dinka (see above ch. 4.8), the earlier history of the Dinka people was, instead, characterized by a dynamic expansion, in doing which they, by no means, came to occupy empty land but conquested and ruled the aboriginals. The views of the authors quoted above are more in keeping with the state of Dinka society when faced with Arab aggression and with later European intrusion in the 19th century. No solution exists to explain why Nuer territorial expansion necessarily had to result in drift or mass relocation in new territories rather than some form of fission and dispersion of localized descent groups.

Accounts indicate that a number of factors were responsible for the ultimate migration of the Nuer people. We might consider whether population pressures can be held responsible for the Nuer incursions. Certain resources, notably dry season water and pasturage, are evidently in short supply among the Nuer, and Evans-Pritchard is prepared to agree that Nuer expansion was due to overpopulation, which was also the Nuer explanation. (5) Moreover, one of the traditional solutions to the problem of increasing or rebuilding a cattle herd or recouping stock losses due to famine or disease had been accomplished through the institution of the cattle raid. The fighting between the Nuer and the Dinka had been incessant from time immemorial. (6) The more favoured Dinka tribes were more prosperous and far richer in stock than the Nuer. The sanction for systematic raiding of Dinka, whom the Nuer regarded as cleverer and more cunning than themselves is contained in a well-known myth, which remainds us of that of Esau and Jacob. The story has several variants. (7) Nuer and Dinka - the peoples are personified in the myth - were both sons of God, who had promised to give an old cow to Dinka and its young calf to Nuer. Dinka came by night to God's byre and deceived him by imitat-

ing Nuer's voice, and God gave him the calf. When God found that he had been deceived he charged Nuer to raid the herds of Dinka to the end of time. The fighting between them seems to have remained in a state of equilibrium - or rather a gradual expansion of the Nuer, while the Dinka expanded over other areas at the same time - until the Arab-European conquest upset it. As long as the technology of war on both sides was roughly comparable, there was a general "stand-off", with neither side clearly the victor. From about 1840 to near the end of the century, continued cattle raiding was intensified by repeated outbreaks of cattle-plague, which decimated the herds, and which entered the Sudan along with the alien invaders. (8) The payment of bride-wealth and blood-wealth was reduced by one half. (9) Social changes must have resulted from this disturbance of the ecological equilibrium. Nevertheless, this ought to have affected the Nuer and the Dinka alike. Evans-Pritchard's stress upon the cattle-plague as the finishing cause of the Nuer expansion is not sufficient, since it does not explain why the Dinka did not retaliate. Since the Dinka society (much more than the Nuer) had become impaired by the Arab-European conquest of the Sudan with accompanying pillage by slave-traders, it resulted in the elimination of intertribal warfare, and the reduction of cattle raiding from the Dinka. The consequence of this was that the Nuer human population increased. It is therefore likely that, given the condition of human population expansion, territorial expansion was a necessary and logical corollary. As said above, the Nuer themselves also suggested that their expansion eastwards was due to overpopulation. The Dinka became weaker above all in the areas along the Nile where the alien intruders had established themselves. In this "front sector" the Nuer broke through the Dinka borders, and in doing so they produced the ravaging expansion eastwards. Had the Nuer not been able to expand at the expense of the Dinka, and to raid them, they would have been more antagonistic to people of their own breed.and the structural changes which would have resulted would have led to greater social differentiation in Western Nuerland than what existed at that time.

4.9.2 Social structure

The social stratification in a Nuer tribe consisted of three categories. (10) The nuclear host clan was diel (sing. dil, cf. the Shilluk dyil) or died. There was a prestige in being a dil or "aristocrat". The diel clan were the true owners of the country: its village sites, its pastures, its fishing and drinking pools and wells. Later accretions only acquired usufructuary rights by association with the host lineage. Not every member of a clan lived in a tribe where his clan had a superior status, and not every clan had an area in which they were diel. A man was a dil only in the tribe in which his clan was dominant, for a man could only be landowner in the country where his clan had this status. Members of other clans settling after the establishment of the host lineage were rul or goodh, strangers, settlers, or clients. A rul was a Nuer who was not dil in the tribe in which he lived on the understanding that he was a stranger and on sufferance. The third category, jaang, or Dinka, had many meanings to the Nuer: (a) any foreigner whom the Nuer habitually raided, (b) Dinka living in Dinkaland and raided by Nuer, (c) aboriginal Dinka of unabsorbed "pockets" in Nuerland, or on its confines, (d) recent Dinka immigrants, (e) certain clans which were said to be Dinka in origin, e.g. the Kir clan (see below!), and (f) adopted Dinka.

The diel clan was only a small proportion of the people in the tribe where it was dominant. The majority were descended from later immigrants from

other parts of Nuerland, or from Dinka accretions. Persons of Dinka descent probably formed at least half the population of most tribes. In the Lou tribe 75 % of the people were of Dinka descent, while perhaps 15 % were of mixed Nuer descent and only 10 % belonged to the dominant clan (Jinaca). (11)

Every community was associated with a host lineage in such a way that all persons in the community who were not members of the lineage were assimilated or adopted to it in political relations which were, therefore, often expressed in lineage values. (12) When Nuer strangers came to live in the village of diel and marry into their families there was always a tendency towards matrilocal conditions, and descent through the mother was stressed so that the lineage of the stranger's son was traced to the mother and through her linked to the diel clan. Captured Dinka boys were almost invariably incorporated into the lineage of their Nuer captors by adoption provided that they were able and ready to work. If possible the Dinka avoided adoption into a Nuer clan and rather asked for clientship. There were also many Dinka lineages descended from men who had come of their own free will to settle as clients in Nuerland, either to escape famine, largely caused by Nuer raiding, in their own country, to visit captured sisters, or to reoccupy the sites from which Nuer raids had ousted them. Such immigrants were unmolested and were permitted to settle or return to Dinkaland as they might choose. A wealthy man could obtain followers or clients by means of offering hospitality. A supplicant for clientship could place his spears outside the entrance of the byre of the patron in spe as an indication of his request. A Nuer would give him - as his client (r a n d e , "his man") - an ox and maybe a cow when he had given proof of his fidelity and attachment to his new home. He might even be given a daughter of the house if she were blind or lame and no Nuer would contemplate taking her as a bride! A fourth way was by creation of kinship fictions, and this way was appropriate to relations between host lineages and stranger and Dinka groups, which were too large and occupied too distinct a territory for incorporation by either of the other methods. It was the way in which large "pockets" of strangers and Dinka were incorporated into the conceptual scheme of a tribe.

Evans-Pritchard emphasizes that the Nuer could not be said to be stratified into classes: "There is little inequality of wealth and no class privilege." "There is no master and no servant in their society, but only equals...". "When the Nuer become dominant, fusion and not a class structure results." (13) Nevertheless, he concedes that there was in every tribe some differentiation of status, but "the people so differentiated do not constitute classes, and 'strangers' and 'Dinka' are properly to be regarded as categories rather than as groups". The social differentiation was, in his view, created on a ritual and domestic, rather than on a political, plane and was only indicated in certain situations of social life. Once their membership of a community was recognized their legal status was the same as that of a free-born Nuer. "Although in his domestic and kinship relations a Dinka has not so strong a position as a Nuer, I have never observed that they suffer any serious disabilities, far less degradation." (14) The only possible exception, he says, was perhaps on the periphery of Nuer expansion eastwards.

With these quotations as background one may be surprised at the fact that Evans-Pritchard interprets the Nuer social system in terms of "superiority", "aristocracy", and "dominance", unless the terms should have only a minimum of meaning. Or are the sources open to conclusions in such terms? There are strong arguments for such an assumption. The equality had refer-

ence only to the pure Nuer people, while the superiority was directed towards other people, which above all was at the expense of the Dinka both in the Nuer society and out of it. The Dinka had no political influence; they were commoners (dwek). (15) The most obvious indication of Nuer superiority is the fact that all over Nuerland Nuer and Dinka were socially differentiated by assessment of their value in blood-cattle. (16) It is an old anthropological hypothesis that the significance of an offence is above all defined by the social distance between the parties concerned. Judgement and the means of enforcing it has to do with the status of the offender as well as that of the victim. This hypothesis has here an affirmative instance. There are also other palpable proofs of Dinka inferiority. (17) A Dinka could never get rid of his inferior status, which was transmitted to his descendants. It was said that people did not wish the fact that they were strangers in the tribal area to be publicly stressed, especially if they were of Dinka origin. Captured Dinka relatives were purposely distributed among different families and by that they were scattered. (18) A captured Dinka woman who had got married to a Nuer had an inferior position to a Nuer wife, since she had no relatives who could protect her. (19) Crazzolara states that "Von einer sklavenmässigen Behandlung ist keine Rede, wenn die Opfer sich ruhig in ihr Schicksal ergeben können. Bei Fluchtversuchen würde sie alsbald eine Lanze durchbohren." (20) Moreover, a man of Dinka descent said that if you told a Dinka of your household that "you will kill him... nothing will happen. You will merely clean your spear on the ground and hang it up".

The small "pockets" of Dinka and Anuak mentioned above who had been conquered and more or less absorbed into Nuer society and culture, suffered serious social inequality. (21) They lived in a state of semi-slavery under the protection of the more powerful Nuer, and were called upon to perform many household and menial duties for their neighbours. Such pockets were much down-trodden and enjoyed neither the privileges of Nuer citizenship nor the freedom of foreigners. Yet, such groups, Evans-Pritchard wrongly maintains, did not truly consitute part of a Nuer tribe. (22)

Evans-Pritchard's impression that to the west of the Nile the status of diel was less pronounced, whereas among the Eastern Jikany tribes, on the periphery of Nuer expansion, there was the greatest insistence on social differentiation and legal prestige (23), appears to be more well-founded, since the western communities had a long history in the same area. To the west, the clans of Nuer strangers were so well and long entrenched that a dil had no legal prestige, while Nuer obtained a "moral ascendancy" over the Dinka. Yet among the Western Jikany which had diel lineages which were regarded by all, including themselves, as being of Dinka origin, the status of diel might have been enhanced. (24)

As to the Nuer equality among themselves, the general rule that, if one has a surplus of some valued things, he must share it with his neighbours, was not applicable to captives, women of marriageable age, boys and girls, and cattle, which were not redistributed, but belonged to their original captor, which, to a great extent, strengthened his social and political position. (25)

The category of diel tended to be more stressed in the larger tribes than in the smaller ones due to the integrating effects of conquest and settlement and to the absorption of large numbers of Dinka. The very nature of the relationship of adoption - like that of the client-patron relationship - based on ties of reciprocal allegiance and personal loyalty, obstructed all possibilities of change in the direction of equalitarianism. As long as the place of the indi-

vidual Dinka in Nuer society was wholly determined by the strength, or vagaries, of a strictly personal relationship, one could hardly conceive of individual rights, only of obligations.

4.9.3 Political structure

The organizing principle within the Nuer political structure, which gave it conceptual consistency and a certain measure of actual cohesion, then, we find in the status of diel. Its unity was expressed in the idiom of lineage and clan affiliation. Thus, dominant clans had the greater political importance. "Where there is a dil in a village, the village clusters around him as a herd of cattle clusters around its bull." (26)

The political life of village and district and the organization of cattle-camps was in the hands of the elders of the community, particularly the elders of the dominant clan (gaat tuot or tutni, sing. gat tuot, "the son of the bulls"). (27) An elder was even called a "bull" (tut), and in strict usage this term was equivalent to dil or gat dila. (28) Every local community or cattle-camp had a leader (tut wec, diel wec, or died wec), who was normally the head of the dominant lineage and therefore a corner stone in the community structure of kinship and aggregations which we have seen was the basis of social cohesion among the Nuer. Even a rul, i.e. aNuer who was not dil in the tribe in which he lived, might be called a tut, if he was influential and highly respected, though not belonging to the dominant clan. (29) He might, indeed, group round him an entire village community in spite of the presence of several diel in the same village. In this respect personality and influence might count for more in everyday local affairs than a particular lineage affiliation. In still more general sense tut might merely mean a paterfamilias or even a male person. Yet, the elders belonging to a lineage of the dominant clan of a tribe, were far more important in the political system than the tut of the Nuer immigrants, for they were centres of clusters of kin and were also agnates, each having in relation to the others a structured position in the lineage system of the dominant clan.

Evans-Pritchard states that the clan "has no hereditary leadership; a senior lineage does not rank higher than others; there is no 'father of the clan'; and there is no 'council of clan elders'." (30) On the other hand, the leadership of the localized lineages was hereditary, but the position developed on the basis of particular qualifications. (31) First of all, the authority of a gat tuot rested on the right of ownership of the land on which he lived. But his authority was never formalized; it was personal, very indefinite, and based on analogy with domestic relations within the family. He had no defined status, powers, or sphere of leadership. Lineage, age, seniority in the family, many children, marriage alliances, wealth in cattle, prowess as a warrior in his youth, skill in debate, character, and often ritual powers of some kind (which were believed to be inherited), all combined in producing an outstanding social personality who was regarded as a leader in village and camp, and a person of importance in a district. "It is easy", Evans-Pritchard says, "to see in village or camp who are its social leaders." (32)

In the early stage of contact with the Nuer, earth custodians or cattle experts were made the agents of government policy and expected actually to prevent feuds. Later, the people were invited to nominate their own headmen and chiefs over the recognized tribal divisions, and they were always chosen in practice from the social leaders belonging to the dominant lineages. (33)

When a local community acted corporately and leadership were required,

these functions rested with the elders conducted by the tut wec. (34) They decided when seasonal moves were to be made and where camps were to be formed, organized hunts, negotiated marriages, advised on questions of exogamy, performed sacrifices, and so forth. Within the village differences between persons were discussed by the elders of the village and agreement was generally reached and compensation paid, or promised, for all were related by kinship and common interests. In this connection it is to be noted that even disputes in which rul and jaang were involved must be brought before the tut wec of the area, since - according to Crazzolara - their own heads had no authority to administer justice among them. In those cases where the tut wec could not arrive at a satisfactory decision, the case was brought before the earth custodian. (35)

Thus, there were intermittent meetings of local heads and elders to decide in matters of local concern. But even if the village or camp was a political unit in a structural sense, there was, Evans-Pritchard avers, no formally organized political body which could enforce its decisions, even though other sanctions were sometimes strong enough to ensure conformity, and there was no headman or other appointed leader invested with authority who symbolized its unity, which instead was vested in the dominant clan. (36) Crazzolara's report from the Western Nuer is quite contrary to that. Evans-Pritchard's opinion is, nevertheless, partly dependent upon the fact that he was concerned particularly with the function of government in maintaining law and order. In some measure he did not consider the question of communal policy decisions and what such decisions were about. The political dominance was, however, disguised by the fact that rul and jaang were individually attached to the dominant lineages. Here we probably have an important part of the explanation why there did not crystallize any formal political offices on this level among the Eastern Nuer. Nuer conquest did not lead to a ruling system, but, by the customs of adoption and clientage, absorbed the settling Nuer and conquered Dinka into its kinship system, and through the kinship system admitted them into its political structure but on the basis of inequality. The familial authority system was fundamental to Nuer political order, because, at a low level of political specialization, groups based on kinship principles were forced to retain a considerable responsibility for the provision of personal security and the regulation of everyday social relationship.

The office of war expert (gwan tang, kuar tang, or gwan muot; ngol, ngul, or niel, cf. the Shilluk ngol) often, perhaps always, was hereditary in the senior lineage of the dominant clan; sometimes associated with the office of earth custodian. (37) The word tang means "spear-shaft". Recent authorities state that he was really a ritual official rather than a secular military leader concerned with the success of raiding parties by means of casting the tip of the spear-shaft in the direction of the enemy. Coriat, on the other hand, maintains that the war leader controlled the tactical organization consisting of the age-sets, which indicates that he had a staff position. (38) As everywhere else men noted for their prowess and ability in war had no political status or permanent leadership. His diminishing important may possibly be placed in conjunction with the increasing importance of the prophets. He - as well as the earth custodian and the cattle expert - was entitled to receive his due of the booty after a cattle raid. (39)

There were also different kinds of experts, who were collectively called ji twac (sing. gwan twac), who had hereditary status firmly established in tribal tradition and regular, specific functions to perform in connection

with the people as a whole. (40) Evans-Pritchard and Howell interpret their duties as entirely ritual. Their social, political, and economic functions had obviously ritual and magical features, but the chief stress certainly lay upon their rational activities which they performed for public welfare. They had an established official status in society symbolized by their traditional right to wear a particular skin (twac) as a badge of office, although some of them, notably the cattle expert, had none - the rest of the people who had no such distinction were known as commoners or laymen (dwek) - and they were expected to carry out tasks which in some African tribes were less specialized or even embodied in the person of one man.

One of these experts was the cattle expert (wut ghok, wud oak, wud ok, wud ogg, kwor ok, or kwaar goog, cf. the Dinka bang wut). (41) Certain lineages had hereditary powers in relation to cattle. The cattle experts were often said to be members of stranger lineages, while the dominant clan in the Bul tribe to the west were especially prominent as cattle experts. (42) The well-being of the cattle was their affair; to avoid cattle disease, to treat them in sickness, to increase the fertility of the cattle and to regulate their movements. They also intervened in disputes concerning cattle and pasturage. Apart from cattle, the functions of the cattle expert were concerned with the social processes of the age-set system. (43) In each tribe there was one cattle expert who can be said to have had a position of authority in relation to the activities of the whole community. He was responsible for opening and closing the initiation periods and thereby dividing the sets. His role in this connection was - according to Evans-Pritchard (44) - due to the fact that the initiation into the age-set system radically altered the relations of the youths to the cattle. Their change of status was epitomized in the taboo on milking. Probably the defence of cattle against the raiders was a more important connection between the cattle expert and the age-sets. The ritual, economic, and military importance of the cattle expert added to his hereditary prestige gave him the opportunity of acquiring real political power (ruec).

The water expert (kuar thoi) had a hereditary office running in certain lineages, sometimes of reputed extraneous origin (probably Shilluk or Anuak). (45) His principal function was to bless the water and to see that there were an abundance of fish and that the people were successful in catching them as well as to facilitate the crossing of crocodile-infested waterways.

The office of earth custodian (kuar muon) had certain ritual powers and control over the earth (mun, gen. muon) and its productiveness and by extension over mankind which lived on and by the earth. (46) We have preferred the term "earth custodian" to the older translations in order to make ourselves free from the encumbrance which they have produced, since they are inappropriate and because our term is more adequate, as it emphasizes the primary source to the position of the holder. (47) The office was hereditary and traditionally linked to a particular territory. Possession of land and prescribed rights to a particular territory were often expressed in mythological terms in the history of the diel clan. Crazzolara states that the earth custodian knew the earth and could exert influence upon it, since he and his lineage, from time immemorial, had been made owners of their area by God "in der Bebauung des Feldes seinen Leuten voranzugehen und ihnen behilflich zu sein, und gelegentlich für ihnen Schutz und ihre Interessen bei Gott einzutreten". (48) The majority of the dominant lineages and landowners in the Western tribes also held the office of earth custodian. (49) The Eastern areas, which Evans-Pritchard explored, must, on the other hand, be regarded as coloniza-

tion territories, where the circumstances necessarily must have been different from those to the west. The groups which held the office there seem to have had another origin. The Lek clan (Gaatleak), which provided earth custodians for a great part of the Gaajok country and also in Lou tribe and doubtless in other tribes as well, appear to have belonged to the aboriginals of the area. (50) Oddly enough, they were considered as "strangers" (rul) having no tribal territory of their own, since other groups had made themselves masters of the area. According to a myth, Lek was a man who possessed no cattle but lived in a hole in an anthill. He used to hunt elephants, buffaloes, and other animals and lived on their flesh. The ancestor of the Gaagwong lineage of the dominant Kir clan (Gaatgankir) offered him the chance of living with him at his home and "lead the life of a man", which Lek accepted in the end. (51) Having no position in the system of dominant lineages, these earth custodians came to be regarded as blessed with personal virtue (r i n g , cf. the Dinka): "eine Art übernatürlicher, religiös-magischer Machtvollkommenheit, die auf den verschiedensten Gebieten des gesellschaftlichen Lebens zur Ausübung kommt, ohne direkt die politische Sphäre zu berühren. Diese Machtvollkommenheit ist persönlich und darum territorial unbeschränkt". (52)

On account of his sacred association with the earth, the earth custodian could bless the seed and the farming implements before sowing, and he could make use of soil for blessing people and curing them of sickness. (53) He had also a limited role in rain-making and the regulation of the weather. (54) Moreover, his ritual powers included the power to curse (b i i t) and his curse was believed to be particularly harmful to the crops, though it might cause other misfortunes as well. (55) In his imprecation he might forbid the man he cursed to plant in his earth and tell him to beget children in the treetops and herd his cattle in the sky. His function was mainly ritual but political importance may be attributed to him for relations between different groups were regulated through him, which could involve social consequences because he had power to banish people from his territory.

The most common reasons to disputes were connected with economical activities, viz. disputes about land, grazing, and water rights, which derived from clan heritage and were divided among the chief lineages of the dominant clan, questions in which cattle were at issue, and injuries to person (homicide, etc.), incest, adultery, etc. (56) It was an ideal standard of conduct that every man should retaliate against an offence, and that his kinsmen and neighbours should support him when called upon. Traditional customs regulated conflict, determining, e.g., the suitable kinds of weapons, and extent of the bodily injury appropriate in duels within the lineage group and out of it. These conventions were enforced by bystanders, who might separate the combatants when the proprieties nad been exceeded, or by the elders of a particular group, who might intervene in a duel.

Yet, even in the Nuer society, there was a point at which a feud or dispute might threaten the cohesion of the community and recourse might be had to a specialized role, the earth custodian, to mediate the argument. (57) The act of killing a man was most serious involving the killer in supernatural dangers (n u e e r) , creating a barrier between the kinsmen of the killer and those of the victim which could not be broken down until the killing had been paid for and a rite of reconciliation performed. (58) Hence, it was necessary, if normal life to go on, that blood-feuds be brought to an end, and many other people were always anxious to persuade them to accept compensation for the injury that they had suffered. Homicide also implied that the soil was polluted with

blood, which may give the explanation why the earth custodian was indispensable for the ritual of atonement and pacification. His homestead was an asylum for the murderer until the case was settled. (59) If there was any doubt about the facts, certain oaths, which were in the nature of ordeals, might be employed, such as swearing statements on the leopard skin of the earth custodian or by drinking blood mixed with earth. (60) It was expected that he would attempt to intervene in the early stages of feud. He might even be sent for to ward off an actual fight by drawing a line on the earth between the contestants which theoretically no man would dare to pass. (61) For his part in the proceedings the earth custodian received a number of cattle, but he had to give some of these to his assistant who was either a relative or the g w a n b i e t h. (62)

Evans-Pritchard sums up: "In taking the view that to regard the leopard-skin chief as a political agent or a judicial authority is to misunderstand the constitution of Nuer society... It is not his duty to decide on the merits of a case of homicide. It would never occur to Nuer that a judgement of any kind was required. Likewise... he has no powerful kinsmen or the backing of a populous community to support him. He is simply a mediator in a specific situation". (63) Nevertheless, it is clear that the earth custodian did not only adjudicate the dispute by determining whether a custom had been violated and the appropriate form of redress, but might also threaten to curse the disputing parties if they did not abide by his decision. In a society where there is a lively belief in the supernatural, the threat of a traditional curse might verge on authoritative compulsion or coercion, and not merely "a conventional, ritual, operation in the settlements of feuds" as Evans-Pritchard interprets the situation. To this extent the earth custodian constituted a specialized application and adjudication role.

Having the opportunity of using Evans-Pritchard's field material, Seligman comes to the conclusion that the earth custodian had "an authority so great that it is improbable that his decisions were ever seriously disputed in the old days. Even though his influence may have been temporarily diminished from time to time on the appearance of important prophets, it was probably never greatly affected until Government action led to a great diminution of his power. The Kwor muon was however no despot, and had no organized political machinery to support his power". (64) This interpretation does not agree with the situation which prevailed in the colonized areas in the east. In the Zeraf tribes (the Lak, Thiang, and Gaawar), on the other hand, where the earth custodian usually had powerful kinsmen and where, in the majority of tribal segments, earth custodian families were represented in the dominant lineage, there were - according to Howell - indications of certain earth custodians having a considerable authority. (65) Howell's opinion is confirmed by Crazzolara who writes that among the community leaders there was one who was kwar muon (or k w a r w e c). In his group he acted as the tut wec. His special position gave him some superiority to the other local leaders. If the tut wec was incapable of arriving at a decisive verdict, the case was brought before the earth custodian by the parties together with their tut wec. As earth custodian he reserved for himself the settlement of prescribed judicial cases. Common current matters or more important decisions he discussed with the local leaders in the district. Other earth custodians in the tribe, or in other tribes, could be asked about their opinions. (66) Even in the Bul tribe in Western Nuerland the dominant clan seems to have been especially prominent as earth custodians. (67)

It must be pointed out here that, eo ipso, the influence of the earth custodian was mainly restricted to the circuit of his ritual functions. Nevertheless, his function was political, for relations between political groups were regulated through him, though he was not a political authority controlling them. Only if he was also the head of a dominant lineage (gaat tuot or tut wec), did he exercise influence beyond these limits. With the support of his group he could influence public opinion which gave him additional power. This was the case in the western territories; in the east such opportunities were non-existent. In these parts the earth custodian families only constituted "neutral" groups, the leaders of which other groups could apply to in times of disputes, since they stood outside the system of dominant lineages, which made them more fitted to mediate between them, if the parties regarded their prestige to be sufficient. Even other persons with no hereditary ritual status might easily acquire a reputation for fairness and tact and be employed as arbitrators in minor disputes. (68) In most instances in which alien peoples were incorporated into a political system by conquest, the conquered and their descendants as a group occupied a position inferior to the conquerors and their descendants. These group distinctions were maintained even though as individuals some of the former enjoyed greater power or privilege than some of the latter. In fact, the unique inferiority of members of these status groups of alien origin made them attractive sources of recruitment for functions in the political system, strange as this may seem.

From the foregoing account it is evident that, whether concerning the old territories, or the new ones, we must agree with Howell's view that there was little or no evidence that earth custodians had political authority in the past "except in so far as they were centre of prevailing political cohesion". (69)

In groups larger than a village and camp there was far less coordination of activities and less scope for leadership. Only when they were united by a common purpose, some form of leadership was necessary. In this connection there appears a word, ruec, which implies in a general sense "leadership", or more precisely "spokesmanship". (70) The quality of ruec meant the ability to speak for the people; in fact to voice their will. It was in this sense that the word expressed the Nuer idea of leadership. There was no sense of domination. The expression ruic naadh, "the leaders of the people", was frequently used when referring to outstanding personalities of the past. They left their mark on the period of invasion from the west, when the Nuer had a high degree of political cohesion, and the following period of expansion and absorption of Dinka. For a while the concept of ruic naadh remained vested in the Nuer "prophets" in opposition to foreign aggression. Since these had been defeated and removed by the British administration, the term stood for the Government or more likely the District Commissioner (D. C.).

It is worth noting that there were never any rule whose influence extended over a unit of society larger than the tribe, which tends to support the contention that the tribe was the largest unit of any permanent political significance. The term ruic was relative to the social structure even to that extent that there were also ruic whose influence was effective only in segments of a tribe and their significance was greatest at a period when political cohesion on a tribal scale was at its lowest ebb. (71)

As the term ruic indicates, it had always reference to a relation to a party outside the group, where ruic appeared as the negotiator on behalf of the group or as the initiator of confrontation with the other party. On the other hand,

the ruic seem to have had rather few functions within the group but, since skill in arbitration was considered one of the attributes of leadership, they often extended their influence into the sphere of legal disputes. (72)

Howell maintains that any person might achieve such a position over his fellows by reason of certain qualities which the Nuer considered admirable: generosity in giving of cattle and in hospitality; wisdom and even temper in settling disputes between others; ability to hold the group together; bravery and powers of leadership in war. (73) Yet, it is clear that considerations of obligations of kinship, which several of these qualities indicate, was not sufficient to attain such a position. This is apparent from Lewis' short "biographies", which prove that practically all ruic were recruited from the dominant clan of the tribe. (74)

With some exceptions, the concept of ruic did not imply a crystallized institution in the form of a position in society automatically filled with the present holder died, though there was perhaps always a tendency for leadership to run on hereditary lines within the dominant clan. If a hereditary successor did assume the position, this did not mean that his influence would necessarily extend over the sphere affected by the actions of his predecessor. When a ruic died his successor gradually established himself by the accumulation of prestige and popularity among the people and gained their acceptance. And he kept a degree of authority acceptable only so long as the sanctions making for political unity within the group which he swayed were sufficiently strong to maintain it.

Yet, there is even some evidence that in earlier days certain of the ruic naadh had a position of quite a different character. (75) In the Gaawar tribe the first ruic was Buogh Kerpel (or Kerfeil), a member of the dominant clan, and moreover, the earth custodian of the tribe, who led the tribe across the Nile to conquer fresh lands from the Dinka. He was said to have been chosen as their leader by all the people and lifted up on high "so that God should know he had been chosen" suggesting a ritual investiture, which we know from the installation of a Dinka beny nial. Then he assumed the stool (kum or kwom), a fact which suggests a special symbol of chiefship of the same kind as that among the Anuak, Shilluk, etc. Finally, he drank a gourd full of milk into which everybody had spat, a rite full of symbolism for the Nuer, which gave him an enhanced authority. Moreover, the Gaawar clan had rain-making powers, since their ancestor came down from heaven in a rain-storm holding in his hand a sprig of the nyuot tree, and, some said, a small round stone besides. (76) Since Nuer tradition refers to events which happened in the first half of the 19th century and, being thus much more recent than Dinka and Shilluk traditions, may have a greater degree of historical accuracy, we are not inclined to agree with Howell that "the story scarcely provides adequate evidence that a form of institutionalized authority was then in evidence or that the ruic Naadh approximated even remotely to the general conception of an African Chief with political and executive powers". (77)

Another example to the contrary is the Jikany tribes. (78) They migrated at the middle of the 19th century from the Bahr el Ghazal region and settled on the Upper Sobat as lords of the country together with a number of prisoners captured in their marauding march through Shilluk and Dinka territories. The Jikany occupation of Dinkaland appears to have been the only systematic colonization. The motive power behind this enterprise was the Kir clan (see above!), the major lineages of which were found both among the Eastern Jikany and the Western Jikany, and they still belonged to one clan, since they did not

intermarry. The Kir clan descended from Kir, who - according to a myth - was found in a gourd by a man of the Ngok Dinka, but they were also mythologically related to the Gee group, because Gee, the founder of the Nuer family of clans (Gaatgangeeka), was variously represented as the protector or father-in-law of Kir. Since Kir had no blood-relationship (buth) to Gee, he was adopted by Gee and married three daughters of his by whom he gave birth to the major lineages of his clan. The Kir clan was, therefore, attached through its mothers to the lineage of Gee. The Kir clan had a sacred spear (mut wiu) which was believed to have been held by Kir when he emerged from the gourd. (79) The tanged spear was a Dinka, and not a Nuer, type of spear. The shaft of the spear was wrapped in a leopard's skin and the spear rested on a seat (kom), described as being not unlike an Anuak stool with four legs. There seems to have been some doubt whether the Kir clan had the right to exercise functions of the earth custodian. (80) Members of other clans often said that all leopard skins could eventually be traced back to Gee, and that therefore a man who did not trace back his descent to Gee could not possibly be the possessor of one. Some, however, would appear to concede ritual functions to certain Kir lineages but to deny them altogether to the Gaajok major lineage, who, indeed, did not make any claims to them, though they said that their ancestor once possessed a leopard's skin. On the death of Kir, the eldest son, Majok, the ancestor of the Gaajok lineage, was appointed by his father as head of the tribe and given the hereditary leopard skin but, since he was ignorant of the ritual associated with it, he gave it to his maternal uncle Lek upon whose descendants, the Lek clan, they relied since then for the performance of homicide ritual.

Hence we conclude that the concept of ruic included various categories of leading positions on the tribal level, which, each of them, probably had its own name. The leading positions among the Jikany and Gaawar tribes diverged from the other political roles (apart from the earth custodian) inasmuch as they constituted an "office", the holder of which was installed in his office and possessed special symbols of office, all of which point to a stabilized institution continuing on a permanent level. This chiefship was of the same kind as that which we have found among the majority of the Nilotic peoples. The rapid expansion of the Nuer society and the inclusion of foreign elements must, nevertheless, have created centrifugal and pluralistic tendencies of some importance. In the absence of external opposition a process of segmentation and political fission followed, and the tribal leaders began to lose their influence, particularly during the early period of Arab aggression. The opposition to the increasing intervention by foreign invaders was, instead, taken up by the "prophets", who were assigned a place under the concept of ruic naadh, too.

The prophets were those who personified the opposition, the unity and homogeneity of Nuer against the Arab-European menace. (81) A system of hereditary political leadership and extensive political unification began to emerge. The prophets (guk or gok) were also called ji kuthni (sing. gwan kwoth), "possessors of sky spirits" (kuth nial). According to Evans-Pritchard Nuer prophetism was a recent development. He says that the Nuer stated, with surprising uniformity, that in the old days there were no prophets at all: "... no one has ever heard of sky spirits entering into men before Deng came down from heaven and entered into his first home, the body of Ngundeng". (82) Nevertheless, since it is hard to believe that people with prophetic powers had not always existed among the Nuer, we cannot agree with his opinion, that "we must in the absence of conflicting evidence, accept

so unanimous a declaration by Nuer". Brun-Rollet's report from the early 1850's must be taken as a conflicting evidence: "Les Nouer ne reconnaissent qu'un seul Dieu, qu'ils appellent Néar. Le chef du culte, appelé Dowa, est une sorte de pape auquel on professe une vénération extrême, voisine de l'adoration. Les Nouer s'imaginent qu'il est non seulement inaccessible aux besoins de la nature humaine, comme par example à la faim, mais encore ils le croient immortel; aussi lorsque sa mort arrive, il est soigneusement caché par ses disciples, ou prêtres auxiliaires, dont le plus âgé le remplace. Sa demeure est entourée de palissades et inaccessible à tout autre qu'à ses disciples et aux rois ou chefs guerriers. S'il voyage, on le transporte sur un branchard couvert de feuillage. Rien ne se fait dans la tribu sans qu'il soit consulté; il passe sa vie, disent ses ouailles, à communiquer avec les esprits qui dominent ce monde et à enseigner à ses disciples l'art de la divination, la médecin et la connaissance des simples. Lorsque la guerre est décidée, il envoye quelques disciples pour maudire les ennemies; après leurs malédictions, ces Balaams jettent trois dards au delà des frontièrs du pays qu'on va dévaster". (83)

This account, which Evans-Pritchard unjustly characterizes as "too fanciful to carry weight", shows that there is such a striking resemblance between Brun-Rollet's "pope" and recent Nuer prophets as to conceive the "pope" as the predecessor of the latter. A plausibe supposition might be that both roles derived from two kinds of specialists in Nuer-traditional society: the medicine man and the diviner. (84) Medicine men worked primarily with "trees" (roots, bark, leaves) and other natural substances, and entered the profession of their own accord; diviners, often people of outstanding intelligence, diagnosed the cause rather than directed the specific cure and relied on spirit possession for their insight. Within the two major categories of ritual specialists several grades are distinguished on the basis of training and technique. The prophets might apparently have belonged to both of these categories, but above all to the category of diviners. In describing the emergence of the prophets as a recent phenomenon in Nuerland co-incident with Arab aggression, Evans-Pritchard is only partly correct. Undoubtedly, added tension and insecurity multiplied the situations for which "remedy" was desired, and new techniques of divination were introduced and integrated with traditional modes of thought and behaviour in order to meet the new circumstances. Before we set about to work at this problem, we will examine the information available of the recent Nuer prophets.

After the British reconquest of the Sudan, the prophets were more respected and had more influence than any other persons in Nuerland. Evans-Pritchard considers that it is remarkable, in view of Nuer feelings of authority, that they so easily submitted to persons who claimed certain supernatural powers. (85) Among the most prominent prophets to the east of the Nile was Dengkur (or Ngundeng), who introduced the cult of Deng in Lou country. (86) He was a descendant of Dinka ancestors, and he died in 1906. He had practised as an earth custodian before he acquired a reputation as a prophet by prolonged fasts and other erratic behaviour (existing, as it was believed, on human and animal excrement) in the bush, by his skill in curing sickness, and by his prophecies. He also led expeditions against the Dinka. Evans-Pritchard wrongly takes him for a "genuine psychotic". His non-conformity was surely sanctioned by his spirit.

As symbols of tribal cohesion the leading prophets played an important role in war. (87) They were able to direct large-scale expeditions against the

Dinka tribes and resistance to foreign aggression represented first in the Dervish forces who attempted to establish slaving centres in Nuerland and, finally, by the forces of the British administration. They received instructions about the time and object of operations from their particular sky spirit in dreams and trances. No extensive raids were undertaken without the permission and guidance of the prophets, and often they accompanied them in person. They took for themselves part of the spoil and to some extent supervised the distribution of the rest of it. Initiating and directing operations seems to have been one of their most important occupations. This is one more reason why they had never been popular with the British administration.

It must be remembered that the great majority of these peoples gained no widespread prestige and had no political influence at all. (88) They had no traditional status or specialization of social and economic function, although in most cases their position became hereditary. But there was a tendency by these people to assume the leopard-skin, i.e. clearly a desire to establish themselves in a ritual and traditional, and therefore more orthodox, status in society. Their activities were limited to the ordinary ritual divination and diagnosis of the cause of the minor misfortunes which beset the individual. Some of the prophets even acted as rain-makers. (89) Dengkur, e.g., restricted himself to performance of ritual and did not hear cases nor carry out administrative functions on a large scale, and the same was true of most other prophets.

Owing to the fact that Nuer prophets had been the foci of opposition to the British Government they were in disgrace and the more influential of them under restraint or in hiding. (90) In spite of that - or rather thanks to that - there were many who had exceptional influence over the Nuer, and it is interesting to note that they were never proposed as possible representatives of the people to the colonial authorities. As an instance of their power and authority we may mention the pyramid in Rumjok in Lou country, a mound (yik) 15 - 20 m. in height with large ivory tusks planted round the base and at the summit. (91) It was built by Dengkur and his son Gwek, and people from all over Lou and Eastern Jikany tribes assisted in the building bringing oxen with them for sacrifice, the bones of which were said to have been buried in the body of the mound. The flesh of the sacrifices was divided among the workers, and helped to keep up the supply. (92) Nuer said that it was built in the honour of the god Deng and as a token that Dengkur was a very big man. Above all we may see it as a monument erected to the common opposition to the colonial system, which Dengkur was the symbol of. Consistently it was blown up by Government forces at a Nuer revolt in the 1920's.

A reasonable method to try to elucidate a phenomenon is to find parallels corresponding to it. With respect to the Nuer prophets we have obvious counterparts among a number of mainly pastoral tribes in East Africa. "Chief diviners" or "prophets" were to be found among the Masai (laibon), the Nandi and Kipsigis (orkoiyot), the Pakot (werkoi), the Luo (jabilo), and even among the Bantu Luyia (omungoli). (93) These men were experts both in divination by dreams, which they believed to be the best method of foreseeing the future, and in the use of magic, which is universally recognized as a medium of both social control and private revenge. While these prophets were not real political leaders of the tribe in the usual sense, they nevertheless appear to have wielded political power of a kind, as they provided a supernatural focus for major community activities, and thus to a certain extent some of the most important part of tribal life - war, migration, initiation, planting, and simi-

lar matters of wider concern - were centred on them, by reason of the necessity for obtaining their sanction before they could be undertaken. In addition to giving this guidance they were expected to perform rites to ensure success of these enterprises. These examples, which cogently indicate identical functions, confirm the assumption that Brun-Rollet's account furnishes us with a conclusive proof of the fact that such a role had a possibility of existence even among the Nuer in pre-colonial times, since they lived in a similar cultural environment. But, in spite of that, there is no explanation why prophets of Dinka descent and not Nuer prophets became the leading authorities in the opposition towards the colonial powers. The old tribal diviners appear to have lost their authority, since they turned out to be inadequate in the new political situation.

This becomes evident, if we look at the whole matter from a broader angle of approach. In the first place the development of Nuer prophetism was due to altered political conditions in the Sudan, which threatened the existence of their society. That the opposition assumed the form of a prophetic movement may be due to a factor which seems to be determining in regard to the origin and shaping of societal disturbances, viz. the structural complexity of the society at the beginning of the development. (94) In the least developed countries, where "the language of politics is simultaneously the language of religion", the movements of protest almost at once find a religious expression. The secularization of the protest increases hand in hand with the development and differentiation.

Ever since the Mahdi revolt had been stamped out by the British, prophets constantly reappeared in the Sudan proclaiming that the holiness of the Mahdi had passed to them or that they were the prophet Jesus who, according to the Koran, was to return to earth. Fanatic supporters raised the standard of revolt and the authorities regarded themselves to be forced to cut short their activity, lest the revolt should have extended. Evans-Pritchard points out that there is some evidence to suggest that the Mahdist movement in the northern Sudan might have been partly responsible for the emergence of the Nuer prophetism. (95) A more plausible explanation of the connection between the two prophetic movements may be found in the common political situation, which, in both cases, gave rise to movements independent of each other. Both movements had an indigenous character firmly founded in their own cultural environment. In our view, a more important source of the development of Nuer prophetism we find among the Dinka, where the god Deng revealed himself in the form of possession or inspiration. (96) From the hymns of cultic character that had been made owing to inspiration from Deng and dedicated to him we may conclude that his mediums, from the beginning, had been more or less firmly associated with a shrine as "cult prophets" and diviners similar to the bang ret among the Shilluk. These mediums were probably recruited from the tiet, persons who, by means of an ancestral spirit residing in them, could reveal hidden things, and maybe also from the menyor, even if they did not traditionally concern themselves with divination. A more recent form of revelation, which started in Dervish days, was an epidemic of possession and prophetic movement, the leaders of which regarded themselves as inspired by Deng, and consequently claimed to have supernatural powers, but they had apparently no traditional status. Their main activities were aimed at curing diseases but some tried to obtain a position by influencing the social and political situation. Being subversive of the religious foundations of the society, such Deng prophets were severely repressed by the Shilluk and Dinka political and religious

authorities. (97) Be that as it may, there is no doubt that powerful prophets and messianic leaders arose about the time when Arab intrusion into Nuerland was at its height. It is not difficult to understand why Dinka prophetism in particular happened to play such an outstanding role among the Nuer, since, as said above, from the moment of the foreign penetration the Dinka people suffered severe afflictions through the slave-trade, and, in our opinion, as a consequence of that, they became an easy prey to the Nuer, who expanded at the expense of the Dinka and to a large extent incorporated them into Nuer society. Before that time, there seems to have been a balance in the interrelations of the two peoples with only less serious skirmishes instigated from both sides. The disintegrated Dinka society was therefore rendered incapable of defending itself. Instead, their protest took the form of a prophetic movement which then continued within the frame of Nuer society and, moreover, characterized the Nuer opposition to their common enemies.

The chief political importance of the Nuer prophets was according to Evans-Pritchard that "For the first time a single person symbolized, if only... in a mainly spiritual and uninstitutionalized form, the unity of a tribe, for the prophets were essentially tribal figures, though - and this fact is also of great political significance - their influence often extended over tribal boundaries". (98) Lewis objects to this opinion to that extent that he avers that it was in virtue of their ruic position - which Evans-Pritchard seems to be ignorant of (99) - that they performed the few tribal functions they did and that their significance in the political structure depended on this. "These outstanding prophets supplied the necessary political leadership by filling the traditional position of spokesmen of their tribes, with the additional authority provided by their prophetic powers." (100) Since their charismatic power (using Weber's term) tended to be institutionalized owing to the fact that the spirits became hereditary, we are justified to agree with Evans-Pritchard's conclusion that "development was taking place towards a higher degree of federation between tribes and towards the emergence of political leadership". (101) It will perhaps be urged by way of objection that in pre-colonial times there might have been rather more coordination between the Nuer through the activities of the tribal diviner, than could have been achieved without him, but that he, however, was in no way a supreme or central authority to whom appeals might have been made. His real functions were confined to that sort of expertness which was founded on magic and religion, and which was indispensable to the deliberations of the decision-making authorities.

Writing of the Nuer political system Evans-Pritchard sums up his opinion, which for quite a long time has dominated the debate on the so-called segmentary social systems: "The Nuer constitution is highly individualistic and libertarian. It is an acephalous state, lacking legislative, judicial and executive organs. Nevertheless it is far from chaotic. It has a persistent and coherent form which might be called 'ordered anarchy'. The absence of centralized government and bureaucracy in the nation, in the tribe, and in tribal segments - for even in the village authority is not vested in anyone - is less remarkable than the absence of any persons who represent the unity and exclusiveness of these groups". (102)

Our re-analysis of the available literary sources gives us occasion to re-evaluate the Nuer political system on some important points. First of all, Evans-Pritchard's characterization has only a limited validity. It is rather applicable to the unstable situation in the Eastern colonist communities but not to the more stable political structure in the Western parts of Nuerland.

In spreading out so far afield the Nuer lost a certain amount of their homogeneity and former tribal structure. Their traditions which are sufficiently recent to contain elements of fact, are full of references to great leaders, as we have seen; and there were persons who achieved coordination and came to symbolize common aspirations. Whereas among the Western Nuer these aspirations were attached to more organized and more permanent institutions, among the Eastern settlers they were focused on personalities. This emphasis on personality or "charisma" is especially characteristic of critical situations and changes of regime, but which gradually tends to become traditional or institutional. We may thus attribute the difference in the powers of leaders to the social situation of the group, and we may attribute the temporary development of inter-tribal leadership to the expansion and struggle with foreign intruders. Faced with this crisis, the Nuer responded by delegating a measure of intertribal authority to certain leaders which they had not previously done. War and inter-tribal conflict was thus one of the major factors strengthening the authority of leaders and promoting social inequality.

Second, in most instances in which Dinka peoples were incorporated into Nuer society by conquest, the conquered and their descendants, as a group, occupied a position inferior to the conquerors and their descendants. The individual connection of the Dinka to a Nuer lineage always served the "useful" function of dividing the Dinka who were accordingly prevented from constant contact and communication with one another so that the Nuer enjoyed a structural advantage, thus facilitating the efforts of the political elite to maintain its control despite its small numbers. These group distinctions were maintained even though as individuals some of the Dinka enjoyed greater power or privilege than some of the Nuer.

4.10 The Anuak

4.10.1 Introduction

At the time of the establishment of the Shilluk kingdom, a Nilotic society was founded along the Sobat river through the emigration of Lwo-speaking elements from the Wipac area, who are supposed to be nearly related to the Shilluk. This people have later been known as the Anuak. (1)

The Anuak are now primarily an agricultural people with few cattle. They were driven east into tsetse-infested forests by the Nuer. They depended for livestock on sheep and goats rather than cattle because of the tsetse fly; they had cattle, but, as they themselves admitted, they - unlike the other Nilotes - slaughtered them for food with reckless disregard for the maintenance of the herd. (2) The extensive list of cattle-names and the elaborate vocabulary of cattle-colour names which are found in their language suggest, however, that at one time they were predominantly pastoral and a cattle people in the Nilotic sense. (3)

In the western part of the country the rivers flood in the rainy season. Those that had to move in the dry season went independently, each to its own camp at the edge of the marshes. In the extreme east of the country, on the other hand, the land never floods. The villages were therefore built close together on the river banks. The villages were completely self-contained as far as the necessities of economic life were concerned; needs for pasturage did not bring villages into contact. The village autonomy was consistent with demographic and economic conditions. (4) The only economic activities which required the cooperation of groups larger than the members of an individual

homestead were occasional hunting forays, the erection of fishing-dams at certain seasons of the year, and special services to the headman of the village which will be described later.

4.10.2 Political structure

There are various opinions concerning the political system of the Anuak people. Seligman supposes - basing his opinion upon Heasty - that the Anuak had a king as the head of the nation, like the Shilluk, but a king without the supreme position and dignity of the Shilluk king. (5) Schilde states that "Das Volk hat als einheitliches Oberhaupt einen Sultan (nyeya oder rwoth), der, obwohl er sehr unterwürfig begrüsst wird, im Vergleich zu seinen Söhnen und den Dorfhäuptern (djago) nicht die entsprechende Stellung einnimmt. Der Thronfolger wird noch zu Lebzeiten des Vaters gekrönt. Alle Unruhen bei den Anuak gehen auf Streit zwischen den thronberechtigten Familien zurück, wobei der Abzeichen eine grosse Rolle spielt". (6) According to Crazzolara the history of the first king of the Anuak is analogous to that of the first king of the Shilluk: "both represent a state of development". But in Anuakland the kingship plainly degenerated into anarchical competition, until in quiter times every nyiya claimed right to the possession of the royal insignia on his descendants. (7) On the other hand, Evans-Pritchard maintains that nothing of that has been confirmed by his field investigations. His interpretation is: "Since the Anuak were known to speak a language similar to Shilluk and to have a clan of superior rank possessing certain insignia it was assumed that they had a monarchical system like that which has been described among the Shilluk, and the unqualified use of such expressions as 'King', 'Sultan', 'Royal Emblems', and 'Royal House', has given support to this belief and has obscured the real nature of their political organization". (8)

According to Evans-Pritchard, the Anuak had two types of political system: Anuakland was divided into the land ruled over by village headmen (po kweri) and the land of the nobles (po nyiye). These two systems are here described separately, although they have much in common and the latter has encroached on and affected the former. We begin with the former type. (9)

4.10.2.1 The village headman system

In the western part of the country, the members of each village recognized the primacy among them of a section of a single clan, from which alone the successive village headmen could be chosen. The dominant lineage of a village which might come from any of the non-noble clans comprised what Anuak called "the people of the settlement" ((jo)bur), in relation to people who had arrived later and were called "strangers" or "guests" (welle). (10) They were not mere clients who had lost their status elsewhere and lived on sufferance under the protection of their hosts. They retained connections with their original homes, which they might have left only to avoid temporary difficulties. Individuals could also leave a village in the area of Anuakland ruled by headmen, and seek their fortune as retainers to the nobles in the south-eastern part of the country. "Guests", whether temporary or permanent, added to the prestige of a village and to its military strength; and except where a village had become too large for the resources at its disposal, their assistance in joint enterprises such as hunting, fishing, and helping to hoe the headman's cultivations was an economic asset.

The right to the office of headman (kuaaro or kwäro, pl. kuaari) was restricted to a single branch of the dominant clan, called tung kuaari or wat thuoni ("the sons of the bull"). (11) Only those who were biologically the sons of a headman could themselves assert the right to succeed to office. Sons of the same father competed and also paternal cousins, but a son would not try to replace his own father, nor would full brothers compete against each other. This rule compelled a rotation of the headmanship between branches of the entitled lineage. A dying headman's nominated succes-

sor might be accepted since he could always be turned out if not found congenial. If the successor was still a child, his mother could act as regent.

Consequently, in every generation some grandchildren of a headman were likely to be disqualified from the succession because their father had not held the office. (12) They were distinguished collectively as "the great lineage" (tung dwong). This reduced the number of potential headmen at any given time, but the extent of the reduction was modified by the number of wives some headmen acquired, and by the frequency with which headmen were changed.

In the Anuak view, what was most necessary in a successful headman, after great generosity, was composure (atiedi). According to Lienhardt, "while a headman is successful in retaining his position within the village, he correctly judges how far to yield, and how far to assert himself, when to dominate and when to be dominated by the people with whom he is dealing". (13)

In spite of the outward respect attached to it, the headman's office was by no means stable. (14) If he lost the support of his village community he would be turned out of office and expelled from the village by a "village rebellion" (agem). It is not to be regarded as revolution but as part of normal political life. (15) Normally it was not expected that the headman would be killed, but he, and any close supporters, were expelled from the village. Expelled headmen usually went to the village of their maternal kin and stayed there hoping that they might eventually be recalled. (16) The amount of fighting first taking place depended on the relative strength of the parties in conflict. Moreover, the supporters of the rival claimant must secure the approval of the guardians of the regalia. It was the duty of the line - that is the brothers and their sons - who had been most recently disqualified to take charge of the regalia of headmanship, to keep these during interregnum, and to instal the new headman when the occasion arose. (17) In this way, the dispossessed branches of the dominant lineage was a stabilizing factor in village political structure, for without the necessity of approaching the question of a change of headman through this lineage as intermediary, the direct unmediated antagonisms of different factions would quickly produce anarchy.

A headman might be exiled for a number of reasons. (18) The chief reason for dissatisfaction was meanness, particularly stinginess with food. The headman must distribute meat presented to him by the villagers. Even if he had impoverished himself in fulfilling these duties he might still be expelled. According to Lienhardt, it is clear that the village benefited economically by the ostracism of a poor headman and his replacement by a richer man, since the ostracized headman must leave behind not only the unconsumable possessions of the headmanship but also the produce of those of his gardens with which villagers had assisted him; the new headman was compelled to distribute his personal wealth. (19) Probably the headmen had more substantial resources earlier but lost them because of the upheavals during the last century. On the other hand, the traditional expectations of the hospitality and generosity and the fulfilment of these expectations caused a decreased level of support.

The agem was general throughout the villages held by headmen but they were more likely to take place in certain structural situations. (20) If most of the village population belonged to the dominant lineage, the village would usually support its representatives and not desire a change, provided that the number of rival candidates was limited. But if there were a number of immigrant lineages, which were as numerous, or more numerous, than the members of the dominant lineage, they might support rival candidates in order to exert their power. Among the opponents to the actual headman were also people who had not got what they wanted in the discussion of disputes at his court, and others who had been punished for disrespect. Even economic difficulties within a village tended to be reflected in changes of headmen. The evidence suggests that it had been the largest villages which had been sunder-

ed by disagreement over the headmanship, and that such villages had been hosts to many "guests", and had thus probably begun to increase in size beyond the possible local economic resources.

So the many fissions in the village community would lead to constant rebellions. If they were dissatisfied with the headman and his court, there was nothing to stop them either from withdrawing from him, or leaving the village altogether (sometimes to go to seek favour at a noble's court), if they could not raise sufficient support to ostracize the headman of whom they disapproved, or the matter might be settled by inviting a noble to occupy the village as its head. Lienhardt considers that it was by virtue of constant ostracisms of headmen that the Anuak were able to avoid diffused and uncontrolled conflict within the village, and to rule themselves, rejecting any submission to the symbol of their implicit contract which they themselves had created. The rebellions expressed in action the opposition between the factions of the village and prevented the complete fusion of the constituent lineages under the oligarchic or autocratic domination of the headman's lineage, while the temporary acceptance of a new headman prevented complete fission of the political community. (21) Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the real weight in a village were the dominant lineage. However long immigrants and their descendants lived in a village and however much they intermarried with the dominant lineage they could never become members of it but remained strangers. It is therefore felt that in an agem the candidate for the headmanship who was supported by the majority of his lineage was likely in the end to be successful.

At the installation the village headman was granted with certain badges of office as, e.g., the village drums, which might only be held by him, special strings of beads, and sometimes certain sacred spears. (22) The village drums seem to have been the most important since it was the first object of a rebellious faction to seize and beat. Special notched posts (dikweri) were erected outside his homestead (labo kwäro). Parts of large game found or killed on the headman's land as well as skulls of beasts he had killed to feast his people and trophies of game he had distributed were attached to the posts in token of his generosity.

The people showed the headman ceremonial respect. Headmen of different villages had special salutations and their unique status was indicated also by the fact that there were special words which might be used only in reference to them. (23)

As said above, the headman was expected to be a source of benefits to his fellow villagers. (24) It was said that the prestige which a great man received on account of his generosity was of more value to him than the material goods which he was bound lavishly to dispense in order to obtain it. To keep in office he had to kill his cattle for feasts, to help to provide young men with bridewealth, and make gifts. After a raid the headman received all the spoils, no matter how great, and from them selected what he wanted for himself before distributing the rest among the villagers. The villagers owed allegiance to the headman, they hoed his cultivations and made gifts of game and fish, part of which he had to redistribute. This was said not to be regarded as their duty; they gave their services in recognition of the generosity which the headman showed them. There was no calculation (at least while a headman was popular) of the balance between the gifts which he made to them and the services which they rendered to him. They received as of right, and gave and served as of grace. He had thus no claim on their wealth, and so he was not likely to be able to keep up for very long the standard of generosity which his villagers expected. Moreover, the services people rendered their headman were to the office and not to the man. This is also evident from the fact that in the past the headman's first wife often was really the wife of the whole village, since her bridewealth was provided by the villagers and not by the headman. Consequently, in the event of the headman's being driven out, he had to leave his wife behind with the other village properties

in his keeping.

There were court officials attached to the headman's homestead: nyikurungu and nyiol - whose functions are not known. The headman's representative (nyikugu) might come from any village. Almost any person who was regularly with the headman, and to whom the headman deputed tasks concerned with the management of village affairs, might be referred to as nyikugu, though in some villages the office was more highly formalized than in others and was often passed from father to son. (25) The person who was nyikugu might also sometimes fill another office, that of nyibur. The difference between these two offices, in principle, was that the nyikugu was the personal representative of the headman, while the nyibur was the headman's representative in relation to a particular area. The nyibur, then, was a person in any village who represented the traditional owners of the village as a social and territorial unit, and his major duties were connected with the proper entertainment of "guests" in the headman's absence. Where a village had colonized an outlying hamlet, a nyibur, who was usually the senior man of those first settled there, acted as the headman's local representative. In particular the officials of a headman's court were said to function when he gathered a following for himself.

The kwai lwak appears to have been the leader of the age-sets of the village (lwak). According to Lienhardt, he was an elderly wealthy man who was the "sponsor" for the youths, whom he provided with food, and who in return helped him in his cultivations. (26) Otherwise the group seems to have occupied their time with raiding cattle in order to provide meat to feasts. The system, he writes, was difficult to observe on the Sudan side of the border at least, where it was breaking down, possibly as an indirect result of the difficulties of raiding cattle, because the Government took energetic measures to prevent the raiding of cattle, and the consequent difficulty of providing feasts. If it is really true that even in the past each age-set chose its own sponsor, who must be a man of substance, with the result that each village consisted of age-sets of several different men, some living and some dead, there must have been several centra of influence besides that of the headman, which probably tended to increase the tensions in the village provided that the headman had no check upon them.

Nevertheless, it was said that from time to time a rich headman would gather together a following of men (lwop) consisting of the junior age-sets (tieng) extant in the village. The lwop was in effect a temporary army of retainers bound specially to the headman himself. He thus established a relationship with the rising generation of the village, combining and welding to the headmanship age-sets formed by various different sponsors. (27)

We could see the young men who attached themselves to the court of a successful village headman as a body of retainers, whom he could call on to enforce his decisions, and who identified themselves more closely with him than with any of the divisions of the population, although no headman managed to keep his retainers for long. The reason is not difficult to understand: people expected to get something in return for loyalty to their leader. They settled for a period around his court as long as he could provide them with food. In the economy of the Anuak with their small herds of stock, even the richest headman could not go on giving feasts for long. We can grasp how important it is for the building up of leadership that the society should have some surplus of wealth which can be concentrated in the hands of the ruler and used for purposes of State - among which one of the most important is rewarding services.

In internal polity, then, the headman could not rely for long upon the swaggering support of a private army which he had created. In Anuak political theory a successful headman must therefore be cunning as well as generous and dignified, and his diplomacy consisted in part in maintaining within his domain an adequate information service. Consequently, within the village itself, there were informants (nyimong). In order to transact necessary

business in outlying hamlets of his village or in other villages, he relied upon messengers (nyiatwel). They were chosen from among his followers. (28)

Evans-Pritchard emphasizes that the headman, though he was treated with great outward respect, was not regarded by them as a political functionary in his sense of the word political. (29) From our theoretical point of view we cannot agree with him. The fact that the village united under their headman in defence and raiding may certainly be included in his definition of the word political. (30) In addition, the headman controlled the village activities by means of the whole village being obliged to await his orders before sowing. (31)

Further, as to the regulative function, disputes in a village were talked out in the presence of the headman and elders. According to Evans-Pritchard, this does not mean that the headman acted as judge. It is not that the headman or the elders heard cases and gave decisions; disputes were discussed at court and popular opinion was mobilized there, so that the parties to a dispute knew how much general support they might expect. But it is clear that for the Anuak themselves there was a close link between the presence of a generally accepted headman in the village, and the possibility - and even necessity - of the peaceful settlement of disputes between the villagers without immediate recourse to self-help: "Ordinary people can't own drums! What would they do with them, and who would control a fight, if it broke out at their dance?" (32) The extent to which the court was frequented and the formalities of court life were practised was, then, an index of the stability of the headmanship at any given time. A headman was entitled to formal respect and this imposed a certain order upon the proceedings.

Lienhardt says that the dominant lineage and the headman were by powerful convention regarded as neutral in inter-lineage disputes. (33) But, he concedes, if a dominant lineage as a whole, and the headman's office, can thus be held to have been equally impartial in relation to all lineages, families, and individuals of which a village was composed, the position was inevitably different for each particular headman through links of uterine kinship and affinity, through friendship formed before and during his period of office, through the fact that some villagers had supported his candidature more vigorously than others and expected to gain the advantage of it. While he had no power to compel disputants to accept their adjudication, then, the people expected him to assist one side against the other. Within a village it was possible for the headman to enforce his decisions by raiding the offender party and he would have the backing of the community. (34) Another possibility for the headman to exercise an executive power consisted of the temporary "army" of retainers mentioned above. Attempted self-help in a case of homicide should never occur, the Anuak said, if both the slayer and his victim were members of the same village. The headman and other villagers would intervene and persuade the people of the slain man to accept compensation. The headman could not of course enforce the payment of compensation, except in so far as the most influential of his people were behind him, but he might expect support in any effort to reduce conflict within the village. If a member of a family of "guests" were the slayer, then the villagers might despoil his homestead and seize what they would as compensation. On the other hand, if a member of a family of "guests" were slain, his family might expect to receive compensation no matter what was the strength and status of the family of the slayer. (35) When compensation was received for homicide, the headman took one cow, or its equivalent, because the man was killed on his land. (36)

Between villages, on the other hand, political relations seem rather to have resembled those of independent political communities. If someone was killed by a man from another village, either his kin could seek revenge or the headman and elders of the two villages would discuss the matter and try to effect a reconciliation. (37) There was no individual with the special function of ending a feud, as there were among the Nuer and Dinka.

As to the authority of the headman, Evans-Pritchard says that one did not

have to live long in Anuak villages, especially in "operational circumstances", when it was essential to win the cooperation of the people, before realizing that the headman could only act with the approval of the villagers and do what they had decided among themselves should be done: "He is a puppet moved by the fingers of popular will". (38) The point is to what extent this conclusion is dependent upon the extraordinary circumstances that the Anuak people experienced at the time of his investigations. He refers in particular to the guerrilla operations in which he took an active part. We can break down the processes of planning and decision making into two broad types - routine decisions and non-routine decisions - and define them as follows: Decisions are r o u t i n e to the extent that they are repetitive, to the extent that a definite procedure has been worked out for handling them so that they will not be treated over again each time they occur. Decisions are n o n - r o u t i n e to the extent that they are novel, unstructured, and consequential. There is no cut-and-dried method for handling the problem because it has not arisen before, or because its precise nature and structure are elusive or complex, or because it is so important that it deserves a custom-tailored treatment. Obviously Evans-Pritchard bases his opinion on non-routine decisions, while he underestimates the authority of the headman in routine affairs.

As regards the scope of political power Lienhardt gives a more varied picture. (39) The authority of the village chief was limited to a single village. He administered his village together with the lineage heads. He was bound by their consent in deciding all problems connected with the administration of village affairs. The authority of a village chief included, apart from the rights in the economic sphere and besides the administration of village affairs, also the supervision of the maintenance of rules. A village chief did not exercise unlimited power; on the contrary, he could be characterized as a headman among headmen. Without the approval of the lineage heads his decisions could not attain full recognition.

In this connection, another interesting thing is touched upon by Lienhardt who writes: "The more the people a man knows himself to have offended, the greater his danger of being haunted. The more hatred and malice there is in a community, the more prevalent a c y e n i". (40) Hence suspicious village headmen might send observers to the deathbeds of their people in order to discover whether or not they had been cursed. It was said also that the nobles, rivals who in the nature of Anuak politics must frequently kill one another in the past were thought to be more prone to die of acyeni than others, and the land of the nobles had a reputation for the prevalence of this cause of death.

Whereas the headman could not compel his villagers to obey him in every respect, a kind of order did emanate from his court, since the village accepted him as their headman;when there was no headman this kind of order did not exist. The headman was, in fact, the symbol of the cohesion and he encouraged cooperation and solidarity of the village. He represented the common interests of the community internally and externally. The highest common value of a village community was their headmanship which personified their unity and exclusiveness. This value was not shared with other villages, since several villages did not come under the same headman.

The system of village headmanship was based on the lineage structure of the village and both held it together. Lienhardt's opinion, quoted above, points to the fact that the authority of the headman was substantial in the villages which had a homogeneous social structure, while a heterogeneous social structure (g w a c) produced a "constitutional" regime with high responsive capability, which prevented both despotism and anarchy. As we will see further on, in the "noble" system of authority a heterogeneous structure resulted in an increasing power in the hands of the noble, i.e., a lower responsiveness. As a matter of fact, the relations between a headman and his people was an alternation of dominance and submission.

The dominant lineage might or might not be thought to be descended from

the first owners of the village-site. In some villages, according to the Anuak, there were people already settled on the site when the main body of the present villagers arrived with their headman. The descendants of the first settlers then formed a lineage of "earth custodians" or "masters of the earth" (kwai ngom or delami), with certain minor ritual functions and status. (41) The man (or in some cases the woman) who held the office was often called wabur (pl. watbuci), too. If the lineage originally in possession was still powerful, then the offices of headman and earth custodian were combined. When there were two officials, it meant that the original dominant lineage had lost its position and a usurping lineage had taken over all but the ritual functions connected with the land. An earth custodian could bequeath his rights to another lineage if his own lineage was becoming extinct at his death. As a consequence of his ritual connection with the earth, he obtained rain and told the people when to begin sowing. He had the power of blessing people by invoking the earth. Moreover, when a village moved to one of its sites he made a sacrifice so that no dissentions or other calamities might happen in the village to be built on "his earth".

4.10.2.2 The nobles' system

At the eastern end of the Anuak country a different system prevailed. (42) According to Lienhardt the land of the nobles was considered "much more dangerous owing to the fierceness of dynastic rivalries and inaccessibility of any administrative or medical services".

Eastern Anuakland can be said to have formed a single political community. But this came about not as a result of any actual need for peaceful cooperation between the villages, but because the greater ease of communications had made it possible for all to combine in a single system. Here a single clan, which apparently came from outside Anuakland, penetrated and claimed preeminence over an area which, according to tradition, were at one time politically isolated from each other and autonomous under local headmen. This claim was based on the possession of certain emblems which had been handed down through the generations and were regarded as sacred.

In every village the great mass of the people were commoners (baangi, sing. bang), but instead of a kuaaro representing the village there was the noble (nyiya, pl. nyiye). All nobles belonged to the royal clan (watnyiye), which was restricted almost entirely to the villages of the east of Anuakland. It is clear that the descendants of Ukiro, the founder of the line of nobles, were quite as numerous as, possibly more numerous than, any commoner clan. Watnyiye were a clan with patrilineal descent and therefore no Anuak could become a nyiya, unless he was born into this clan. (43) But even if he was by birth a member of this clan, a man did not become a noble unless he was invested with the royal emblems. If he failed to be so invested, his descendants were excluded from the right and became jowatong, members of dispossessed noble lineages.

The expansion and penetration of the political system dominated by the nobles and their competition for the royal emblems caused this system to come into conflict with the system of headmanship prevailing in the western villages of Anuakland. In all the villages of the area there was an increasing interest in the royal emblems and it was this common interest which organized the villages into a system. This refers to the dominant lineages of the villages; in most parts the spread of noble influence was vigorously opposed by the commoner lineages. (44)

The explanation how the contest to hold the sacred emblems gradually spread to penetrate more and more villages lies in the fact that a claimant to investiture had to have a following - in the old days to fight for his claim, and later to amass the gifts that had to be made to the emblem-holder. These contests were different in a significant way from the contests for the headmanship of a village. Rivals for the position of headman were competing for the support of the same body of people, the inhabitants of the village. The

villagers were choosing between two personalities, according to which they expected to get most from. In the contest for the royal emblems it was the emblems themselves that mattered. There was no issue to divide the village of the holder; all were united in valuing the prestige that came to their village through having the emblem-holder there. So a new claimant could not hope for any support in the holder's village; he had to seek it elsewhere, and he sought it in the village from which his mother came or in some village where a number of her agnates lived. Since a claimant had to be the son of a previous holder, all the claimants had the same agnatic kin, and full brothers also had the same maternal kin. But if two half brothers wished to contend for the emblems they could find different maternal kin to support them. They built up this support by going to live as guests in villages where a body of these kinsmen formed the dominant lineage.

At the same time as more and more villages came to be included in the field of kingship and brought into the political system of the emblems through their support of claimants to investiture, there was a distribution of members of the noble clan who penetrated villages which were situated outside the nuclear area of the noble clan. Besides the previously mentioned reason to try to find supporters, the claimants were forced to leave the centre of royal power because of the risk of rebellion. This dispersion of nobles produced a complex series of relations in the villages where they settled down.

There were in Anuakland nobles living in commoner villages with much variation in status and authority. Anuak villages may be graded, from the point of view of the relations of headman to nobles, into several types. (a) Nobles or jowatong, people of noble ancestry who had lost their rank, owned the land and ruled the villages either because the land was noble clan land or because the land had been given to them by the villagers or usurped by them. (b) Nobles were found in authority in commoner villages to which they had been invited, but their tenure was uncertain and the headmen still received recognition and acted as representatives of nobles, or might have been reduced to the position of "earth custodian". (c) Nobles were found living as guests in the villages of their maternal kin with little or no authority. (45)

In describing how the leadership of villages passed from headmen to nobles the Anuak sometimes cited the myth of Ukiro, the founder of the line of nobles. They said that what happened between Ukiro and Cuai, the ancestor of the aboriginal Jowatcuaa clan and the prototype of all village headmen, had been repeated in many villages up to the present time. (46) The ucuok beads, which played the predominant part in investiture, derived their significance from their mythical association with Ukiro who was believed to have come out of a river wearing the beads. Cuai received Ukiro into his home and treated him as an honoured guest, and gave him his daughter in marriage. While Ukiro was in the village he laid down laws. On disappearing into the water again he left behind a son, Giilo, and he became the first noble holding the beads. He was the prototype of all kings. He was a sister's son to Cuai's lineage and he took from the children of Cuai their position of leaders of the community. This myth, with all its local variations, explained, justified, and sanctified - according to Evans-Pritchard - the important role played by the beads and the system of competition in the east Anuak villages. In addition, it provided a moral sanction for the usurpation of the rights of the headman by the members of the noble clan, for in the myth, the people forced kingship on Ukiro against his will. (47)

The Ukiro tradition is interesting in another respect, viz. as a historical document, too. The story shows the original status of the newcomer being raised to that of chief through marriage with the daughter of the pagan head. It is possible that Ukiro arrived as a settler or client, and the female link was treated as a male link in favour of the client's children, and the origin of the begetter was slurred over. This does not appear to be an isolated case. and other founders of groups which were politically important (cf., e.g.,

Aiwel, the first Dinka chief) seem to have been clients who came as destitutes from other tribes, married daughters of their patrons, and later came to supersede the landowners whose lines became weaker and weaker, while those stemming from the cleints became more and more powerful.

There were three stages in the full establishment of a noble in a village. First, a noble generally obtained a footing in a commoner village through maternal kinship, and he was invested with the royal emblems through the support of his maternal village. Second, he might then be invited to become the head of a village (usually other than that of his maternal kin) and was in this case invested with the village emblems. Finally, the rights of "grain and earth" (beel ka ngom) might be given to him.

By adopting a noble youth and putting him forward as their candidate for the kingship the people of a village had a chance of obtaining the emblems for their community and making their village for a time the ritual centre of Anuakland. (48) Sons of nobles were generally brought up in the villages of their maternal uncles, who usually belonged to a dominant clan but the noble was merely a sister's son in his relationship to it.

Another procedure was followed when a village invited a noble to stay and be its nyiya. (49) A village on the edge of the area in which the competition for the emblems was dominant might invite a noble to become its headman, either because it wished to have the prestige associated with a noble headman or because the village was more or less equally divided in support of two candidates, or there was no alternative to its present headman. The villagers might do this to avoid a fight. The headmanship was left in abeyance or perhaps the kuaaro existed in a subordinate position. Once a noble was installed as ruler of a village, he maintained his position by encouraging the internal cleavages in the village structure. It was easiest for him to get into large villages with heterogeneous clans, for in such villages internal cleavages were wider and deeper than elsewhere. When installed the noble had the same position as the headman had before him. The one difference between the position of the noble and that of the commoner headman was that a village could not turn out its noble by force. In that case the agem mechanism did not work. If he was not forced out by neglect he could only be expelled by inviting another noble to replace him by attacking him and perhaps killing him. (50) Thus the village had for ever been incorporated into the noble system.

A village was identified on the one hand with the land and on the other with the office of headman, so that the headman not only symbolized the unity of the village but also owned the land, though not as an individual. Hence the giving of the land to a noble permanently identified his line with the village community and the village sites. When this happened, as in the Adongo and Thim districts, the ancestral home of the nobles (po nyiye), the nobles fully and finally took the place of the traditional lines of common headmen. (51)

In some villages in which nobles had some authority they owned the land and had collected around themselves a small following of commoners. (52) They had not been installed as rulers of the villages in which they lived, and were consequently not dependent on the villagers for their rights of residence but they had acquired small estates, where refugees from other villages, poor persons in need of assistance, and what few original inhabitants there might have been in the vicinity before their arrival, had collected. On such sites the nobles did not compete with headmen. They could not, therefore, be expelled and if their followers were dissatisfied with them their only redress was to go and live elsewhere.

The dispossessed lineages (jowatong) consisted of the descendants of men who belonged to the noble clan but lost claim to nobility through failure to be invested with the royal emblems. (53) These independent lineages could trace relationship to Ukiro, the founder of the noble clan, but were separate owing to their disinheritance. They had established themselves in many of the villages which formerly had commoner headmen. A record of the Gila

river villages shows that in the vast majority the dominant lineage was jowatong, but only in two cases they were descendants of the original occupiers. (54) This shows how the jowatong of the royal clan had spread at the expense of the commoner clans. Where they had been long established in their own right, the village organization was similar to that outside the area of kingship. Where they had recently taken over, the organization was more like that where nobles were established and there was no proper headman and no agem. Evans-Pritchard concludes that the distribution of jowatong was precisely what one would expect if the royal clan had once lived on its own land and as a result of dynastic disputes had spread outside that area. (55) Thus, the village headmen had to contend against nobles who could still compete for the emblems as well as against those who could not, and the area of headmanship gradually lessened by the increase of both.

If we compare the two political systems of Anuakland it is found that, in spite of some obvious differences, they were alike in many basic features. A crucial difference between them arose from the fact that the nobles established in villages all belonged to one noble clan and, therefore, one could be substituted for another in any village recognizing nobility. In addition, all villages recognized a common value in the possession of certain emblems by one dominant noble or king. That recognition was shown, not only in the prestige accorded to the holder, but also in the support given to various noble candidates who entered the competition for the emblems. In this way a group of villages were formed which, through the competitive system, stood in a systematic opposition towards one another, and in this way the eastern villages were still politically independent, like the western villages, but they were not politically isolated but absorbed into a common system.

As village headman a noble had the same symbols of office, privileges, and services and the same duties as a kuaaro. (56) Commoners treated all nobles with respect, had special greetings for them, and spread skins for them to sit on, for a noble must not sit on bare earth. The people of the village made the noble presents of food. In return he had to pay for his privileges and honours. Like the kuaaro, nobles had possession of the village drums and their homestead or court (pan duong) was marked by forked poles. There was also a special court vocabulary (lum nyiye). A noble was entitled to have court officials who looked after various aspects of the noble's household, such as the kwai kodo, who was in charge of the court drums and supervised the preparation of food. Members of the aboriginal Jowatcuaa clan were caretakers of the tombs of prominent nobles. (57) Every important noble also had officials responsible for accompanying and protecting him on journeys and for other duties. One of his sons organized hunting and fishing expeditions for him, and could be sent on his behalf to other villages. One official was left in charge of the village, if the noble himself went away. Each had a title, a special form of greeting to himself alone.

The noble might also gather round him a band of youths who formed a bodyguard (luak), headed by a captain (kwai luak). (58) Young men came from all over the country to seek their fortunes at the court of the possessor of the royal emblems. To join such a band was one recourse for a homicide who had to leave his own village. These bands were considerably older than the bands in villages of headmen. The luak used to cultivate and build for the noble and formed the nucleus of the village army. It could be sent to punish a village or destroy one which threatened the noble's position. The bodyguard was extremely important as the basis of the noble's position in the village and was an essential part of the political system prevailing in east Anuakland. When rifles were introduced from Ethiopia at the end of the 19th century the luak became an effective armed force both within the village and against neighbouring villages, so that the actual power of the nobles multiplied. (59) Even persecuted families and poor persons in need of assistance migrated to live under the protection of powerful nobles.

A powerful noble who had control over more than one village would place

his representatives in the villages where he did not reside himself. When one of his sons went to live in a village under his control, he became ruler of it in virtue of his father's influence. In some villages a member of the lineage which used to be dominant but had lost its old authority acted as the noble's representative or spokesman (nyibur). The nyibur was always nominated by the noble. The descendants of such a man might take over or rather resume the headmanship when the power of the noble and his successors had waned. (60)

It is not easy to say how much power was exercised by the nobles in the past in the villages where their authority was recognized. According to Evans-Pritchard they did not perform any of the functions of government. The noble was not in any sense an authoritative organizer of public affairs or a maker of community decisions. This was a position of privilege without responsibility. "They are a democratic people who brook any authority ill, but they love the pomp of a noble's court...". (61) Nevertheless, he appears to ascribe the noble a certain degree of authority, since he writes that it was a conclusion forced on him that a noble "however important he appeared to be, could do nothing unless he carried the village with him, and that he therefore found out what the villagers wanted before acting. Among the Anuak the tail wags the dog". (62) According to our model we might say that the system had a high responsive capability, but Evans-Pritchard refers, even in this context, to the exceptional, non-routine "operational circumstances" when it was essential to win the cooperation of the people. In all probability, where he was well established, the noble could exercise authority as leader of the common routine activities in the village assisted by the elders of the different lineage groups. Who else should have been the leader and dispute the rank with him? Besides the formal power which the noble exercised in his capacity of installed headman, he certainly had informal means of influencing the policy decisions partly as a consequence of bigger resources and partly by deriving advantage from the above-mentioned internal divisions in the village according to the principle of dividing and ruling.

Moreover, Evans-Pritchard maintains that "there does not appear to have been any procedure that can correctly be regarded as the functioning of legal institutions or any person or body of persons who can be called a constitutional judicial authority". (63) Nevertheless, even though the noble exercised only slight judicial functions he was sometimes asked to settle a dispute by throwing his weight in favour of one disputant against the other. And the noble claimed, successfully, the right to fall upon commoners who offended him and despoil them of their possessions, and sometimes a noble used his bodyguard to destroy the home and to plunder the possessions of somebody who had offended him by wronging another of his subjects, and in this case he kept the plunder and did not pass any of it in damages to the wronged subject. (64) The armed force at the disposal of a noble could thus be used in the case of justice. It is reasonable not to consider such acts as sanctions applied by an impartial authority to enforce the decisions of a court, but as the support of one faction, or person, in a village against another. The very violence of the acts is, nevertheless, contrary to Evans-Pritchard's view, an indication of authority, since he himself says that "no one would pay attention to a decision which was not accompanied by simultaneous application of force". (65)

Evans-Pritchard maintains that there was no Anuak term to distinguish the king from other nobles, but in another part of the book he states that several nobles told him that their grandfathers used the word r a t h for a man invested with the emblems of nobility. The son of such a man was known as w a r a t h. (66) Since the royal dignity could circulate, but there could be only one holder of the emblems at the time, we consider it legitimate to call him "king".

The position of the king was not really different from that of the other nobles. He was only temporarily the first among those who had already been invested and was distinguished from them only by actual possession of the

emblems for the time being. All nobles had the same status and displayed the same status and displayed the same signs of rank. The king was, according to Evans-Pritchard, only primus inter pares. Yet, he was in a more dangerous position and he had more prestige temporarily, but he had no more authority. Village communities liked the honour of possessing the emblems and invited the king to reside among them. This did not mean that he automatically became their permanent ruler or even the head of their village, for the headman might still occupy that position in spite of the presence of the king.

We must here distinguish between the symbolic quality of kingship and its secular character. What seems to have happened was that the assimilative and symbolic capability of kingship enlarged without the regulative capacity of the king increasing. The kingship was revered over a wide area, but the king's authority was hardly recognized outside his own village. Or as Evans-Pritchard words it: "The common values of the kingship in which all share and the parochialism of local communities, together explain the form of the polity and the position of the kingship in it". (67)

The office was not a legislative or administrative one and there was little secular authority attached to it. People of other villages sought his help but he could only send his band of youths to assist them in taking action against wrongdoers, if the latter were not too strong to make this unprofitable. No judicial decisions were made by the king. (68) In this respect, then, the king could not imitate the prototype of all kings, viz. Ukiro, since it was related that it was Ukiro who established elementary rules of justice and first gave judgements between disputants. There was a kingship but no central government. The king was not the ruler of the country. The nobles who had authority over the villages were not delegates of the king, no subjects to him. The ecological conditions of the country prevented regular communication and did not favour an effective political unity. As has been noted, the village was the largest political and economic unit. Adjacent villages might coalesce to resist oppression by nobles, and nobles might establish control over several villages and impose a slight degree of political unity on them. Larger units were non-existent. (69)

In the symbolic field, on the other hand, the value and prestige attached to the emblems was great and the kingship and the competition for the emblems was essentially of ceremonial significance. The office itself was a ceremonial object. It is surprising that the king had no ritual duties to perform. On the information collected one can only say that the king took no part in ritual for the health of the people as a whole, for the welfare of their crops and livestock, for success in warfare, for rain, and so forth. (70)

The contradiction between the symbolic supremacy of the kingship, acknowledged by the whole country, and the weakness of the king's authority over villages other than his own was - as we will se further on - eliminated by the kingship becoming detached from its traditional seat and circulating through all the villages of the area.

This is evident from the mode of transmitting the royal emblems that varied over the generations. A brief outline of the historical changes - as Evans-Pritchard sees them - is given below. (71)

The royal emblems consisted of five bead necklaces, four spears, a drum, which was beaten "on state occasions", and two stools. One of them was more important and was called the "throne" (wellu). (72) Yet, as we have seen, it was the investiture with the string of ucuok beads, which was believed to have been worn by Ukiro, that conferred royal dignity. The maternal uncle of a son of a noble placed the necklace on his nephew.

In the earliest period the king appears to have kept the emblems until he died, and the emblems passed from father to son without violence. But at the time when traditions begin to be clear and consistent, the emblems could not be taken from the holder without a fight to the death. This was not a single combat, but a pitched battle between the supporters of the king and those of

his rival. During this early period there were only a small number of persons with noble rank who had the right to compete for the emblems and they were restricted to a small area. The king seems to have remained at the centre of the nobility and there was no move from village to village. The king would not allow his kinsmen to live in his village and they resided in others, usually those of maternal kin. The overwhelming and slaying of the king and the seizure of the emblems by his rival was called a g e m - the same word which was used for the rebellions by which the headman of the commoner villages were expelled. At this period, in fact, the two political systems were almost identical. As long as the emblems were transferred in this way, at any given time there could only be one emblem-holder living.

However, there came a time when the holders did not think the privileges of kingship, whatever they were, worth defending with their lives. Killing became more rare and the emblems were often passed without a battle taking place. In this period the emblems circulated rapidly and several nobles held them more than once. When the emblems were held for a short time only and the kings were not slain, the number of candidates eligible for the office increased and was distributed through a great number of villages. The kingship had disappeared as a single central authority in a restricted area and became a highly mobile office which travelled round a large area passing from one noble to another. Thus, the kingship became a common value for a large number of villages and a league of villages was formed, each member of which competed for the emblems on behalf of the resident noble. At this stage the actual holder was in no way superior in authority or privileges to his predecessors; the uniqueness of his position consisted simply in the fact that only one man could hold the emblems at any one time, and for the moment he was the man.

A tentative explanation of these conditions may be proposed by the help of Goody. (73) According to him, in those recruitment systems which designate a specific successor on the basis of kinship criteria, the simplest method of selection is by lineal succession. One member of the sibling group is designated as heir and the rest are eliminated. The basic alternative to the lineal system is a lateral one. Instead of excluding brothers, they are included. As a result, a wide range of kin acquires a direct interest in the office; and there are older office-holders and shorter reigns. An examination of these two main modes of succession helps us to spell out the socio-political consequences of the different types of kinship transmission. The difficulties in lateral succession are obvious, since the number of eligibles increases at each generation. Such effects - reinforced by a polygynous marriage system - complicate the process of selection, because the larger the number of eligibles, the more difficult they are to handle. All of these can only be satisfied by continually decreasing the length of reign to such an extent that it will end with a dynastic merry-go-round. In some generations there must ensue strong pressures towards a reduction in the number of potential successors, towards some system of elimination. The Anuak kingship system is an important instance of such a state of things. In the beginning the concentration of royal power appears to have been accompanied by a system of succession that was at once more lineal and more determinate. Vertical transmission of kingship meant a smaller group of eligibles, and the partial removal of the threat that strong collateral branches might offer. Those members of the eligible group who were not selected for the kingship were degraded from the dynasty to the lower rank of nobility (jowatong). For some unknown reason, at some time the rule of elimination came to be put out of order, so that even a lateral succession was facilitated which smoothed the way towards struggle for power. Indetermination increased the tension between the potential heirs; the very openness of the succession encouraged the struggle for power. Any contest between equal claimants for the kingship might lead to threats against the territorial unity of the community. The more members of the dynasty were seen as having an equal claim over the

office, the more they would be disposed to split the existing political community, or, if conditions allowed, to establish others. Moreover, the electing body was extended by forcing the claimants to seek what support they could from the people themselves. As we have seen, many of the contests between the claimants were helped on by the ambitions of their maternal kinsmen, who wanted to see their own offspring successful against the other claimants.

At the end of the 19th century, this tendency was checked when three members of the noble clan managed to obtain guns from Ethiopia, with which they armed their followers. (74) Amhara traders supplied them with rifles and ammunition and only exacted ivory (and slaves?) from them in return. Thus they consolidated positions of real power resting on armed force. By obtaining guns these men dominated a number of villages and kept the emblems for many years. It was difficult for other nobles to attack them and seize the emblems, and the league of separate villages competing individually changed into a number of loose federations of villages, each federation headed by a candidate, and ready to defend its possession of the emblems from the others. The majority of the noble clan were thus threatened with loss of rank and the practice arose whereby the dominant holder of the emblems kept them but allowed his kinsmen, on payment of a fee, to visit him and be invested with the emblems, yet, without being holders of them.

Each of the three men held the emblems for a long time, and the last was able to hand them over to his son, who was recognized by the British administration and he retained the emblems. The other nobles dared not attack him because of government support. Complaint was made to the government that the emblems belonged to all the members of the noble clan and not just to one person. The government's decision that the emblems should be held for a year only and then passed on was not effective. The payment of a fee replaced the agem.

The introduction of firearms had the effect of extending the personal authority of the king beyond the limits of his village, though it never covered more than a portion of the whole field of the kingship. These developed, therefore, a new orientation in inter-village relations. The villages in the vicinity of the king formed a loose political unit under his authority and were opposed by similar loose confederations of villages under the authority of his chief rivals. This enabled him to raid the "headman villages" which before had been out of reach. He also led the Anuak on counter-raids against the Nuer and Beir. (75)

Hence we see that a kingship whose function had become symbolic only, and which was associated with little or no political power, might become invested with such power in consequence of social change and the impact of foreign rule. But what is also important from our point of view is the way in which they were able to extend their power through the possession of arms. Even now the possession of the emblems did not give one of these three men pre-eminence over the other two, but each of the three had a sphere of influence within which he was unchallenged. Lesser nobles attached themselves to one or other, either in the hope of gain or in the hope of protection; they were able to change their allegiance, so that one could not say that the three rival nobles had carved themselves out territorial kingdoms. During this period it was often by distributing guns that the nobles succeeded in wresting the leadership of villages from their maternal kinsmen. It appears to have been understood that in return the people so armed would pay tribute in ivory and valuable skins, as well as sending a share of all the game they killed to the noble's household. They plundered the possessions of those who refused. Here we can certainly see the prototype of a centralized system, in which a number of territorial subordinates act as agents of a superior ruler and collect tribute on his behalf. Had it not been for the intervention of the government, one of the three might have established a centralized government over the whole of Anuakland.

Summing up our results, we can say that from the beginning the Anuak

kingship probably had a comparatively great power but only in a limited area. But because of the system of succession the kingship became weaker; at the same time it gained ground in ever increasing areas, paradoxically enough. The struggle for and the capture of the emblems as well as the consolidation of power made such great demands on the king that there was little time left to governmental duties. The Anuak are, of course, an extreme case in this respect. Consequently the kingship had lost the greater stability and uniqueness it once enjoyed. The symbolic capability of the kingship is clear from the fact that its symbols - on account of their value of prestige - were coveted by people outside the sphere of the noble clan, too. This prevalence of royal symbols simultaneously prepared a way for penetration of areas outside the domains of the noble clan by members of the clan. Their initial regulative capability does not appear to have been very high - apart from the fact that areas in which they had secured a permanent footing were never surrendered, but time was on their side; bigger resources made it easier for their representatives to establish connections with local authorities and in consequence of that additional power. This tendency to decentralization turned into its opposite when additional resources were supplied to the system from the international environment in the form of technological and military innovations which involved that some of the nobles extended their power at other persons' expense.

5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This final section consists of a systemic analysis of the traditional social and political order of the Nilotic societies. We have attempted from the information at our disposal to analyse the form which the political systems took in the days before the establishment of the British Administration. Information about the social and political order, in the days before European rule was established, is necessarily fragmentary. There are many aspects of the organization which may either have been omitted or dealt with inadequately. Some details of the causal structure underlying Nilotic behaviour in those days have been inferred from modern observances, others from the works of European travellers and from the peoples' traditions; others again have been deduced from an examination of the structure and functioning of present day social formations. Since the exact form we have described disappeared some hundred years ago, we cannot claim any high degree of certainty for these conclusions; most of the conclusions reached in this work are tentative and some are speculative. But it is the belief of the writer that as a result of it we now have a more complete picture of the political systems of the Nilotes.

5.1 Social stratification

We have found that everywhere there was one group that had a political control over the majority of the population. How did this relation come into existence? First, the majority of the Nilotic societies appear to have resulted from conquest or ethnic stratification achieved by an immigrant group. Here it must be stressed that the conquerors did not necessarily belong to a so-called "superior" civilization, but simply had at their disposal either more efficient military techniques or a political organization which enabled them to mobilize and deploy more men than their enemies and in a shorter period. Moreover, the process of conquest did not simply reduce to a success in fighting, it was also affected by the acceptance by the dominated groups. On the other hand, they could originate without armed conflict on the basis of an alliance according to which the head of a territorially and politically threatened society requested the protection of a more powerful chief and voluntarily subjugated himself to him. The Alur, e.g., extended their hegemony when neighbouring peoples invited their chiefs to come and rule over them; we find, in effect, an upward delegation of authority rather than the assumption of power by a military dominant group. A third type of origin may be outlined: dispersed communities of an unorganized population might invite leaders of immigrant groups to organize them into a political community. This is what happened for certain Alur chiefdoms. Finally, the process of disintegration and re-integration of social units which appears to have characterized so much of the past Nilotic history, provided an additional factor in the local situation. Men singly or with their families sought the protection of a chief after being rejected by their own kin, or by a deliberate choice, or through famine or other disaster. These men and their descendants were bound to the chief by ties of personal service and by real or fictional affinal relationship.

How the minority managed to extend and maintain their hegemony over the mass of the original populations is a question to which different people have given different answers. For some of them the hegemony lay in their innate superiority. To a large extent they have accepted the ethnocentric ideology of the dominant groups as a psychological fact. It is possible that even before their arrival at the area they had a belief in fundamental differences between the members of various groups incorporated into their social system or into their relations with neighbouring peoples and that they naturally formed the

new situation in accordance with their own ideology. They were the only holders of political power (ker, ring). Even if - before the conquest - they had each their own ideology of equality, the formation of hereditary status groups, by means of which the prescription of vanquishers and vanquished was maintained, probably sufficed to create a theory of inequality.

A more widely accepted explanation is that they used their economic power to subdue the indigenous tribes; according to this view, the key to the whole situation was a special form of cattle-clientship through which the alien oligarchy acquired sovereign political rights over their clients. Historically, however, the situation appears to have been much more complex.

The proportion between the invading groups and the indigenous population was a significant element in their wielding of power. It is not possible exactly to know the proportion; moreover, the density of the original population in relation to the invading group varied greatly from one area to the other. Yet, the invaders formed a minority. If, e.g., the elite had been composed of 50 per cent of the population, the commoner groups should not have been able to supply them with food and labour that was vital for them to retain the mastery of the commoners. We will here point to Mosca's opinion (1) that a minority may benefit by being just a minority. Yet, we must not disregard the fact that the kinship groups of the political elites was as a rule bigger than each of the commoner clans. One may ask oneself whether they were conscious of this demographic factor and whether, in that case, they tried to preserve a favourable proportion. Since they as well as the commoners attached much value to fertility and numerous offspring, and since we, moreover, know that once the privileged status was accepted the elite groups grew at a great rate in the polygamous society, we would expect a decreasing power to the elite groups provided that the economic surplus remained on the same level. Nevertheless, there was a possibility to maintain the proportion by means of incorporating new subjects and in that way to defend their superiority. In every way the demographic situation seems to have been a favourable factor that has given the possibility to a minority politically and economically to exploit a majority.

5.2 System maintenance and adaptation functions

It has also been possible to describe the system maintenance and adaptive characteristics of the Nilotic societies in terms of recruitment and socialization, namely how the members were inculcated into the special norms and attitudes adapted for the political roles. In describing the system maintenance processes, we have to distinguish between the recruitment and socialization of the population in general into the roles of members, and the recruitment and socialization of elites into the more specialized roles of the political system.

Traditionally, children learnt the system of values and techniques of life in informal groups and by precept at home. In addition, knowledge of agriculture and animal husbandry, and other techniques was acquired through participation in the economic activities of the home. Formal education was provided by initiation ceremonies during which young boys received training and instruction in traditional lore and morality. Child rearing was aimed at enhancing the authoritarian pattern of society. Strong emphasis was put on obedience and deference towards parents, particularly the father, as well as respect for elders. This is what we should expect in a socially stratified society. Even the formal educational system was explicitly aimed at perpetuating the values of the community. The younger generations, therefore, were socialized into accepting a common code of behaviour. The educational system also promoted the process of assimilation. Members of different groups were drawn together, and this considerably helped fostering a common identity, by means of undermining the strength of traditional ties and values, since the agancies of political socialization - family, neighbourhood, and regional and ethnic groups - tended to perpetuate a fragmented and alienated political culture.

Among the Nilotes there were evident correspondences between the principles of appointment to office and the structural types of the societies. The political roles can be divided into different categories according to different points of departure. One important difference is that between institutionalized power and inofficial influence. If we compare these two types of roles with norms of recruitment represented by criteria of ascription and achievement, we get the following pattern of recruitment. Ascriptive or hereditary recruitment has been found among all societies, where it was consistent with the general stress given to kinship in the social system. Nevertheless, elements of achievement occurred even in the most rigidly hereditary systems. No system of recruitment was completely automatic, even setting on one side the recurrent possibility of dethronement, abdication, or usurpation. In the first place, the political roles demanded some particular qualities of their incumbents. Custom furnished a complex interaction of behaviour-patterns which combined to buttress their authority, the respect due to age, hereditary status, marriage alliances, ritual powers, wealth in cattle, fighting powers, oratorical ability, and personality. Moreover, the health of the incumbent often had a direct link with the health of the country. Hence, some flexibility must exist or the system would find itself out of power through inadequacy or incompetence.

Roles involving inofficial influence were of course mainly "recruited" on the basis of merit according to varying norms. In most cases such leaders had a position in some other sub-system. There was a constant tendency for such roles to become subject to hereditary rules. Otherwise it was largely in the military sphere that considerations of age and competence continued to override such tendencies, even over the long term.

When it is a question of institutionalized roles of a permanent type, i.e., those which, in the event of vacancy, are immediately filled by means of some formality, or intermittent or "ad hoc" roles, which are discharged in a special, temporary situation, the main types of recruitment were found in all societies, but they occurred in different combinations depending upon the kind of polity.

This pattern of recruitment made it possible to avoid the necessity for a specialized socialization into the particular roles of the political systems. Socialization of the males in the royal or aristocratic families could combine political role socialization with general socialization.

5.3 Political structures

The classic study of African political institutions has classified them into two main groups. The first group consists of those societies with a centralized authority, well-defined administrative machinery and established judicial institutions - the three major structures of a truly political community in the modern sense. The second group of African societies consists of those in which authority is dispersed through a number of counterbalancing segments, instead of being concentrated in a single central authority.

Our analysis of the character of the Nilotic societies has indicated that the broad classification of African societies into two main groups must be taken as subject to a number of qualifications and reservations. It is at least apparent that the system of social and political relations which prevailed among the Nilotes at that time, was by no means as simple as has been imagined.

If we discuss this structural problem in terms of "community" and "society", we have a better point of departure. The community finally turns into a society, which is just the name we have given to the group of individuals with the least intensity of personal relations, that is, in which kinship ties are weakest and social and political solidarities (in terms of common territory, language, traditions, customs, and marriage) are strongest, even if the composing groups are at war with each other time and again.

Three types of political systems are discernable among the Nilotes: first, we have the institution of kingship which was a characteristic feature of two Nilotic societies - the Shilluk and the Eastern Anuak. In these societies the "society" and the "political community" formed one unit. The difference between them has a historic background; the Shilluk society was from time immemorial an established political system, while the Anuak society was an embryonic political state system.

Next we have another category of Nilotic political systems to which the majority of the Nilotic peoples belonged. It is the multi-chiefdom system, where - as the term indicates - the society consists of a greater or lesser number of political communities, which are more or less autonomous in relation to each other. To this category we count the Alur, Acholi, Lango, Luo, Joluo, Dinka, and Western Anuak.

Finally, we have the Nuer system which in its Western form seems to correspond to the proper "chiefless" societies but in its Eastern form it has during the last hundred years created a method of domination not by evolving a chiefship system but by means of a patron-client system scattering and dominating the indigenous population.

Our study has shown that in the kingly or chiefly society it was possible for the communities to be e i t h e r graded hierarchically or rather pyramidally o r not graded in any way but merely composed of one unit of administration under a single head. In the former case, the lowest level was made up of the heads of the local kinship groups (Lwo: jodongo). The second level was represented by the local chief (Lwo: jago) who was, on one hand, the head of the locally dominating kinship group and, on the other hand, the head of the entire local community. Finally, the highest level of the structure was held by the tribal chief (Lwo: ruoth). Moreover, some of the Lwo peoples (e.g. the Shilluk, Alur, Luo) had extended this structure with more levels but the basic pattern remained - even terminologically. The Dinka differed terminologically from this order, but it is clear from our analysis that - contrary to earlier statements - their political structure had a similar character.

On the other hand, the chiefless society of the Western Nuer normally consisted of a council of elders chosen in virtue of their being the titular heads of local families, each such arrangement being of co-ordinate authority with neighbouring ones, but without any of the co-ordinate segments being regarded as having any supra-ordinate power over its equals.

5.4 The conversion processes

Let us now examine the conversion processes of the Nilotic political systems - the pattern of flow of inputs and outputs.

The flow of demands for political action into the political systems was not handled by specialized political input structures. The interests of the members were, instead, articulated through their family or lineage heads and local community leaders. Interest articulation and aggregation seem also to have been among the primary functions by the more or less formalized councils which existed at various levels of the political systems performing aggregative functions as they heard complaints and deliberated over appropriate courses of action. Another form of interest articulation was occasional rebellions. Among the nobility interest articulation principally took the form of informal demands for offices, privileges, and benefits. This may be said to be one of the forces accounting for continued territorial expansion. Each expansion provided opportunities for additional offices for members of the nobility.

The Nilotic systems were a traditional political system in the sense that rule making or legislation was not viewed as a legitimate function of the political system. Instead, the rule making tended to be either a charismatic process or a slow, incremental process of the accumulation of tradition, which was in part a derivative of the day-to-day rule enforcements and rule adjudications of the systems with consequent elasticity in the technique as well as the interpretation of rules. Through the application of rules to specific cases,

general rules emerged and slowly were elaborated and changed as the society encountered and coped with novel problems. The structures which were involved in the making of rules might be the lineage elders intermittently meeting as a council, or specialized roles such as those of the chief in executive council or of individual officials. In these political systems there might also be prophets and law-givers active primarily in times of conflict and threat, who might reaffirm traditional rules or transmit new rules attributed to supernatural forces. Most of these persons were nevertheless identical with the founders of the political systems. If, therefore, we regard rule making by personal decree as an exception rather than as the rule in Nilotic customary law, we shall be nearer the truth.

The performance of the rule adjudication function involves a process of making the authoritative decision as to whether or not a rule has been transgressed in a given case. The all too common assumption that Nilotic judicial processes recognized only arbitration but no judgement, may be traced to an erroneous attitude to Nilotic law. This narrow attitude stems from the approach which judges everything Nilotic in terms of European standards and values and which dismisses out of hand anything that does not conform to such patterns. It is sufficient here to state that, although the maintenance of the social equilibrium was the prime objective of Nilotic as indeed of any legal system, its judicial process is not best described as consisting mainly of arbitration. Nilotic law had its punitive as well as its compensatory side, and such a dual feature is not at all inconsistent with the maintenance or restoration of the social equilibrium. Moreover, the imposition of European rule upon the Nilotic societies since the end of the last century has witnessed political and social rearrangements. The right to inflict corporal punishments was taken away from the political authorities, who thenceforward had to depend upon the colonial government for punishing criminals. Because no longer needed for such purposes the customary decision-making structures was declining in importance.

The normal procedure in the private suits of lesser importance was for the injured party first of all to approach a neutral third party with the complaint; there was in fact no special, judicial machinery, but things were done in a recognized and ordered way. The function of the mediator was to provide the parties with an opportunity to come to their own agreement which settled the question at issue. If the private dispute was of bigger importance, the case was brought before a court, viz. a structure preordained to come into operation as required. The same was valid for criminal acts. On the local level the step in the direction of an organized judicial system was the recognition of certain elders as traditionally qualified and entitled to participate in the adjudication of disputes. The possibility of appealing a judgement was dependent on the political structure of the society. More centralized political systems tended invariably to have a more advanced body of legal principles and judicial techniques than had those with more or less rudimentary political structures.

Where the wrong-doer had yet to be identified resort was more directly taken to the supernatural in order to divine the culprit. To aid in the difficult task of identification, various expedients were resorted to. Ordeals, oath-swearing and divination were the principal modes of appeal to the supernatural employed in the detection of crime; yet they might also be invoked in certain civil disputes where witnesses were unavailable. A diviner was normally consulted as he was expected to have wide local knowledge, whether this was obtained by natural or supernatural means.

The structure of rule application guards the "output gate" of the political system. It refers to the organization through which political authorities seek to implement their decisions and to serve their information and resource needs. In the more developed societies, a more or less elaborate rule-application structure had emerged. The enforcement of rules was handled through a specialized officialdom consisting of military officers, messengers,

the various officials responsible for the maintenance of the court, and the retainers of the king or chief. The lower echelons functioned under the order of the higher ones, although the communication process was so intermittent that these lines of control often became tenous. Moreover, the functions of the various offices of the administrative organization were only partially differentiated. Most officials performed aggregative, deliberative, administrative, and adjudicative functions as well as military ones in times of war. Adjudicative tasks were differentiated from political ones not by the appointment of special officers, but rather by employing a different kind of procedure. The simpler types of political systems were characterized by an almost total lack of officialdom. There might be a headman of the village and/or a council of elders. But this was part-time roles operating within face-to-face groups. Yet, even in the Nuer, where there are said to have been almost no specialized political roles, there was a point at which a dispute might threaten the cohesion of the community and recourse might be had to a specialized role, the earth custodian, to mediate the argument. When one come to examine the facts closely, however, one does not find that the execution of the decision of the council of elders presented the spectacle of ineffectiveness that is often painted by some writers. Indeed, the duties were effectively performed by more or less regular bands of youthful warriors acting under the direction of the elders.

Finally, we would like to argue that the feud and the duel must be viewed as institutionalized ways of resolving disputes. These rule-application and rule-adjudication processes are not to be confused with random outbursts of violence; they were recurring social processes with well-understood rules and modes of enforcement. As such, they constituted the most primitive political structures, undifferentiated, diffuse, and intermittent, but yet invoking the ultimate sanctions of the society.

5.5 The capabilities

Finally, despite the limitations of the material in the study it can be used for making certain general statements about the system capabilities.

Thus, one can describe the assimilative capability of the Nilotic societies as they were engaged in the process of social and cultural integration. A major characteristic of societies with a kingly or chiefly system is that it tends to compromise heterogeneous or relatively heterogeneous ethnic groups within its fold while that of the chiefless society is that the units composing it may or may not be heterogeneous and is probably often homogeneous. The chiefly societies are based upon cultural and economic heterogeneity corresponding to distinctions of wealth, privilege and status; whereas in chiefless societies there is a notable absence of these features. Moreover, the first do not generally have the same degree of cohesion and cultural identity, whereas the second generally display a large measure of cultural and ethnic identity.

As to the degree of homogeneity as a criterium of whether the society has a chiefly or chiefless character, it is necessary to bear in mind that there were few Nilotic communities that could claim homogeneity. Most of them were in varying degrees heterogeneous, since, as a consequence of the process of Lwo expansion, peoples of diverse cultural traditions were brought within the framework of a single political system. Absorption of the "peripheral" communities into the social structure of the Nilotes was an almost continuous process, involving as a result a partial loss of cultural identity for the absorbed group and its reintegration into a new system of social action. When the alien ethnic groups were absorbed, their identity was, nevertheless, not invariably lost or destroyed. On the contrary, they often took their place as a distinct subunit within the dominant society. Not all societies handled the problem of assimilating aliens in the same way, and a variety of patterns had developed in Nuer. Because of the very nature of dyadic relationships (i.e., those based on reciprocal obligations between patron and client), the Dinka masses adopted into the Eastern Nuer society had little consciousness of

themselves as a group. The roles, norms and statuses associated with the clientage structure tended not only to block the emergence of a separate Dinka to his Nuer lord. The result, up to a point, was to hamper the development of any sort of corporate ties other than those based on feelings of personal allegiance.

Political attitudes remained for the most part caught up in a web of community ties and loyalties. They were parochial in their political orientations, that is to say, they were diffusely oriented towards local authority. The local community remained the primary focus of political activity. Beyond the local community there was relatively little sense of unity; even where ethnic solidarities were most in evidence, fragmentation and parochialism were the rule. Nevertheless, throughout the different systems of relationship which formed the traditional political and social order of the Nilotes, similar principles and processes may be supposed to have been present. Up to the chiefdom or tribal level of organization, there was an increase in the degree to which the separate parts formed a cooperative assemblage; the coordination, combination and mutual dependence of the parts was progressively extended. These parts clearly formed a political community. But the relations between them which constituted the society contained irreconcilable conflicts and were inhibitive of further political development. They derived their internal form from the external opposition of like groups.

In spite of that, the society owed its homogeneity in relation to surrounding peoples to a number of related attributes. These included language, myths, traditions, customs, endogamy and a common territory in which similar ecological conditions existed. Although these were present at all levels of the social and political organization, they were mainly significant as factors of integration at the tribal or national level.

As said above, the formal educational system also promoted the process of assimilation. Puberty initiation rites tended almost invariably to aggregate the individual to wider groupings than those based purely on kinship ties. This often resulted in stronger bonds of loyalty. Age-set associations and warrior classes played their by no means insignificant part in increasing the range and widening the boundaries of the social interests of the individual beyond the restricted ones of the kinship group.

Another factor of social cohesion lied in the very nature of the competitive relations that had developed among them. Simmel's observation (2) that "conflict may also bring persons and groups together which otherwise have nothing to do with each other", gives a clue to an understanding of the institution of rebellion as an integrating factor.

The same historical factors which in the past gave territorial unity to each society were also responsible for the elements of disunity manifest in their social structures. The results were heterogeneous societies, in which power and influence were concentrated in the hands of a small oligarchy, and wherever social and economic differences tended to coincide with ethnic divisions the cohesiveness of the system was directly threatened. The social differentiation created formally recognized relationships of superiority and subordination. Although these interests might be reconciled through reciprocal advantages, they were nontheless a potential source of conflict.

As far as this integration based on identification with the ends of the system is concerned, it is possible to argue that every status group must have a certain minimum degree of identification with the ends of the social system. Nevertheless, the privileged groups defined its end as a general one with which all other members of the society must identify themselves. From this it results an interconnection between privileges and identification. In this sense it is possible to consider the cohesion of the status group as antagonistic to the cohesion of the society as a whole.

Concerning the regulative capability, the political structures in precolonial Nilotic society were diffuse, although a certain degree of differentiation of roles existed. It is enough to say that slavery clearly fostered a pro-

cess of disintegration of the political and social institutions of the Nilotic peoples affected by it. The depredations of the slavers depopulated wide areas and further increased internal anarchy. Added to the foregoing factor of disintegration must be the ethnic cleavages and the consequent re-alignment of peoples due to the fortunes of war or of necessity for migration and search for better means of subsistence, often in times of stress. Finally, the imposition of European rule upon the Nilotic societies since the beginning of the last century has witnessed further political and social rearrangements.

Historically, an important step towards increasing the rate of penetration was taken with the establishment of local chiefs. There were two patterns of connecting the central level with the local one. First, the administrative functions could be delegated to local leaders; second, members of the political elite could be distributed among the local groups as their leaders and as political representatives of central authority. Both models of penetration resulted in contests between the chief and corporate descent groups which, in turn, ended in political decentralization. Power was fragmented among relatively autonomous political units each under the authority of a local leader. The political fragmentation produced, at best, a loose aggregate of semi-autonomous territorial units, each constituting a political community, owing only a conditional allegiance to the larger unity of which it formed a part; at worst they tended to look like a cluster of warring units.

All levels of the political systems were involved in the performance of the regulative function in the society. On the whole the quantity of output in the political systems was minimal. People in the local communities lived a rather autonomous life. Penetration by the central authority down to the local level was intermittent; interference from above was rather sparse. Thus, while we can say that there was an effective regulative capability it was widelydiffused throughout the political systems and not concentrated at the centre. At the lowest level, the regulative capability of the political system was penetrative and extensive, covering almost the whole range of personal, social and economic activity.

Two factors which seem to have influenced the location of Nilotic societies on the regulative capability scale were the size of the political units involved and the quality of transportation and communication facilities. The larger the society and the poorer its transportation and communication facilities, the more decentralized mode of government was likely to develop. The quality and efficiency of transportation were in turn, to some degree at least, functions of environmental conditions. Owing to the inefficiency of techniques for moving men and goods political authorities found it extremely difficult to maintain effective control over their outlying provinces. Thus, the primitive character of communication was a major factor contributing to the frequent breakups of political units. Furthermore, the rapid expansion of the Nilotes and the inclusion of ethnically and linguistically foreign elements must have created centrifugal and pluralistic tendencies of some importance.

A third factor found to be associated with the level of political differentiation in the societies was the nature of their social environment. Those societies which had been most threatened by neighbouring societies tended to have a higher level of political differentiation than the others. Evidently such threats forced societies to respond politically, or to risk being conquered and absorbed by aggressive neighbours. Specifically, we attribute the temporary development of inter-community leadership in the 19th century to the struggle with foreign invaders. Faced with this crisis, they responded by delegating a measure of inter-community authority to certain leaders which they had not previously done. Thus, war or inter-tribal conflict has been one of the major factors strengthening the authority of leaders and promoting social and political differentiation. Moreover, we have been impressed with the apparent ease with which small-scale, temporary systems of a centralized kind arose around (or in opposition to) the raiders for slaves and booty during the period immediately prior to the coming of the Europeans.

Regarding the extractive capability, all Lwo chiefly groups held that the innate superiority of themselves as human beings, and of their social arrangements, entitled them to demand certain services of others, or even to exact benefits arbitrarily if they were not voluntarily supplied. The subjects were usually expected to turn over a portion of everything they produced and in addition were usually liable for labour and military services. Moreover, the chiefly groups received incomes from their military, judicial and ritual activities. In return they offered collective feasting, protection and increasing participation in their society.

As was the case with the capacity to regulate behaviour, the capacity of the political system to mobilize and extract resources from the society was relatively limited. This was, at least in part, due to the mixture of household and administrative forms of organization and control which was characteristic of the political systems. Indeed, it had the effect of a concentration of wealth in the hands of persons with political authority which was not balanced by any of the other means of accumulating wealth.

On the whole satisfactory and regular maintenance of the extractive capability was very difficult to achieve in such a poor area with its small surplus. In 1960 Kimble mentioned that the efficiency of African agriculture was still as low as to demand from two to ten persons - men, women, and children - to produce enough food for their own need and that of another non-farming adult person. (3) Thus, limits were set on the extraction of resources from the society. Furthermore, the traditional agriculture was subject to variations in productivity in consequence of crop-failure, insect-ravages, etc. The devastating cattle-plague which came upon the societies in the 19th century resulted in a decisive decrease in the resources with accompanying political consequences, partly in the form of diminishing extractive capability, partly by waging war against neighbouring peoples in order to enhance the strength of the political authority and to increase its resources by the capture of cattle and prisoners of war. Finally, it seems likely that as a result of the break up of the traditional political order, and the curtailment of the powers of the old chiefs, who were largely responsible for organizing agricultural work, there had been a deterioration in production.

From another point of view, the extractive capability could be taken as a standard of the support of the members to the regime. Given the same degree of economic surplus, the amount of "goods and services" which came into the political system, i.e. the resources which the members placed at its disposal varied with the degree of support they thought that the authorities ought to receive. Yet, this must be related to the possibilities of the authorities to collect the resources required by coercion, which, in turn, was dependent upon the communication capability of the political system.

The political systems also performed important distributive functions which was, to a large extent, tied up with the extractive capability. The production of a surplus was a necessary prerequisite for the existence of economic stratification and thus also for the general social stratification. Differences in wealth were certainly limited, and to a stranger's eye might have appeared insignificant. But the great number of information which deal with the subject of wealth and poverty make it clear that these differences impinged in no small way on the consciousness of the people. Moreover, the obtaining of information has been made difficult by the fact that differences in status seem to have become obscured in recent times.

In some Nilotic societies redistribution was done in a decentralized, non-political fashion; in others, a centralized, political solution was adopted. In the former instance, those who were able to produce a surplus of consumer goods simply held a feast and distributed the surplus to their guests directly. In other societies, however, the redistributive process was more institutionalized, with the village headman or tribal chief functioning as the custodian and dispenser of the group's surplus. This technique afforded a unique opportunity for one individual leader to exercise an inordinate degree of control

over the life of his community, provided there was an appreciable surplus. If there was, the chief was in a position to withdraw some of it for private purposes; part of the revenues was spent on collecting followers to support the leaders of the regime, either by means of establishing marriage relations or by means of obtaining clients. From the point of view of the other party, personal attachment to the chief or one of his relatives was the best way for a commoner to secure some benefits and some protection in society. The very nature of the client-patron relationship obstructed all possibilities of change in the direction of individualism and equalitarianism. This in turn suggests that the dividing line between the economic and political spheres was nowhere sharply delineated. As a protection against the dangers inherent in undue disposal, the people usually insisted that their leaders be men noted for their generosity. In fact, generosity was virtually a prerequisite for leadership. Much of the revenue actually was expended in this form of hospitality.

Another factor which in many cases provided an additional distributive capability to the systems was the policy of conquest and extension. If a society organized along the lines described successfully brought neighbouring groups under its control, the surplus of the society was substantially increased, and the leaders could subordinate their subjects much more effectively. Their ability to distribute booty was a powerful instrument of control. The redistribution of land acquired by confiscation had the same effect. The opening of new political opportunities would increase the rates of movement into the governing and retainer status groups of the dominant society. On the other hand, it would lead to a significant increase in the rate of downward movement in the subject group. The substantial growth in both number and value of transferable resources had significant implications for status mobility, since it facilitated the transfer of power and privilege from one generation to the other. A second development facilitating that kind of transmission was the expansion and elaboration of formal offices. Where offices were firmly established, the importance of personal qualification was substantially reduced. Even where some controls were exercised in the transmission of office, the office nearly always remained in the same descent group.

More efficient means for transmitting power and prestige provided the development of fairly well defined hereditary status groups. The rank of leader could be attained only by a member of the privileged and dominating Lwo people. The criteria of ranking, in other words, did involve ethnic differences as well as differences of lineage and power. Because the Nilotic societies were generally heterogeneous systems, their populations were divided along ethnic lines. This fact was usually of considerable importance as an instrument of distribution controlled by the political system, since ethnic groups became status groups, and the ethnic identification of an individual tended to become either a resource facilitating his advancement in society or an obstacle hindering it. Usually those who belonged to the same ethnic group as the leader were favoured, while members of alien, or subject groups were at a disadvantage.

There were also recognized legal distinctions within the political grouping, and the higher social status of the privileged groups was recognized by the heavier punishments inflicted for offences against their person and also by the fact that they received less severe penalties for the same deviations.

Certain well-defined prerogatives often attached to people of high rank. All the leaders and rulers were distinguished from the rest of the political community by the right to wear special dress and ornaments, to be addressed and referred to in ways that were appropriate for no one else. Deference customs apparently reflected existing power relationships. It is worth while considering these external symbols of the leaders' position. When these special statuses were hereditary (and they, as well as the economic status, usually were), the possibility of status discrepancies arose.

As to the symbolic output they possessed a myth-conveyed scheme of values to explain the division of their societies into distinctive social catego-

ries, and as such it provided a moral justification for the maintenance of the system. What is meant here, specifically, is that the political regime operated on the basis of certain symbols, and within the framework of a certain belief system, from which it derived a powerful, though largely irrational support. It was part of a psychic whole which was designed to give meaning and purpose to all members of society, regardless of social or ethnic origins. There were rituals, too, such as royal enthronements which were used as occasions to consolidate the authority and the legitimacy of the political system; in most royal rituals important parts were allotted to persons representing major divisions of country and people. The evidence suggests that it was largely successful in accomplishing these goals allowing for the fact that the more privileges an individual had within the framework of the political system, the more he identified himself with its end, and vice versa.

In sum, in evaluating distributive capability we must take into consideration the two existing lines of division of the Nilotic peoples, i.e. the division of the population on the basis of different parts in the performance of economic, political, and ritual activities and that based on membership in the Lwo group and all the other clans. We notice an almost perfect coincidence of social stratification and ethnic divisions. Thus, one may conceive of a situation of minimal upward mobility, where social prestige, economic wealth and political power all tended to gravitate into the same hands.

Let us now, finally, look into the r e s p o n s i v e capability evolved for the application of checks and balances to the exercise of political power in the types of Nilotic society.

There is reason for thinking that ideology functioned as a two-edged sword in the societies in question. On the one hand, it rendered the common people vulnerable to elite demands; on the other, it rendered the leaders vulnerable to the demands of their subjects. All official ideologies incorporate the idea that the existing system serves the common good. Since no ideology can long survive, if there is no substance to back up this claim, a leader must make some delivery on the promises inherent in it. In the traditional Nilotic society, the material needs of the ordinary men remained more or less constant, and were usually satisfied by existing local resources. The members of the traditional society had limited expectations of their leaders. Hence there were few "input" demands on the political authorities. By and large the political culture was, what Almond calls, parochial. However, the ideal behaviour for the local authorities was different from that expected of more important chiefs. The latter were expected to inspire fear and this was an element in the dignity of their position. This was not expected especially of village headmen; the ideal for them was to maintain peace of the village.

There were always different kinds of checks and balances upon the powers of the political authorities. Autocratic government was extremely difficult to establish and maintain in such societies; the nature of the economy made responsive government almost inevitable. Moreover, in primitive conditions of transport and communications, there were certain natural limits to the possible ways in which a central authority could maintain any kind of orderly government. We may even say that, the larger the realm the less despotic the leader could be. Just the small area of Shillukland in proportion to the areas of the other Nilotic peoples indicates that the king's instrument of force was important.

On the other hand, rebellions were a common feature of life in most societies. Moreover, the frequent migration of whole societies together with other conditions led to chronic states of warfare between tribes and nations. These situations almost certainly promoted authoritarian tendencies and inhibited the development of responsive government. As various writers have pointed out, the exigencies of war generally made it advantageous to vest ultimate authority in the hands of one man. If an important factor in the growth of responsive government is the absence of internal or external threats to the security of the existing regime, the surprising thing is that responsive govern-

ments were ever established.

Since the chiefs, however, could not hope to exercise a monopoly of power, and since their security depended ultimately on their ability to generate support from below, they had to adopt a far more conciliatory attitude towards the "lower orders" than might have been the case. It follows therefore, that government must have been of the hegemonic type. This means that in any situation in which there was no one obviously correct course of action, effective leadership was possible only if a majority of the population was predisposed to follow the direction of certain individuals and to reject that of others. The same conditions also served to limit the possible extent of political inequality.

In theory, a considerable number of key offices were transmitted as "property" which could be retained indefinitely or transmitted within kinship groups without regard to the qualifications of the possessor. Which chances were there for different categories of members of the society to influence the decision processes, i.e. the degree to which the whole population was involved, by direct participation, by representatives, or by delegates? In fact, careful inspection indicates that there were institutionalized controls which had the effect of preventing or restraining the abuse of political power. First of all it is the question of more formal and permanent or regular structures. The subjects participated in government by means of determiming of which individuals were to be political authorities. The actual incumbency of high office was the direct concern only of a narrow segment of the community, although others might be involved as eligibles, still more as supporters of rival candidates, and the whole population as consenting (in some sense or other) to the particular office and the particular incumbent. In addition, they had control over the incumbents' continuation in office. This was manifested in various ways, one of the most important being the practice of government by council, in which the leader was only primus inter pares. The councils might impose penalties upon the leader, such as refusing to collaborate or deposing. Furthermore, some limited the tenure of chiefs to the years in which they were vigorous and capable, and made provision for them to step aside when they became too old to fulfil the requirements of their office. From the conception of the close association between the chief's physical health and the well-being of land, people, and cattle it follows logically that the fatal illness and death of a chief should bring every kind of disasters on his country. Those chiefs who were regarded as "divine kings" suffered the equivalent of compulsory retirement when, with the impairment of their faculties, they were killed. Thus, checks on ageing in office existed even in hereditary systems. All these as well as the fact that a leader could not keep all his power to himself, but must give some of it away by means of delegation, and the intangible but effective factor of public opinion were some of the major limitations on political authority. Thus, one can recognize a form of the responsive capability in these political systems.

On the other hand, where two quite different principles of political regime were uneasily juxtaposed ("conquest states"), the dominating group's tendency to retain political power in its own hands might leave the subordinated majority with few formal means of representation; the people had few means of showing their dissatisfaction with the rule of the chiefs. Generally, acts of oppression and violence could be committed by a chief without his authority being seriously questioned. Popular opinion might express itself through ad hoc institutions like clientship or, in the last resort, by withdrawal or support for their superior by withholding customary economic services or deserting from the leader's authority and so transfer their allegiance.

Individual members of the system holding a position of power, particularly those of the dominating dynasty, did sometimes conspire against the chief, but did so because of individual ambition rather than common grievance. Manifestations of political upheaval seldom entailed demands for the destruction of the existing system of traditional authority but instead aimed at im-

proving aspects of its uses. The institutionalization of rebellion gave the social systems a greater measure of internal cohesion; since members of the political elite competed among themselves and so must seek support elsewhere than among their own kin, commoners had the chance to participate in and affect the political processes.

These traditional systems had more responsiveness in them than would seem to be the case from a description of the formal powers of the political authorities. The mere fact that most regulative issues were settled at the lowest possible levels made regulative decisions more responsive to the interests of the parties, who lived in the immediate neighbourhood. The rule seems to have been that the smaller and more intimate the group and the smaller the administrative staff, the greater the dependence of the leader on the participation and the support of the commoner members of the group. Participation in political activities, moreover, affected the assimilative capability by means of increasing the sense of loyalty and identification between political elites and common members. They might satisfy underlying emotional needs for security and identification engendered by the traditional society. Fulfilling such needs could be a powerful factor in mobilizing support for the regime and the political system. One final point to note, somewhat in the nature of a paradox, is that the very structural weakness of the Nilotic political systems constituted their principal source of strength and legitimacy.

1 Problem and method

1. Where nothing else is indicated, the terms "Nilotes" and "Nilotic" shall represent the term "River-lake Nilotes", etc. Cf. Sutton (1968: 84) who proposes the classification of the Nilotes in three branches: the Highland Nilotes, the Plains Nilotes, and the River-lake Nilotes.
2. Cf. concerning the Sudan, e.g., Beshir 1968, Albino 1970, and Heradstveit 1970.
3. Cf. Macridis 1955: 3ff.
4. Radcliffe-Brown's definition of political organization which was followed in these studies, was intended to apply to all societies, whether or not they had a state form of government. He said it is that part of the total organization which is concerned with "the maintenance or establishment of social order, within a territorial framework, by the organized exercise of coercive authority through the use, or the possibility of use, of physical force" (1940:XIV).
5. Easton 1957:383ff.
6. Of course, there are also other systemic approaches to political analysis. For a discussion of other particularly influential approaches, see, e.g., Young 1968 and Balandier 1971.
7. Easton 1965 a, 1965 b.
8. Almond & Powell 1966.
9. Parsons 1951. Lasswell 1936, Lasswell & Kaplan 1950.
10. Almond & Powell 1966: 19ff., Pipping 1969.
11. Systems thinking has the merit of implying the interdependence of parts in the system without postulating anything about the relative weight of the individual components in this interaction. The question of a possible superordinate or subordinate relation between the parts is consequently open to empirical research. (Cf. P. Cohen 1968: 176f.)
12. The reason why we prefer the terms "role" and "structure" rather than "office" and "institution" is that we wish to emphasize the actual behaviour of the individuals who are involved in politics, and the actual performance of the particular institution with which we may be concerned.
13. Almond's Weber-inspired definition runs thus: "Legitimate force is the thread that runs through the action of the political system, giving it its special quality and importance, and its cohesion as a system". (Almond & Powell 1966: 17f.) Cf. Etzioni (1961: 12f.) who emphasizes that coercive power is different from other means of power owing to the fact that it can only be used as negative sanctions (punishments) while other resources (such as material or normative power) can usually be used both as negative and as positive sanctions (rewards). After all, Weber has also a broader view of politics and political phenomena. Power, he writes, is "the chance of a man or of a number of men to realize their own will in communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action". (Weber 1946: 180)
14. Easton 1965 a: 50.
15. Cf. Bachrach and Baratz (1963: 632ff.) who maintain that the relations of a political system can be of different kinds, of which "authority" only makes one. The necessary conditions for these relations are that 1) there is a conflict over values or course of action between A and B, and that 2) A or B must comply. a) If B complies, A has *influence* over B. b) If B complies, because A has the means of applying economic, moral, or other sanctions, there is a relation of *power*. c) If B complies as

the result of physical force from A, there is a relation of force. d) If B complies, because a concession in relation to A is consistent with B's system of values, there is a relation of authority. e) If A makes B comply through methods, the character of which B is ignorant of, there is a relation of manipulation.

16. A useful distinction in the methods of wielding power we find in the concept of hegemony and that of domination. For Gramsci, who draws this dichotomy, domination is always associated with "coercion, state power and the movement of forces"; hegemony, on the other hand, despite its inegalitarian implications, conveys an impression of "equilibrium, persuasion, consent and consolidation". (See Williams 1960: 590f.)
17. Almond & Powell 1966: 50ff.
18. Almond & Powell 1966: 64ff.
19. Almond & Powell 1966: 47ff.
20. Easton 1965 a: 70f.
21. Easton 1965 b: 38.
22. Easton 1965 b:71f.
23. Easton 1965 b: 153ff.
24. Easton 1965 b: 171ff.
25. Easton 1965 b:249.
26. Cf. Weber 1946: 78ff.
27. Almond & Powell 1966: 27.
28. It is beyond dispute that the concept of "function" has not been univocally applied in the literature concerning functionalism. (Cf., e.g., Young 1968: 28f.) In our work the concept will oly be applied to an activity in relation to a system. The meaning of function is that of an activity performed by a structure which maintains the system of which it is a part. (Cf. Holt 1967: 90)
29. Hydén 1968:20.
30. Almond & Powell 1966: 29, 73ff.
31. Almond & Powell 1966: 31.
32. Almond & Powell 1966: 42. Considering the range of political systems in their structural aspect, from the simplest ones to the more complex ones, Almond adopts some concepts which are important for us (Almond & Powell 1966: 43f.). In simple political systems the interactions, or the structures, may be occasional or intermittent; there is no set of roles, no structure, which is specialized for political purposes. The boundaries that separate an intermittent political system from the religious or the economic system are diffuse. The roles themselves are combined. The Weberian patriarchal type of political system has an intermittent political structure. The patrimonial political system is different from the patriarchal system in that it has a specialized officialdom. This means that roles having to do with the implementation of policies and decisions are specialized. (Cf. Weber 1947: 341f.)
33. Easton 1965 b:86ff.
34. Almond & Powell 1966: 136.
35. Easton 1965 b: 264f.
36. Almond & Powell 1966: 28, 190ff.
37. The main difference between the classification of capabilities used by Hydén and that presented by Almond lies in the introduction of the assimilative capability and the exclusion of the symbolic one as an independent concept. (Hydén 1968:23)
38. Almond & Powell 1966: 35f.
39. Almond & Powell 1966: 35, 196f.
40. Almond & Powell 1966: 195f.
41. Almond & Powell 1966: 198f.
42. Almond & Powell 1966: 201f.

2 Geographical background

1. General cultural surveys, see, e.g., Murdock 1959:176ff., 328ff., Grottanelli 1948: 285ff., Baumann 1940:223ff., Seligman 1932, Crazzolara 1950, 1951, 1954, Butt 1952, Köhler 1950, and Bryan & Tucker 1948. Area of extension, see Meyers Handbuch p. 190f.
2. The scanty information concerning the demographic conditions that we have been able to include is impaired by the many deficiencies in demographic statistics. (Cf. Dorjahn 1962: 87f.) It has nevertheless been quoted here in order to give an introductory survey of the conditions prevailing during the colonial era. (Alur: Bryan & Tucker 1948: 17; Acholi: Butt 1952: 6; Lango: Crazzolara 1960: 179; Luo Ogot 1967: 23; Shilluk: Lienhardt 1954: 139; Joluo: Santandrea 1944: 94; Dinka: Butt 1952: 3; Nuer: Howell 1954: 10; Anuak: Lipsky 1962: 50f.)
3. See Southall 1956: 3f.
4. My thanks are due to Mr. A.B.C. Ocholla, M.A., Dip. Sc., a native of the Luo of Kenya. He has read through the earlier drafts of my manuscript and pointed out a number of errors and inconsistencies and made valuable suggestions both as to the Luo and the other Nilotic peoples.
5. Jur - a nick name meaning "foreigner" - was originally applied to them by the Dinka. (Santandrea 1944: 94) For that reason this name ought to be avoided.
6. Herzog 1958: 77, Barbour 1961: 91f.
7. Weigt 1958: 48, Ojany 1968: 41f.
8. Barbour 1961: 38f., Kimble 1960: 47f., Stamp 1964: 71, Ojany 1968: 32f.
9. Stamp 1964: 332, 394.
10. Stamp 1964: 337f., Barbour 1961: 234f.
11. See ch. 3.2.
12. Barbour 1961: 240f., Sutton 1968: 70f.
13. Stamp 1964: 338, 394.
14. Barbour 1961: 240f.
15. Stamp 1964: 159, 394, Ojany 1968: 41.
16. Herskovits 1926: 230ff.
17. Cf., e.g., Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 26, Gleichen 1905: 194.
18. Big herds were kept not only as a consequence of social prestige, but they were necessary for securing a maximal net balance, since the herds constantly ran the risk of becoming reduced in numbers as a result of diseases and undernourishment. (Cf. Barbour 1961: 239)
19. Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 16.
20. See, e.g., Southall 1956: 130f., Driberg 1923: 212f., Seligman 1932: 157, Hofmayr 1925: 159f., Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 154f., Hamilton 1935: 86.
21. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 21, 1951: 27, Hayley 1947: 60, Southall 1956: 32, Santandrea 1944: 123, Willis 1928: 204. Among the Alur there was no cattle feudalism as in Ruanda and Nkole (cf. Maquet 1954: 142f., Oberg 1940: 128f.), though the distribution by chiefs of charge over their cattle to their closer followers approached this latter system on a more restricted scale. (Southall 1956: 78, 189, 195, Crazzolara 1951: 186f., 203f., 213f.)
22. D. Cohen 1968: 148.
23. Southall 1956: 271f., Driberg 1923: 96f., Seligman 1932: 32, 136f., Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 21f., 1940 b: 63f., Hofmayr 1925: 283f.
24. Cf. Wagner 1956: 40: the Luo kept cattle belonging to the Bantu Logoli.
25. Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 22, Emin Pasha 1888: 342, Grunnet 1962: 10, Seligman 1932: 170f., Driberg 1923: 93, Westermann 1912: XXIX, Southall 1956: 270f. Cf. Baumann 1934: 305, Murdock 1959: 334f.
26. Crazzolara 1934: 305, Seligman 1932: 170f., Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 22, Driberg 1923: 93, Hofmayr 1925: 284.
27. See, e.g., Southall 1956: 89, Seligman 1932: 136, Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 87, Girling 1960: 17.

3 Basic social structures

3.1 The lineage system

1. See Sahlins 1961: 322f. for a critical analysis of the concept of "segmentary" systems.
2. Alur: Southall 1956: 36f.; Acholi: Crazzolara 1938: VIIf., 1950: 97f., Seligman 1932: 114f.; Lango: Driberg 1923: 189f., Hayley 1947: 40f., Tarantino 1949 a: 109f.; Luo: Evans-Pritchard 1949 a: 29f., Southall 1952: 11f.; Anuak: Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 27f., 1947: 81f.; Joluo: Santandrea 1944: 103f.; Shilluk: Howell 1941: 47f., Westermann 1912: 127f., Pumphrey 1941: 6f., Hofmayr 1925: 233f., Seligman 1932: 41f.; Dinka: Seligman 1932: 141f., Stubbs 1934: 243f., Bedri 1939: 125, 1948: 42, Lienhardt 1958: 104f.; Nuer: Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 192f., Crazzolara 1953: 15f.
3. Middleton 1965: 39.
4. Hayley 1947: 52, Evans-Pritchard 1949 a: 29, 1940 a: 27f., 1940 b: 192f., 1951: 3f., 140f., Santandrea 1944: 107, Seligman 1932: 142, Stubbs 1934: 243f., Bedri 1948: 42.
5. Cf. Crazzolara 1950, 1951, 1954: passim.
6. Southall 1956: 65, Crazzolara 1950: 97f., Hayley 1947: 41, Southall 1952: 12, Stubbs 1934: 244, Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 123.
7. Southall 1956: 307, Evans-Pritchard 1951: 140.
8. Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 234f., Crazzolara 1953: 34f.
9. Southall 1956: 40, Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 28, 1940 b: 194, 1949 a: 29, Santandrea 1944: 107, Westermann 1912: 127f., Stubbs 1934: 246. The absence of the prefix from a lineage name seems to indicate that the members of the lineage in question were of alien origin and absorbed by the society at some period of its history. Cf. Stubbs 1934: 245.
10. Cf. Crazzolara 1950, 1951, 1954: passim.
11. Crazzolara 1950: 97, 1951: 150, 323, 326, 1953: 17f., 21f., 37, 1954: 555, Southall 1956: 67f., Butt 1952: 82, Seligman 1932: 210, Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 28f., 1949 a: 31, 1956: 231f.
12. Concerning different kinds of "ownership" terms, see Elias 1956: 162f.
13. See below ch. 4.
14. E. g., Hayley 1947: 42, 52, Southall 1952: 32, Santandrea 1944: 107, Stubbs 1934: 244.
15. See below ch. 4.
16. Southall 1952: 20, Santandrea 1944: 103, 107.
17. See Säfholm MS.
18. E. g. Nalder 1937: 145, Seligman 1932: 42, 109, 142f., Santandrea 1944: 109, Crazzolara 1953: 38, 196f., Stubbs 1934: 245f., Jackson 1923: 164f., Evans-Pritchard 1949 b: 225f.
19. Westermann 1912: 127.
20. Murdock 1959: 27.
21. Crazzolara 1950: 47, 1951: 220ff., 1954: 490, 495, 537.
22. Cf. Lévi-Strauss 1969: passim, Fox 1967: 175f.

3.2 The local community system

1. For a discussion of the concept of "community", see Schnore 1967: 82f.
2. Southall 1956: 40, Vanneste 1949: 5, Seligman 1932: 40, 141, 158, Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 23f., 35, 1940 b: 114f., 135f., 1947: 65f., Howell 1954: 20f., Bedri 1948: 53, Crazzolara 1953: 4f., Pumphrey 1941: 7f., Bacon 1922: 116, Lienhardt 1954: 141f., Cummins 1904: 152, Poncet 1863/4: 40, D. Cohen 1968: 143f.
3. Butt 1952: 174.
4. Ingham 1958: 21, Butt 1952: 82f., Driberg 1923: 71f., Hayley 1947: 58, Girling 1960: 8, Ogot 1967: 98.
5. Seligman 1932: 137f., Bedri 1948: 42.
6. Southall 1952: 27, 1956: 15, 40, Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 27, 35f., 1940 b:

115, 194, 179, 203f., 212f., 234, 1947: 93, 1949 a: 29, 1950 b: 370, 390, 1951: 9, 19, 23, 27f., Hayley 1947: 58, 43, Pumphrey 1941: 7f., 21, Hofmayr 1925: 150f., Seligman 1932: 41, 76, Lienhardt 1954: 154, Crazzolara 1953: 16, 31f.; cf. Middleton 1965: 32.

7. Cf. ch. 4 passim.
8. Crazzolara 1950: 47f. Cf. Lemarchand 1970: 36f., Buxton 1957: 100f.
9. Crazzolara 1951: 132, 220, 1954: 490.
10. Crazzolara 1950: 85.
11. Cf. Buxton 1963: passim.
12. In the societies where the Lwo aristocracy formed a distinct social stratum, the commoners were sometimes described as "serfs". Cf. Crazzolara 1954: 339, 440. Their position was not exactly like that of serfs in feudal Europe, since they were not "tied to the soil" nor to a particular lord but to the political leader. But they were certainly second-class citizens and were subject to a number of disabilities. (Cf. Weber 1947: 373ff.)
13. Evans-Pritchard 1949 a: 29f., Southall 1952: 21.
14. Sometimes the village community was mentioned as the owner of its cultivations, water-supplies, fishing-pools, and grazing grounds. (Hayley 1947: 58, cf., yet, Driberg 1923: 170). The ownership was, nevertheless, usually spoken about in terms of the lineage with which the village was socially identified.
15. Butt 1952: 82, Southall 1956: 61, Pumphrey 1941: 21.
16. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 35, 1947: 93, Howell 1941: 54f., Pumphrey 1941: 8.
17. Howell 1954: 18.
18. Evans-Pritchard 1949 a: 37.
19. Grove 1919: 161f., Girling 1960: 7. Cf. Seligman 1932: 116, Lloyd 1907: 179, Butt 1952: 83. It is probable that the o fulfilled much the same functions as the Lango o t e m and the Teso e t e m, meaning the fire-place. This original meaning had been extended to mean the locality served by the meeting-place and, collectively, the people belonging to the locality. Cf. Lawrance 1957: 68, Driberg 1923: 80, 112f., Wagner 1949: 55.
20. Westermann 1912: XX.
21. Southall 1956: 33f., 271f., 1952: 26f., Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 18f., 1951: 2.
22. Girling 1960: 47f.
23. Hayley 1947: 58f. Under colonial administration wang tic for women were organized, too. (Ingrams 1960: 274)
24. Evans-Pritchard 1949 a: 37.
25. Grove 1919: 162, Driberg 1923: 106.
26. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 37.
27. Driberg 1923: 206f., Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 9, 25, 119.

3.3 The age-set system

1. They were probably lacking in the Acholi, Alur and Luo tribes. According to Girling (1960: 67f., 169) there was no system of age-sets or initiation schools in Acholi society, and for this reason the socialization of the male was progressive and uninterrupted. Although they had no specific organization, those of about the same age in a village knew each other as "age mates" (y a a), and the status of social maturation was marked only by the acquisition of a new name referring often to incidents which occurred on their courtship expeditions. Cf., yet, Usher-Wilson (1947:33) who mentions a man in charge of the youths and dances, called r w o t b u l. Among the Lendu groups incorporated into Alur society circumcision was regarded as one of the prime distinguishing marks of the adult. But there was no trace of any age-set organization even to the extent of names for initiation sets, although initiates were given new individual names. (Southall 1956: 166f.)
2. Joluo: Santandrea 1944: 127, 1945: 254; Shilluk: Howell 1941: 52f., 1952: 107f.

Hofmayr 1925: 287, 343, Seligman 1932: 70f., Crazzolara 1951: 140; Dinka: Seligman 1932: 170f., Titherington 1927: 205, Bedri 1948: 46f.; Nuer: Crazzolara 1932 b: 28f., Seligman 1932: 223f., Evans-Pritchard 1936 b: 233f., 1940 b: 249f., 1956: 264f., Huffman 1931: 30f.

3. The same word was also known among the coastal tribes of the North-Eastern Bantu. Among the Nyika age-sets were called m a r i k a (sing. r i k a), and the Teita system was known by the word i r i k a (pl. m a - r i k a). (Prins 1952: 71, 124) The Pokomo used the term to a feast given to the whole sub-tribe by the members of a set on their admission. (Werner 1917: 90) The Djaga adopted from the Masai the custom to unite those who were circumcised at the same time to a warrior set (r i k a). (Baumann 1940: 209)
4. Nalder 1937: 145, Howell 1941: 52f., Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 250.
5. Circumcision ceremonies are only stated from two tribes (Rek Dinka, Joluo). In both cases they refer to an Arab origin. (Seligman 1932: 172, Santandrea 1944: 128, cf. Hofmayr 1925: 116) Baker gives us an interesting insight into the Luo assimilative methods. He writes that some Bantu groups claimed to have suffered greatly from the Luo colonists. They "still practised circumcision until the neighbouring JaLuo forced them to abandon the custom by sending out spies to ascertain when the ceremony had taken place and then attacking them whilst their young men were still suffering from the effects of the operation". (Baker, E. C., The Ba-Girango. Unpublished MS. Quoted from Ogot 1967: 218) Among the Logoli the Luo were derided because they did not practise circumcision, and cowardly boys were told in a circumcision song to run off to the Luo country and marry there, as the Luo women were satisfied to marry uncircumcised men! (Wagner 1940: 226)
6. Cf. n g o l as one of the Nuer terms for a war leader. (See below ch. 4. 9. 3)
7. Crazzolara 1932 b: 28f. Cf. Prins 1952: 124: among the Teita boys who entered the bachelors' hut (g a r o) at the same time constituted one group called w a g a r o.
8. Seligman 1932: 170.
9. Bedri 1948: 46f.
10. Santandrea 1945: 254.
11. Evans-Pritchard 1936 b: 252.
12. Stigand 1918: 117.
13. Howell 1941: 56f., Crazzolara 1951: 140, Seligman 1932: 171f., 225f.
14. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 42.
15. Lienhardt 1957: 347.
16. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 69f., 1947: 78.
17. Driberg 1923: 243f., Hayley 1947: 61f., 71.
18. Concerning the age systems of the Nilo-Hamitic peoples, see, e. g., Prins 1953, Peristiany 1951, Gulliver 1951 a, 1954, Fosbrooke 1948, Wright 1942.
19. Bernardi 1952: 317.
20. Howell 1952 b: 107f., Hofmayr 1925: 343.
21. Nalder 1937: 146.
22. Bedri 1948: 48, Lienhardt 1958 b: 131.
23. Hayley 1947: 72.
24. Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 250.
25. Santandrea 1944: 127, Seligman 1932: 72f., 172, Crazzolara 1951: 140, Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 256f.
26. Seligman 1932: 226, Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 259.
27. Hayley 1947: 60.
28. Nalder 1937: 145.
29. Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 260.
30. Wagner 1949: 378. Cf. Bernardi 1952: 320.
31. Howell 1952: 107.

4 Political systems

4.1 Historical background

1. This summary sketch of the early history is mainly based on Crazzolara 1950, 1951, 1954, 1960, Riad 1959, Ogot 1967, Sutton 1968, D. Cohen 1968.
2. Crazzolara 1933: 85ff. Cf. Santandrea (1967: 197f.) who is of the opinion that the stories about pygmies may be considered as exaggerations of the "over-tall" Nilotes.
3. Crazzolara 1950: 75f., 1954: 444, 1960: 199.
4. Riad 1959: 147.
5. Most of the information in this section comes from Gray 1961, Holt 1961, Girling 1960, Beshir 1968, Bennett 1968.
6. Sanderson 1965: 6f.
7. Thomas 1949: 32.
8. Allen 1931: 61.
9. Holt 1961: 79.
10. Beshir 1968: 14f., Sanderson 1965: 8.
11. Collins 1962: 72f., Gray 1961: 36.
12. Anywar 1948: 76.
13. Beshir 1968: 14.
14. Holt 1961: 53.
15. Baker 1879: 265.
16. Grunnet 1962: 20.
17. Beshir 1968: 19ff.
18. Girling 1960: 186.
19. Collins 1966: 375f., Postlethwaithe 1947: 67. Cf. Klima 1970: 95 concerning the Barabaig in Tanzania.

4.2 The Alur

1. Crazzolara 1951: 180f., 1954: 401f., Southall 1956: 4f.
2. Beattie 1971: 55ff.
3. Crazzolara 1954: 443, Southall 1956: 19.
4. Southall 1956: 218f. The Lwo ruot was probably identical with the Nyoro mutongoli. Cf. Emin Pasha (1888:89) who writes that "The whole of Unyóro is divided into large districts, over each of which a makúngo, temporarily appointed by the king, presides whose duty it is to collect the contributions of cattle, corn, &c., due to the sovereign, and to administer justice... Each makúngo appoints a number of matóngali who administer subdivisions of the district on the same principles. A makúngo usually retains all the matóngalis he finds in power on taking office, and hence this dignity is far more permanent than the other, often indeed it has become hereditary". (cf. deMaeght 1968: 210, 225, 235f., and Beattie 1971: 129f.)
5. Crazzolara 1951: 200, 1954: 408, Southall 1956: 59, 90, 225, Vanneste 1949: 6.
6. Crazzolara 1954: 424, 434.
7. de Maeght 1968: 196.
8. Southall 1956: 174, 202, 224.
9. Southall 1956: 18f.
10. Southall 1956: 225, 229f.
11. Southall 1956: 181. Southall's term "chieflet" in diminutive form is inapplicable, since it does not call attention to the relations between the chief and the sub-chief.
12. Crazzolara 1951: 193f., 209, Southall 1956: 79, 363.
13. Crazzolara 1951: 207, Southall 1956: 77.
14. Southall 1956: 80.
15. Crazzolara 1951: 200f., Southall 1956: 136.
16. Southall 1956: 231.

17. de Maeght 1968: 204, 206.
18. de Maeght 1968: 208, 228.
19. Southall 1956: 85, 194, 358.
20. The story of the quarrel between Labongo and Nyipir, the sons of Lwo, about the sacred beads has been recorded many times in slightly different versions among the Acholi and the Alur. Cf. Crazzolara 1937: 11, Lowth 1935: 245, Bere 1947: 2f.
21. de Maeght 1968: 204, 247.
22. There are even traditions containing the Cinderella and the Esau and Jacob motifs. (Crazzolara 1951: 179, 188, 206f., Southall 1956: 222, 359)
23. Vanneste 1949: 161, Crazzolara 1951: 207f., Southall 1956: 86, 359.
24. Southall 1956: 95.
25. See, e.g., Southwold 1966: 114 concerning the Ganda people.
26. Crazzolara 1954: 410.
27. Crazzolara 1951: 219.
28. Vanneste 1949: 81f., Crazzolara 1950: 83, 1951: 196, Southall 1956: 87, 367f. de Maeght 1968: 205f.
29. Among the instructions given to the new chief we find: "... He must be human and condescending, and not harsh in his way with the people, otherwise the lwak, subjects, will recede from him, deprive him of the keer, power, and set up another in his place. Let him not "eat" wantonly the property of the people... He should be generous in giving food to the lwak ... He must show regard for women in general... A Rwoot must not pretend to rule alone; he must hear the elders. He must accept the assistance of the Jegos of the country; in matters of moment he must ask and follow the advice of the sub-chiefs and elders of his people". (Crazzolara 1951: 208f.)
30. Crazzolara 1951: 208, Southall 1956: 240.
31. Southall 1956: 77.
32. Southall 1956: 82f., Ingrams 1960: 258.
33. Southall 1956: 84, 202, 224.
34. de Maeght 1968: 204, and passim.
35. Butt 1952: 175f.
36. Southall 1956: 80, Crazzolara 1954: 420, de Maeght 1968: 206f.
37. Crazzolara 1951: 189, Southall 1956: 89.
38. Southall 1956: 80.
39. Crazzolara 1951: 203, Southall 1956: 78. Since every chief and all the numerous sub-chiefs acted as foci of groups of this sort, the system was not so dissimilar from the cattle attachment of Hutu to Tutsi in Ruanda or of poor to wealthy Hima in Nkole, except that the Lwo system had no exclusive caste barriers. Cf. Westermann 1952: 327f., Maquet 1954: 142, Lemarchand 1970: passim.
40. Southall 1956: 80f.
41. Crazzolara 1951: 204, 209, Vanneste 1949: 73, Southall 1956: 88f., de Maeght 1968: 215f., 232.
42. Southall 1956: 90f., 376. Cf. de Maeght 1968: 224.
43. Stirton 1925: 206f., Vanneste 1949: 163f., Southall 1956: 92f., 370, 376, Crazzolara 1951: 205f.
44. One of the Alur myths of the origin of rain power had the motif of the cultural differences characteristic of economically and socially stratified peoples. The Alur, Lendu and Okebo had a common ancestress, who gave the hen to the Lendu, the hoe to the Okebo, and the rain power to the Alur, the youngest. Therefore, the Alur was their chief, since they were dependent on him. (Vanneste 1949: 18f.)
45. Southall 1956: 94f., Crazzolara 1951: 195f. The whole country presents an unusually varied topography, and while definite rainfall zones are distinguishable, the local rainfall within these zones is exceedingly capricious, and an area of a few square miles may be favoured with heavy rain, while surrounding areas suffer drought, the incidence of this highly local

distribution changing from year to year. (cf. Greenland & Chancellor 1958: 64f.) This ecological factor gives obvious point to the political emphasis on rainmaking.

46. Southall 1956: 188, Crazzolara 1951: 208.
47. Southall 1956: 181.
48. Southall 1956: 192.
49. Southall 1956: 189f.
50. Southall 1956: 182, Crazzolara 1954: 410, de Maeght 1968: 206f.
51. Southall 1956: 186f.
52. Southall 1956: 183f.
53. Southall 1956: 190f.
54. Southall 1956: 195.
55. Southall 1956: 196f.
56. Southall 1956: 47f., Vanneste 1949: 5f.
57. Southall 1956: 47, 93, Butt 1952: 175.
58. Southall 1956: 27. Cf. Middleton 1965: 33.
59. Southall 1956: 189f.
60. Southall 1956: 79.
61. Southall 1956: 223.
62. Southall 1956: 144, Crazzolara 1951: 209.
63. This applied also to the wives of chiefs who were sometimes sent to live in an outlying part of their territory so as to keep the peace there by their mere presence. (Southall 1956: 77)
64. The aboriginals were said to have been gatherers and did not know how to cultivate the soil. (de Maeght 1968: 225, 238) One tradition narrates that the founder of the chiefdom of Panyimur found that the aboriginal Bantu Mukubia ate raw fish and that he gave them fire in exchange for their drum whereby he became their chief. Another story tells us that the aboriginal Bira had tails like cows, which the Lwo cut off to make them properly human. (Southall 1956: 56, 376, Crazzolara 1951: 213f. Cf. Middleton 1965: 23f.)
65. Southall 1956: 229f.
66. Southall 1956: 230.
67. Southall 1956: 7.
68. Southall 1956: 232.
69. Cf. the Lendu and the Lwo versions: the Lendu version: the Lwo "came slowly, like you British. They came friendly, and to friends you exchange food, and so they became chiefs..., deceived us with things to eat". (Southall 1956: 201f.) This "decoy" motif is a very frequent traditional theme referring to the usual Lwo provision of food to groups which they wished to dominate. The Lwo version: "We did not fight them; first of all we plundered them a little... We struck them if they did not pay heed to what we told them... All really good things they got from us... Lendu attached themselves to us because of our kindness to them and then we sent them to dig our field... If they did not like us and went and attached themselves to another Alur master we had no redress; ... if they went off to live among the independent Lendu we would go after them and seize a child that we could sell". (Southall 1956: 202. Cf. de Maeght 1968: 228)
70. Southall 1956: 225f. Cf. Crazzolara 1951: 217, 1954: 416.
71. See, e.g., Wagner 1947: 926f., Mair 1970: passim.

4.3 The Acholi

1. Bere 1947: 5.
2. Crazzolara 1951: 297f., Girling 1960: 101, 123.
3. Crazzolara 1951: 297, 1954: 454, 459, 500.
4. Crazzolara 1951: 169, Bere 1947: 5.
5. An example of this attitude we find in the tradition that tells us that the Lwo discovered an aboriginal group living quite primitively in the bush. They brought them home to "civilized conditions", as their subjects. But

they happened to have very low habits: their children deposited their filth simply anywhere within the village; consequently they were driven away. (Crazzolara 1954: 484)

6. Wallis 1920: 68. The Lwo made peace with the Madi through fear of the Madi bow-and-arrow war tactics. (Hayley 1947: 37)
7. Crazzolara 1938: VIII. Cf. Crazzolara 1937: 18.
8. Speke 1863, Grant 1864, Baker 1866, Gessi 1892, Emin 1888.
9. Girling 1960: 126.
10. Girling 1960: 153f., Beattie 1960:3.
11. Speke 1863: 576, Girling 1960: 153f.
12. Speke 1863: 530f.
13. Gessi 1892: 106.
14. Girling 1960: 164.
15. Girling 1960: 16, 134.
16. Girling 1960: 126.
17. Beattie 1971: 254.
18. Gray 1948: 121. Cf. Bere 1946: 76.
19. Schmidt 1949: 297f.
20. Seligman 1932: 114, Schilde 1947: 351, Wallis 1920: 106.
21. Girling 1960: 91, 135.
22. Crazzolara 1954: 481. Cf. ib. p. 486.
23. Anywar 1948: 74.
24. Girling 1960: 15, 156.
25. Girling 1960: 171.
26. Girling 1960: 126.
27. Girling 1960: 82f.
28. Girling 1960: 8, 82.
29. Girling 1960: 217.
30. According to a summary given by Girling 43 p. c. of the Acholi clans traced their origin from the Lwo, 17 p. c. from the Karamojong, 14 p. c. from the Lango, 9 p. c. from the Madi, 2 p. c. from the Bari, and the rest (15 p. c.) consisted of different unknown tribes. (Ogot 1968:64)
31. Wallis 1920: 106, Butt 1952: 81, Bere 1947: 3f., Crazzolara 1938: VIIf., 1950: 70f., 1951: 193.
32. Crazzolara 1954: 487.
33. Girling 1960: 212.
34. Girling 1960: 208.
35. Girling 1960: 36f., 169f.
36. Girling 1960: 8, 89, 101, Boccassino 1964: 7f.
37. Crazzolara 1954: 457, 464, 500, Girling 1960: 107f., Boccassino 1964: 1ff., 1965: 362ff.
38. Boccassino 1964: 7.
39. Girling 1960: 54, Boccassino 1965: 364.
40. Girling 1960: 30.
41. Crazzolara 1950: 48, 1954: 402.
42. Girling 1960: 107.
43. Girling 1960: 106.
44. Girling 1960: 72.
45. Girling 1960: 61.
46. Baker 1866 1: 319, Kitching 1912: 152.
47. Girling 1960: 163.
48. Girling 1960: 163.
49. Crazzolara 1937: 13, Girling 1960: 85, 153f.
50. Girling 1960: 123.
51. Crazzolara 1951: 273, 1954: 529, 542, Girling 1960: 85, 113.
52. Menzies 1954: 184f., Girling 1960: 43, 86. It is interesting to note that the Acholi chiefs had "state" wives of the kind formally recognized among some Southern Bantu tribes. (Cf., e. g., Schapera 1937: 75, 91, Gluckman 1940: 35, Kuper 1947: 88)

53.Seligman 1932: 132.
54.Girling 1960: 43, 86.
55.Seligman 1932: 132, Nalder 1937: 146.
56.Girling 1960: 43, 193.
57.Girling 1960: 85f.
58.Crazzolara 1951: 209.
59.Girling 1960: 88.
60.Wright 1936: 198, Negri 1937: 180, Nalder 1937: 146, Malandra 1939: 34, Crazzolara 1951: 175, 276, 288, 293, 300, 306, 1954: 465, 500, Menzies 1954: 183f., Bere 1947: 5, Ingrams 1960: 268, Girling 1960: 43, 115f.
61. Crazzolara 1937: 13, Girling 1960: 86.
62.Girling 1960: 96.
63.Crazzolara 1954: 542.
64.Crazzolara 1937: 13, Anywar 1948: 74, 79.
65.Crazzolara 1951: 193, 288f., 1954: 477, Girling 1960: 87, 96f.
66.Crazzolara 1951: 241.
67.Crazzolara 1951: 262, 294, 1954: 545, Girling 1960: 97.
68.Crazzolara 1951: 242, 272, Menzies 1954: 183, Girling 1960: 104f.
69.Nalder 1937: 146.
70.Seligman 1932: 115.
71. Girling 1960: 97.
72.Girling 1960: 94f.
73.Wallis 1920: 137, Seligman 1932: 115, Nalder 1937: 146, Boccassino 1938: 75, Crazzolara 1951: 233, Girling 1960: 95.
74.Girling 1960: 95.
75.Ingrams 1960: 270.
76.Girling 1960: 96.
77.Girling 1960: 96.
78.Girling 1960: 96.
79.Crazzolara 1954: 463f., 472f., Girling 1960: 34.
80.Girling 1960: 30, 46, 122.
81. Bere 1955: 49f., Girling 1960: 60, 95f., 184f., 231. Cf. Boccassino 1938: 78.
82.Grove 1919: 172.
83.Nalder 1937: 146.
84.Bere 1955: 49.
85.Girling 1960: 60.
86.Girling 1960: 60f.
87.Girling 1960: 59, 97, 232.
88.Grove 1919: 164, Negri 1932: 94, Girling 1960: 231.
89.Usher-Wilson 1947: 30.
90.Girling 1960: 58.
91. Girling 1960: 183.
92.Seligman 1932: 115, 130f., Grove 1919: 172f., Bere 1946: 77, Boccassino 1949: 323, Crazzolara 1954: 464.
93.Wright 1936: 198, Crazzolara 1951: 109, Girling 1960: 82.
94.Girling 1960: 171.
95.Girling 1960: 80f.
96. Girling 1960: 82.
97. Girling 1960: 99f.
98.Girling 1960: 100.
99.Girling 1960:155.
100. Girling 1960: 104, 124.
101. Girling 1960: 30, 72.
102. Girling 1960: 69, 83, 122.
103. Seligman 1932: 131, Nalder 1937: 146, Crazzolara 1951: 305, Girling 1960: 102, 124.
104. Girling 1960: 102.
105. Hofmayr 1925: 28.

106. As an example of this chiefly ideology we can quote a declaration of a former Payera chief: "Il territorio è proprietà del capo e non tutti hanno la proprietà; se fanno la caccia, hanno la proprietà nel territorio del capo, e la gente ha dato questa proprietà perchè il capo deve essere sopra di loro; se la gente fosse sola, senza capo, morrebbe". (Boccassino 1938: 78)
107. It is not clear whether the legislative powers of the chief were confined to clarifying custom, or whether he could introduce innovations. According to legendary traditions the chiefs set up various rules about social and economic relations. (Cf. Girling 1960: 124, Crazzolara 1951: 281, Bere 1955: 49, Anywar 1948: 78)
108. Girling 1960: 104.
109. Anywar 1948: 78, Girling 1960: 104f.
110. Girling 1960: 83, 122f. Crazzolara (1954: 388) gives an instance of chiefly power, which is, nevertheless, difficult to interpret. Important cases, he says, were referred to the chief of Palaro, as the highest authority. A session of the people's court (bura) was convened for the settling of grave cases, such as murder (possibly by sorcery), serious injury, adultery, etc., which might lead to disorder. The court, which - beside the chief - consisted of the lodito, i.e. sub-chiefs and elders, was summoned by the jago kal. They had even power to pronounce a sentence of death. In that case the jago kal was the executor. If this "people's court" was sanctioned by tradition, the chief would only in exceptional cases have been provided with such a coercive power.
111. Anywar 1948: 78, Crazzolara 1954: 492.
112. Baker 1866 1: 319f.
113. Crazzolara 1954: 496.
114. Crazzolara 1954: 456.
115. Crazzolara 1950: 71. Among the Pabo sub-chiefs or headmen were never called jago but atekere, a Lango term for clan. (Crazzolara 1954:455)
116. This information, which Butt (1952: 82, cf. Malandra 1939: 35, Crazzolara 1950: 59f.) has drawn from Girling's unpublished doctorate dissertation "The traditional social and political order of the Acholi of Uganda", is not to be found in his book published in 1960, where he (p. 87) maintains that the elders who officiated in the installation ceremony were called the jagi (sing. jago). "Although this word jago was used for one of the grades in the hierarchy of Government chief, many Acholi were of the opinion, he says, that the jagi in the past had no executive responsibility, and that the word referred only to their roles in the installation and other ceremonies."
117. Nalder 1937: 145f., Crazzolara 1951: 283, Boccassino 1964: 17.
118. Girling 1960: 63, 170.
119. Girling 1960: 64.
120. Girling 1960: 170.
121. Bere 1947: 5.
122. Emin Pasha 1919 2: 131.
123. Postlethwaithe 1947: 56f.
124. Girling 1960: 82f.
125. Girling 1960: 114.
126. Girling 1960: 104.
127. Girling 1960: 123.

4,4 The Lango

1. Since time immemorial they had been designated by the term Lango-Omiru. The Lango were said to take offence at the term omiru, which they supposed to have been applied to them by the Lwo to insult them by calling them "slaves" (from the Nyoro term mu-iru). Crazzolara (1954: 562) rejects this interpretation and maintains that the term omiru is of Lango-Teso origin, meaning "naked". Nevertheless, we prefer the first-mention-

ed interpretation, since (j)omiru is a term found even among the Alur with the same meaning. (de Maeght 1968: 200)
2. Seligman 1932: 113f.
3. Westermann 1912: 1.
4. Driberg 1923: 38.
5. Tarantino 1946: 12f., 1949 b: 230f., 1949 c: 145f.
6. Tarantino 1946: 14.
7. Tarantino 1946: 15.
8. Cf. Oliver 1963: 176f.
9. Crazzolara 1960: 200.
10. Crazzolara 1960: 176.
11. Crazzolara 1960: 200.
12. Crazzolara 1960: 191.
13. Crazzolara 1960: 200f.
14. Driberg 1923: 204f.
15. Tarantino 1949 a: 110.
16. Ingham 1958: 156f.
17. Speke 1867: 509.
18. Wright 1958: 131f.
19. Driberg 1923: 252.
20. Ingham 1958: 157.
21. Driberg 1923: 205, Hayley 1947: 39.
22. Driberg 1923: 106.
23. Wallis 1920: 68, Ingham 1958: 21, Low 1963: 337, Alpers 1968: 250.
24. Lawrance 1957: 10ff., 148.
25. Hayley 1947: 145.
26. Driberg 1923, Hayley 1947.
27. Driberg 1923: 175, Hayley 1947: 43.
28. Hayley 1947: 103f.
29. Hayley 1947: 43.
30. Tarantino 1949 a: 110. Concerning the exaction of the death penalty in cases of patricide or fratricide, see Driberg 1923: 210ff.
31. Tarantino 1949 c: 15.
32. Driberg 1923: 206, Hayley 1947: 56, 175.
33. Driberg 1923: 206.
34. Driberg 1923: 170.
35. Driberg 1923: 114, Hayley 1947: 12, 148f. The term won is usually translated as "owner", much misunderstanding being caused thereby. It would be more accurately rendered as "one who has influence over the object". The words "guardian", "custodian", "protector" or "trustee" might sometimes be adequate translations.
36. Driberg 1923: 208, 213, 360, 419, Hayley 1947: 57f., 146.
37. Driberg 1923: 208.
38. Hayley 1947: 56.
39. Driberg 1923: 208.
40. Driberg 1923: 113f., Hayley 1947: 148f.
41. Driberg 1923: 80.
42. Driberg 1923: 206, Hayley 1947: 56, 145.
43. Driberg 1923: 206.
44. Hayley 1947: 56f., 145f.
45. Huddle 1957: 185.
46. Tarantino 1940/41: 882.
47. The term twon ("bull") was applied of a great man. The expression twon me atekere ("bull of the clan") was used for the famous ancestors who were supposed to have founded the clan. (Hayley 1947: 42f., 204f., Crazzolara 1951: 236, Driberg 1923: 206f.)
48. Driberg 1923: 206.
49. Tarantino 1949 a: 110.
50. Driberg 1923: 207f.

51. Hayley 1947: 61.
52. Driberg 1923: 254.
53. Driberg 1923: 248f., Hayley 1947: 24, 74f.
54. Hayley 1947: 73.
55. Driberg 1923: 252.
56. Among the Lwo the concept of k e r (political power) was exclusively connected with chiefship. Among the Lango, on ther other hand, ker seems to have been connected with the council of elders. (cf. Driberg 1923: 208) In the administrative system introduced by the British the term was applied to the districts of a ruot or a jago.
57. Huddle 1957: 185.
58. Olyech 1937: 317f.

4.5 The Luo

1. Ogot 1967: 25, 144.
2. Ogot 1967: 127f., 137.
3. Evans-Pritchard 1949 a: 26.
4. Crazzolara 1950: 89.
5. Ogot 1967: 150f., 154f., 215.
6. Ogot 1967: 154f., 159.
7. Southall 1952: 41.
8. Ogot 1967: 153, 220.
9. Ogot 1967: 217.
10. Ogot 1967: 163.
11. Ogot 1967: 217.
12. Wagner 1949: 27f., Southall 1952: 28, 1956: 4.
13. Ogot 1968: 65f.
14. Ogot 1967: 39, 169,220.
15. Ogot 1963: 252.
16. Wilson 1961: 8, Ogot 1967: 192.
17. Ogot 1963: 252.
18. Ogot 1967: 158f., 187.
19. Ocholla MS.
20. Wilson 1961: 2, 25.
21. Wilson 1961: 70.
22. Wilson 1961: 1f.
23. Wilson 1961: 2, 6f.
24. Evans-Pritchard 1949 a: 29, 37f.
25. Wilson 1961: 18, 49, 75f.
26. Southall 1952: 27.
27. Wilson 1961: 19f., 67.
28. Wilson 1961: 29f.
29. Wilson 1961: 57.
30. Wilson 1961: 56f., 29.
31. Wilson 1961: 57f.
32. Wilson 1961: 80.
33. Wilson 1961: 24, 26.
34. Wilson 1961: 25.
35. Wilson 1961: 24.
36. Wilson 1961: 30.
37. Wilson 1961: 63f.
38. Wilson 1961: 55f.
39. Wilson 1961: 137.
40. Ocholla MS., Mboya 1967: 165.
41. Evans-Pritchard 1949 a: 24f., 39f., cf. du Pré 1967: 56f.
42. Southall 1956: 5, 190.
43. Ogot 1967: 170.
44. Ogot 1967: 151, 163, 171.
45. Ogot 1964: 284ff.

46.Whisson 1964: 23f.
47.Whisson 1964: 43.
48. Lonsdale, J. M., A political history of Nyanza, 1883-1945. Unpublished thesis 1964. (Quoted from Ogot 1967: 173)
49.Ogot 1967: 173.
50.Cf. Northcote 1907: 58, Roscoe 1915: 276, Johnston 1902: 765, Stam 1920: 968, Hobley 1903: 328, 1929: 172f.
51. Ogot 1967: 111. 169. Bohannan (1954: 2ff.) discerned two types of movement which he termed "expansion" and "disjunction". By "expansion" he meant "that type of movement which leads to the enlargement in area of a lineage's territory". This kind of movement may eventually "lead to a change in geographical location of the lineage territory; it does not affect the overall juxtaposition of lineage areas". In contrast to this mode of expansion is what he called "disjunction". This is the clan colony type of movement which "brings about a separation of groups in space and affects not only the geographical position of a lineage territory, but also the juxtaposition of lineage territories".
52.Wilson 1961: 18, 24.
53.Ogot 1967: 159, 163.
54.Ogot 1967: 149.
55.Ogot 1963: 252.
56.Ogot 1963: 270.
57.Ocholla MS., Mboya 1967:9. To-day doho is used to refer to the African Native courts, while buch piny was displaced by the colonial government. (ib.)
58.Evans-Pritchard 1949 a: 31.
59.Mboya 1967: 9.
60.Ogot 1963: 252, Wilson 1961: 122.
61. Evans-Pritchard 1949 a: 29. Cf. Wagner 1949: 132f. concerning the o m b i l o (pl. a v a v i l a) of the neighbouring Luyia people.
62.Northcote 1907: 64, Stam 1910: 362.
63.Roscoe 1915: 292, Wagner 1949: 152f.
64.Ogot 1963: 252.
65.Ocholla MS.
66. Phillips 1945: 125.
67.Evans-Pritchard 1949 a: 28, Wilson 1961: 24f.
68.Ocholla MS.
69.Wilson 1961: 18.
70.Wilson 1961: 25.
71. Wilson 1961: 25.
72.Northcote 1907: 60.
73.Ocholla MS.
74.Ocholla Ms.
75.Cf. Crazzolara 1954: 323, 559, 561f.
76.Mboya 1967: 9.
77.Southall 1952: 26f., Wilson 1961: 3.
78.Evans-Pritchard 1949 a: 26.
79.Wilson 1961: 1, 6f., 93, du Pré 1967: 24f., 41f.
80.Ocholla MS., Mboya 1967: 13ff.
81. Ocholla MS.
82.Wilson 1961: 59, 87f.
83.Evans-Pritchard 1949 a: 28f., 31.
84.Ocholla MS.
85.Wilson 1961: 12, 38.
86.Wilson 1961: 70.
87.Ocholla MS.

4.6 The Shilluk

1. Howell & Thomson 1946: 7.
2. Crazzolara 1951: 129.
3. Lienhardt 1955: 41, Holt 1961: 5, 53, 63.
4. Hofmayr 1925: 258f., Seligman 1932: 40f., Pumphrey 1941: 7f., Howell & Thomson 1946: 6, Howell 1952 b: 101.
5. Riad 1959: 200.
6. Seligman 1932: 76, Howell 1941: 54f., Pumphrey 1941: 7f.
7. Hofmayr 1925: 150f., Seligman 1932:41, Pumphrey 1941: 21.
8. Brun-Rollet 1862: 23, Westermann 1912: 149.
9. Howell & Thomson 1946: 6f.
10. Westermann 1912: XLVIIIf., Hofmayr 1925: 260, Crazzolara 1932 a: 185, Pumphrey 1941: 10f., Howell 1952 b: 100.
11. Crazzolara 1951: 132f., de Pruyssenaere 1877: 4. Cf. Lienhardt 1955.
12. Hofmayr 1925: 71, Seligman 1932: 49, Crazzolara 1951: 133.
13. Crazzolara 1932 a: 185, 1951: 137, Hofmayr 1925: 141. It was a definite crime against the king himself, formerly punishable with death but later by a heavy fine, for any man to have sexual intercourse with their king's daughter. (Seligman 1911: 218f., Howell 1952 b: 107f.)
14. Munro 1918: 150, Hofmayr 1925: 66, 83, 261f., Seligman 1932: 49, Crazzolara 1951: 139.
15. Hofmayr 1925: 261f.
16. Banholzer & Giffen 1905: 199.
17. Westermann 1912: LII, Hofmayr 1925: 263, Crazzolara 1950: 5, 1951: 139f.
18. Hofmayr 1925: 50, 141f., Seligman 1932: 77, 89, Crazzolara 1932 a: 187f., 1937: 7, 1951: 132, 140f., Howell 1952 b: 101, Pumphrey 1941: 10, 14f.
19. Crazzolara 1932 a: 881.
20. Riad 1959: 161.
21. Hofmayr 1925: 263f.
22. Hofmayr 1925: 28. The singular forms r i t and r a t have also been found. In older literature the term for king is said to have been "bondu". The Europeans usually called the king "mek", which is a contraction of the Arabic word "malik". (Westermann 1912: XLVI, 279, Banholzer & Giffen 1905: 192)
23. Concerning Nyikango, see, e.g., Brun-Rollet 1855: 100, Hofmayr 1925: 139f., Seligman 1932: 43f., Howell & Thomson 1946: 9f., Tegnaeus 1950: 121f., Crazzolara 1951: 128f., Lienhardt 1954: 150f.
24. Cf. Griffith (1936: 193f.) who points out that "ret" was a frequent title in Demotic and can be translated as "inspector" or "agent". Demotic "rt" is Egyptian "rwd" - agent, found also in Coptic. In Egypt the title was used nearly always in connection with a divinity, generally Isis ("agent (perite) of Isis"), rarely with a king or as a title standing alone. In Nubian language "arti" was the term for a divinity and in Somali language "garat" was the term for a chief. (Westermann 1912: 279, cf. Wright 1940: 195ff., 1952: 86f.)
25. Frazer 1905: passim, 1911: I, XIf.
26. Hofmayr 1925: 48f., 76f., 152f., Howell & Thomson 1946: 10, Howell 1953 a: 189f., Lienhardt 1954: 163.
27. Hofmayr 1925: 46f., 235f.
28. Seligman 1911 a: 221f., Pumphrey 1941: 21.
29. Pumphrey 1941: 7. Cf. Schweinfurth 1918: 45b.
30. Hofmayr 1925: 48, Pumphrey 1941: 19.
31. Westermann 1912: LIV, Hofmayr 1925: 28f., 149, 178f., Seligman 1932: 90f. Howell & Thomson 1946: 10, 27, Howell 1952 b: 102, Crazzolara 1951: 134.
32. Evans-Pritchard 1948 a: 33f.
33. Seligman 1932: 90f.
34. Riad 1959: 174.
35. Riad 1959: 175.
36. Howell & Thomson 1946: 18.

37. Hofmayr 1925: 145, Crazzolara 1932 a: 185, 1951: 134. Westermann (1912: XLVI) emphasizes that "there are three houses of the royal family, and the king is elected from each of these royal branches in turn", and further that "there seems to be two branches of each house, so that when a king dies, it will be the turn of his eldest son to become king, after five kings have reigned and died". Seligman, on the other hand, enforces (1932: 44f.) that he found no basis for such a belief, which were, nevertheless, "common among the Europeans in the Shilluk country". Cf. Nadel (1947: 343) concerning the Tullishi-Nuba: their chieftainship was divided between two royal houses which took office alternatively. Concerning "polydynastic succession", see Goody 1966 a: 157f. The Shilluk convention seems to have been developed in recent decades and was connected with the dichotomy of the kingdom into northern and southern halves, between which selection should also alternate. The kingship was made to circulate between representatives of the different parts of the kingdom. Another possible solution to the problem is that the electors naturally favoured different candidates - the district chiefs, in particular, being motivated by extreme rivalry. Compromises were therefore inevitable and were characteristically achieved by one faction agreeing to support another's candidate in return for a promise of reciprocal support at the next election. Hence the succession rarely passed from father to son but shifted from one branch to another of the royal clan, a common device for distributing and balancing power.
38. Riad 1959: 171, 185.
39. Anonymous 1956: 99.
40. Hofmayr 1925: 258, Seligman 1932: 93, Howell & Thomson 1946: 29f., Riad 1959: 171f., Anonymous 1956: 99f.
41. Howell & Thomson 1946: 29.
42. Riad 1959: 187.
43. Westermann 1912: XLVII, Howell & Thomson 1946: 33f.
44. Munro 1918: 146f., Howell & Thomson 1946: 5f., Thomson 1948: 151ff.
45. Westermann 1912: 125, 161, Howell & Thomson 1946: 48f., Howell 1952 a: 160, Crazzolara 1950: 39, Anonymous 1956: 99, Riad 1959: 195.
46. Anonymous 1956: 100.
47. Oyler 1918 b: 115.
48. Westermann 1912: 125, Thomson 1948: 158, Anonymous 1956: 101, Riad 1959: 194.
49. Hofmayr 1925: 28, 151f., 258, Seligman 1932: 45f., de Pruyssenaere 1877:5.
50. Riad 1959: 196.
51. Hofmayr 1925: 151, Crazzolara 1951: 142.
52. Howell & Thomson 1946: 30, Crazzolara 1951: 142. Crazzolara (ib.) maintains that the decision was arrived at through "a majority vote". A decision by consensus is rather to be expected in such a situation. Cf. Bailey 1965: 1f.
53. Seligman 1932: 45. Cf. de Pruyssenaere 1877: 5.
54. Seligman 1932: 45.
55. Seligman 1932: 47.
56. Hofmayr 1925: 259, Howell & Thomson 1946: 30, Crazzolara 1951: 143.
57. Howell & Thomson 1946: 44.
58. Crazzolara 1951: 142f.
59. Howell 1952 b: 105.
60. Hofmayr 1925: 150f., Seligman 1932: 41, 46f., Pumphrey 1941: 21, Howell & Thomson 1946: 34, Crazzolara 1951: 143f., Howell 1952 b: 105.
61. Howell 1946: 34.
62. Riad 1959: 202.
63. Crazzolara 1951: 143.
64. Hofmayr 1925: 343, Howell 1952 b: 107f.
65. Pumphrey 1941: 9 f., 21f., Riad 1959: 202.
66. Seligman 1932: 40, Pumphrey 1941: 21f.

67. Hofmayr 1910: 333, Westermann 1912: XLVIII, 124f., 133f., Seligman 1932: 45f., Crazzolara 1951: 142.
68. Lienhardt 1954: 163.
69. Hofmayr 1925: 160. Cf. (ib.): "So zahlte das Dorf Nibodo vor einigen Jahren zwei Mädchen und 15 Kühe. Auf Einschreiten des Sudanregierung welch letztere die Uebergabe des Mädchens als Sklavenhandel betrachtete, musste König Fadyet die Mädchen wieder freigeben".
70. Brun-Rollet 1862: 23.
71. Hofmayr 1925: 49f.
72. Brun-Rollet 1862: 22.
73. Tappi 1903: 122.
74. Seligman 1932: 39, 43.
75. Westermann 1912: XLVII.
76. Hofmayr 1925: 150.
77. Evans-Pritchard 1948 a: 13.
78. Howell 1941: 57, Howell & Thomson 1946: 8.
79. Crazzolara 1951: 142.
80. Howell 1952 b: 105.
81. Howell 1952 b: 102f.
82. Schweinfurth 1873: 93.
83. Hofmayr 1925: 133.
84. Seligman 1932: 45, Crazzolara 1951: 139.
85. Seligman 1932: 96.
86. Seligman 1932: 46, Hofmayr 1925: 157f., Howell & Thomson 1946: 48, Crazzolara 1951: 143, Howell 1952 b: 114f., Riad 1959: 210f.
87. Hofmayr 1925: 157.
88. Hofmayr 1925: 162.
89. Howell 1952 b: 105.
90. Westermann 1912: XLVII.
91. Hofmayr 1925: 159f. Cf. Seligman 1911 a: 218f.
92. Seligman 1932: 94, Howell & Thomson 1946: 48, Riad 1959: 190.
93. Munro 1918: 146, Seligman 1932: 93.
94. Hofmayr 1925: 50.
95. Hofmayr 1925: 224, Seligman 1932: 102, Westermann 1912: XLIIIf. Cf. Brun Rollet 1862: 23.
96. Seligman 1932: 80.
97. Riad 1959: 210.
98. Hofmayr 1925: 167f.
99. Howell 1952 b: 105, 113, de Pruyssenaere 1877: 5.
100. Westermann 1912: XX, Hofmayr 1925: 162.
101. Howell 1952 b: 112.
102. Oyler 1920: 296f.
103. Howell 1952 b: 114.
104. Howell 1952 b: 113, 117.
105. Hofmayr 1925: 151f., Seligman 1932: 45f., Pumphrey 1941: 21.
106. Gluckman 1954 a: 78, 1954 b: 25.

4.7 The Joluo

1. Santandrea 1967: 27.
2. Santandrea 1967: 30ff.
3. Santandrea 1964: 65ff.
4. Santandrea 1967: 31f.
5. Santandrea 1967: 154f. Cf. Crazzolara (1953: 36): the Joluo had no cattle "aus dem Grund, weil ihre Nachbarn, die Dinka, sie alsbald rauben würden, sobald sie hörten, dass jemand solche hat. Ein Joluo, der solche hat und behalten will, ist gezwungen, sie bei einem befreundeten Dinka unterzubringen".
6. Petherick 1861: 394.
7. Cummins 1904: 166, Tucker 1931: 50.

8. Tucker 1931: 50.
9. Schweifurth 1874 1: 154.
10. Santandrea 1946: 230f.
11. Santandrea 1967: 32, 105.
12. Santandrea 1967: 75.
13. Santandrea 1967: 73.
14. Cf. Magagnotto (1917: 134) who states that the Dinka language was the "lingua sacra" of the Joluo.
15. Santandrea & deGiorgi 1965: 25.
16. Santandrea 1938: 278, 1944: 101.
17. Santandrea 1938: 280, 1946: 228, 1967: 48, Magagnotto 1926: 72f., Santandrea & de Giorgi 1965: 26.
18. Santandrea 1944: 104, 113, 1948: 192, 1967: 30.
19. Santandrea 1967: 83, 187.
20. Hofmayr 1925: 27f., Santandrea 1944: 97. Crazzolara's information (1950: 118) that ja was "king" and rwoth "sub-chief" is obviously wrong, all the more as he adds that "the rwoth was...consigned the famous 'spear of the fathers'...".
21. Santandrea 1944: 97f., 104f.
22. Santandrea 1944: 97.
23. Santandrea 1944: 98f., 1967: 86, Santandrea & de Giorgi 1965: 27f.
24. Santandrea 1967: 81ff., 48, 110, 116, 120.
25. Santandrea 1944: 101. Owing to the absence of a leader of some standing among the w. Jur, a war-leader, Kangi, eventually became the chief of a fairly extensive area. He was a self-made man and the first commoner to become a chief. He started his career as a "captain" of the chiefly army, but gradually rose to the status of an indepedent chief with a comparatively large following: weaker groups rallied to him for assistance, virtually accepting his suzerainty. Also the southern Shilluk-Luo fell under his sway. He was succeeded by his heir. (Santandrea 1967: 72)
26. Santandrea 1944: 96.
27. Santandrea 1944: 99.
28. Santandrea 1944: 96f., 101, 129.
29. Crazzolara 1950: 118.
30. Frobenius 1912: 87.
31. Santandrea 1944: 99, 1948: 188, Santandrea & de Giorgi 1965: 30. Dimo's sacred spear was lost during Arianhdit's troubles (1922), when a band of furious Dinka warriors broke into the village where it was kept. The loss of the spear was regarded as one of the factors of the decline of the Wadelmak's dynasty. (Santandrea 1967: 82)
32. Santandrea 1944: 101, 1948: 192, 1967: 94.
33. Santandrea 1944: 97,
34. Santandrea 1938: 277f., 283, 1944: 97, 1948: 190f.
35. Santandrea 1948: 191.
36. Santandrea 1948: 188f.
37. Frobenius 1913: 82, Santandrea 1938: 277f., 1948: 191.
38. Santandrea 1948: 193.
39. Santandrea 1948: 187f., 191.
40. Magagnotto 1926: 52f.
41. Santandrea 1948: 187f., 198.
42. Santandrea 1944: 98.
43. Santandrea 1967: 70.
44. Santandrea 1967: 83, 139, Santandrea & de Giorgi 1965: 31.
45. Schilde 1947: 350.
46. Ghawi 1924: 71f.
47. Santandrea 1944: 103, 1948: 189. The most common ordeal was, otherwise, that of drinking a poison-draught (kwir), a method well-known among many other Nilotic peoples. (Cf. Stubbs 1938: 138, Johnston 1902: 792, Santandrea 1938: 338f., Boccassino 1958: 286ff.)

48. Ghawi 1924: 77.
49. Magagnotto 1926: 20f.
50. Santandrea 1938: 280.
51. Santandrea 1938: 283, 1944: 101.

4.8 The Dinka

1. Lienhardt 1958 b: 109f.
2. de Pruyssenaere 1877: 13, Wilson 1905: 126, Seligman 1932: 196, Santandrea & de Giorgi 1965: 176.
3. Lienhardt 1961: 25.
4. Seligman 1932: 137f., 163, 169f., Titherington 1927: 176, Stubbs & Morrison 1938: 25lf., Lienhardt 1961: 10f.
5. Santandrea 1967: 61, 127ff., Stubbs & Morrison 1938: 231, Lienhardt 1961: 177, 187.
6. These artificial mounds which form a conspicuous feature of the country, provided undoubtedly a place safe from floods, and nowadays the cattle are tethered there. Nebel suggests that bigger mounds almost naturally became homes of chiefs, serving occasionally as store and fortress for the community, as remnants of stockades indicate. Those built by the river were also said to be turned into beacons whence the rising of the river or the coming of floods were signalled by conventional fires. (Santandrea 1967: 128, 154)
7. Santandrea 1967: 62. Cf. Seligman 1932: 136, Whitehead 1953: 275f.
8. Santandrea 1967: 64, Lienhardt 1961: 73f.
9. Santandrea 1967: 107. Cf. Riad 1959: 229. Cf., also, a tradition reported by Nebel (Santandrea 1967: 107, 158): Apuk, a Rek Dinka section, got into an area, where they could not gain their livelihood, for they were unacquainted with fishing. Therefore their chief Thik decided to learn from the aboriginal Jur not only how to fish but also how to cultivate. Nebel's information hints to us that even the Dinka could be in inferiority, but that they, nevertheless, had the capability of usurping the power.
10. Lienhardt 1958 b: 113f., 1961: 80, 311, Cummins 1905: 160, Willis 1928: 207, Stubbs 1934: 243f., 247, Bedri 1948: 48, Howell 1951: 255.
11. Lienhardt 1961: 8f. Cf. Kish ("the lieges"), the designation of those subdued by the Hadendoa-Bedja ("the lions"), and kisa or kisya, meaning "serf". (Rossini 1947: 836)
12. Lienhardt 1961: 168.
13. Howell 1951: 242.
14. Santandrea 1967: 155.
15. Cf. Santandrea 1967: 132: the Luel were said to have had long broad spears with long shafts.
16. Lienhardt 1961: 108, 171f., cf. p. 190.
17. Stubbs 1934: 25lf., O'Sullivan 1910: 176.
18. Lienhardt 1961: 210.
19. Lienhardt 1961: 191.
20. Bedri 1948: 47, Lienhardt 1961: 188.
21. Bedri 1948: 46, Lienhardt 1961: 91.
22. Seligman 1932: 148. Cf. Evans-Pritchard 1934: 3, Wilson 1905: 128.
23. Lienhardt 1961: 135f., Bedri 1939: 130.
24. Lienhardt 1961: 206f. Cf. Säfholm Ms.
25. Lienhardt 1958 b: 123.
26. Lienhardt 1961: 20.
27. Lienhardt 1961: 174f.
28. Lienhardt 1961: 217.
29. Lienhardt 1961: 217.
30. Howell 1951: 207.
31. Among the Ngork Dinka the Pajok lineage held a leading position. They did not have representatives in all sections of the society. The most powerful clan was that of the dinyor. (Howell 1951: 242)

32. Howell 1951: 242.
33. Lienhardt 1958 b: 128.
34. Santandrea 1967: 157f., 192f.
35. Riad 1959: 244.
36. Willis 1928: 185f., Johnston 1934: 125, Bedri 1948: 44f., Lienhardt 1961: 191f.
37. Lienhardt 1961: 102, Willis 1928: 196. Cf. Crazzolara 1951: 126.
38. Even the title m o n e b i t has been found among the Raik Dinka. (Titherington 1925: 194)
39. Lienhardt 1961: 193, 252f.
40. de Pruyssenaere 1877: 21.
41. Seligman 1932: 195f.
42. Seligman 1932: 197.
43. Howell 1951: 273.
44. Lienhardt 1961: 298f., Seligman 1932: 197f., Bedri 1948: 50, Howell 1951: 271f., Santandrea & de Giorgi 1965: 167ff.
45. Lienhardt 1961: 215.
46. Stubbs 1934: 252.
47. Titherington 1925: 196.
48. Bedri 1948: 50.
49. Lienhardt 1961: 301.
50. Lienhardt 1961: 299f.
51. Seligman 1932: 197.
52. Bedri 1948: 50f.
53. Seligman 1932: 142, Howell 1951: 304, Lien hardt 1961: 210f.
54. Bedri 1939: 130.
55. Stubbs 1934: 247, Santandrea & de Giorgi 1965: 185.
56. Türstig 1905: 144.
57. Santandrea & de Giorgi 1965: 185.
58. Bedri 1939: 130, 1948: 48f. Cf. Willis 1928: 204f.
59. Bedri 1948: 50.
60. Seligman 1932: 181f., 196, Titherington 1925: 194, Johnston 1934: 126f., Stubbs 1934: 245f., Bedri 1948: 50, 55f., Lienhardt 1958 b: 104f., 118f., 1961: 252f.
61. Bedri 1948: 56.
62. Seligman 1932: 182.
63. Bedri 1948: 50.
64. Titherington 1927: 166.
65. Lienhardt 1961: 208.
66. Lienhardt 1961: 287f., Bedri 1948: 53f.
67. Santandrea & de Giorgi 1965: 180.
68. Cummins 1904: 154.
69. Lienhardt 1961: 211.
70. Bedri 1948: 46, Santandrea & de Giorgi 1965: 178f.
71. Seligman 1932: 198.
72. A similar theme appears in Alur and Burundi where in theory the heir to the kingdom was born with all kinds of seeds in his fist. (Southall 1956: 359, Maes 1947: 1040)
73. Cf. Willis (1928: 203): the Dinka system of life, with its religious basis and social and moral rule, its priesthood and tribal chiefs whose functions were interdependent, were all resting ultimately on the religion of Deng.
74. Seligman 1932: 180, Lienhardt 1961: 261f.
75. Lienhardt 1961: 97f.
76. Seligman 1932: 180, 198.
77. Lienhardt 1961: 264.
78. Howell 1948: 52f., Bedri 1948: 54.
79. Lienhardt 1961: 211.
80. Titherington 1925: 194, Stubbs 1934: 248, Boccassino 1935: 7f., Bedri 1948: 48, Lienhardt 1961: 211.

81. Lienhardt 1951: 304.
82. Lienhardt 1961: 145, 241.
83. Titherington 1927: 166, Cummins 1904: 155f., Seligman 1932: 157, Stubbs 1934: 247, Bedri 1948: 51f., Howell 1951: 260, 272, Lienhardt 1958 b: 116.
84. Stubbs 1934: 247f., Bedri 1939: 130f., Lienhardt 1961: 105, Santandrea & de Giorgi 1965: 179.
85. Lienhardt 1958 b: 118f.
86. Lienhardt 1958 b: 103, 133, 1961: 318, Bedri 1948: 46f., Howell 1951: 259.
87. Lienhardt 1958 b: 116.
88. Lienhardt 1958 b: 119f., 1961: 9.
89. Lienhardt 1951: 310.
90. Seligman 1932: 157, Cummins 1904: 155f., Titherington 1924: 127f., Bedri 1948: 51f., Lienhardt 1961: 248.
91. Stubbs 1934: 248, Lienhardt 1961: 287. To swear a binding oath they also went to the blacksmith and licked his hammer (Seligman 1932: 194). Cf. Tegnaeus 1950: 52 f., concerning the smith as an arbitrator. His lineage was considered as a "neutral" outsider in relation to the other social groups.
92. Schilde 1947: 354.
93. Titherington 1927: 166.
94. Cf. Willis (1928: 197) who mentions a kind of aboriginal "tribal chiefs", whose functions were partly executive, and partly ritualistic, quite distinct from the descendants of Aiwel.
95. Titherington 1927: 164.
96. Titherington 1927: 164, Seligman 1932: 141f., 191, 195, 200, Stubbs 1934: 244, 248f., Schilde 1947: 354, Bedri 1948: 53.
97. Stubbs 1934: 249, Bedri 1948: 53.
98. Seligman 1932: 142.
99. Seligman 1932: 200, Stubbs 1934: 248.
100. Schilde 1947: 354.
101. Olivetti 1933: 27, Lienhardt 1951: 304, 1958 b: 131.
102. Cf. Stubbs 1934: 249.
103. Lienhardt 1961: 73f.
104. Seligman 1932: 188f., 196.
105. Cf. Fergusson's account (1922: 163f.) of a man emphasizing that Nhialic, the Supreme Being, had appeared to him at the bottom of a suddenly arising pool instructing him to act as his representative with the people. This phenomenon was originally connected with the Messianic expectation that an Agar hero, Kejok (a parallel to Aiwel) was about to manifest himself again to his people and to bring them untold wealth and happiness. The incident affected other Dinka tribes and the Mandari and Nuer as well. There was a general feeling that the miracle boded good to the Dinka and ill to the foreigners.
106. Santandrea & de Giorgi 1965: 180f.
107. Bedri 1939: 130, Titherington 1925: 194, 1927: 165, Cummins 1904: 156, Howell 1951: 264, 268, Santandrea & de Giorgi 1965: 179f.
108. Seligman 1932: 142, 196.
109. Lienhardt 1958 b: 107.
110. When they lay in the grave, the chiefs who were the principal repositories of their tribal traditions, were said to recall the past history of the tribe, how they had ruled and advised the people, and instructing them how to act in the future. (Seligman 1932: 197) Cf. also Lienhardt (1958 b: 118) who holds that the Dinka political theory was one of expansion. "They see their history as a spreading out and separation of peoples on the ground ... a notion which includes the notion of a measure of personal leadership."
111. Santandrea & de Giorgi 1965: 180.
112. Lienhardt 1961: 301.
113. Lienhardt 1961: 255.

114. The Government disregarded in the early days the menyor and made certain kic chiefs. A chief dismissed by the Government was immediately made a beny nial by the people. (Bedri 1948: 45, 50)

4.9 The Nuer

1. Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 5, Crazzolara 1953: 30f., 37.
2. Riad 1959: 236ff.
3. Sahlins 1961: 341f.
4. Sahlins 1961: 341f.
5. Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 111. Among the myths of the origin of death some have the motif of over-population (cf. Abrahamsson 1951: 145). Also the Nuer had such a myth according to which God asked men whether they wanted to live for ever or die. The people said that the earth was growing full of people, and that it would be better that some should die and make room for those who came after them. (Huffman 1931: 90)
6. Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 20, 48, Crazzolara 1953: 35.
7. Jackson 1923: 71, Evans-Pritchard 1934: 3, 1940 b: 125, 1956: 11. Cf. the Nuong Nuer version, in which an adopted Cic Dinka boy cheated Rill, the Nuer ancestor, out of the best share of inheritance. (Fergusson 1921: 149f.)
8. Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 19, 68f., 130.
9. Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 20.
10. Evans-Pritchard 1933: 42, 1940 b: 212f., 216, 224, Crazzolara 1953: 7, 16, 31f., Howell 1954: 17f., 181f.
11. Evans-Pritchard 1933: 53, 1935: 87, 1940 b: 203f., 214, Crazzolara 1953: 36f.
12. Evans-Pritchard 1933: 36, 1940b: 160, 221f., 228f., 1951 a: 25, Crazzolara 1953: 34f.
13. Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 7, 91, 125, 182, 217, 234.
14. Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 221.
15. Crazzolara 1953: 31f.
16. Evans-Pritchard 1933: 42, 1940 b: 155, 217f., 234f., Crazzolara 1953: 34f.
17. Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 205, 219.
18. Evans-Pritchard 1951 a: 24f.
19. Evans-Pritchard 1951 a: 133f.
20. Crazzolara 1953: 36.
21. AES 1:132, 138, 320, Evans-Pritchard 1949 b: 221.
22. Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 221.
23. Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 127, 215f., 219.
24. Evans-Pritchard 1933: 5f., 36f., 40f., 1934: 16f., 31, 1940 b: 231, 1956: 239f., Crazzolara 1950: 15, 1953: 19.
25. Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 128, 183, Crazzolara 1953: 35.
26. Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 215.
27. Evans-Pritchard 1934: 38f., 1940 b: 179f., 1950 b: 390, 1951 a: 27f., Howell 1954: 31. Each small lineage had its gwan buthni, an agnatic kinsman of a collateral branch of the lineage, who was its representative at its rites such as weddings, mortuary rites, composition and atonement of homicide, sacrifices to honour the ancestral spirits, sacrifices to sever kinship and allow marriage or cohabitation, raiding, and elephant hunting. It was particularly his duty to call out the clan spear-name (mut) and to slay sacrificial beasts. He had a right to some of the meat of sacrifices, to a section of the tusk of any elephant they might kill, and to the first turtles and the skins of the first leopards and genets killed by the youths of the lineage. His acts were mainly of a ritual nature and he had no political authority, but he did represent or symbolize the unity and exclusiveness of the group. (Seligman 1932: 235, Howell 1945: 95f., 1954: 9f., Evans-Pritchard 1950b: 367f., Crazzolara 1953: 24ff.)
28. Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 179, Crazzolara 1953: 7.
29. Evans-Pritchard 1934: 40f., 1940 b: 179f., 214f., 1950 b: 370, 1951 a: 9.
30. Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 179.

31. Crazzolara 1953: 7, 32.
32. Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 179f.
33. Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 180, Crazzolara 1934: 315.
34. Evans-Pritchard 1934: 40, 1940 b: 169, 178f.
35. Crazzolara 1934: 308, 1953: 31.
36. Howell 1954: 2.
37. Evans-Pritchard 1934: 22f., 1940 b: 177, Crazzolara 1953: 12. Howell (1954: 213) supposes that gwan or kuar bith was identical with gwan tang. Evans-Pritchard (1934: 52, 1956: 246), on the other hand, mentions gwan biedh ("the owner of the fishing spear") as an official who assisted the earth custodian in homicide cases.
38. Evans-Pritchard 1934: 39. Cf. Stigand 1918: 116f.
39. Schilde 1947: 364.
40. Howell 1954: 215f.
41. Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 177, 250, Crazzolara 1934: 311f., 1953: 13, Jackson 1923: 89, Seligman 1932: 217, Howell 1948: 174, 1954: 212.
42. Evans-Pritchard 1935: 45f., Crazzolara 1953: 12.
43. Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 250.
44. Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 254.
45. Howell 1954: 212. Gwan pini was probably identical with kuar thoi. (Evans-Pritchard 1935: 44)
46. Evans-Pritchard 1934: 43, 1940 b: 172, 1956: 291, Howell 1954: 43. Even the forms kwar mong and kwor muong have been found (Jackson 1923: 89, Schilde 1947: 161). Anthropological textbook writers - walking in Evans-Pritchard's footsteps - often refer to the kuar muon as "leopard-skin chief" or "leopard-skin priest" named after his official garment, hence the title kwar kwac (or kwaitch) - not kwar twac which Evans-Pritchard constantly misuses. Kwar or gwan twac (pl. ji twac) was the common name for all experts (the kuar muon included) who had the traditional right to wear a particular skin as a badge of office. (Howell 1954: 213f.)
47. Cf. Evans-Pritchard 1934: 44: "As a general rule I shall refer to the kuar muon as a leopard-skin chief when speaking of him more particularly in relation to his politico-priestly functions, and as land-expert when speaking of him more particularly in relation to those magical functions which give him control over the soil". Jackson's scanty information (1923: 89) of the fact that among certain sections the office of kwar mong and kwar kwac were identical, in others not, indicates that the problem is still more complicated. Cf. Seligman 1932: 207.
48. Crazzolara 1953: 85.
49. Crazzolara 1953: 13, 85, Howell 1954: 29.
50. Evans-Pritchard 1933: 41, 47, 1934: 22, 1940 b: 174, 213, 1956: 292. Cf. Crazzolara 1953: 9f.
51. Evans-Pritchard 1934: 36.
52. Crazzolara 1953: 12f. Cf. Howell & Lewis 1947: 163.
53. Evans-Pritchard 1934: 43f., 1956: 291, Crazzolara 1953: 13, Howell 1954: 43.
54. Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 173, 1956: 290f.
55. Evans-Pritchard 1956: 167, 300, Howell 1954: 207. Crazzolara (1934: 314f.) reports that the wut or kwaar goog not infrequently got at loggerheads with the kuar muon and threatened to destroy the live-stock of the latter, who replied by banishing his cattle from the earth. Hence the cattle expert came off a loser. It may be questioned whether it concerns common conflicts or whether there is a deeper lying cultural antagonism reflected in this struggle for power.
56. Evans-Pritchard 1933: 18, 1934: 44f., 1940 b: 16, 173, 1951 a: 42, Howell 1954: 27f., 206f., 212, 219f., Cf. Coriat (Evans-Pritchard 1934: 44f.) who writes concerning the Gaawar tribe: "The hereditary kwar Mon was at one time the sole authority for settlement of disputes connected with land and

water rights. His powers were autocratic and semi-divine..." ... "the practice of hearing disputes in collaboration with older men is born of the present administration".

57. In some parts of Nuerland a special functionary (k u a r t h o a n) with a serval cat skin as official garment existed to mediate in disputes between two opposing earth custodian families. In Eastern Nuer areas this function must be performed by a commoner (d w e k). (Howell 1954: 44)
58. Howell 1954: 27f., Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 150f., 162f.
59. Jackson 1923: 102, Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 152.
60. Howell 1954: 219f., Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 164, 1956: 297.
61. Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 152, 173, Howell 1954: 43.
62. Evans-Pritchard 1934: 52, 1940 b: 154, 1956: 246, Crazzolara 1953: 204. In Western Nuerland the kinsman was called g w a n b i e d h, "the master of the fishing-spear", which was the title of the Dinka chief. (ib.)
63. Evans-Pritchard 1935: 39, 1940 b: 174f.
64. Seligman 1932: 215.
65. Howell 1954: 28f. Cf. Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 163f.
66. Crazzolara 1953: 7f.
67. Evans-Pritchard 1935: 45f.
68. Howell 1954: 211.
69. Howell 1954: 29.
70. Lewis 1951: 83, Howell 1954: 30f., 247.
71. Howell 1954: 32.
72. Howell 1954: 211.
73. Howell 1954: 31.
74. Lewis 1951: 83.
75. Lewis 1951: 81, Howell 1954: 29, Evans-Pritchard 1934: 20f., 1956: 172, 241.
76. Evans-Pritchard 1935: 43, 1940 b: 230, 240.
77. Howell 1954: 32.
78. Evans-Pritchard 1933: 5f., 36f., 40f., 1934: 16f., 31, 1940 b: 231, 1956: 239f., Crazzolara 1950: 15.
79. Evans-Pritchard 1934: 20f., 1940 b: 236, 241, Jackson 1923: 75. Cf. Cummins 1904: 154.
80. Evans-Pritchard 1935: 46f., 1956: 114, Jackson 1923: 75f.
81. Howell 1954: 8, 214, Jackson 1923: 91. The Shilluk used the term g u u c parallelly with b a n g or n g a t e d e n g to describe those who, without being ruined, had been struck by Deng, the god of thunder, and who had become his "servants". (Crazzolara 1932 a: 196f., 881)
82. Evans-Pritchard 1935: 63, 1940 b: 187.
83. Brun-Rollet 1855: 222f. Cf. Werne 1849: 207. Poncet (1863/4: 40) states that among the Nuer there were rich and important persons ("devins ou sorciers", "jongleurs") honoured after their death.
84. Howell 1954: 216f.
85. Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 184.
86. Coriat 1939: 221f., Seligman 1932: 231, Evans-Pritchard 1935: 56, 1940 b: 185.
87. Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 188, 1940 c: 295, 1956: 304, Lewis 1951: 81, Howell 1954: 8.
88. Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 187f., Howell 1954: 214f.
89. Evans-Pritchard 1935: 43, Seligman 1932: 233.
90. Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 185, Howell 1954: 214.
91. Jackson 1923: 158, 1954: 170, Coriat 1939: 221f., Evans-Pritchard 1935: 56f., 1940 b: 185f., plate XXV.
92. Seligman 1932: 231.
93. Fosbrooke 1948: 25f., Huntingford 1953 c: 38f., 49, Schneider 1962: 145f., Wagner 1940: 204.
94. See, e.g., Hodgkin 1957: 95f.
95. Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 187.
96. Shaw 1915: 35f., Schmidt 1949: 147, Seligman 1932: 195, Bedri 1948: 43f.

Cf. Stubbs 1934: 248, Boccassino 1935: 7f.
97. Willis 1928: 201f., Howell 1952 b: 117.
98. Evans-Pritchard 1940 b: 189.
99. Cf., yet, Evans-Pritchard (1951:9): "a man holding the social position of tut is sometimes referred to as r u e i w e c", an expression which he gives the interpretation "spittle of the camp (community)" which is difficult to understand.
100. Lewis 1951: 82f.
101. Evans-Pritchard 1940 c: 295.
102. Evans-Pritchard 1940 c: 296.

4.10 The Anuak

1. Crazzolara 1951: 146f.
2. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 10, 19f., 112.
3. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 20.
4. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 18f., Lienhardt 1962: 74.
5. Seligman 1932: 110.
6. Schilde 1947: 346, cf. Hofmayr 1925: 28.
7. Crazzolara 1951: 149. Cf. Murdock (1959: 176): "The Anuak seem to have succeeded better than any political cartoonist on a European anti-royalist newspaper in producing an effective caricature of the kingship"!
8. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 51. Evans-Pritchard made two field investigations in Anuakland. The first he made on a hard march through Anuakland in 1935, when the people were at loggerheads with the Government. He followed this with a record of observations made while he was leading Anuak guerrillas against the Italians during the War.
9. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 38f.
10. Lienhardt 1958 a: 24.
11. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 35, 43f., Lienhardt 1958 a: 25. Cf. the Nuer term kuaro. The usual Lwo term was jago.
12. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 43, Lienhardt 1958 a: 25.
13. Lienhardt 1957: 350f.
14. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 43f., 1947: 92, 95, Lienhardt 1958 a: 25ff.
15. Cf. Gluckman 1965: 137.
16. Evans-Pritchard 1947: 94.
17. Lienhardt 1958 a: 25.
18. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 43.
19. Lienhardt 1958 a: 35.
20. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 35, 38, 1947: 93.
21. Lienhardt 1958 a: 31.
22. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 38f., 46, 1947: 95, Lienhardt 1957: 344, 1958 a:25.
23. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 41f.
24. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 40f., 1947: 95, Lienhardt 1957: 344f.
25. Lienhardt 1957: 346, Evans-Pritchard 1947: 96.
26. Lienhardt 1957: 347.
27. Lienhardt 1957: 347.
28. Lienhardt 1957: 348.
29. Evans-Pritchard 1947: 94f.
30. Evans-Pritchard 1947: 65f.
31. Evans-Pritchard 1947: 95.
32. Lienhardt 1958 a: 31.
33. Lienhardt 1958 a: 27f.
34. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 26, 44.
35. Lienhardt 1958 a: 30.
36. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 26, 40, 1947: 94f.
37. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 26.
38. Evans-Pritchard 1947: 95.
39. Lienhardt 1962: 75.
40. Lienhardt 1962: 84.

41. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 47f., 1947: 84f., Lienhardt 1958 a: 23f.
42. Lienhardt 1962: 82.
43. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 46f., 51f., 100.
44. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 105, 115, 1947: 47.
45. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 120, 1947: 82.
46. Seligman 1932: 109, Bacon 1922: 114, Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 76f., 123, Lienhardt 1955: 36f., 1958 a: 24f.
47. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 79.
48. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 107f., 120, 1947: 76.
49. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 116, 119, 1947: 76f.
50. Evans-Pritchard 1947: 78f.
51. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 114f., 1947: 79f.
52. Evans-Pritchard 1947: 81.
53. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 99, 1947: 83, Bacon 1924: 114.
54. Evans-Pritchard 1947: 87f.
55. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 100.
56. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 57f., 62f., 77, Bacon 1921: 163f.
57. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 71, 74.
58. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 37, 69f., 81, 125, 1947: 77f.
59. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 11.
60. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 45, 69, 116, 120, 1947: 96. Cf. Lienhardt 1957: 346
61. Evans-Pritchard 1947: 77.
62. Evans-Pritchard 1947: 79.
63. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 124f.
64. Evans-Pritchard 1947: 77f.
65. Evans-Pritchard 1947: 79.
66. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 51. Cf. Crazzolara 1951: 146, 150: rwäth.
67. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 131f.
68. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 79, 119, 124f., 1947: 77.
69. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 25.
70. The Anuak sometimes went to a Beir specialist when they wanted rain. (Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 48)
71. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 86f., 102f., 1947: 91f.
72. Bacon 1921: 163, 1922: 115, 118, 1924: 114f., Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 54f., Crazzolara 1951: 147f.
73. Goody 1966 b: 1ff.
74. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 11f., 52, 102f., 119, 131f., 137, 1947: 73, Bacon 1924: 114f.
75. Evans-Pritchard 1940 a: 104.

5 Summary and conclusions

1. Mosca 1939: 53.
2. Simmel 1955: 98.
3. Kimble 1960: 572.

Periodicals and other scientific publications

A	Anthropos (Wien)
AA	American anthropologist (Wisconsin)
AB	Afrika. Handbuch der angewandten Völkerkunde. Herausg. H. A. Bernatzik. Bd 1-2. Innsbruck 1947.
AC	Africa (London)
AEB	Anthropos ethnologische Bibliothek (Wien, Mödling)
AES	The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. A compendium prepared by officers of the Sudan Government. Ed. A.E.W. Gleichen. 1-2. London 1905.
AL	Annali Lateranensi. Pubblicazione del Pontificio museo missionario ethnologico (Città del Vaticano)
AMH	Afrikas medeltidshistoria. Ed. R. Oliver. Falköping 1968.
APM	Annali del Pontificio museo missionario ethnologico già Lateranensi. See AL.
APS	African political systems. Ed. E.E. Evans-Pritchard and M. Fortes. London 1940.
APSR	American political science review (Menasha Wis.)
AQ	Anthropological quarterly (Washington)
AR	Africa (Rome)
ASA	The association of social anthropologists of the Commonwealth. Monographs.
ASKM	African systems of kinship and marriage. Ed. A.R. Radcliffe-Brown and D. Fortes. London 1950.
AV	Archiv für Völkerkunde (Wien)
AW	African worlds. Studies in the cosmological ideas and social values of African peoples. London 1954.
BSKG	Bulletin, Société Khédiviale de géographie. Cairo.
BSRBG	Bulletin de la Société royale belge de géographie. (Bruxelles)
BTW	Baumann, H., Thurnwald, R. & Westermann, D., Völkerkunde von Afrika, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der kolonialen Aufgabe. Essen 1940.
CC	Continuity and change in African cultures. Eds. W.R. Bascom & M.J. Herskovitz. Chicago 1962.
CEA	Cahiers d'études africaines (Paris)
CPA	Contemporary political analysis. Ed. J.C. Charlesworth. New York 1967.
CS	Cambridge papers in social anthropology (Cambridge)
CSAS	Communications from the School of African studies. University of Cape Town. New series.
E	Ethnos (Stockholm)
EAEC	Ethnographic survey of Africa. Ed. D. Forde. East Central Africa (London)
ERE	Encyclopaedia of religion and ethics (Edinburgh)
F	Folk. Dansk etnografisk tidskrift (København)
FT	Festschrift Thurnwald. Beiträge zur Gesellungs- und Völkerwissenschaft. Berlin 1950.
G	Genus (Roma)
GJ	The geographical journal (London)
HEA	History of Eastern Africa. Eds. R. Oliver & G. Mathew. Oxford.
HTA	The historian in tropical Africa. Eds. J. Vansina, R. Mauny, & L.V. Thomas. London 1964.

IAIM	International African institute. Memorandum (London)
IPS	The institutions of primitive society. Eds. E.E. Evans-Pritchard & al. Oxford 1954.
IRCBM	Institut royal colonial belge. Section des sciences morales et politiques. Mémoires. Collection in 8° (Bruxelles)
JAH	Journal of African history (London)
JEAS	Journal of the East Africa and Uganda natural history society (Nairobi)
JHI	Journal of the history of ideas (New York)
JRAI	Journal of the (Royal) Anthropological institute of Great Britain and Ireland (London)
JRLI	The Journal of the Rhodes-Livingstone institute (Livingstone)
LN	La Nigrizia (Verona)
LPS	Lund political studies (Lund)
M	Man. A record of anthropological science (London)
MC	Museum Combonianum. Collana di studi africani dei missionari Comboniani... (Verona)
MH	Meyers Handbuch über Afrika. Mannheim 1962.
MRCB	Annales du Musée royal du Congo belge (Tervuren). Série in 8°. Sciences de l'homme. Ethnologie.
MSA	Monographs on social anthropology. The London school of economics and political science (University of London) (London)
PME	Dr. A. Petermanns Mittheilungen aus Justus Perthes' geographischer Anstalt. Ergänzungsband (Gotha)
S	Sociologus (Berlin)
SEU	Studia ethnographica Upsaliensia (Uppsala)
SIA	Studia Instituti Anthropos(Wien-Mödling)
SIS	Sociology: an introduction. Ed. N.J. Smelser. New York 1967.
SNR	Sudan notes and records (Khartoum)
TEA	The transformation of East Africa. Studies in political anthropology. Eds. S. Diamond & F.G. Burke. New York 1966.
TNR	Tanganyika notes and records (Dar-es-Salaam)
TWR	Tribes without rulers. Studies in African segmentary systems. Eds. J. Middleton & D. Tait. London 1958.
UJ	Uganda journal. The organ of the Uganda society (Kampala)
WP	World politics (New Haven)
WTRL	Wellcome tropical research laboratories at the Gordon memorial college. Reports (London)
Z	Zamani. A survey of East African history. Nairobi 1968.
ZE	Zeitschrift für Ethnologie (Berlin-Braunschweig)

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